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What exactly does freedom of overflight entail and how is it evolving? What 
is the interaction between the law of the sea and international civil aviation 
law in international airspace? What do these things mean for the operation of 
a State’s aircraft in international airspace adjacent to another State?
This research addresses these, and related, legal questions, through the lens 
of contemporary challenges in the maritime arena. From jurisdiction in air-
space over maritime constructions, to air defence identification zones, and 
the provision of air traffic services in international airspace, it examines 
assertions of coastal State jurisdiction beyond that which is explicitly gran-
ted under international law. ‘Creeping jurisdiction’ as such assertions are 
known, is not a new phenomenon and much has been written on it over the 
years. This research aims to contribute to this body of work by approaching 
the matter exclusively from the perspective of freedom of overflight. What 
is the frontier of freedom of overflight and coastal State jurisdiction in inter-
national airspace?
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This study is part of the 
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Freedom of Overflight
A Study of Coastal State Jurisdiction in International Airspace
“You are fortunate in having before you one of the great lessons of history. 
Some centuries ago, an attempt was made to build great empires based on 
domination of great sea areas. …We do not need to make that mistake again. 
I hope you will not dally with the thought of creating great blocs of closed air, 
thereby tracing in the sky the conditions of future wars. I know you will see 
to it that the air which God gave to everyone shall not become the means of 
domination over anyone.”
Franklin D Roosevelt
The International Civil Aviation Conference, Opening Plenary Session
Chicago, 11 November 1944
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1 Introduction
1.1 Context of research
The concept of ‘creeping jurisdiction’, or the assertion by coastal States of 
‘sovereignty and/or jurisdiction in adjacent waters beyond the rights they 
strictly enjoy under the law of the sea’,1 is not a new phenomenon. On the 
contrary, as Rothwell describes, ‘a common thread throughout world affairs 
over the past 100 years has been a gradual encroachment by coastal states 
over their adjacent maritime domain’.2 There are many instances over this 
period where the practice of coastal States of extending their jurisdiction 
has subsequently been codified in international law: the expansion of the 
territorial sea from 3 nautical miles (nm) to 12nm,3 the drawing of straight 
baselines,4 the extension of exclusive economic jurisdiction over maritime 
resources through the continental shelf5 and the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ),6 and the formal recognition of the concept of archipelagic States.7 
Many of these changes have resulted in large maritime areas falling under 
State sovereignty while others, such as the EEZ and the continental shelf, do 
not expand sovereignty but involve the extension of coastal State jurisdic-
tion and sovereignty rights.8 On this basis, Gavouneli describes the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)9 as:
1 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP 2011) 3. The term ‘creeping 
jurisdiction’ in this context has been traced back to the US Navy in the 1960s (Erik 
Franckx, ‘The 200-Mile Limit: Between Creeping Jurisdiction and Creeping Common 
Heritage – Some Law of the Sea Considerations from Professor Louis Sohn’s Former 
LL.M. Student’ (2007) 39 Geo Wash Int’l L Rev 467, 476-77).  
2 Donald R Rothwell, ‘Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary and 
Anticipated Challenges for Australia and New Zealand’ in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop 
and Donald R Rothwell (eds), Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives 
from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge 2010) 248.
3 See Section 2.2.3.1.
4 See Section 2.2.3.1. 
5 See Section 2.7.4.
6 See Section 2.7.3.
7 See Section 5.4.
8 As discussed in, Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and 
Duties (CUP 2009) 203-14; JA Knauss, ‘Creeping Jurisdiction and Customary International 
Law’ (1985) 15(2) Ocean Dev Int’l L 209, 210. See also, specifi cally in relation to the EEZ 
and the continental shelf, Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Miles 
in the Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice’ (1991) 22 Ocean 
Dev & Int’l L 153.
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 Dec. 1982) 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), entered into force 16 Nov. 1994 (‘UNCLOS’).
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2 Chapter 1
‘…the culmination of the tug-of-war between the sovereignty of the coastal State, 
which atavistically purports to expand its power further and further away from 
land; and the freedom of the high seas, a principle partly created as a reflexion 
of the impossibility to subdue the vast expanse of water for long centuries in 
human history’.10
The tendency of coastal States to assert growing claims over maritime areas 
adjacent to their territory is well-acknowledged,11 including by the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),12 the United Nations (UN) 
agency responsible for managing the ‘administration and governance of 
the Convention on International Civil Aviation’13 (Chicago Convention).14 
Despite this broad acknowledgement, a comprehensive, contemporary 
examination of the impact of assertions of coastal State jurisdiction beyond 
that which is explicitly granted under international law, on overflight 
rights, specifically, was elusive. It is this set of circumstances that led to the 
research that forms the foundation of this study.
The initial impetus to question the application of the law in respect to 
coastal State rights vis-à-vis the right of overflight was the realisation of a 
10 Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Brill Nijhoff 2007) 1. 
11 See further, for example, Stuart Kaye, ‘Maritime Security in the Post-9/11 World: A New 
Creeping Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea?’ in Clive H Schofi eld, Seokwoo Lee and 
Moon-Sang Kwon (eds), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
2013) 347; AMJ Heijmans, ‘Artifi cial Islands and the Law of Nations’ (1974) 21(2) Neth-
erlands International Law Review 139, 148; Jon M Van Dyke, ‘Military Exclusion and 
Warning Zones on the High Seas’ (1991) Marine Policy 147, 155; Alex G Oude Elferink, 
‘Artifi cial Islands, Installations and Structures’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia 2013) 8; Ivan L 
Head, ‘ADIZ, International Law, and Contiguous Airspace’ (1964) 3 Alta L Rev 182, 196.
12 ICAO WP/5-1, Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5: Consideration of the Report of the Rappor-
teur on ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Implications, if any, for the Appli-
cation of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other International Air Law Instruments’, 
Presented at the Legal Committee 26th Session, Montreal (4 February 1987), reproduced 
in (1987) 3 Int’l Org & L Sea: Documentary YB 243, 245. 
 Note: this study is written using UK English but the terms and quotations that are used, 
including articles of treaties and names of organisations, refl ect the diversity of spelling 
and phraseology in the English language. No further signposting will be included where 
the language of a quotation differs from UK English.   
13 ICAO, ‘About ICAO’, available at <www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/default.aspx> 
accessed 12 February 2020.
14 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 7 Dec. 1944) 15 U.N.T.S. 
295, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, entered into force 4 April 1947, as amended by 1175 
U.N.T.S. 297, entered into force Oct. 1998 (‘Chicago Convention’).
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Introduction 3
number of current events reflected in the media15 that involved disputes 
between States over the use of international airspace, that is, airspace 
outside a State’s national airspace.16 These examples demonstrated, at one 
end of the spectrum, disapproval by coastal States over the way in which 
the aircraft of another State operated in international airspace off the first 
State’s coast, such as in the case of northern European States with respect 
to Russian fighter jets in the Baltic.17 At the other end of the scale, the items 
reported on the coastal State prohibiting the aircraft of another State from 
operating in international airspace off the first State’s coast, such as was 
reported in relation to China and the overflight of military aircraft of the 
United States (US) in the South China Sea.18 These reports stimulated an 
interest in the international law framework that applies to overflight rights 
in international airspace. At the very basic level, the aircraft of all States 
enjoy freedom of overflight in international airspace, but what rights this 
entails in practice for the operation of aircraft, is not clear. Furthermore, 
these examples all involved military aircraft, which raised the question of 
whether freedom of overflight applies differently depending on whether 
the aircraft is a State aircraft, on the one hand, or a civil aircraft, on the 
other.19 These questions are necessarily tied to the consideration of legiti-
mate restrictions on the right of overflight, whether from other States exer-
cising their freedoms in the maritime area or the coastal State, in the exercise 
15 Richard Milne, ‘Scandinavians Warn Russia after Air Near-Miss’ (Financial Times, 
15 December 2014), available at <www.ft.com/content/95751ff2-837e-11e4-8a84-
00144feabdc0> accessed 12 June 2015; ‘Report on Occurrences over the High Seas 
Involving Military Aircraft in 2014’ (EASA, 14 April 2015); ‘China and Japan Trade Barbs 
after Close Encounter over South China Sea’ (The Guardian, 25 May 2014), available 
at <www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/china-japan-jets-south-china-sea> 
accessed 28 June 2015; ‘South China Sea: China’s Navy Told US Spy Plane Flying over 
Islands to Leave ‘Eight Times’, CNN Reports’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
22 May 2015), available at <www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-22/us-spy-plane-in-south-
china-sea-warned-to-leave-by-china/6488690?nw=0> accessed 28 June 2015; ‘US Fighter 
Planes Intercept Russian Combat Jets off Alaska, Sweden Protests ‘Violation’’ (Deutsche 
Welle, 20 September 2014), available at <www.dw.com/en/us-fi ghter-planes-intercept-
russian-combat-jets-off-alaska-sweden-protests-violation/a-17936231> accessed 2 May 
2015.
16 See Section 2.2.2.1 for a discussion of what constitutes national airspace in accordance 
with the Chicago Convention, and what subsequently constitutes international airspace. 
See also, Section 2.2.1 (n 83) for discussion of territory that does not fi t into one of these 
categories.
17 This issue will not be addressed further in the context of this research because it did not 
involve claims that the coastal States were permitted to prohibit or restrict the operation 
of the aircraft. 
18 The name ‘South China Sea’ will be used throughout this study as the term most 
commonly used for this maritime area in English. 
19 See Section 2.4 for a detailed discussion on the distinction between civil aircraft and State 
aircraft, and the implication of this for the application of international civil aviation law. 
Throughout this study, the term ‘aircraft’ will be used to refer to both State and civil 
aircraft in those situations where the distinction is not relevant. See also, Section 1.3.1 for 
a discussion of the importance of the distinction to this study.
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 22
4 Chapter 1
of its specific rights and jurisdiction as provided under international law. 
Such concepts are not static and, as will be evident, the development of 
customary international law plays a significant role in shaping the answers 
to these questions. 
1.2 Scope of the study
1.2.1 Central research question
The central research question of this study is: What jurisdiction does a 
coastal State have over the operation of the aircraft registered in other States 
in international airspace adjacent to its coast?
Freedom of overflight, like the freedom of the high seas in general, is a 
fluid concept. Whilst being a foundational principle of the law of the sea, 
it is broad and difficult to define. O’Connell, discussing the difficulty of 
defining the legal characterisation of the high seas as a concept itself, argues 
that, in the vagueness of the freedoms it is the practice of States that gives 
meaning to them: ‘[a]t any particular moment the concept of the high seas 
will embody a balance achieved by State practice between the freedom of 
the seas and national jurisdiction’.20 As he explains, it is determining this 
balance at a given time that allows for an understanding of the scope of 
each. In this sense, this proposition is not an answer to what the scope of 
the freedom is, or consequently, what the rights of the coastal State are, but 
rather a methodology for confronting the question.21 It is this approach 
that has been taken to this research. Freedom of overflight is in large part 
uncontroversial: an international network of civil aircraft makes use of the 
ocean space every day, as do State aircraft engaged in transport and military 
exercises and, considering the volume of traffic, disputes are relatively few. 
The events in the media, referred to above, though, and subsequent research 
on freedom of overflight and the exercise of coastal State jurisdiction in 
international airspace, revealed three key aspects of coastal State jurisdic-
tion in international airspace where this balance with freedom of overflight 
is currently unclear.
First, China’s opposition to US aircraft flying in international airspace 
in the South China Sea over its artificial islands, a matter that is ongoing 
but which gained prominence in 2015, instigated research into whether 
safety zones over artificial islands, installations and structures – termed 
‘maritime constructions’ in the context of this research – could be legiti-
mately imposed in the airspace above the construction in addition to on 
20 DP O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea – Vol II (OUP 1982) 796.
21 ibid.
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the surface of the sea around them.22 UNCLOS expressly provides that a 
coastal State, in its EEZ and on its continental shelf, has the right to establish 
safety zones around its maritime constructions,23 but is silent on whether 
they can extend to the airspace above the constructions. The facts of this 
case are used as a basis from which to examine the law in this area from 
a hypothetical perspective: China did not attempt to restrict overflight on 
the basis of safety zones. The artificial islands at the centre of the overflight 
dispute between China and the US are a useful starting point from which to 
analyse the law on safety zones because their legal status was addressed in 
the 2016 decision, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines 
v. China) (‘South China Sea Arbitration’).24 The decision provided clarity on 
whether human modification of a maritime feature could change the status 
of that feature, and thus, the nature of the rights associated with it. As will 
be further discussed in Section 1.3.2, this helps to inform when safety zones 
apply around maritime constructions. The examination of the legitimacy of 
extending these safety zones to the airspace follows on from this.
Secondly, the Gulf States’ ban on Qatari-registered aircraft from interna-
tional airspace within their flight information regions (FIRs),25 introduced 
in 2017, led to the question of what in international civil aviation law, if 
anything, prohibits a State from discriminating against the aircraft of 
another State in this airspace. As will be addressed in Chapter 2,26 freedom 
of overflight is understood to provide all States with the right to use 
international airspace, consistently with international law, and therefore 
as prohibiting any State from precluding the aircraft of another State from 
operating in the airspace. It is presumably on this basis that flights through 
the portions of international airspace were quickly reinstated in the case of 
the Gulf States’ ban.27 International civil aviation law, on the other hand, 
despite providing the legal basis governing the coastal State’s responsibility 
in international airspace within an FIR, provides no express non-discrimi-
nation principle in relation to this responsibility in terms of its application 
to international airspace.
Thirdly, the adoption by China of its air defence identification zone 
(ADIZ) in 2013 resulted in opposition from other States based on a number 
of features of the ADIZ, despite similar procedures for ADIZs imposed 
by other States.28 ADIZs have no foundation in codified international law 
and serve as an example of the possible dynamic nature of freedom of 
overflight, on the basis they were to be deemed legitimate. If ADIZs are 
22 This study does not consider overfl ight over the number of natural islands in the South 
China Sea beyond the general discussion on the law applying to overfl ight in national 
airspace.
23 UNCLOS, Article 60(4).
24 P.C.A. Case No 2013-19, 12 July 2016.
25 See Section 4.2.1.1 for the defi nition of FIR.
26 See specifi cally, Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.3.2. 
27 See Section 4.2.2.2.
28 See Section 4.3.1.
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accepted as customary international law, they represent a significant shift 
in the international community’s acceptance of coastal State jurisdiction in 
international airspace. The legality of ADIZ has been debated for decades 
and this study does not aim to revisit and examine each ground of justifica-
tion. Instead, the purpose here is to consider the legality of ADIZ in light 
of the most prominent justifications that represent potentially significant 
diversions in the understanding of States of freedom of overflight moving 
forward.
This study approaches its central research question from the perspective 
of these three matters, as the areas in the law that have been identified as 
involving ambiguity in respect to the balance between coastal State jurisdic-
tion and freedom of overflight. The study also, briefly, considers coastal 
State jurisdiction in international straits and archipelagic sea lanes as mari-
time areas which, whilst constituting national airspace, involve aspects of 
regulation more akin to international airspace. As mentioned at the begin-
ning of this chapter, coastal States have demonstrated a tendency to assert 
jurisdiction over increasingly greater maritime areas adjacent to their coasts. 
The three cases of expanding coastal State jurisdiction identified above, 
which form the basis of this study, each demonstrate how this ‘creeping 
jurisdiction’ encroaches upon the rights of other States and specifically, in 
these cases, on freedom of overflight.
On a final, terminological note, jurisdiction in this study is used in 
the context of both prescriptive jurisdiction, or the capacity of the State to 
make law, and enforcement jurisdiction, the capacity of the State to ensure 
compliance with the law.29 The terms ‘jurisfaction’ and ‘jurisaction’, coined 
by Cheng, are commonly used in air and space law.30 The term ‘jurisaction’ 
is broader than the concept of enforcement jurisdiction though and refers 
to the ability of the State ‘to exercise the functions of a State’ as a whole; it 
encompasses the ‘State’s power in international law to set up machinery 
to make, implement and enforce, and physically to make, implement and 
enforce its laws, judicial pronouncements and other legally binding deci-
sions’.31 This study will use the more widely employed terms ‘prescriptive’ 
and ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction.
 1.2.2 Aims and objectives of the study
Fragmentation of the law in this area has led to consideration of matters 
impacting overflight in international airspace from the perspective of 
international civil aviation law or the law of the sea, but rarely through a 
combined lens. With a focus on these two areas of law, and with consider-
29 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 645-46.
30 Bin Cheng, ‘Crimes on Board Aircraft’ (1959) 12 Current Legal Problems 177, 177-202.
31 Bin Cheng, ‘International Responsibility and Liability for Launch Activities’ (1995) 20(6) 
A&SL 297, 301. See also, Bin Cheng, ‘The Extra-Territorial Application of International 
Law’ (1965) 18 Current Legal Problems 132, 136.
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ation to their place in public international law more broadly, the objective of 
this study is to present a comprehensive analysis of the legality of contem-
porary attempts by coastal States to exercise jurisdiction in international 
airspace adjacent to their coasts over aircraft registered in other States in 
cases where the legal basis for the exercise of that jurisdiction is ambiguous. 
In doing so, the study aims to determine the contemporary understanding 
of what freedom of overflight entails by establishing the legitimate limi-
tations to it. As set out in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2006 
report on the fragmentation of international law,
‘[a]ny technical rule that purports to ‘develop’ the freedom of the high seas is 
also a limitation of that freedom to the extent that it lays down specific condi-
tions and institutional modalities that must be met in its exercise’.32
Through its examination of specific instances of coastal State limitations to 
overflight, it is hoped that this study will also be able to serve as a basis 
from which to examine the actions of other States engaged in similar prac-
tices in future in an attempt to provide greater legal certainty regarding the 
right of overflight and of coastal State actions in respect to overflight, in 
international airspace.
The extension of coastal State jurisdiction is often underpinned by 
political motives. Where a group of States – in this case, coastal States – 
have an incentive to act in a concerted manner for their own benefit, and 
to the disadvantage of other States – States whose rights and freedoms are 
consequently curtailed – the actions must be closely scrutinised under inter-
national law. This study will consider whether the exercise of coastal State 
jurisdiction it examines is consistent with international law and, in instances 
where this is not found to be the case, whether the law seems likely to 
develop to support the specific extensions of coastal State jurisdiction.
Although this study is approached from the perspective of overflight, its 
relevance extends beyond aircraft. In particular, the legal issues discussed 
in the context of Chapter 3 are not restricted to maritime areas but also have 
consequences for the development of the legal framework governing activi-
ties in outer space: the US recently proposed the establishment of safety 
zones around areas of space activity as part of its Artemis programme, 
which restricts the ability of other space actors to operate in the vicinity 
32 ‘Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi culties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, finalised by Martti 
Koskenniemi (ILC 58th Session, 13 April 2006) 22.
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of the activity.33 This situation raises similar questions on conflicting rights 
to those that arise in relation to safety zones around maritime construc-
tions. Chapter 3 is also relevant to the development of space activities in 
respect to the launch of rockets from mobile maritime platforms, that is, 
from maritime constructions. These platforms have the advantage of being 
able to be positioned in equatorial areas which enables more efficient access 
to the geostationary orbit,34 and they also minimise the risk to third parties 
on the ground associated with land launches.35 The first orbital-class rocket 
was launched from an ocean platform in 1999.36 China recently launched its 
first rocket from a maritime platform37 and SpaceX has announced plans to 
move away from land-based launches in favour of launches from maritime 
platforms.38 In this sense, the analysis in this study is more far-reaching than 
the specific instances that it addresses. 
1.3 Structure of the analysis
1.3.1 Part I
The first part of this study consists of one chapter – Chapter 2 – which 
serves as a preliminary chapter: it provides the legal framework for the 
analysis that forms the remainder of the study. The two key treaties that are 
33 Leonard David, ‘NASA Proposes New Rules for Moon-Focused Space Rules’ (Scien-
tific American, 21 May 2020), available at <www.scientificamerican.com/article/
nasa-proposes-new-rules-for-moon-focused-space-race/> accessed 3 June 2020; Joey 
Roulette, ‘Trump Administration Drafting ‘Artemis Accords’ Pact for Moon Mining’ 
(Reuters, 5 May 2020), available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-space-exploration-
moon-mining-exclusi/exclusive-trump-administration-drafting-artemis-accords-pact-
for-moon-mining-sources-idUSKBN22H2SB> accessed 3 June 2020.
34 This is the ideal orbit for communication and meteorological satellites because it enables 
them to maintain their position relative to the Earth’s surface (NASA Science, ‘Basics of 
Spacefl ight: Planetary Orbits’, available at <solarsystem.nasa.gov/basics/chapter5-1/> 
accessed 3 June 2020). 
35 See, respectively, Louis de Gouyon Matignon, ‘Sea Launch and Launching States’ (Space 
Legal Issues, 19 June 2019), available at <www.spacelegalissues.com/sea-launch-and-
launching-states/> accessed 23 June 2020; Dave Mosher, ‘Elon Musk: ‘SpaceX is Building 
Floating, Superheavy-Class Spaceports’ for its Starship rocket to reach the moon, Mars, 
and Fly Passengers around Earth’ (Business Insider, 17 June 2020), available at <www.
businessinsider.nl/elon-musk-spacex-starship-ocean-spaceports-offshore-engineer-job-
posting-2020-6?international=true&r=US> accessed 23 June 2020.
36 Jeff Foust, ‘Sea Launch ‘Frozen’ after Ships Moved to Russia’ (Space News, 24 April 2020), 
available at <spacenews.com/sea-launch-frozen-after-ships-moved-to-russia/> accessed 
3 June 2020; de Gouyon Matignon (n 35).
37 Rui C Barbosa, ‘China Conducts First Sea Launch Mission with Long March 11 Launch 
of Seven Satellites’ (NASASpacefl ight.com, 5 June 2019), available at <www.nasaspace-
fl ight.com/2019/06/china-fi rst-sea-launch-long-march-11-seven-satellites/> accessed 3 
June 2020.
38 Mosher (n 35).
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involved in the study39 are the Chicago Convention and UNCLOS. Chapter 
2 describes the concept of the right of overflight which, in the context of 
international civil aviation law, refers to the privilege granted to a State 
for its aircraft to operate across the territory of the State making the grant, 
without landing, on a scheduled air service or non-scheduled flight.40 Over 
international airspace, in contrast, the right of overflight has its basis in the 
customary international law principle of freedom of overflight, as codified 
under Article 87(1)(b) UNCLOS, and all States, coastal or landlocked enjoy 
this freedom. The freedom also applies in the EEZ.41
Chapter 2 is divided into two main parts. The first establishes the 
regime for overflight over sovereign territory. This is further divided into 
two key parts, as dictated by the legal framework that applies to them: 
civil aircraft, which fall within the scope of the Chicago Convention and 
its annexes, and State aircraft, which fall outside its scope. The distinction 
between these two groups of aircraft is not unambiguous, but the Chicago 
Convention provides that aircraft used in police, military and customs are 
considered to be State aircraft.42 The chapter will address the right of over-
flight in respect to, in turn, civil aircraft and State aircraft.43
The second part of Chapter 2 sets out the various maritime areas that are 
recognised under UNCLOS with implications for overflight. It establishes 
the legal foundation and fundamental rights associated with these areas, as 
a basis for the chapters to follow. In doing so, this part also introduces the 
interaction between international civil aviation law and UNCLOS, which 
sits at the heart of the study. Whilst freedom of overflight exists in interna-
tional airspace, it does not mean that overflight is unregulated. In contrast, 
the regulation of overflight is necessary to ensure the safety of the aircraft 
to which the regulation applies, the safety and security of other users of the 
maritime area, including other aircraft, and to ensure the coastal State is 
able to exercise its rights in the area.44 Freedom of overflight applies to both 
State and civil aircraft and so this part does not distinguish between the 
39 See, Appendix to Chapter 1: List with basic data on the principal treaties, for a list of the 
core treaties applied in this study and principal information about them as relevant to 
this research.
40 Scheduled services and non-scheduled fl ights are discussed in Section 2.3.3.
41 UNCLOS, Article 58(1). See Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.3.2 for further discussion on the legal 
basis of freedom overfl ight and, in the latter section, for the implications of the EEZ for 
the application of international civil aviation law. 
42 See Section 2.4.2.
43 This research does not address non-State actors, which fall outside the legal framework 
of the Chicago Convention and UNCLOS.
44 See, for instance, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja Aalberts, ‘Search and Rescue as 
a Geopolitics of International Law’ in Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tanja Aalberts 
(eds), The Changing Practices of International Law (CUP 2018) 190: ‘…despite its name, 
the Mare Liberum is hardly a space devoid of regulation. The law of the sea imposes a 
complex set of norms on the maritime environment, charting out a web of intersecting 
rights and obligations for both states and private actors’.
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two. At the same time however, State aircraft are, in general,45 not subject 
to the rules in the annexes to the Chicago Convention that apply over the 
high seas that are discussed in this part, given that they fall outside the 
scope of the Convention. Leaving aside the applicable international law, the 
distinction between State and civil aircraft is relevant to this study because, 
as indicated above,46 the instances of coastal State interference with over-
flight in international airspace predominantly involve State aircraft being 
targeted. There are a couple of main reasons for this, taking into account 
both the intention of the coastal State and of the State of registration of the 
aircraft operating in the international airspace. As to the former, attempts 
to extend coastal State jurisdiction to regulate overflight tend to be for the 
purpose of, at least explicitly, protecting national security and State aircraft, 
specifically military aircraft, pose the greatest threat in this respect. This is 
particularly relevant to the second part of Chapter 4, addressing ADIZs.
States also assert jurisdiction beyond their national airspace to support 
territorial claims. The legitimacy of these territorial claims will not be 
explored in this study but it is mentioned here to demonstrate the complex 
and often political undercurrent of the coastal State actions that will be 
addressed. This is not to disregard other coastal State intentions, which will 
be addressed throughout the study. Importantly for Chapter 3, a State may 
attempt to impose restrictions or prohibitions on overflight, particularly at 
lower altitudes, in order to protect the safety of its maritime constructions. 
As will be seen in Chapter 4, a coastal State responsible for international 
airspace within its FIR will also make decisions affecting the movement 
of aircraft registered in other States to ensure the safety and efficiency of 
operations in that airspace.
1.3.2 Part II
The second part of the study comprises three chapters – Chapters 3 to 5 – 
which form the central analysis.
Chapter 3 considers the question of whether safety zones may be 
established in the airspace over maritime constructions in the EEZ and on 
the continental shelf. Safety zones are well accepted in the law of the sea 
as mechanisms for the protection of maritime constructions. This chapter 
begins by establishing the legal framework under UNCLOS applying to 
safety zones in a State’s EEZ or on its continental shelf, including the defi-
nitions and uses of the maritime constructions to which they are relevant. 
Safety zones are strictly regulated under UNCLOS, including the limitation 
of their breadth to no more than 500 metres from the construction, unless 
otherwise permitted. There is no express provision allowing the State to 
establish them in the airspace. In establishing the maritime constructions to 
45 See Section 2.4.3 for details of this qualifi cation, and also Section 4.3.5, specifi cally in 
respect to interception of civil aircraft.
46 See Section 1.1.
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which safety zones apply, the chapter addresses the South China Sea Arbitra-
tion. In this case, the Arbitral Tribunal established in accordance with Annex 
VII UNCLOS and serviced by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), 
henceforth referred to in respect to this case as ‘the Tribunal’, confirmed 
the legal status of the relevant artificial islands constructed using natural 
maritime features, hence clarifying the constructions to which the question 
of safety zones is relevant.
The chapter then proceeds to interpret the provisions of UNCLOS 
applying to safety zones in light of their drafting history and in consider-
ation of both State practice and academic opinion, to ascertain the scope of 
the provisions. The chapter addresses whether the extension of safety zones 
to the airspace above maritime constructions may be justified using existing 
provisions regarding air traffic management (ATM) under international civil 
aviation law and whether, this not being the case, coastal State jurisdiction 
in the airspace could amount to an unjustified interference with freedom 
of overflight. Regardless of its consistency with existing international law, 
the right to do so may develop as customary international law. In this case, 
the extension of safety zones to the airspace above maritime constructions 
may exist in parallel with the safety zone provisions under UNCLOS or 
may reflect the States’ interpretation of the UNCLOS provisions; each of 
these circumstances is explored. There has been considerable discussion in 
the past on the jurisdiction over airspace above artificial islands facilitating 
aircraft operations. Without revisiting this analysis in detail, this chapter 
briefly examines its consistency with the analysis in the previous sections 
of the chapter.
Finally, this chapter addresses the extension of coastal jurisdiction over 
international airspace on the basis of human modification in the context of 
land fortification and reclamation. In doing so, it considers the distinction in 
the law between human modification amounting to a maritime construction 
– with its corresponding safety zone – and human modification amounting 
to an extension of a State’s coastline and therefore, possibly, of the State’s 
national airspace. Whilst maritime constructions do not generate maritime 
zones, state practice indicates that land reclamation leads to a change in 
the delimitation of the territorial sea and thus, may have implications for 
the delimitation of national and international airspace. These questions are 
particularly relevant given rising sea levels. This section is briefly discussed 
as it does not form part of the central analysis but rather, complements it 
by demonstrating that human modification does have the capacity to shift 
airspace boundaries.
Chapter 4 examines, in two parts, FIRs and ADIZs. In particular, it con -
siders whether a State is, under international civil aviation law, prohibited 
from discriminating in the provision of air traffic services (ATS) in inter-
national airspace and, secondly, whether ADIZs are consistent with inter-
national law. The first part of the chapter, addressing FIRs, establishes the 
legal framework governing the provision of ATS in international airspace, 
which is the purpose for which airspace is divided into FIRs. In doing so, 
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it defines the legal characteristics of an FIR and the scope of responsibility 
of the coastal State within its boundaries. The chapter then sets out the 
relevant facts of the case involving the Gulf States’ prohibition of Qatari-
registered aircraft in their FIRs, as a foundation for the examination of a 
possible implied principle of non-discrimination in the provision of ATS in 
international airspace, which the chapter subsequently turns to examine. 
In the absence of an express principle of non-discrimination in Annex 11, 
as the foundation for FIR responsibility, it takes a step back to consider its 
context within international civil aviation law more broadly, in particular 
considering the application and purpose of the principle of non-discrimina-
tion under the Chicago Convention to aspects of air navigation in national 
airspace. This first part of the chapter ultimately questions whether, on 
the basis of the explicit application of the principle in the regulation of air 
navigation aspects in national airspace, it can be argued that the principle is 
implied in the rules governing FIR responsibility in international airspace.
The second part of Chapter 4, addressing the legality of ADIZs, consists 
of three main elements. The first introduces ADIZs, providing a brief over-
view of their development and of the most common procedures associated 
with them. The second examines a number of legal bases that are used to 
justify ADIZs. These bases have been chosen both for their prominence 
in ADIZ discourse and their potentially significant impact on the balance 
between coastal State jurisdiction and freedom of overflight beyond ADIZs 
in the case that they were to be accepted as a legitimate legal basis for 
ADIZs. This part of the chapter also considers whether the right to establish 
ADIZ may have developed into customary international law. Up until this 
point, the chapter considers the legality of ADIZs in terms of whether States 
are able to rely on a legal basis under international law for their exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction in establishing the zones. The chapter here under-
goes a shift, examining whether, in light of The Case of S.S. Lotus (France v. 
Turkey) (‘Lotus Case’),47 the question is rather whether States are prohibited 
under international law from establishing ADIZs. The enforcement of ADIZ 
procedures within international airspace is dealt with separately on the 
basis of extra-territorial enforcement jurisdiction unequivocally requiring a 
permissive rule in international law.
Chapter 5 complements the previous chapters in addressing, in turn, 
transit passage through international straits and archipelagic sea lanes 
passage. The application of both of these passage regimes under UNCLOS 
results in conflicting views between, on the one hand, the coastal States to 
whose national airspace the passage applies and, on the other, the airspace 
users passing through the lanes. This chapter will examine the inconsistent 
application of the regimes, both on the basis of reservations by States to the 
provisions under UNCLOS or as a result of ambiguity in the law, in the case 
of archipelagic sea lanes passage.
47 (1927) P.C.I.J. Series A, no. 10.
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Chapter 6 reflects on the previous chapters of the study in light of the 
central research question and brings the different elements of the study 
together to provide the resulting conclusions and recommendations.
 1.4 Methodology
This study involves classic doctrinal research. It is the result of normative 
analysis of the Chicago Convention and its annexes, and UNCLOS, together 
with public international law more broadly as the body of law within which 
these conventions function. It takes a positivist and, to a certain extent, 
formalist, approach to international law.
The interaction between UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention is 
unusual in that it results naturally on the basis of the two bodies of law 
governing the same physical space – maritime airspace – but there was little 
cross-input from the perspective of air law in the process of the codification 
of UNCLOS. Whilst ICAO was present at the Third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea between 1973 and 1982, at which UNCLOS was adopted, it 
did not contribute to the process:
‘during the more than nine years of deliberations at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, ICAO has not formulated or addressed to the 
Conference any specific policy with respect to international civil aviation to be 
taken into account in the drafting of a new convention’.48
At first this seems curious considering the importance of maritime areas to 
international civil aviation. Beyond the principle of freedom of overflight 
though, UNCLOS provides very few explicit provisions related to aviation. 
It is perhaps on this basis that the ICAO representatives were removed from 
the negotiations, in that the direct subject matter was largely outside the 
scope of their competence.49 As will be seen in Chapter 3, at least one State 
representative involved in the law of the sea conferences likewise, and for 
the same reason, demonstrated a reluctance to engage in negotiations for 
provisions governing aviation.50 Together, the two conventions govern 
the same physical space but there are many aspects of governance that 
have developed, and continued to develop, externally to the conventions, 
whether through the annexes to the Chicago Convention, or State practice 
interpreting the conventions or otherwise contributing to the law governing 
48 ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5 (n 12) 244.
49 As will be addressed in Chapter 5, provisions regarding overfl ight in the archipelagic sea 
lanes regime are designed primarily for State aircraft, which are outside the scope of the 
Chicago Convention and so, even in this case where aviation is directly affected, it is not 
within the scope of ICAO’s competence.
50 See Section 3.3.1.
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international airspace. In any case, it is with this in mind that these conven-
tions are considered.
In terms of the approach to treaty interpretation taken in this study, 
it follows the customary international rules51 set out in Articles 31 and 32 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties52 which the ILC clarifies, 
‘must be read together as they constitute an integrated framework for the 
interpretation of treaties’.53 Article 31, which provides the ‘general rule of 
interpretation’ requires a treaty to be ‘…interpreted in good faith in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.54 Article 32 allows 
for the consideration of ‘supplementary means of interpretation’, in the 
case that the meaning resulting from the interpretation under Article 31 
is ‘ambiguous or obscure’ or ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.55 These 
supplementary means, as indicated under Article 32, frequently involve 
recourse to the drafting materials of the treaty, commonly referred to as the 
travaux préparatoires. The purpose of Article 32 is restricted to circumstances 
where clarification of the meaning of the terms is required beyond the 
application of the rules under Article 31; it is well accepted that ‘there is no 
occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the text of a convention is 
sufficiently clear’.56
There are three broad approaches generally recognised to treaty inter-
pretation: textual or objective, purposive or teleological, and subjective or 
intention-based.57 Article 31 itself prioritises a literal interpretation, with 
‘the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty’ as the starting 
point for interpretation.58 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the 
primary judicial body of the UN, has also made clear through its judgments 
51 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1991 (Nov. 
12), p. 53, p. 70 para. 48; G.A. Res. 202, U.N. GAOR, 73rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, vol. 1, at 
1118, U.N. Doc. A/73/202 (vol. 1) (2018) 1119; Panos Merkouris, ‘Introduction: Interpreta-
tion is a Science, is an Art, is a Science’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos 
Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 
Years On (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 5.
52 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
entered into force 27 Jan. 1980 (‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’).
53 YILC (2013) Vol. II, Part 2, 18. 
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1).
55 ibid Article 32(a) and (b).
56 The Case of S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927) P.C.I.J. Series A, no. 10, p.16.
57 YILC (1966) Vol. II, 218. See also, GG Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the Inter-
national Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points’ (1951) 
28 Brit YB Int’l L 1, 1; Irina Buga, Modifi cation of Treaties by Subsequent Practice (OUP 2018) 
80-81.
58 Jean-Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré Eveno, ‘Article 31 Convention of 1969’ in Olivier Corten 
and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Vol I) 
(OUP 2011) 829.
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that treaty interpretation is based on the primacy of the text of the treaty.59 
In practice, the methods of interpretation are not distinct though: the literal 
and teleological approaches are means of establishing the intention of the 
drafters at the time of the treaty’s conclusion60 and, as set out in Article 
31(1), the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty are to be considered in 
light of the object and purpose of the treaty, necessarily requiring reliance 
on the teleological approach in undertaking a textual approach. The general 
rule of interpretation is not a checklist,61 but is rather formed of a number 
of aspects to be taken into account, as determined by the circumstances, 
resulting in an holistic – or integrated – approach to the interpretation of the 
terms, reiterating the statement of the ILC, above.62 In this sense, Article 31 
has been described as ‘a true example of compromise’: ‘[t]he objective is to 
find an interpretation that is simultaneously obvious (the ordinary meaning 
of the terms), logical (an acte clair), and effective (a useful effect)’.63 The 
pursuit of these objectives through an integrated application of Article 31 is 
echoed by Gardiner, who emphasises the danger of focusing too much on a 
particular method of interpretation at the expense of applying the rules as 
set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.64
This study favours an holistic approach to treaty interpretation in 
that it gives primacy to the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty to 
the extent that they are taken as the starting point for interpretation but, 
consistent with the rules of interpretation under Article 31, and Article 32 
where necessary, it determines the meaning of the text in consideration of 
its place within the treaty more broadly, as well as in consideration of the 
other sources relevant to its interpretation, as applicable, including through 
the use of systemic integration.65
59 Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 31 General Rule of Interpretation’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten 
Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2nd edn, 
Springer 2018) 580, with reference to, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Jamahiriya/Chad), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Rep. 1994 (Feb. 3), p. 6, p. 22 para. 41; and, Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia 
and Montenegro v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2004 (Dec. 15), p. 279, p. 318 para. 100; 
See also, Buga (n 57) 80: ‘…the textual or objective method, which emphasizes the literal 
meaning of the text, rooted in Article 31(1) VCLT, … is favoured by the ICJ’; Sorel and 
Boré Eveno (n 58) 829: ‘In conformity with its line of conduct privileging textual interpre-
tation, the ICJ has accorded minimal space for the intention of the parties’.
60 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 9.
61 ibid 157 and 10, respectively.
62 In other words, Article 31(1) consists of ‘three separate principles… for a single combined 
operation taking account of all named elements simultaneoulsy’ (Dörr, ‘Article 31 
General Rule of Interpretation’ (n 59) 580).
63 Sorel and Boré Eveno (n 58) 808.
64 Gardiner (n 60) 9.
65 For the defi nition of systemic integration and for a more detailed description of how it 
relates to this study, see 2.2.2.1.
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1.5 Appendix to Chapter 1
List with basic data on the principal treaties
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 Dec. 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 
I.L.M. 1261 (1982), entered into force 16 Nov. 1994 (‘UNCLOS’)
Number of parties: 167 States and the European Union
Provisions reflecting customary international law that are central to this research: the 12nm breadth of 
the territorial sea under Article 3 and freedom of overflight under Articles 87(1)(b) and 58(1) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969) 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force 
27 Jan. 1980 (‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’)
Number of parties: 116 States
Provisions reflecting customary international law that are central to this research: the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda under Article 26, the general rule of interpretation under Article 31 and 
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32
Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 Jun. 1945) 1 U.N.T.S. 16, entered into force 24 Oct. 
1945 (‘UN Charter’)
Number of parties: 193 States
Provisions reflecting customary international law that are central to this research: the prohibition on the 
use of force under Article 2(4) and the right of self-defence under Article 51
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 7 Dec. 1944) 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 61 Stat. 
1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, entered into force 4 April 1947, as amended by 1175 U.N.T.S. 297, entered into force 
Oct. 1998 (‘Chicago Convention’)
Number of parties: 193 States
Provisions reflecting customary international law that are central to this research: Article 1 recognising 
a State’s sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and, linked to this, Article 2 recognising 
that the territory of a State includes the land areas and territorial waters under its sovereignty
International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 7 Dec. 1944) 84 U.N.T.S. 389, entered into force 
30 Jan. 1945 (‘Transit Agreement’)
Number of parties: 133 States
Provisions reflecting customary international law that are central to this research: None
Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris, 13 Oct. 1919) 11 L.N.T.S. 173, 
entered into force 31 May 1920 (‘Paris Convention’)
Number of parties: 33 States at the time of the signing of the Chicago Convention 
NB: This convention was superseded by the Chicago Convention 
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2 The international legal framework
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the international legal framework that forms the basis 
of the analysis in the following chapters of this research. It examines the 
development of the relevant laws and the interaction between international 
civil aviation law and the law of the sea, and of these two bodies of law 
within public international law more broadly insofar as it is relevant to 
overflight. In introducing and examining the application of the relevant 
law, this chapter also confirms the scope of the research, complementing 
Chapter 1 in this role.
The chapter will first outline the relationship between territory and 
sovereignty in international civil aviation law. In doing so, it will examine 
the development of the relationship between sovereignty and overflight 
rights, from the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 
(1919) (Paris Convention)66 to the Chicago Convention (Section 2.2.2), as 
well as the delimitation of territory for the purpose of defining the scope 
of a State’s sovereignty, both in terms of its vertical and horizontal limits 
(Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4).
Section 2.3 will then set out the legal framework governing the exchange 
of overflight rights between States in their national airspace. In international 
civil aviation law, the right of overflight is the right or privilege granted to 
a State for its aircraft to operate across the territory of the State making the 
grant, without landing, on a scheduled air service or non-scheduled flight.67 
The legal basis for overflight rights in national airspace differs depending 
on whether the flight is part of a scheduled service or is non-scheduled, 
whether the aircraft is manned or unmanned, and whether it is a State 
aircraft or a civil aircraft.
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention is the natural starting point in 
establishing the legal framework for the exchange of overflight rights in 
sovereign territory: it is pursuant to this provision that the exchange of 
these rights is made separately amongst States for scheduled international 
services. Most States exchange such rights through the International 
Air Services Transit Agreement (1944) (Transit Agreement),68 which was 
adopted at the same time as the Chicago Convention and which regulates 
66 Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris, 13 Oct. 1919) 11 
L.N.T.S. 173, entered into force 31 May 1920 (‘Paris Convention’).
67 Scheduled services and non-scheduled fl ights are discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
68 International Air Services Transit Agreement (Chicago, 7 Dec. 1944) 84 U.N.T.S. 389, 
entered into force 30 Jan. 1945 (‘Transit Agreement’).
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the multilateral exchange of the right of overflight and of technical stop-
overs. A great majority of flights falling under the Chicago Convention 
today are scheduled services conducted by manned aircraft and while 
non-scheduled flights have decreased in significance in recent decades,69 
unmanned aircraft, or pilotless aircraft as they are referred to in the Conven-
tion, are taking on an ever greater role in international civil aviation. This 
section of the chapter will address the distinction between scheduled 
services and non-scheduled flights, recognising the exchange of transit 
and traffic rights for non-scheduled flights under Article 5 of the Chicago 
Convention. It will then explain why, in accordance with Article 8, there 
is a necessity for the exchange of overflight rights to be made separately 
amongst States for pilotless aircraft, regardless of whether the flight is 
scheduled or non-scheduled.
As a terminological side note, Article 96(a) of the Chicago Convention 
defines ‘air services’ as ‘any scheduled service performed by aircraft for the 
public transport of passengers, mail or cargo’. For this reason, the term 
‘services’ will be used throughout this study to encompass both scheduled 
and non-scheduled services while the term ‘air services’ will be restricted 
to scheduled services. Further to this, non-scheduled flights include both 
commercial and non-commercial flights. In this respect, the term ‘non-
scheduled flight’ will be used to refer to non-scheduled flights generally, 
while the term ‘services’ will only be used in relation to non-scheduled 
flights when referring specifically to those that are commercial.
Section 2.4, still focusing on national airspace, will examine the grant 
of overflight rights in relation to the operation of State aircraft, which falls 
outside the scope of international civil aviation law. This part will begin 
by outlining the development of the distinction between civil aircraft and 
State aircraft, from the Paris Convention to the Chicago Convention, and 
then consider in more detail the definition under Article 3(b) of the Chicago 
Convention. Overflight rights over sovereign territory for State aircraft are 
generally negotiated bilaterally at a diplomatic level for individual flights.70 
69 Section 2.3.3.  
70 See for example, US Department of State, ‘Diplomatic Aircraft Clearance Procedures for 
Foreign State Aircraft to Operate in United States National Airspace’, available at <www.
state.gov/diplomatic-aircraft-clearance-procedures-for-foreign-state-aircraft-to-operate-
in-united-states-national-airspace/> accessed 1 August 2020; Australian Government, 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Diplomatic Clearances: Aircraft and Ships’, 
available at <dfat.gov.au/about-us/foreign-embassies/protocol/Pages/diplomatic-
clearances-aircraft-and-ships> accessed 5 January 2019; Government of Canada, ‘Global 
Affairs Canada: State, Military or Scientific Overflight Authorization’, available at 
<www.international.gc.ca/protocol-protocole/policies-politiques/overfl ight_clearance-
autorisation_survol.aspx?lang=eng> accessed 1 August 2020; Switzerland, Federal Offi ce 
for Civil Aviation (FOCA), ‘Diplomatic Clearances’, available at <www.bazl.admin.ch/
diplomaticclearances> accessed 1 August 2020. See Section 2.4.4 for further discussion on 
diplomatic clearances.
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In international airspace there is no distinction made between State aircraft 
and civil aircraft for the purpose of freedom of overflight. The distinction is 
relevant though because, as will be seen throughout this research, coastal 
State actions in attempting to restrict freedom of overflight are predomi-
nantly focused on State aircraft and, more accurately, on military aircraft.
Section 2.6 will address a State’s right to revoke or suspend overflight 
flights in its territory and to establish prohibited or restricted areas, as well 
as danger areas, which may be established in national and international 
airspace. It will also examine whether a State may, in certain circumstances, 
have an obligation to close its airspace. Finally, this section will consider the 
closure of national airspace through legal mechanisms outside international 
civil aviation law, including by way of a UN Security Council resolution 
and in the form of a countermeasure.
Section 2.7 sets out the foundation of freedom of overflight in interna-
tional airspace, which is expressly provided under UNCLOS and which 
flows from the freedom of the high seas. With reference to Chapter 1, 
freedom of the high seas means that no State can claim sovereignty over any 
part of those seas and that all States have the right to enjoy them, including 
freedom of navigation and the related freedom of overflight.71 The seas are 
however, at the same time, ‘an object of the law of nations’, a state without 
which ‘the consequence would be a condition of lawlessness and anarchy 
on the open sea’.72 Accordingly, whilst freedom of overflight means that no 
grant of overflight is required to operate in international airspace, it does 
not correspond to the operation of aircraft through international airspace 
without regulation. This part will establish the limited application of 
international civil aviation law to international airspace through Article 12 
of the Chicago Convention and the related annexes. Annex 11, governing 
air traffic services (ATS), will be examined in further detail in Chapter 4 in 
relation to the rights of a coastal State in its FIR.73 This section furthermore 
introduces the EEZ, the continental shelf and the contiguous zone, all zones 
recognised under UNCLOS which are located in international waters and 
therefore over which freedom of overflight exists. Each of these zones grants 
certain rights to the coastal State. These rights will be outlined in this part as 
a basis for the chapters to follow which will critically assess the interaction 
between the rights of the coastal State and the right to freedom of overflight.
71 Under UNCLOS, the term ‘navigation’ applies to vessels, while ‘overfl ight’ is used with 
respect to aircraft. 
72 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, ‘The Freedom of the High Seas’ in Robert Jennings 
and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume 1 Peace (9th edn, OUP 2008) 
726.
73 See Section 4.2.1.1 for the defi nition of ATS and the relationship between it and other 
aspects of airspace management.
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Two additional maritime areas codified under UNCLOS with implica-
tions for overflight are archipelagic waters and international straits, with 
their corresponding archipelagic sea lanes passage and transit passage. 
These areas are anomalies in that national airspace exists over them, but 
the coastal State does not have the same rights in respect to overflight as it 
does in other national airspace. They are considered in the context of this 
research as maritime areas that, although constituting national airspace, 
involve rights regarding overflight that are in some ways akin to those in 
international airspace. In this context, archipelagic sea lanes passage and 
transit lane passage are introduced and analysed separately in Chapter 5.
At the conclusion of this chapter, the legal basis of the right of overflight 
in both national airspace and international airspace will be clear. In relation 
to the latter, the interaction between international civil aviation law and the 
law of the sea, as they apply to the maritime areas beyond the territorial 
seas, will be evident. Coastal States rely on their rights and responsibili-
ties in these maritime areas to justify – legitimately or illegitimately, as will 
be examined in subsequent chapters – the exercise of jurisdiction over 
aircraft in international airspace within them. Thus, it is the second part of 
the chapter addressing international airspace that will be referred back to 
frequently throughout the research in examining the legitimacy of coastal 
State actions in restricting and prohibiting overflight. 
2.2 Defining ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territory’
2.2.1 Sovereignty and territory under general public international law
The concept of territory is central to international civil aviation law as it 
provides the delimitation for the exercise of State sovereignty over airspace. 
As in public international law more broadly, the concepts of sovereignty 
and territory are integrally linked. A territorial unit forming a State neces-
sarily involves the exercise of sovereignty by that State over the territory, 
a key principle of public international law as recognised in Article 2(1) of 
the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter).74 On the other hand, terri-
tory that does not constitute a State or part of a State is not subject to the 
sovereignty of any State.75
74 Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco, 26 Jun. 1945) 1 U.N.T.S. 16, entered into force 
24 Oct. 1945 (‘UN Charter’).
75 Although a State may have sovereign rights or jurisdiction in the territory (see Section 
2.7).
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In the words of Crawford, ‘[t]he term ‘sovereignty’ has a long and 
troubled history, and a variety of meanings’,76 but it is generally understood 
as ‘the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the func-
tion of a State’.77 The concept of sovereignty has its basis in the political 
philosophy of, influentially but among others, Bodin, Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau.78 The Peace of Westphalia (1648) is also frequently cited in rela-
tion to the emergence of sovereignty as we understand it today,79 although 
the role of this event in forming the modern concept of sovereignty is 
increasingly downplayed.80
A defined territory is one of the four necessary elements of a State, as 
provided in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, along with a permanent 
population, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other 
States.81 As described above, territory that forms a State is under the sover-
eignty of that State, where sovereignty ‘is not… a criterion of statehood… 
[it] is an attribute of States, not a precondition’.82 Under international 
76 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 32.
77 Island of Palmas (US v. Netherlands) (1928) II R.I.A.A. 829, 838.
78 JL Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th edn, OUP 1963) 7-16; Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and 
Responsibility to Protest: A New History (The University of Chicago Press 2014) 61-68; for 
Bodin and Hobbes specifi cally see, William A Dunning, ‘Jean Bodin on Sovereignty’ 
(1896) The Academy of Political Science 82.
79 See, for example, Brierly (n 78) 5-6: ‘The Peace of Westphalia, which brought to an end in 
1648 the great Thirty Years War of Religion, marked the acceptance of the new political 
order in Europe. This new order of things gave the death-blow to the lingering notion 
that Christendom, in spite of all its quarrels, was in some sense still a unity, and there 
was a danger that the relations between states would be not only uncontrolled in fact, as 
they had often been before, but henceforth uninspired even by any unifying ideal. The 
modern state, in contrast with the medieval, seemed likely to become the fi nal goal of 
unity…’.
80 Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth’ 
(2001) 55(2) International Organization 251, 252 and 281; Stéphane Beaulac, The Power of 
Language in the Making of International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin and Vattel and the 
Myth of Westphalia (Martinus Nijhoff 2004) 70.
81 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference of American States (Montevideo, 26 Dec. 1933) 165 L.N.T.S. 19, entered into 
force 26 Dec. 1934, Article 1(b), together with Articles 1(a), (c) and (d) (‘Montevideo 
Convention’). The Montevideo Convention is a restatement of customary international 
law and therefore applies to the international community as a whole rather than just to 
its signatory States. However, ‘[d]espite its wide acceptance in the practice of states (far 
beyond its sixteen parties), it [the Montevideo Convention] has come under scholarly 
criticism, especially the fourth element (‘capacity to enter into relations with other 
states’). Many scholars do not include that condition among the elements of statehood, 
considering such capacity to be a consequence, not a condition, of statehood, or holding 
that the essence of that capacity is independence’ (Aristoteles Constantinides, ‘State-
hood and Recognition’ in André Nollkaemper, August Reinisch, Ralph Janik, Florentina 
Simlinger (eds), International Law in Domestic Courts: A Casebook (OUP 2018) 32).
82 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 76) 32.
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law, territory generally falls within one of three categories: territory that 
is under the sovereignty of a State or territory that does not belong to a 
State, being either terra nullius or res communis. 83 Res communis, as territory 
that is incapable of being placed under sovereignty,84 is often understood 
83 The classifi cation of certain territory under these categories has been, and in many cases 
continues to be, ambiguous under the law, not just because territory is disputed, as to 
which see this note below, but also because the application of the legal concepts them-
selves are unclear. This is the case, for example, regarding the application of res communis 
to the high seas, as will be discussed later in this section. Regarding terra nullius see, for 
example, the case of Mabo v Queensland (No 1) [1988] HCA 69, (1988) 166 CLR 186, in 
which the High Court of Australia overturned the classifi cation of the Murray Islands 
having been terra nullius at the time of colonisation, over 100 years later. It ruled that the 
Meriam people held, and continue to hold, native title over the territory. 
 Furthermore, not all territory falls within one of these categories. Consider, for example, 
airspace over occupied or contested territory, such as that over Northern Cyprus (Mark 
Franklin and Sarah Porter, ‘Sovereignty over Airspace and the Chicago Convention: 
Northern Cyprus’ (2010) 35(1) A&SL 63; Alexis Heraclides, Greek-Turkish Conflict in 
the Aegean (Palgrave MacMillan Limited 2010) 193-98; Nicholas Grief, ‘The Legal 
Principles Governing the Control of National Airspace and Flight Information Regions 
and their Application to the Eastern Mediterranean’ (European Rim Policy and Invest-
ment Council, 2009)); and, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ICAO WP/245, ATM 
Aspects within Simferopol and Dnipropetrovs’k FIRs, Presented by Ukraine at the 13th Air 
Navigation Conference, Montreal (28 September 2018)); Consider also, the airspace 
over Antarctica. Antarctica is partly terra nullius but over its other territory, seven 
States – Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK - have 
made territorial claims. There is a ‘thin legal basis to fl y over Antarctica’ provided by 
the Antarctic Treaty (Peter Haanappel, ‘Aerial Sovereignty: From Paris 1919, Through 
Chicago 1944, to Today’ in Pablo Mendes de Leon and Niall Buissing (eds), Behind and 
Beyond the Chicago Convention (Wolters Kluwer 2019) 28, referring to Article 7(4) of the 
Antarctic Treaty (Washington, 1 Dec. 1959) 402 U.N.T.S. 71, entered into force 23 June 1961: 
‘Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by 
any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers’); Finally, the UN 
Charter recognises non-self-governing territories as ‘territories whose people have not 
yet attained a full measure of self-government’ (Article 37). There are seventeen of these 
States recognised by the UN today (United Nations, ‘Non-Self-Governing Territories’, 
available at <www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt> accessed 18 June 2019) 
including, for instance, Western Sahara: Morocco claims sovereignty over the territory, 
which no other State recognises. The ICJ has ruled that Morocco’s claim is not valid 
and that the people of the territory are entitled to form an independent State (Western 
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1975 (Oct. 16), p. 12, p. 68 para. 162). A referendum 
determining the will of the people on this question is yet to be held and, in the meantime, 
Western Sahara is classifi ed as a non-self-governing territory with the liberation front for 
the people of Western Sahara, Polisario, as the legitimate international legal representa-
tive of its population.
84 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) 
237-38.
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to apply the high seas and outer space,85 while the only remaining example 
of terra nullius – as ‘a territory belonging to no-one’86 – is Marie Byrd 
Land, unclaimed territory lying in the west of Antarctica between territory 
claimed by New Zealand and Chile.87 Whilst the high seas are referred to 
as res communis, this is not without objection. As discussed by O’Connell, 
Grotius identified that the terms res nullius, res communis and res publica 
were all used to refer to the seas,88 with each having since been subject to 
criticism, as well confusion over the precise implications of their application 
to the high seas.89 
 
85 For the high seas, see: UNCLOS, Article 89; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 84) 237; 
Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 492; For outer space, see: Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (London, Moscow, Washington, 27 Jan. 
1967) 610 U.N.T.S. 8843, entered into force 10 Oct. 1967, Article 2 (‘Outer Space Treaty’); 
Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, Kai-Uwe Schrogel and Gérardine Meishan Goh 
(eds), Cologne Commentary on Space Law: Vol I (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2009) 27. The law 
of the sea and outer space law also recognise the concept of the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ applying to the sea bed (UNCLOS, Article 136) and the Moon (Agreement 
governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (New York, 
5 Dec. 1979) 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force 11 Jul. 1985, Article 11 (‘Moon Agree-
ment’)); The principle of the common heritage of mankind is not clearly defi ned under 
international law, although it is understood to consist of four elements: prohibition on 
sovereign claims, use for peaceful purposes, sharing in management, and distribution 
of benefi ts (Edward Guntrip, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime 
for Managing the Deep Seabed?’ (2003) 4(2) Melb J Int’l L 376, 393; Cheryl Chan, Fatima 
Noor Khan and Sajida Awan, ‘Bigger Issues in a Smaller World’ in Blake Hudson, Jona-
than Rosenbloom and Dan Cole (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Study of the Commons 
(Routledge 2019) 403).
86 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1975 (Oct. 16), p. 12, p. 39 para. 79; See also, 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment (1933) P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 53, p. 63.
87 Robin Churchill, ‘The Piracy Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – 
Fit for Purpose?’ in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of 
Piracy at Sea: European and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2014) 20, the author 
at the same time recognising that the validity of the claims to sovereignty over the other 
territory of Antarctica is debated (see above n 83).
88 Grotius wrote, ‘[a]s the seas is commonly described in (Roman) law as res nullius, as 
common property, or as public property according to the law of nations…’ (Hugo 
Grotius, Mare Liberum (Lodewijk Elzevir 1609) 13). Regarding the concept of res publica, 
or public property, ‘[i]t is unclear to what extent the concept of the high seas as public 
domain coincides with its characterization as res nullius or res communis or with neither’ 
(DP O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea – Vol II (OUP 1982) 794).
89 O’Connell (n 88) 792-94. 
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2.2.2 Sovereignty as the foundation of international civil aviation law
2.2.2.1 Sovereignty over national airspace under the Chicago Convention
The principle of sovereignty sits at the heart of international civil aviation 
law and ‘airspace sovereignty over national territory… is well recognised 
by States as part of international customary law’.90 The airspace and more 
specifically the territorial classification of airspace, determines the physical 
extent of the exercise of a State’s sovereignty. Reflecting their paramount 
position as the basis of international civil aviation law, the Chicago Conven-
tion deals with sovereignty and territory in Articles 1 and 2, respectively. 
Article 1 is declaratory of the above-mentioned customary law, recognising 
that ‘…every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory’. In order to define the physical space over which a State 
has sovereignty as referred to in Article 1, it is necessary to establish both 
the horizontal and vertical limits; that is, what ‘territory’ encompasses and 
then to what altitude above the territory the ‘airspace’ extends. The first of 
these will be termed ‘horizontal territory’ while the second will be termed 
‘vertical territory’. The horizontal and vertical limits of a State’s airspace 
will be addressed in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, respectively.
Article 2 is the starting point for establishing what is meant by ‘terri-
tory’ in Article 1:
‘For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to 
be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzer-
ainty, protection or mandate of such State’ (emphasis added).
Whilst the phrase ‘suzerainty, protection or mandate’ represented the rela-
tionships between certain States and other entities at the time of the drafting 
of the Chicago Convention, it is now ‘a vestige of colonial times’ which ‘has 
90 Bin Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (Stevens & Sons Ltd 1962) 120; Eugène 
Pépin, The Law of the Air and the Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted by 
the International Law Commission at Its Eighth Session (A/CONF.13/4) – Extract from the 
Offi cial Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume I (Preparatory 
Documents), United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 24 February-27 
April 1958, 65.
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no legal relevance at present’ and will therefore not be further considered as 
part of this research.91
Although the concept of sovereignty is not static or even capable of 
a universally-accepted definition at a single point in time, such debate is 
outside the scope of this research and the areas ‘under the sovereignty of 
a State’ is taken to be that consisting of a State accepted as such, consistent 
with the criteria in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention.
As identified in Section 1.1 and as will be revisited at various stages 
throughout this study, the law of the sea has developed so that the mari-
time areas under the sovereignty of maritime States has increased over 
time. The interpretation of ‘territory’ under Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago 
Convention has shifted as a result. This method of interpretation involves 
‘systemic integration’,92 or ‘the process… whereby international obligations 
are interpreted by reference to their normative environment (‘system’)’.93 
Systemic integration is recognised under Article 30(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that, as part of the general 
rule of interpretation, ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties’ shall be taken into account. It is presented 
as a remedial measure against the fragmentation of international law.94 In 
relation to the changes to the concept of territory that have resulted from 
developments in the law of the sea, many of these have been recognised 
91 Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (3rd edn, Eleven International Publishing 
2016) 37. The term ‘mandate’ is used in the UN today with a number of different 
meanings, all of which are to be distinguished from the context in which it is used in 
the Chicago Convention, referring to the League of Nations’ reference of ‘the system of 
international supervision over colonial territories’ (United Nations, ‘UN Documentation: 
Researching UN Mandates’, available at <research.un.org/en/docs/mandates#s-lg-
box-2829995> accessed 5 May 2020). One of the ways in which it is used by the UN is in 
reference to the establishment of a peace-keeping mission, such as the mandate of the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which established 
and enumerated the responsibilities of that mission (UNSC 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc 
S/RES/1244). In carrying out its responsibilities, UNMIK entered into the Multilateral 
Agreement on the establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, as an ‘additional 
Associated Party’ to the agreement (Multilateral Agreement on the Establishment of the 
European Common Aviation Area [2006] OJ L285/3). Despite the distinction between the 
UNMIK mandate and the term as it was used under the League of Nations, UNMIK 
has been described in colonial terms, as having ‘assumed almost complete governing 
authority, essentially designating the Balkan province a UN protectorate’ and exercising 
‘neocolonial powers as a third-party sovereign authority’ (Alexander Cooley and 
Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton 
University Press 2009) 200). 
92 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54(2) ICLQ 279, 280; ‘Report of the Study Group on Fragmen-
tation of International Law: Diffi culties arising from the Diversifi cation and Expansion 
of International Law’, fi nalised by Martti Koskenniemi (ILC 58th Session, 13 April 2006) 
208.
93 ILC ‘Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 92) 208.
94 Adamanita Rachovista, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration in Human Rights Law’ 
(2017) 66 ICLQ 557, 559.
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as customary international law.95 This is important because the rules that 
fall within the scope of Article 30(3)(c) are only those ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. The State parties to the Chicago Convention 
and UNCLOS do not align – notably, there are more State parties to the 
Chicago Convention – and so the capacity for its rules to bind these non-
State parties rests on their recognition as customary international law.96 The 
use of customary international law as a tool for interpretation in systemic 
integration is further discussed in Section 3.3.4.5.
This leaves the question of whether a rule under UNCLOS that is not 
customary international law can ever be used for the interpretation of a 
provision under the Chicago Convention. The ILC has examined this matter 
and determined that the best solution ‘is to permit reference to another 
treaty provided that the parties in dispute are also parties to that other 
treaty’.97 Recognising that this allows for divergence in the interpretation 
of a treaty, the report acknowledges that this a fundamental element in the 
functioning of treaties in any case, as is evident in the various reservations 
that attach to them.98 In the alternative, the absurd situation would result 
where a treaty that is widely ratified, such as the Chicago Convention, 
would increasingly be isolated from the wider body of international law, as 
any treaty with fewer State parties would be unable to be taken into account 
in interpreting the Chicago Convention, at least insofar as the rules were not 
codification of customary international law.99 As mentioned in Section 1.1, 
and as will be further discussed in Section 5.4, the concept of archipelagic 
States was codified in UNCLOS and has led to an extension of the area that 
comes under the sovereignty of such State.
The provisions under UNCLOS relating to archipelagic States built on 
maritime claims by States, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, that pre-
dated the convention100 and State practice has broadly been consistent with 
the regime under UNCLOS since its adoption.101 This has led to debate that 
the archipelagic State regime and the related archipelagic sea lanes passage 
are customary international law102 and indeed, the United States, as a non-
State party to UNCLOS, has declared archipelagic sea lanes passage to be 
customary international law.103 As will be discussed further in Sections 5.4.3 
95 For the extension of the territorial sea from 3nm to 12nm and the drawing of straight 
baselines, see Section 2.2.3.1.
96 See also, Section 2.7.1. 
97 ILC ‘Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 92) 238.
98 ibid.
99 ibid 237.
100 Alina Miron, ‘The Archipelagic Status Reconsidered in Light of the South China Sea and 
Düzgit Integrity Awards’ (2018) 15(3) Indonesian Journal of International Law 306, 308.
101 Carlos Jiménez Piernas, ‘Archipelagic Waters’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law 2009) 29. State practice is arguably too varied to establish customary 
international law, as to which see Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. 
102 Miron (n 100) 309-11.
103 Hugo Caminos and Vincent P Cogliati-Bantz, The Legal Regime of Straits (CUP 2014) 472.
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and 5.4.4, despite broad consistency with the UNCLOS regime, there are 
significant variations to State practice that are restrictive in finding a status 
of customary international law and rather, the regime for archipelagic States 
is more likely ‘based on interaction between custom and treaty’.104 Despite 
this, ICAO stipulated upon the adoption of UNCLOS that ‘territory’ under 
the Chicago Convention now includes archipelagic waters.105 Considering 
the foregoing discussion on the scope of Article 31(3)(c), it is difficult to see 
how non-State parties to UNCLOS would be bound by this interpretation 
of ‘territory’ under the Chicago Convention unless, like the US, they have 
specifically declared their intention to be bound by the provisions, or until 
the provisions are formally accepted as customary international law. At the 
same time, in the absence of express and ongoing opposition to it, ICAO’s 
position on the role of UNCLOS in interpreting the Chicago Convention 
in this instance may ultimately contribute to evidence of the customary 
international law status of the archipelagic State regime under UNCLOS, 
at least in part.
2.2.2.2 Article 1 of the Paris Convention (1919) to the Chicago Convention (1944)
The principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace for all 
States has been the foundation of international civil aviation law since the 
beginning: it was codified in the first multilateral agreement governing 
civil aviation, the Paris Convention, signed in 1919. Article 1 of the Paris 
Convention reads:
‘[t]he High Contracting Parties recognise that every Power has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory’.
No objections were offered to the recognition of the principle in the Paris 
Convention during its drafting process, and no further discussion was 
recorded at the Chicago Conference regarding the principle as it appears 
in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention.106 Despite this, the principle of 
sovereignty over airspace had been a point of contention between States 
in the lead-up to the Paris Convention, from the early 1900s. At this time, 
there were four main schools of thought on the matter.107 One of these, not 
surprisingly, advocated exclusive sovereignty while, in direct opposition, 
another was a proponent of absolute freedom of air navigation. In between 
the two extremes was the belief that sovereignty should be accepted but 
104 Jiménez Piernas (n 101) 29.
105 See Section 5.4.2. 
106 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 36.
107 Peter H Sands, Jorge de Sousa Freitas and Geoffrey N Pratt, ‘An Historical Survey of 
International Air Law before the Second World War’ (1960-61) 7(1) McGill L J 24, 28. The 
authors address these views as those of ‘publicists of international air law’. Refer to the 
source for the names of the most prominent publicists in each group.
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with a vertical limitation, and finally, that sovereignty should be accepted 
but with functional limitations. The last of these – sovereignty with func-
tional limitations – appeared to be the most dominant although opinion 
‘widely differed on the question of the degree of limitation’, from innocent 
passage through national airspace to limitations by way of international 
agreement.108 World War I or, more so the paramount importance of 
national security during this time, led to States109 prohibiting the flight of 
foreign aircraft over their territories, which resulted in the creation of State 
practice that ‘evidenced a recognition of the principle of State sovereignty 
in the air’.110 It was this practice that came to be reflected in Article 1 of 
the Paris Convention and later under the Chicago Convention. In reaching 
the decision, States were required to consider whether the airspace above 
their land is part of their territory or whether, like the high seas, it is res 
communis.111 The final decision to regulate international civil aviation with 
the sovereignty of States as the baseline principle ultimately quashed the 
voices of those who willed a law of the sea inspired freedom of the air; in 
the words of Havel and Sanchez, ‘there would be no global commercial 
airspace’.112
The Paris Convention provided, alongside the principle of sovereignty, 
freedoms in relation to overflight that did not withstand the Chicago negoti-
ations. Specifically, under Article 2 of the Paris Convention, each State to the 
treaty was ‘in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above 
its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting States’. This appears to 
be a functional limitation to sovereignty but it was in fact ‘granted as a 
privilege… not conceded as a natural right’, and was therefore consistent 
with absolute sovereignty.113 With this in mind, the corresponding Article 
15 was somewhat obscurely phrased, providing that ‘[e]very aircraft of a 
contracting State has the right to cross the air space of another State without 
landing’ (emphasis added).
108 ibid. 
109 ibid. Including the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Greece, Spain, 
Italy Romania, Bulgaria and China.
110 ibid 33. 
111 Ronald I C Bartsch, Aviation Law in Australia (4th edn, Thomson Reuters 2013) 6. Although 
freedom of the high seas was not codifi ed until UNCLOS in 1982, it existed as customary 
law well before: ‘The oceans had long been subject to the freedom of the seas doctrine - a 
principle put forth in the seventeenth century essentially limiting national rights and 
jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation’s coastline. The 
remainder of the seas was proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none’ (United 
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘The United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective’ (Paper prepared for the International 
Year of the Ocean, 1998), available at <www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_historical_perspective.htm> accessed 21 August 2018). See Section 2.7.1 for 
further discussion on the customary status of freedom of the high seas.
112 Brian Havel and Gabriel Sanchez, The Principles and Practice of International Aviation Law 
(CUP 2014) 38.
113 Sands, de Sousa Freitas and Pratt (n 107) 33. 
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 2.2.2.3 The implications of sovereignty over national airspace
National security was a central consideration again during the drafting of 
the Chicago Convention114 but over the intervening decades from the Paris 
Convention to the Chicago Conference, the development of the commercial 
aviation industry meant that the ‘economic protection of the national air 
transport industry… became the dominant factor’ in the negotiations.115 
This shift is reflected in the Chicago Convention under which inter alia the 
right of overflight has been restricted to non-scheduled flights under Article 
5 and the more controversial matter of the right of overflight for scheduled 
air services – the first freedom of the air – is omitted, to be agreed upon 
separately by States.116
At the Chicago Conference, the United Kingdom (UK) was of the 
opinion that certain economic aspects117 of air transport should be tightly 
regulated at the international level in order to allow States to protect their 
national carriers.118 That is, States should impose economic restrictions on 
the operation of international services by foreign carriers to and from points 
in the first State’s territory. This view was met with direct opposition by, 
most prominently, the US, who at the time of the Chicago Conference had a 
strong international air transport network and civil aircraft fleet relative to 
the European States present, including the UK.119 Other States fell on either 
side of the debate, but not necessarily for the same reasons. New Zealand120 
and Australia,121 supported by France and Afghanistan,122 advocated for 
the internationalisation of the ownership and operation of air services. This 
position was incompatible with the UK’s restrictive approach and placed 
these States together with the US in their opposition to the UK approach, 
although the US was also unequivocally opposed to the international 
ownership of carriers.123 On the other side of the debate, Canada supported 
114 The Chicago Convention was, like the Paris Convention, negotiated in the wake of a 
world war and, particularly in World War II, the use of aircraft had a devastating impact. 
115 Peter H Sands, James T Lyon and Geoffrey N Pratt, ‘An Historical Survey of International 
Air Law Since 1944’ (1960-61) 7(2) McGill L J 125, 126. 
116 The distinction between scheduled air services and non-scheduled flights and the 
exchange of overfl ight rights in respect to each will be discussed in Section 2.3.3.
117 Namely, routes, rates and frequencies (Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol 
I, Pt I ‘Verbatim Minutes of Second Plenary Session, November 2’ (Document 42) 65); 
Bin Cheng, ‘The Right to Fly’ (1959) 42 Transactions of the Grotius Society: Problems of 
Public and Private International Law 99, 109.
118 Peter Haanappel, ‘Bilateral Air Transport Agreements – 1913-1980’ (1980) 5(2) Md J Int’l L 
241, 243.
119 ibid; Pablo Mendes de Leon, Introduction to Air Law (10th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2017) 9-10.
120 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt I ‘Verbatim Minutes of Second Plenary 
Session, November 2’ (Document 42) 79. 
121 ibid 83.
122 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt II ‘Verbatim Minutes of Joint Plenary 
Meeting of Committees I, III, and IV, November 22’ (Document 372) 457.
123 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt II ‘Verbatim Minutes of Plenary Session, 
November 8’ (Document 117) 545-546; Cheng, ‘The Right to Fly’ (n 117) 109. 
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the UK’s position of international control of certain economic aspects of 
air transport.124 The US ultimately received insufficient support from other 
States for its pro-market position to succeed,125 and international air trans-
port has, as a result, traditionally been highly regulated in the economic 
sphere through a system of restrictive bilateral air services agreements 
(ASAs). In essence, complete and exclusive sovereignty of airspace led to 
national airspace being ‘de iure closed for foreign aircraft and their opera-
tors’.126
In addition to national security and economic interests, State sover-
eignty is also at the heart of ensuring the safety of international civil 
aviation. Each State has a responsibility for safety oversight based on 
aircraft nationality and territorial jurisdiction, both of which stem from 
sovereignty.127 This entails both rights and obligations of a State. States are 
required to ensure that international civil aviation is operated consistently 
with the international minimum Standards set out in the annexes to the 
Chicago Convention and that the aircraft bearing their nationality mark 
meet these Standards and comply with the laws and regulations of the 
States over whose territory they operate.128 States have the right to exclude 
aircraft from their territory in the case that they act inconsistently with 
those laws and regulations, by revoking a carrier’s operating permit.129 At 
the same time, the fact that States are required to implement internationally 
agreed Standards with the aim of achieving international uniformity in the 
regulation of the safety of international civil aviation, is also a restriction 
124 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention (Document 42) (n 120) 70-71.
125 Havel and Sanchez (n 112) 38. A compromise of sorts was reached by the States at 
the Chicago Conference in that it was decided that ‘the fi rst Freedom and the second 
Freedom be unconditionally embodied in a separate agreement’, which went on to be 
the Transit Agreement (Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt II ‘Minutes of 
Meeting of the Joint Sub-Committee of Committees I, III, and IV, December 2’ (Document 
463) 514).
126 Mendes de Leon (n 119) 10.
127 Jiefang Huang, Aviation Safety and ICAO (Kluwer Law International 2009) 31.
128 This is provided in ASAs between States, including in the Transit Agreement (see Section 
2.6.1). These rights and obligations stem from various provisions in the Chicago Conven-
tion. Article 11 reads, ‘the laws and regulations of a contracting State relating… to the 
operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory… shall be complied 
with by such aircraft… while within the territory of that State. Regarding specifi cally 
the Rules of the Air, ‘[e]ach contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure 
that every aircraft flying over or maneuvering within its territory and that every 
aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall comply with 
the rules and regulations relating to the fl ight and maneuver of aircraft there in force’ 
(Article 12). Further articles addressing matters such as the provision of air navigation 
facilities (Article 28) and interception under Article 3 bis, provide States with rights and 
obligations aimed at helping to ensure the safety of international civil aviation over their 
territories.
129 This is provided in ASAs between States, including in the Transit Agreement (see Section 
2.6.1).
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 49
The international legal framework 31
on sovereignty.130 As Huang explains: ‘[i]t follows from the principle of 
sovereignty that a State is free to enact aviation law in whatever form it 
prefers, provided that the enactment is compatible with its international obliga-
tions under the Chicago Convention and other applicable rules of international 
law’ (emphasis added).131 The extent to which this applies depends on the 
degree to which a State views itself to be bound by Standards adopted in 
the annexes to the Chicago Convention which are, as discussed in Section 
2.3.2, generally understood to be binding.
The concept of sovereignty over airspace is firmly entrenched in inter-
national civil aviation law but it is by no means static. In more recent years 
the third school of thought mentioned above – sovereignty with a vertical 
limitation – has been recognised by the space law community as a solu-
tion to the uncertainty of the physical scope of the legal regimes applying 
to airspace and outer space.132 In the Chicago Convention’s silence on the 
matter, international space law may in the not-too-distant future require 
an implied vertical limitation to the interpretation of ‘complete and exclu-
sive sovereignty’ under Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, as will be 
addressed in Section 2.2.4. 
 2.2.3 Horizontal delimitation of airspace
2.2.3.1 The boundaries of the territorial sea
Adjacent to those States that happen to be coastal States, their territorial 
sea is defined under Article 3 of UNCLOS, which provides that a territorial 
sea may extend to 12nm from the baseline of a State, where the baseline is 
generally the low-water line along the coast.133 Within the bounds of this 
provision, States have the right to determine the extent of their territorial 
sea under their domestic laws.
Prior to UNCLOS the breath of the territorial sea was debated and as 
a corollary, the horizontal limits of national airspace under the Chicago 
Convention were also uncertain. UNCLOS entered into force 37 years after 
the Chicago Convention and, although from the early 20th century until 
UNCLOS the breadth of territorial sea was recognised in most parts of 
the world under customary international law as 3nm, States had begun to 
130 Huang (n 127) 62.
131 ibid 42.
132 Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Promoting the discussion of the matters 
relating to the defi nition and delimitation of outer space with a view to elaborating a 
common position of States members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space: Working paper prepared by the Chair of the Working Group on the Defi nition 
and Delimitation of Outer Space of the Legal Subcommittee, 57th Session A/AC.105/
C.2/L.302 (Vienna, 9-20 April 2018) 3.
133 UNCLOS, Articles 3 and 5. See the paragraph below on the determination of the baseline 
as to the inclusion here of the qualifi cation ‘generally’.
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make increasingly expansive claims from the mid-20th century.134 UNCLOS 
confirmed the 12nm territorial sea limit and this is now recognised as 
customary.135 Most States declare their territorial sea to extend this distance 
from their baselines, including States that are not party to UNCLOS such 
as the US. However some States – Jordan and Greece – claim less, and 
others – Benin, Ecuador, El Salvador, Liberia, Peru, and Somalia – claim up 
to 200nm.136 Claims extending beyond 12nm remain controversial and ‘call 
for careful assessment’,137 but they are overwhelmingly in the minority and, 
leaving aside these few outlying States, the airspace over which a State is 
permitted to exercise its sovereignty in terms of the horizontal extent of its 
territory is clearly defined under international law.
The determination of the baseline, from which the territorial sea is 
measured, depends on the specific features of a coastline (see Figure 2.1). 
For example, in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,138 the ICJ declared that 
straight baselines, as opposed to baselines strictly following the curvature 
of the land, are legitimate depending on the circumstances. In this case, the 
decision was made on the basis that the section of Norway’s coastline in 
question contains deeply indented fjords, islands, islets, rocks and reefs. The 
ICJ’s decision on the drawing of straight baselines for the types of coast as 
considered in the Anglo-Norwegian Fishes Case is recognised as customary 
and is codified in Article 7 UNCLOS.139 UNCLOS sets out methods for 
determining the territorial baseline with consideration to features including 
but not limited to, reefs, deep indentations in the coastline or a fringe of 
islands off the coast, bays and ports.140
134 John Noyes, ‘The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone’ in Donald Rothwell, Alex G Oude 
Elferink, Karen N Scott and Tim Stephens (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea 
(OUP 2015) 93.
135 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2012 (Nov. 
19) p. 624, p. 690.
136 United Nations, ‘Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction (as at 15 July 2011)’, available at 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_
of_claims.pdf> accessed 1 May 2018. 
137 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 84) 246.
138 Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1951 (Dec. 18), p. 116. 
139 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 84) 244-45.
140 UNCLOS, Arts 6, 7(1), 10 and 11, respectively. An Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA) recently considered the legal status and delimitation of the 
Bay of Savudrija/Piran (as it is known in Croatia)/the Bay of Piran (as it is known in 
Slovenia), among other maritime delimitations, in the case of In the Matter of an Arbitra-
tion under the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and 
the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Signed on 4 November 2009 (Croatia v. Slovenia), 
P.C.A. Case No 2010-04, 29 June 2017. The Tribunal decided that the bay has the status 
of internal waters, divided between the States by a boundary line as determined by the 
Tribunal based on consideration of the effectivités invoked by the States, and that the bay 
is closed by a straight baseline from which Slovenia and Croatia’s territorial seas are 
measured (pp. 243-92 paras. 771-948 and pp. 370-71 VIII Dispositif, II A-C).
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Baselines, and therefore the outermost limits of the territorial sea, can 
also be shifted seaward by permanent harbour works in accordance with 
Article 11 UNCLOS. Under this article, harbour works that ‘form an inte-
gral part of the harbour system are regarded as forming part of the coast’. 
Furthermore, State practice indicates that human-induced extension of the 
natural coastline, that is, land reclamation, can extend the baseline where 
the reclaimed land is ‘an integral part of the mainland or island’.141 This has 
occurred for instance, in the Netherlands where land has been reclaimed 
along the coastline for the purpose of extending the Port of Rotterdam.142 
The implications of land reclamation for overflight will be addressed in 
Chapter 3.
To the landward side of the baseline sits a State’s internal waters.143 As 
part of the territory of a State the airspace above internal waters is de facto 
closed to the aircraft of other Sates under international civil aviation law, 
just as the airspace over other sovereign territory.
 Figure 2.1: Depiction of a baseline calculated in consideration of various coastal features144
141 Coalter G Lathrop, J Ashley Roach and Donald R Rothwell, ‘Baselines under the Interna-
tional Law of the Sea: Reports of the International Law Association Committee on Base-
lines under the International Law of the Sea’ (2018) 2(1-2) The Law of the Sea 1, 52-53. 
142 ibid.
143 UNCLOS, Article 8(1).
144 Source: My Universities, ‘Baselines’, available at <myuniversities.wordpress.com/2013/
10/24/baselines/> accessed 16 June 2018.
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2.2.3.2 Overflight rights in territorial waters
Just as States have sovereignty over the airspace above their territorial 
waters,145 so too do they have sovereignty over the territory beneath: the 
sea itself146 and the bed and subsoil.147 Despite this, the implications of State 
sovereignty differ for overflight and navigation in respect to the territorial 
sea.
Sovereignty under international civil aviation law has resulted in a situ-
ation where transit through, or any other use of a State’s airspace, including 
that over its territorial seas, may only occur on the basis of permission from 
the State.148 In contrast, under customary international law as recognised 
in Article 17 UNCLOS, ships have the right of innocent passage through 
another State’s territorial sea. In other words, although the law of the sea 
recognises that the territorial sea of a State and the State’s exercise of sover-
eignty over it extends from the subsoil up to and including the airspace, the 
privileges of other States differ depending on whether transit is on the sea 
or through airspace over the sea. Innocent passage is presumed to exist for 
the use of the sea but not, in accordance with international civil aviation 
law, for the use of its airspace.149
 2.2.4 Vertical delimitation of airspace
The vertical limit of a State’s territory is less clearly defined or more specifi-
cally, there is no internationally agreed altitude at which a State’s sovereignty 
over its airspace ends. This is important because, while States enjoy sover-
eignty over their airspace, it does not extend to outer space. The non-appro-
priation by States of outer space is one of the founding principles of space 
law and is provided in Article 2 of the Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (‘Outer Space Treaty’).150 Article 2 reads:
‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to 
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, 
or by any other means’.
145 As recognised under Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention, and also by Article 2(2) 
UNCLOS. Article 2(2) UNCLOS in this sense refers not just to the territorial sea but also 
to internal waters and archipelagic waters. 
146 UNCLOS, Article 2(1).
147 ibid Article 2(2). 
148 Chicago Convention, Article 1 read together with Articles 3(c), 5, 6 and 8. See Sections 
2.2.2.1, 2.3.3, 2.3.4 and 2.4.4.
149 In contrast to the territorial sea, the internal waters of a State are also closed to foreign 
ships.
150 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (London, Moscow, Wash-
ington, 27 Jan. 1967) 610 U.N.T.S. 8843 entered into force 10 Oct. 1967 (‘Outer Space Treaty’).
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In other words, while the foundation of international civil aviation law is 
State sovereignty over airspace, the basis of space law is that no State may 
claim sovereignty over outer space.
On the cusp of the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, John Cobb 
Cooper, member of the US delegation at the Chicago Conference, recog-
nised the necessity of ‘defining airspace’, as he termed the task. He saw it as 
a pressing concern as operations involving craft – whether they ultimately 
be defined as air- or space- craft – become more commonly conducted by 
private enterprises in which case, at least part of the flight – that in airspace –
may fall within the scope of the Chicago Convention:
‘While it is true that most instrumentalities usable in outer space are not civil in 
character but are launched and controlled by a particular state, nevertheless this 
will not always be true’.151
Indeed, today, commercial private activity in space is more common than 
State activity.152
Although the two principles – sovereignty over airspace and non-
appropriation of outer space – require delimitation and although this has 
been acknowledged since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, States have 
not agreed upon a fixed altitude that demarcates the two ‘areas’.
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(UNCOPUOS), which among other things was established for ‘studying 
legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space’,153 recognises 
two main approaches in the debate surrounding the delimitation of airspace 
and outer space: the functionalist approach and the spatialist approach.154 
The spatialist approach supports delimitation and argues that the altitude 
should be determined by science, for example by considering the aerody-
namic characteristics of flight in accordance with the von Kármán line,155 
sitting at around 100 kilometres (km) above mean sea level where ‘aerody-
namic lift decreases to critical levels and the lowest perigees obtainable by 
151 John Cobb Cooper, ‘The Chicago Convention – After Twenty Years’ (1965) 19(3) U Miami 
L Rev 333, 343-44.
152 Paul Stephen Dempsey and Maria Manoli, Suborbital Flights and the Delimitation of Air 
Space vis-à-vis Outer Space: Functionalism, Spatialism and State Sovereignty, A submission 
by the Space Safety Law and Regulation Committee of the International Association for 
the Advancement of Space Safety to the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna 9-20 April 2018, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2018/
CRP.9 (29 March 2018) 13.
153 United Nations Offi ce for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space’ <www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html> accessed 1 May 
2018.
154 Working Paper of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, GOAR, 57th Session U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.302 (Vienna, 9-20 April 
2018) 2.
155 Stephan Hobe, Nicolai Ruckteschell and David Heffernan, Cologne Compendium on Air 
Law in Europe (Carl Heymanns Verlag 2013) 206-7.
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space objects can be reasonably identified’.156 The functionalist approach, 
on the other hand, argues that the applicable legal regime should be deter-
mined by the nature of the activity being conducted, including the vehicle, 
that is, an aircraft or a space object, and the objective of the activity, that is, 
for example, whether to transport people or cargo from one point on earth 
to another or whether to orbit the earth.157 UNCOPUOS officially supports 
the spatialist approach, with delimitation based on the von Kármán line, a 
position ‘based on the opinion not only of academics but also delegations to 
[UNCOPUOS] and the Conference on Disarmament’.158
In the absence of an internationally agreed altitude for delimitation, 
national laws continue to define the vertical limits of the sovereignty of 
airspace, taking into account the national interests of the States imple-
menting the legislation. For example, Denmark’s legislation expressly 
defines outer space as the ‘space above the altitude of 100km above mean 
sea level’.159 This delimitation by Denmark has been described by Hulsroj 
and Pecujlic as ‘a bold statement, indeed’.160 In contrast, the UK’s recently 
enacted Space Industry Act 2018 refers to an altitude in order to establish the 
scope of the application of the legislation rather than to define outer space. 
Namely, the act refers to activities operating at or above the stratosphere,161 
which is understood to extend to an altitude of approximately 50km above 
156 Working Paper of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS (n 154) 3.
157 Dempsey and Manoli (n 152) 11.
158 Working Paper of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS (n 154) 3. The Conference on 
Disarmament is a multilateral forum that meets annually to address arms control and 
disarmament (United Nations, ‘Conference on Disarmament: An Introduction to the 
Conference’, available at <www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFE
FE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument> accessed 13 March 2019). The debate 
continues with momentum though: in November 2018 the Fédération Aéronautique 
Internationale (FAI) proposed to the International Astronautical Federation that a work-
shop be held to consider new scientifi c analyses which suggest that the von Kármán line 
should be reduced from 100km to 80km (Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI), 
‘Statement about the Karman Line’ (30 November 2018), available at <www.fai.org/
news/statement-about-karman-line> accessed 4 August 2016).
159 The Danish Act on Activities on Outer Space, Act no. 409 of 11 May 2016, Article 4(4), 
translated from the original: ‘Den del af rummet, der ligger over 100 km over havets 
overfl ade’. 
160 Peter Hulsroj and Anja Nakarada Pecujlic, New in the Nest: The Danish Space Act (2016) 
41(3) A&SL 503, 504.
161 Space Industry Act 2018 (UK), Articles 5(a) and (b) read together with Article 4. More 
specifi cally, it refers to both ‘space activity’ and ‘suborbital activity’ as ‘spacefl ight activi-
ties’, where ‘suborbital activity’ is that of a craft which operates above the stratosphere 
or of a balloon that is capable of reaching the stratosphere. ‘Space activity’ refers to ‘any 
activity in outer space’, among other things, where outer space is not further defi ned 
(Article 4). For further discussion on this aspect of the Act see, Thomas Cheney, UK 
Public Bill Committee Debate - Space Industry Bill (24 January 2018); Lesley Jane Smith 
and Ruairidh JM Leishman, ‘Up, up and Away: An Update on the UK’s Latest Plans for 
Space Activities’ (2019) 44(1) A&SL 1, 14-15; Georgina Hutton, The Space Industry Bill 
2017-2019 (HC Briefi ng Paper, 2 February 2018) 5-6.
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the Earth.162 Similarly, Australia’s national space legislation only applies 
to launches or attempted launches that go beyond 100km above mean sea 
level,163 but the Australia government has made clear that this is not an 
attempt to define outer space164 and that it is therefore not a recognition 
by Australia of an altitude at which its sovereignty over the airspace is 
extinguished.165 While the legislation of these States is relatively consistent 
in terms of the altitude it applies to, not all national legislation follows the 
same trend: the equatorial States that are signatories to the Bogotá Declara-
tion claim sovereignty over the geostationary orbits above their territories, 
which is at an altitude of approximately 36,000km above mean sea level.166 
The Bogotá Declaration does not purport to contribute to the discussion on 
the delimitation of airspace and outer space but it demonstrates the vastly 
different approach States take in their application of the non-appropriation 
principle under Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty in the absence of an 
internationally accepted altitude.
On an international level, the absence of an international delimitation 
is an ‘important legal lacuna’167 and, as mentioned above, one that will 
become increasingly so in light of growing private commercial space activi-
ties and rapid technological developments transforming space transporta-
tion.168 This study is limited to considering navigation through airspace and 
will not further address the laws applying to outer space.
 2.3 Overflight rights for civil aircraft in national airspace
2.3.1 The different legal bases stemming from the Chicago Convention
In addition to the territory being overflown – that is, whether it is national 
or international airspace – there are a number of relevant factors affecting 
the legal basis for overflight rights, as identified in Section 2.1. This section 
will examine those factors for the operation of civil aircraft and discuss the 
162 Oxford English Dictionary, available at <www.oed.com/view/Entry/191344?redirectedFr
om=stratosphere#eid> accessed 17 April 2019.
163 Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth) s 8. 
164 National Legislation and Practice Relating to Defi nition and Delimitation of Outer Space 
– Note by the Secretariat A/AC.105/865/Add.1 (20 March 2006); House of Representa-
tives, Commonwealth of Australia, Space Activities Amendment Bill 2002, Explanatory 
Memorandum (20 February 2002) Item 2.
165 House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Australia, Space Activities Amendment Bill 
2002, Explanatory Memorandum (20 February 2002) 4.
166 Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries (Bogotá 3 December 1976). The 
States are Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire. Five 
of these States – Brazil, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya and Uganda – have ratifi ed the Outer 
Space Treaty and Colombia is a signatory.
167 Working Paper of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS (n 154) 4.
168 Dempsey and Manoli (n 152) 2.
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corresponding legal basis for each of them. It will first address the distinc-
tion between scheduled air services and non-scheduled flights. It will then 
set out the multilateral exchange of the right of overflight for non-scheduled 
flights under Article 5 of the Chicago Convention and the exchange of 
overflight rights for scheduled air services pursuant to Article 6. In order to 
address this latter point in context, the distinction between transit rights and 
traffic rights, as defined in Section 2.3.3.1 below, will be addressed. Finally, 
this part will discuss the legal basis for the exchange of overflight rights for 
unmanned aircraft. Figure 2.2 provides a diagrammatic representation of 
the relationship between these elements.
 Figure 2.2: Legal basis for overflight rights in national airspace169
 2.3.2 Air transport outside the normative powers of ICAO
Under Article 44 of the Chicago Convention, ICAO’s role is twofold: first, 
‘to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation’ 
and second, ‘to foster the planning and development of international air 
transport’ (emphasis added).170 International air navigation involves the 
non-commercial aspects of international civil aviation while international 
169 Source: made by the author.
170 Chicago Convention, Article 44.
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air transport encompasses the commercial/business aspects.171 Leclerc 
describes the division as follows:
‘The first category relates to standards on air navigation. It is made up of tech-
nical and operational rules and includes regulations governing safety. The sec-
ond category relates to standards on the economic and commercial aspects of 
international aviation. This specific branch of international civil aviation law is 
thus concerned with the economic regulation of international aviation, and at 
times comes down to the matter of traffic rights incorporating, in its broadest 
definition, the rules determining the allocation of routes, tariffs, capacity and 
frequency’.172
This division is also reflected in the structure of the Chicago Convention 
itself: Part I addresses air navigation, while Part III addresses international 
air transport. It is in relation to the international air navigation aspects that 
the normative powers of ICAO sit, and consequently it is these aspects that 
the Chicago Convention annexes address. Normative powers here refer 
specifically to the competence of the ICAO Council to adopt Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs) pursuant to Articles 54(l) and 90 of the 
Chicago Convention.
The Chicago Convention is an anomaly in public international law in 
the quasi-legislative function that it gives to the ICAO Council in relation 
to the adoption of SARPs for the air navigation aspects of international civil 
aviation. The SARPs comprise the annexes to the Convention and therefore 
become part of the rules that regulate international civil aviation, but they 
do not form part of the Convention itself. On whether SARPs have binding 
force, Milde has described the question as causing ‘frequent misunderstand-
ings’, highlighting that some commentators consider Standards to have the 
same legal value as treaty provisions while others view SARPs as ‘no more 
171 Havel and Sanchez (n 112) 69: ‘…there are parallel frameworks that organize interna-
tional air services. One is the product of the Chicago Convention and focuses primarily 
on setting the terms of international technical cooperation and harmonization. The other 
is much more specifi c economic system that is based on bilateral exchange where two 
States negotiate an air service agreement (ASA) that grants each party’s carriers the 
privilege to carry passengers, cargo or a combination of both to points to, from, over, or 
beyond their respective territories’.
172 Translated from the original: ‘La première catégorie se rapporte aux normes relatives à 
la navigation aérienne. Elle se trouve constituée de règles techniques et opérationnelles 
et englobe une réglementation liée dès l’origine à l’exigence de sécurité. La seconde 
catégorie se rapporte quant à elle aux normes encadrant les aspects économiques et 
commerciaux de l’activité aérienne internationale. Cette branche spécifi que du droit 
international de l’aviation civile s’intéresse ainsi à la régulation économique de l’activité 
aérienne internationale, et se résume parfois à la question des droits de trafi c intégrant, 
dans sa défi nition la plus large, les règles déterminant l’attribution des routes, des tarifs, 
des capacités et des fréquences’ (Thomas Leclerc, Les mesures correctives des émissions 
aériennes de gaz à effet de serre. Contribution à l’étude des interactions entre les ordres 
juridiques en droit international public (PhD thesis, E.M. Meijers Instituut, Leiden 
University, 2017) 65-67).
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than guidance material or ‘soft law’’.173 Cheng argues that the Standards 
are not binding, hence the term ‘quasi-legislative’ to describe the Council.174 
States are mixed in their positions, some considering Standards to be a form 
of soft law and others considering them to be binding. 175
There is a clear distinction, however, between the contribution of 
Standards, on the one hand, and Recommended Practices, on the other, to 
international air navigation. ‘Standards’ and ‘Recommended Practices’ are 
defined, respectively, as:
‘any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, matériel, perfor-
mance, personnel or procedure…’,
‘the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary for the safety or 
regularity of international air navigation and to which Contracting States will 
conform ...’ (Standard; emphasis added), and, ‘the uniform application of which 
is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity or efficiency of inter-
national air navigation, and to which Contracting States will endeavour to conform 
…’ (Recommended Practice; emphasis added).176
Under Article 37 of the Chicago Convention, which applies to SARPs in 
general, each contracting State is required to ’undertake to collaborate in 
securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity’ in regulations, stan-
dards, procedures and organisation. This is central to aim of the Convention 
173 Michael Milde, ‘Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards: Problems of Safety Oversight’ 
(1996) 45 ZLW 3, 4.
174 Cheng, Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 64.
175 For example, consider the contrast between France, on the one hand, and the US and 
the Netherlands, on the other, as to which see, Vincent Correia and Béatrice Trigeaud, 
‘Transport, Navigation et Sources du Droit International - Remarques Générales’ in Saïda 
El Boudouhi (ed), Les Transport au Prisme du Droit International Public (Editions A Pedone 
2019) 54-55: ‘In France, the Council of State traditionally refuses to recognise the binding 
nature of the technical annexes of the Chicago Convention, which it considers to be mere 
recommendations, including with regard to standards’, translated from the original: ‘En 
France, le Conseil d’Etat refuse traditionnellement de reconnaître le caractère obligatoire 
des annexes techniques à la convention de Chicago, qui constituent selon lui de simples 
recommandations, y compris en ce qui concerne les norms’; The US and the Netherlands: 
‘In the United States, for example, the standards are enforced by the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) without prior approval 
from Congress. Likewise, in the Netherlands, the technical annexes published in the 
Tractatenblad acquire a force comparable to the Chicago Convention, without being 
subject to the control of the Dutch Parliament’, translated from the original: ‘Aux Etats-
Unis, par exemple, les normes sont appliquées par l’US Department of Transportation 
(DOT) et la Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) sans approbation préalable du Congrès. De 
même, aux Pays-Bas, les annexes techniques publiées au Tractatenblad acquièrent une 
force comparable à la convention de Chicago, sans être soumises au contrôle du Parle-
ment néerlandais’.  
176 These defi nitions are in the Foreword to each annex to the Chicago Convention under the 
heading, ‘Status of Annex components’. 
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in ensuring the ‘safe and orderly’ development of civil aviation.177 At the 
same time, national standards may be ‘more stringent’ than the SARPs178 
and States may also, under certain circumstances, deviate from them. In the 
case that a State deviates from a Standard – which, recalling the definition 
above, States ‘will conform with’ – it is required to file the difference with 
ICAO and immediately notify other States of the difference.179 Article 38 of 
the Convention allows for the deviation from a Standard in the case that 
the State ‘deems it necessary’ to do so.180 Where a State has filed a difference 
to an ICAO standard it is the responsibility of the aircraft of other States to 
ensure it meets the regulation of the State when within its territory.181
International air navigation, governed by these SARPs, includes both 
technical and operational aspects,182 with most areas of international civil 
aviation law entailing elements of each.183 Safety is a principal aspect of 
international air navigation and ensuring it is a primary objective of ICAO, 
as recognised in the Preamble and Article 44 of the Chicago Convention.184 
The Chicago Convention was originally silent on the matter of security but, 
as is evident from the adoption of Article 3 bis and Annex 17, ‘Security’, it 
sits within the scope of ICAO’s normative powers by being, in the words 
of Huang, ‘but one important aspect of aviation safety’.185 This is clear 
when considering the subtitle of Annex 17, ‘Safeguarding international civil 
aviation against acts of unlawful interference’,186 together with the fact that 
aviation safety is defined as ‘the state of freedom from unacceptable risk of 
injury to persons or damage to aircraft and property’;187 necessarily, aviation 
177 Chicago Convention, Preamble.
178 ICAO, ‘The Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annexes 1 to 18’, available at 
<www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/NationalityMarks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf> 
accessed 19 September 2018, 10.
179 Chicago Convention, Article 38.
180 ibid.
181 ibid Articles 11 and 12. 
182 Ludwig Weber, International Civil Aviation Organization (Wolters Kluwer 2012) 19.
183 Annexes 9 and 17 though, addressing ‘Facilitation’ and ‘Security’ respectively, contain 
only operational aspects. The SARPs in Annex 9 outline, among other things, require-
ments for the entry and departure of aircraft, persons and baggage, and cargo, and 
Annex 17 provides measures to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference. Technical 
aspects on the other hand include, among numerous others, the technical airworthiness 
standards under Annex 8, pursuant to Article 33 of the Chicago Convention, and the 
specifi cations for the global navigation satellite system (GNSS), as used for aeronautical 
telecommunications under Annex 10, further to Article 37(a).
184 Specifi cally, Articles 44 (a), (d) and (h).
185 Huang (n 127) 5.
186 Chicago Convention, Annex 17 (10th edn, April 2017).
187 Huang (n 127) 4, citing ICAO AN-WP/7699, Determination of a Defi nition of Aviation Safety 
(11 December 2001) 2.2.
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security is required for aviation safety. Environmental matters may also, but 
more controversially, be listed among the normative powers of ICAO.188
ICAO’s role in relation to international air transport is, in contrast, 
restricted to issuing guidance material, such as ICAO Documents and 
Assembly Resolutions, and States negotiate between themselves to facilitate 
this aspect of international civil aviation. Articles 5 and 6 of the Chicago 
Convention form the basis of this governance but beyond this, transport 
aspects sit outside the normative framework of the Chicago Convention 
and its annexes.189
 2.3.3 The multilateral exchange of overflight rights for non-scheduled 
flights and the express exclusion of the exchange for scheduled air 
services
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, following from the basis of complete 
and exclusive sovereignty under Article 1, establishes the regime whereby 
the national airspace of a State is closed to the aircraft of other States oper-
ating scheduled air services until permission or authorisation to operate 
has been granted by the former State. More specifically, Article 6 expressly 
excludes the grant of access to airspace for scheduled international air 
services from the scope of the Convention:
‘[n]o scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the ter-
ritory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other autho-
rization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or 
authorization’.
188 Again, the Chicago Convention is silent on environmental regulation, which was not 
a concern at the time of the Convention’s drafting. The argument that environmental 
matters are within ICAO’s competence is based on the theory of implicit competence, as 
laid down by the ICJ in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1949 (Apr. 11), p. 174, p. 182: ‘Under international law, 
the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly 
provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential 
to the performance of its duties’. On this basis, Leclerc argues that ICAO ‘is… invested 
with a mission to remove obstacles to the development of international civil aviation, 
at least in its technical and operational aspects’. In this sense, ‘[the] appearance of 
environmental data could only be naturally understood within this multilateral forum’, 
translated from the original: ‘se trouve (…) investie d’une mission de suppression des 
obstacles au développement de l’aviation civile internationale, du moins dans ses aspects 
techniques et opérationnels’. In this sense, ‘[l]’apparition de la donnée environnementale 
ne pouvait donc qu’être naturellement appréhendée au sein de cette enceinte multilaté-
rale’ (Leclerc (n 172) 318). This argument is not without its critics however, for example 
see, Andrew Macintosh, ‘Overcoming the Barriers to International Aviation Greenhouse 
Gases Emissions Abatement’ (2008) 33(6) A&SL 403, 411. 
189 As noted briefl y above in Section 2.2.2.3, Article 5 provides the legal basis for overfl ight 
rights for non-scheduled fl ights, while Article 6 expressly excludes from the Convention 
the exchange of the right of overfl ight for scheduled air services.  
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Bin Cheng, in 1962, framed this outcome as a failure of States and as a situ-
ation that was yet to be adequately dealt with:
‘By far the most important sector of international civil aviation is scheduled 
international air transport, a satisfactory multilateral solution for which has so far not 
been achieved … [A]t the Chicago Conference 1944, it was decided that, at least 
for the moment, the matter would have to be regulated by bilateral agreements between 
States and this need was expressly recognised in Article 6 of the Chicago Con-
vention 1944’ (emphasis added). 190
Given that today the Transit Agreement, as will be addressed in Section 
2.3.3.1, has 133 State parties191 – as opposed to 60 in 1962 – the statement 
is now less relevant concerning overflight rights. The global trend towards 
greater liberalisation of air services also reduces the relevance of the state-
ment to the exercise of rights beyond the second freedom. Having said this, 
the core of the issue persists: there is still no global multilateral agreement 
regulating scheduled international air services as a whole.
The Chicago Convention does not provide a definition for ‘scheduled 
international air service’ but the ICAO Council later, in 1952, defined the 
term as: an air service that has all three of the following characteristics: 
(1) it passes through the airspace over the territory of more than one State; 
(2) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of passengers, mail or cargo 
for remuneration, in such a manner that each flight is open to use by 
members of the public, and; (3) it is operated so as to serve traffic between 
190 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 229. The bilateral system was seen at 
the time of the drafting of the Convention as an interim arrangement though, pending 
a multilateral exchange of rights (Havel and Sanchez (n 112) 75-76). There are some 
instances today of a non-bilateral exchange of rights. For example, the exchange of all 
transit and traffi c rights for EU Member States under the EU single aviation market 
(Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community 
(Recast) (‘Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008’)). At the same time though, EU Member States’ 
aviation relations with non-EU Member States continue to be governed through separate 
bilateral ASAs in most cases. Also, consider the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberaliza-
tion of International Air Transport (MALIAT) between Brunei, Chile, the Cook Islands, 
Mongolia (cargo only), New Zealand, Samoa, Singapore, Tonga, and the US (Multilateral 
Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation (Washington DC, 
1 May 2001) 2511 U.N.T.S. 33, entered into force 21 Dec. 2001). Havel and Sanchez note 
though, that MALIAT ‘amounts to little more than a ‘pooled’ open skies accord’, in that 
it essentially just ‘regulate[s] the bilateral aviation relations of its signatories’ (Havel and 
Sanchez (n 112) 113).
191 State parties to the Transit Agreement as at November 2020. See, ICAO, ‘Current Lists of 
Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties – International Air Services Transit Agreement’, 
available at <www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Transit_EN.pdf> 
accessed 13 November 2020.
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the same two or more points either according to a published timetable 
or with flights so regular or frequent that they constitute a recognizably 
systematic series.192
A non-scheduled flight is a contrario a flight that falls outside this 
definition,193 but that is international, that is, it meets the first criterion. 
As for the second criterion, a non-scheduled flight may or may not be for 
remuneration; non-scheduled flights include both commercial and non-
commercial operations. Many non-scheduled flights are clearly not open 
to members of the public or operated according to a published timetable or 
so regular or frequent that they constitute recognisably systematic series, 
but others fit less clearly into the mould and so in practice, the distinction 
between scheduled air services and non-scheduled flights can be murky.194
States have exchanged the right of overflight for non-scheduled flights 
on a multilateral basis through Article 5 of the Chicago Convention. Under 
this article, each contracting State agrees that aircraft engaged in non-
scheduled flights have the right to:
‘make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for 
non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission…’. 195
Article 5 clearly provides for the exchange of the right of overflight for non-
scheduled flights, but this does not mean that there is freedom of overflight 
for aircraft operating these flights in the sense of freedom of overflight 
of the high seas. The article exempts such aircraft from having to obtain 
prior permission for overflight, which had typically been granted through 
192 ICAO Doc 7278-C/841, Defi nition of Scheduled International Air Service (1952). See also, 
more recently, ICAO WP/7, Review of the Classifi cation and Defi nitions Used for Civil Avia-
tion Activities, Presented by the Secretariat at the Statistics Division 10th Session, Montreal 
(16 October 2009), Appendix B; See also, ICAO Doc 9587, Policy and Guidance Material on 
the Economic Regulation of International Air Transport (4th edn, 2017) Appendix 4.
193 PPC Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Approach 
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 111.
194 ibid; Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 173-77.
195 Chicago Convention, Article 5 (paragraph 1). The second paragraph of Article 5 applies 
to non-scheduled services when taking on or discharging passengers, mail or cargo for 
remuneration, and provides a State with the right to impose ‘regulations, conditions or 
limitations as it may consider desirable’ to govern those commercial operations in its 
territory. These rules are usually governed unilaterally by States, under their national 
legislation (ICAO Doc 9060/5, Reference Manual on the ICAO Statistics Programme (5th edn, 
2013) 1.3.2 fn 2). Specifi cally charter services though, are governed under some States’ 
ASAs, for example, those between the US and the UK and Canada and Russia (Air Trans-
port Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 28 November 2018, Article 2(5); 
Air Services Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian 
Federation, 18 December 2000, Annex II, A) 5). For further discussion on the national 
regulation of the operation of non-scheduled services see, for example, Rigas Doganis, 
Flying Off Course: Airline Economics and Marketing (4th edn, Routledge 2010) 38-39.
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diplomatic channels,196 but they are still required to observe other entry 
requirements under the Chicago Convention and its annexes including, for 
example, an approved flight plan.197
The State whose territory is being overflown can also require landing, 
and may, for safety purposes, require aircraft to ‘follow prescribed routes 
or to obtain special permission’ in the case that the aircraft wants to operate 
over a region that is ‘inaccessible or without adequate air navigation 
facilities’.198 The first of these – that the State being overflown can require 
landing – is unqualified under Article 5 but it must ‘not be exercised in 
such a general way as to amount to a cancellation of the right granted to 
non-scheduled aircraft’.199 The second right of the State – to require certain 
paths to be followed or for prior permission to be obtained – is again left to 
the discretion of the State but if airspace is closed, it should be justified and 
consistent with the Chicago Convention and its annexes, for example as a 
prohibited area under Article 9 of the Chicago Convention.200
The right of a State to designate the route to be followed over its terri-
tory is not restricted to non-scheduled flights: a State also holds this right 
under Article 68 of the Chicago Convention in respect to scheduled air 
services.201 Unlike for non-scheduled flights, where the designation must 
be for safety purposes, under Article 68 a State is free to designate routes 
for scheduled services so long as it is in accordance with the Chicago 
Convention in general. As an illustration of the consequences of this right, 
on 1 July 2000, Canada and Russia began allowing commercial air trans-
port to operate through routes over the North Pole, meaning that carriers 
would be able to operate direct services between certain Asian and North 
American cities for the first time. Nav Canada202 estimated at the time that 
196 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 195.
197 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 110. 
198 Chicago Convention, Article 5. See Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt II 
‘Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee 2 of Committee I, November 30’ (Document 449) 
687.
 In contrast to overfl ight, if an aircraft conducting a non-scheduled service wishes to make 
a stop to take on or discharge passengers, cargo or mail, for remuneration or hire, the 
State ‘may impose such regulations, conditions or limitations as it may consider desir-
able’. This reservation has been interpreted so broadly so as to include prior permission, 
that is, that States can require prior permission to be obtained for the operation of non-
scheduled services, which would effectively negate the purpose of Article 5 (Cheng, The 
Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 197). Prior permission should not be required as a 
general standard as it could frustrate or make impossible the operation of non-scheduled 
services (Cobb Cooper, ‘The Chicago Convention’ (n 151) 340).
199 ICAO Doc 9587, Policy and Guidance Material on the Economic Regulation of International Air 
Transport (4th edn, 2017) Appendix 4.
200 ibid.
201 Chicago Convention, Article 68.
202 The corporation that owns and operates Canada’s civil air navigation system.
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this would cut five hours of flight time between Hong Kong and New York 
which, for a carrier operating the route once a day, would amount to cost 
savings of US$12 million per year.203 The right of a carrier to operate on 
allocated routes in a foreign State relies on the fact that the State in which 
the aircraft is registered has already negotiated access to the airspace of the 
other State. The allocation of routes by Canada and Russia is, in this way, a 
secondary consideration to the discussion below in Section 2.3.3.1 regarding 
the exchange of overflight rights by these States on the basis that neither are 
party to the Transit Agreement.
When it comes to the operation of commercial non-scheduled services, 
the distinction between them and scheduled services is becoming less rele-
vant both because non-scheduled services represent a diminishing propor-
tion of overall international traffic and because the regulatory approaches 
to each are converging. Bin Cheng, again writing in 1962, stated that ‘non-
scheduled international air transport has greatly increased in importance 
since the Chicago Conference’, a statement that applied equally over the 
following decades.204 In the 1970s, around 30 per cent of flights on North 
Atlantic routes were non-scheduled205 and in the early 1980s approximately 
half of air passengers travelling within Europe made their journeys on non-
scheduled services.206 The growth in charter services, specifically, during 
this time was stimulated by the more liberal government regulation of them, 
particularly in the US and Europe, relative to the highly regulated market 
for scheduled air services.207 Deregulation of scheduled services in the US 
marked the decline of charter services, the former consequently losing 
their competitive advantage.208 The liberalisation of air services in the EU 
has reduced the relevance of the distinction between scheduled and non-
scheduled services from a regulatory perspective and may eventually lead 
it to it becoming obsolete.209 As a result of the third package of air transport 
liberalisation measures, adopted in July 1991, there is no regulatory distinc-
tion between scheduled and non-scheduled services in that non-scheduled 
carriers are permitted to operate scheduled services and sell directly to the 
203 Joel Baglole, ‘Canada, Russia’s Decision to Permit Polar Routes Promises to Cut 
Hours’ (The Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2000), available at <www.wsj.com/articles/
SB960415817821812909> accessed 4 March 2018.
204 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 27.
205 Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space (n 193) 111.
206 ICAO Doc 9060/5, Reference Manual on the ICAO Statistics Programme (5th edn, 2013) 1.3.2.
207 Doganis (n 195) 39.
208 ibid.
209 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 109.
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public.210 Worldwide, non-scheduled services now play only a minor role 
in the delivery of air transport.211 ICAO estimates from 2017 suggest that 
revenue from non-scheduled passenger traffic in that year made up just 
4.1 per cent of the total revenue for international traffic,212 representing a 
substantial decline even over the course of the preceding decade, from 8.1 
per cent in 2007.213
 2.3.3.1 The Transit Agreement and the value of transit rights
Turning now to scheduled international air services, it is necessary at this 
point to draw a distinction between transit rights and traffic rights. Whilst 
States did not exchange the rights of access to their airspace multilaterally 
for scheduled air services under the Chicago Convention, the 133 States that 
are parties to the Transit Agreement, have exchanged the right of overflight 
on a multilateral basis.
At the Chicago Conference, two agreements were negotiated together 
with the adoption of the Convention to allow for the multilateral exchange 
of a limited number of co-called ‘freedoms’ (see Figure 2.3), or rights for 
scheduled international air services to fly over, make technical stops in, and 
to operate to, from and within another State: the aforementioned Transit 
Agreement and the International Air Transport Agreement (Transport 
Agreement).214 The Transit Agreement, also known as the ‘two freedoms 
210 The third liberalisation package was implemented through Regulation Nos 2407/92, 
2408/92 and 2409/92, which have since been recast and consolidated into Regulation 
(EC) No 1008/2008. For a discussion on the consequences of the third package of liber-
alisation see, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Impact of the Third Package 
of Air Transport Liberalization Measures – Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament’ (Brussels, 22 October 1996, COM(96) 514 fi nal) 
18. The distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled services has also become 
irrelevant to EU legislation governing other aspects of aviation: Regulation (EC) No 
261/2004 on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding 
and of cancellation or long delay of fl ights, applies to both scheduled and non-scheduled 
services in contrast to the legislation it repealed, Council Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 of 
4 February 1991, which applied only to scheduled air transport. Recital 5 of Regulation 
(EC) No 261/2004 acknowledges the decreasing relevance of the categorisation: ‘Since 
the distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled air services is weakening, such 
protection should apply to passengers not only on scheduled but also on non-scheduled 
fl ights, including those forming part of package tours’.
211 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 109 and 111.
212 ICAO, ‘2017 Air Transport Statistical Results’, Table 7, available at <www.icao.int/
annual-report-2017/Documents/Annual.Report.2017_Air%20Transport%20Statistics.
pdf> accessed 12 March 2019. Non-scheduled traffi c in these statistics covers both non-
scheduled traffi c of scheduled airlines and non-scheduled operators.
213 ICAO, ‘2016 Air Transport Statistical Results’, Table 7, available at <www.icao.int/
annual-report-2016/documents/arc_2016_air%20transport%20statistics.pdf> accessed 2 
March 2019. Non-scheduled traffi c in these statistics covers both non-scheduled traffi c of 
scheduled airlines and non-scheduled operators.
214 International Air Transport Agreement (Chicago, 7 Dec. 1944) 171 U.N.T.S. 387, entered 
into force 8 Feb. 1945 (‘Transport Agreement’).
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agreement’, provides for the exchange of the first two freedoms of the air 
for State parties, whilst the Transport Agreement provides for the exchange 
of the first five freedoms of the air. 
 Figure 2.3: The freedoms of the air215
215 Source: Air Cargo – How it Works, ‘An Introduction to the Aircargo, Airfreight and 
Airmail Business’, available at <air-cargo-how-it-works.blogspot.com/p/interest-
organisations.html> accessed 12 July 2018.
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In contrast to the Transit Agreement, the Transport Agreement has just 11 
State parties.216 A reason that States were, and remain, reluctant to sign the 
Transport Agreement is that the fifth freedom requires negotiation between 
two foreign States, in contrast to the first four freedoms which involve just 
one other State.217
As mentioned above, the Transit Agreement provides for the first two free-
doms of the air or more specifically, each State party grants to each other 
State party in respect to international air services: (1) the privilege to fly 
across its territory; and, (2) the privilege to land for non-traffic purposes. 
The second freedom is in practice the right to make a technical stopover and 
is defined in the Chicago Convention as ‘landing for any purpose other than 
taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail’.218 It involves stops for, 
for example, refuelling and repairs.
The first and second freedoms together are known as ‘technical freedoms’ or 
‘transit rights’ and can be distinguished from the remaining freedoms of the 
air on the basis that the former do not involve traffic that originates or termi-
nates in the State granting the rights, whilst the latter do. In other words, 
the third to ninth freedoms establish market access for international civil air 
transport. Although the first and second freedoms do not provide market 
access in the sense of the other freedoms, ‘it must not be assumed that 
[they]… are of little economic value’.219 Despite not being directly related 
to market access, the right of overflight has economic consequences.220 This 
point was emphasised by the Representative of Canada during the Chicago 
Conference when he explained that, ‘the only bargaining power possessed 
by many countries in negotiating bilateral agreements is the possession of 
these two Freedoms’.221 Mendes de Leon elaborates on this statement:
‘[c]ountries with a big airspace including but not limited to the Russian Federa-
tion, Indonesia, Canada and Brazil prefer not to accede to the International ASA 
[referring to the Transit Agreement] as they wish to keep their airspace as an asset in 
bilateral negotiations’ (emphasis added).222
216 State parties to the Transport Agreement as at November 2020. See, ICAO, ‘Current Lists 
of Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties – International Air Transport Agreement’, 
available at <www.icao.int/Secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Transport_EN.pdf> 
accessed 13 November 2020.
217 Mendes de Leon (n 119) 59.
218 Chicago Convention, Article 96(d).
219 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 25.
220 Havel and Sanchez (n 112) 76.
221 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention (Document 463) (n 125) 510. 
222 Mendes de Leon (n 119) 57. 
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Canada was a party to the Transit Agreement but denounced it in November 
1986.223 It did so in response to a dispute with the UK in which the UK 
announced its intention to move Air Canada services from Heathrow to 
Gatwick.224 As British carriers used Canadian airspace to fly to the west of 
the US, Canada’s withdrawal was a way of exerting pressure on the UK.225 
Canada subsequently negotiated overflight rights for its territory with the 
signatories to the Transit Agreement by way of diplomatic notes and/or in 
its ASAs, including with the UK on the resolution of the dispute.226
The above provides an indication of how States can use not being a 
party to the Transit Agreement as leverage in negotiations as a result of 
the economic value of the right of overflight. The right of overflight is also 
economically significant by way of the imposition of overflight fees. As 
mentioned previously in Section 2.3.3, Canada and Russia opened up routes 
over the North Pole in 2000. In terms of the economic consequences of this, 
both countries stood to benefit from the collection of overflight fees from 
carriers for these routes, with Russia standing to attract an estimate at the 
time of up to US$200 million per year.227 States are entitled to charge for 
the provision of air navigation facilities under international civil aviation 
law for both scheduled and non-scheduled services228 but, in accordance 
with Article 15 of the Chicago Convention, they must not be higher for 
foreign aircraft than for national aircraft229 and they must not be ‘imposed 
by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over… its 
territory’.230 Put another way, the ICAO Council in its Policies on Charges for 
Airport and Air Navigation Services, provides that they must be non-discrim-
inatory and cost-related.231 These policies, which were first published in 
1974, direct States to impose fees only as part of a ‘cost-recovery system’ 
whereby ‘the State may require the users of such services [air navigation 
services] to pay the portion of costs properly allocable to them’ being ‘the 
full cost of providing the service’, as opposed to a greater cost.232 This full 
223 ICAO, ‘Current Lists of Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties – International Air 
Services Transit Agreement’, Note, page 3, available at <www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/
List%20of%20Parties/Transit_EN.pdf> accessed 1 May 2020. 
224 Email from Roland Dorsay to Pablo Mendes de Leon (6 November 2003). 
225 Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space (n 193) 121.
226 Email from Roland Dorsay to Pablo Mendes de Leon (6 November 2003).
227 Baglole (n 203).
228 Chicago Convention, Articles 15 (a) and (b). 
229 Chicago Convention, Articles 15 (a) and (b).
230 ibid Article 15 (fi nal paragraph). 
231 ICAO Doc 9082, ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services (9th edn, 
2012) vii. The ICAO Council also highlights the importance of the charges being imposed 
in a transparent manner and in consultation with users. 
232 ibid III-1.
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cost includes the ‘cost of capital and depreciation of assets, as well as the 
cost of maintenance, operation, management and administration’.233
 2.3.3.2 The role of ASAs in the exchange of transit and traffic rights
For those States that are not party to the Transit Agreement, the right of 
overflight for scheduled air services is provided along with the other 
freedoms through ASAs. Given that so few States have signed the Trans-
port Agreement, almost all States exchange the third to fifth freedoms 
through ASAs. The right of overflight (along with the second freedom) is 
also commonly included in the ASAs between States that have ratified the 
Transit Agreement.234 For example, the ASA between Australia and New 
Zealand, both of whom are parties to the Transit Agreement, provides under 
Article 3(a) and (b) the right of overflight and the right to make a technical 
stopover.235 This is done for the purpose of ensuring such rights continue 
in the case of a State or States withdrawing from the Transit Agreement.236
ASAs provide for the exchange of the rights and also establish the 
conditions under which the services between the States operate, including 
routes, designation237 and the related ownership and control requirements, 
or equivalent, of carriers under domestic law, capacity, change of gauge,238 
prices and safety, and security matters. As international air transport under-
goes the process of liberalisation, the more restrictive aspects of ASAs are 
increasingly omitted.239 The features of the more liberalised ASAs today 
include freedom with respect to pricing, no capacity restrictions, multiple 
233 ibid III-3.i. Although it is outside the scope of this research, Siberian overfl ight fees have 
been a source of confl ict between Russia and the EU, with the latter claiming that the 
fees are not cost-related, transparent, or imposed non-discriminatorily (‘Air Transport: 
Commission Welcomes Agreement on Siberian Overfl ights’ (European Commission, 
Press Release, 1 December 2011), available at <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-
1490_en.htm> accessed 12 December 2018; Elena Carpanelli, ‘The Siberian Overfl ights 
Issue’ (2011) 11(23) Issues Aviation L & Pol’y 23.
234 Chicago Convention, Annex 2 (10th edn, 2005) Appendix 5 ‘ICAO Template Air Services 
Agreements’, 8.
235 Agreement between Australia and the Government of New Zealand relating to Air 
Services, signed 8 August 2002 [2003] ATS 18 (entered into force 25 August 2003).
236 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Appendix 5 ‘ICAO Template Air Services Agreements’, 8.
237 That is, the carrier(s) permitted to exercise the rights that are exchanged under the ASA.
238 That is, the ‘transfer of passengers between aircraft at a foreign point for a through 
journey’ (Paul Stephen Dempsey, ‘Flights of Fancy and Fights of Fury: Arbitration and 
Adjudication of Commercial and Political Disputes in International Aviation’ (2004) 32(2) 
Ga J Int’l & Comp L 231, 235). See, for example, Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 
between the United States of America and France (USA v France) (1978) XVIII R.I.A.A. 417, 
which involved change of gauge between London and Paris, and which will be discussed 
in Section 3.3.2.1. 
239 Havel and Sanchez (n 112) 70-71.
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designation, and in terms of route rights, the 6th freedom for passenger 
services and the option of the 7th freedom for all-cargo services.240
 2.3.4 Pilotless aircraft
The Chicago Convention imposes different requirements for admission to 
national airspace for pilotless aircraft.
In accordance with Article 8 of the Chicago Convention, special 
permission is required to operate pilotless aircraft over the territory of a 
contracting State:
‘No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a 
pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by 
that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contract-
ing State undertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in 
regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil 
aircraft’.
This article was incorporated into the Chicago Convention from Article 15 
of the Paris Convention, where it appeared in similar form, and ICAO has 
clarified that its scope extends to ‘all unmanned aircraft, whether remotely 
piloted, fully autonomous or combinations thereof’.241
ICAO’s regulation of unmanned aircraft has so far focused on remotely 
piloted aircraft (RPA), a subsection of the broader category of unmanned – 
pilotless – aircraft. An ‘RPA’ is defined in Annexes 2 and 7 of the Chicago 
Convention as ‘an unmanned aircraft which is piloted from a remote pilot 
station’.242 The decision to streamline the development of international 
civil aviation law applicable to unmanned aircraft to focus on RPA in these 
early stages of regulation was made by the Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Study Group (UASSG), a body established to assist the ICAO Secretariat in 
its work on integrating unmanned aircraft into airspace used by manned 
aircraft. The UASSG made this determination on the basis that only aircraft 
with some degree of control exercised over their operation – remotely 
240 See, for example, Air Transport Agreement between the European Union and the Unites 
States of America [2007] OJ L134/5; Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of 
International Air Transportation (Washington DC, 1 May 2001) 2511 U.N.T.S. 33, entered 
into force 21 Dec. 2001; Agreement between Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
relating to Air Services, signed 8 August 2002 [2003] ATS 18 (entered into force 25 August 
2003). 
241 ICAO Doc 10019 AN/507, Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (2015) 1.1. ‘RPAS’ is 
the current term used by ICAO to refer to such aircraft but accurately encompassing all 
aircraft without a pilot on board in a single term presents a defi nitional challenge. See, for 
example, Mikko Huttunen, ‘Unmanned, Remotely Piloted, or Something Else? Analysing 
the Terminological Dogfi ght’ (2017) 42(3) A&SL 349. 
242 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, 1-8 and Annex 7 (6th edn, July 2012) 1.
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piloted, as opposed to autonomous – could be safely integrated.243 As a 
result, although Article 8 applies to pilotless aircraft more broadly, RPA will 
be the focus in this section.
The special permission under Article 8 is required regardless of whether 
the RPA is scheduled or non-scheduled, despite the apparent conflict with 
Article 5 in the case that the RPA aircraft is operating a non-scheduled flight. 
In other words, this aspect of Article 8 takes precedence over the conflicting 
element of Article 5 when both articles are applicable. The primacy of 
Article 8 is based on the principle of lex specialis and on the interpretation of 
the articles in accordance with their ordinary meaning.
The principle of lex specialis is not codified as a rule of treaty interpreta-
tion in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties but it has been relied 
on a number of times by the ICJ.244 Koskenniemi describes the principle 
as a ‘pragmatic mechanism for dealing with situations where two rules 
of international law that are both valid and applicable deal with the same 
subject matter differently’, as is the case regarding prior authorisation under 
Articles 5 and 8 in the event of an operation involving a non-scheduled 
flight conducted by an RPA.245 In these cases, lex specialis dictates that the ‘if 
a matter is being regulated by a general standard as well as a more specific 
rule, then the latter should take precedence over the former’.246 Article 5 of 
the Chicago Convention is the lex generalis in this context, in that it applies 
to all civil aircraft when conducting international non-scheduled flights. 
Article 8 in contrast, applies only to a subset of those aircraft: those that are 
RPA. Article 8 is thus the more specific rule that takes precedence.
The above interpretation is further supported by reading the two arti-
cles ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose’, as dictated by 
the general rules of treaty interpretation.247 In its ordinary meaning, Article 
5 provides that aircraft conducting non-scheduled flights do not require 
special authorisation or permission to overfly another State’s territory, 
whilst Article 8 requires that they do if they are RPA. Considering the arti-
cles in the broader context of the treaty, it is clear that Article 8 necessarily 
has precedence over Article 5 in the interest of safety. One of the principal 
purposes of the Chicago Convention is to help ensure that ‘international 
243 ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (n 241) 1.2.14.
244 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 2010 (Jul. 22) p. 403, p. 438 para. 83; Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, I.C.J. Rep. 1986 (Jun. 27) p. 14, p. 137 para. 274; Case Concerning the Continental 
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1982 (Feb. 24), p. 18, p. 38 
para. 24.
245 ILC ‘Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 92) 30.
246 ibid 34-35.
247 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1).
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civil aviation may be developed in a safe… manner’.248 RPA pose different 
risks to civil aviation and have different requirements than manned aircraft, 
for example in terms of their detect and avoid capabilities and their detect-
ability and conspicuity to other aircraft, as well their communication with 
ATS, among many other considerations.249 It is through the request for 
authorisation that the State whose territory is to be overflown is able to 
ensure that the operation will be conducted safely250 and it is for this reason 
that special permission is required under Article 8, whether or not the RPA 
operates a scheduled air service or a non-scheduled flight. The obligation 
on States to ensure RPA are operated safely is found in Article 8 itself: States 
are required to undertake to ensure that RPA ‘shall be so controlled as to 
obviate danger to civil aircraft’. While the Chicago Convention’s primary 
focus is international civil aviation, this article requires that the safety of all 
civil aircraft – on international or domestic flights – is protected.251
The requirements for the special authorisation for overflight of an 
RPA through national airspace outside its State of Registry are included in 
Annex 2, Appendix 4 to the Chicago Convention, with supporting guide-
lines in ICAO’s 2015 Manual on RPAS.252 From an operational perspective, 
the requirements include that the request for authorisation is made to ‘the 
appropriate authorities of the State(s) in which the RPA will operate’, which 
is usually the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), and that the request is made 
at least seven days before the intended flight.253 ICAO has issued a template 
form to submit the request,254 in accordance with the criteria under Annex 
2, which includes a request for information about, for example, the RPA 
operator and technical details of the RPA.255
Beyond the scope of Article 8 of the Chicago Convention, States are not 
bound by how they grant overflight rights for RPA and States are free to 
deviate from the ICAO specifications mentioned in the above paragraph. In 
pursuance of ICAO’s objective that international civil aviation is ‘developed 
in a safe and orderly manner’ and that air transport services are operated 
‘soundly and economically’,256 it is in ICAO’s interest that States eventually 
reach broader agreements facilitating the overflight of RPA, as has been 
248 Chicago Convention, Preamble. This is reiterated in Article 44, where the aims and objec-
tives of ICAO include ensuring (a) ‘…the safe … growth of international civil aviation 
throughout the world’ and meeting (d) ‘…the needs of peoples of the world for safe … air 
transport’. 
249 As identifi ed by ICAO, for example, when stating that ‘[s]afety analyses may be needed 
to establish RPAS capabilities to mitigate consequences of each specifi c hazard that may 
be encountered’ (ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (n 241) 10.2.5). 
250 See the template ‘Request for Authorization Form’ provided by ICAO for a more compre-
hensive list of the considerations (ibid Appendix A).
251 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 112.
252 ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (n 241) (2015).
253 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Appendix 4, 3.1.
254 ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (n 241) Appendix A.
255 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Appendix 4, 3.2.
256 ibid Preamble.
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achieved for manned aviation. For this purpose, ICAO emphasises that 
‘States may agree mutually upon simpler procedures through bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements for the operation of specific RPA 
or categories of RPA’.257
The obvious benefit of these broader bilateral or multilateral arrange-
ments in favour of ad hoc authorisation is that they reduce the burden on 
both RPA operators who have to submit the requests and on the State 
authorities responsible for processing them.258 The operation of civil RPA 
is at present still predominantly restricted to national borders, although 
not exclusively. A 2016 ICAO survey found that, of the 61 Member States 
that responded, 26 had received requests in the last two years from foreign 
RPA operators, pursuant to Article 8 of the Chicago Convention, for ‘special 
authorisation’ to operate RPAs in their territories.259
State aircraft, whether they are RPA or manned aircraft, fall outside 
the Chicago regime, that is, from the Chicago Convention and its annexes. 
Overflight rights for their operation stem from an entirely independent 
framework from that which has been set out above for civil aircraft, as will 
be addressed in the following section. 
 2.4 Overflight rights for State aircraft in national airspace
2.4.1 Preliminary matters
Under Article 3(b) of the Chicago Convention, ‘aircraft used in military, 
customs and police services shall be deemed to be State aircraft’ (emphasis 
added). In this sense, State aircraft are defined ‘not by ownership or even 
control, but by a purely functional test’.260 Whether an aircraft is a State 
aircraft or a civil aircraft is significant because State aircraft are expressly 
excluded from the scope of the Chicago Convention and its annexes.261 The 
implications of this for national airspace will be addressed here below.
The focus in this section is the consequences of the exclusion for the 
exchange of overflight rights but the impact is much greater, going beyond 
the scope of the Chicago Convention, the annexes attached to it, and the 
ASAs that flow from it, to the applicability of insurance policies and inter-
national air law instruments more broadly.262 For example, the criminal law 
257 ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (n 241) 3.2.2. At the time of writing, the 
author is not aware of any such agreements or arrangements being in place.
258 ICAO Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (n 241) 3.2.2.
259 ICAO Working Paper LC/37-WP/2-1, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Legal Survey (26 
July 2017) 4.4.1 and Appendix A-9.
260 Bin Cheng, ‘The Destruction of KAL Flight KE007, and Article 3 bis of the Chicago 
Convention’ in JWE Storm van ‘s Gravensande and A van der Veen Vonk (eds), Air 
Worthy – Liber Amicorum Honouring Professor Dr IHPh Diederiks Verschoor (Kluwer 1985) 64.
261 Chicago Convention, Article 3(a). 
262 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 77.
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treaties in relation to international civil aviation do not apply to ‘aircraft 
used in military, customs or police service’263 and the Warsaw/Montreal 
regime is applicable to carriage performed by the State or by legally consti-
tuted public bodies, but States can make a reservation to exclude carriage 
performed directly by the State.264
Insofar as the exchange of overflight rights is concerned, in principle 
and without further negotiation between States, State aircraft are only 
permitted to fly above the territory of the State in which they are registered 
and over international airspace. In contrast to the regime for civil aircraft 
established through the Transit Agreement and ASAs, the framework that 
regulates the overflight of State aircraft is largely based on ad hoc arrange-
ments between States.
The purpose of this section is first to briefly address the distinction 
between State aircraft and civil aircraft (Section 2.4.2) and second, to set 
out the framework governing the grant of overflight rights in relation to 
the international operation of State aircraft (Section 2.4.4). The legal basis of 
overflight rights under the framework stems from clearances or authorisa-
tions, known as ‘diplomatic clearances’, granted to a State aircraft, in respect 
of a certain flight or flights or for a certain duration of time, by the relevant 
authority of the State whose territory is to be overflown, in response to an 
application made through diplomatic channels.
 2.4.2 The definition of State aircraft
2.4.2.1 State aircraft under the Paris Convention (1919) and the Chicago 
Convention (1944)
The Paris Convention distinguished between State aircraft and civil 
aircraft and, like the Chicago Convention, also excluded the former from 
its scope.265 Under Articles 30(a) and (b) of the Paris Convention, military 
263 Convention on Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963) ICAO Doc 8364, 
Article 1(4) (‘Tokyo Convention’); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft (1970) ICAO Doc 8920, Article 3(2) (‘Hague Convention’); and, Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971) ICAO Doc 
8966, Article 4(1) (‘Montreal Convention 1971’). Neither does the Convention on Damage 
Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (1952) ICAO Doc 7364, Article 
26 (‘Rome Convention’). 
264 Convention for the Unifi cation of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (1999) 
ICAO Doc 9740, Article 57 (‘Montreal Convention 1999’); Convention for the Unifi cation 
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (1929) Conférence Internatio-
nale de Droit Privé Aérien (Warsaw), Article 2(1) (‘Warsaw Convention’). The inclusion 
of carriage performed by the State under the Warsaw/Montreal regime makes sense 
considering that at the time of the drafting of the Warsaw Convention ‘in 1929 there were 
in fact no ‘private’ carriers and, except in the USA and possibly Japan, the airlines were 
government owned and government controlled’ (Milde, International Air Law and ICAO 
(n 91) 69).
265 Paris Convention, Article 30.
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aircraft together with ‘aircraft exclusively employed in State service’ were 
expressly considered State aircraft, where State service included ‘posts, 
customs and police’. The Convention defined none of these terms although 
a definition of sorts was provided for military aircraft: ‘[e]very aircraft 
commanded by a person in military service detailed for the purpose shall 
be deemed to be a military aircraft’.266 Goedhuis criticised this definition for 
the fact that it failed to take into account the characteristics of the aircraft 
itself and his view that the article ought to be amended was shared by the 
International Commission for Air Navigation at the time.267
Further ambiguity arose as a result of Article 30(b) providing that all 
other aircraft are ‘private aircraft’268 and therefore within the scope of the 
Convention, but then proceeding to state that ‘[a]ll State aircraft other 
than military, customs and police aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft’ 
(emphasis added). This resulted in what has been described as a ‘curious 
feature’, whereby aircraft employed exclusively for postal services were 
initially included and then excluded from the definition of State aircraft.269 
The overall ambiguity of Article 30 was compounded by the initial reference 
to ‘State service’ in Article 30(a) which suggested, through the use of the 
words ‘such as’, that ‘posts, customs, police’ were examples, rather than 
constituting an exhaustive list, of State services. Considering that all aircraft 
had to fall into one of the two categories – State aircraft or private aircraft –
it is not possible for all aircraft other than military, customs and police 
aircraft to be private aircraft if the term ‘State aircraft’ included aircraft used 
for military, customs, police and postal services, among others.
266 ibid Article 31. 
267 ‘Tegen deze begripsformuleering vallen ernstige bezwaren in te brengen. Het is onjuist 
het militaire karakter van een luchtvaartuig uitsluitend door een persoonlijk criterium 
(een militair als commandant) te doen bepalen, terwijl het objectieve criterium (de tech-
nische eigenschappen en de uitrusting van het toestel) buiten beschouwing blijft. Het feit, 
dat een militair luchtvaartuig niet onder militair commando wordt gevolgen, verandert 
niets aan het karakter van het luchtvaarttuig’ (Daniel Goedhuis, Handboek voor het 
Luchtrecht (Martinus Nijhoff 1943) 62, translated: ‘There are serious objections to be raised 
regarding this method of interpretation. It is incorrect to determine the military character 
of an aircraft exclusively on the basis of the personality criterion (a military offi cer as 
commander), while disregarding the objective criterion (the technical characteristics and 
the equipment of the aircraft). The fact that the military aircraft is not under military 
command changes nothing of the character of the aircraft’. Goedhuis refers here to Reso-
lution no 1055 of the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN) (27th Meeting, 
Copenhagen 1939) 39.1, recognising that an attempt by the Commission to amend Article 
30 had at that point not been successful. See also, discussion of this in JP Honig, The Legal 
Status of Aircraft (Martinus Nijhoff 1956) 38. 
268 The term ‘private aircraft’ refers to what we now term ‘civil aircraft’. This shift in 
language from the Paris Convention to the Chicago Convention took place as a result of a 
suggestion referred to the drafting Committee of Subcommittee 2 on 10 November 1944 
(ICAO WP/2-1, Secretariat Study on ‘Civil/State Aircraft’, Presented by the Secretariat at 
the Legal Committee 29th Session, Montreal (3 March 1994) Attachment I at 2.2.1).
269 Honig (n 267) 37.
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Article 3(b) of the Chicago Convention removes some of the confu-
sion brought about by the Paris Convention, such as that regarding postal 
services, but it does not provide an unambiguous distinction between State 
and civil aircraft. The Chairman of the drafting committee of Article 3 of the 
Chicago Convention recognised in 1949, that the ‘language used was under-
stood to be vague’ but that the final wording was preferable to an attempt 
to define aircraft in a fixed form, as opposed to by its use on a particular 
flight.270 Regardless, international civil aviation law must contend with 
the questions that Article 3 raises, a task that the ICAO Legal Committee 
Secretariat undertook in a 1994 report, echoing the Chairman’s words in its 
acknowledgment that ‘there are no clear generally accepted international 
rules, whether conventional or customary, as to what constitute state aircraft 
and what constitute civil aircraft in the field of air law’.271
Article 3(b) states that aircraft that fall within the specified categories 
‘shall be deemed to be’ State aircraft, but it does not define the term ‘State 
aircraft’. Like the Paris Convention, ‘military’, ‘customs’ and ‘police’ are 
also not defined. As was the case with the Paris Convention, it is also 
unclear from the wording of the article whether the list is exhaustive, that is, 
whether State aircraft are exclusively those used for military, customs and 
police services or whether aircraft used for other State functions, such as 
post or search and rescue, are also classified as State aircraft. Furthermore, 
the article leaves open the question of whether aircraft used for the services 
listed can ever be considered civil, rather than State, aircraft.
2.4.2.2 Subsequent ICAO consideration
The ICAO Legal Committee Secretariat, (‘the Secretariat’) interprets Article 
3(b) restrictively, concluding that aircraft used for military, customs and 
police services are necessarily State aircraft272 and that no other aircraft are 
State aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Convention.273 In reaching 
this interpretation, the Secretariat considered, among other things, that the 
Chicago Convention does not explicitly deviate from the provision in the 
Paris Convention, which stated that all aircraft other than those listed as 
State aircraft were to be considered civil aircraft. Although this provision 
was omitted from Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, the fact that it did 
not expressly deviate from it is, according to the Secretariat, indicative that 
there was no intention to broaden the definition of State aircraft.274
Consistent with the ordinary meaning of Article 3(b) of the Chicago 
Convention, the Secretariat has furthermore emphasised that it is the usage 
that determines whether an aircraft is a State or civil aircraft and not ‘other 
270 ICAO Secretariat Study on ‘Civil/State Aircraft’ (n 268) Attachment I at 5.2.4.
271 ibid Attachment I at 1.1.
272 ICAO Secretariat Study on ‘Civil/State Aircraft’ (n 268) Attachment I at 5.1.1.
273 ibid Attachment I at 5.2.3 – 5.2.4.
274 ibid Attachment I at 5.2.3.
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factors, such as aircraft registration… ownership (public or private), type 
of operator (private/state), except insofar as these criteria go towards showing 
the type of usage’ (emphasis added).275 Other factors, including the technical 
specifications of the aircraft, such as its speed and capacity, may also 
contribute in this respect.276
2.4.2.3 Distinctions in other legal frameworks specific to purpose
The ICAO Legal Committee Secretariat has also recognised that civil aircraft 
under the Chicago Convention may be treated as State aircraft in the context 
of other legal frameworks.277 Where this occurs though, it is not indicative 
of the categorisation of the aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Conven-
tion.
As the ICAO Secretariat explains in the case of medical aircraft under 
the First Geneva Convention of 1949:278
‘The fact that an aircraft is a medical aircraft under the Red Cross Conventions 
and the Protocol does not give it a special status vis-à-vis the Chicago Conven-
tion; an analysis will have to be made, as in the case of any other aircraft, to see if 
it falls under Article 3(b)’.279
Conversely, the Geneva Conventions:280
‘…do not link their own scopes of applicability to the determination under the 
Chicago Convention of the status of an aircraft. The Conventions of 1949 refer 
to civil and military aircraft, but not to these terms as ‘defined’ under Chicago. 
275 ibid Attachment I at 1.3.
276 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 74-75. See also, for a discussion on factors 
that are taken into account, Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘Legal Issues of the Snowden Case: 
State Aircraft vs. Civil Aircraft’ (2013) 62(4) ZLW 648, 652.
277 ICAO Secretariat Study on ‘Civil/State Aircraft’ (n 268) Attachment I at 5.2.6.
278 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949) 75 UNTS 31 entered into force 21 Oct. 
1950, Articles 36 and 37 (‘First Geneva Convention’).
279 ICAO Secretariat Study on ‘Civil/State Aircraft’ (n 268) Attachment I at 4.6.1.
280 In addition to the First Geneva Convention: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
(Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949) 75 UNTS 85 287 entered into force 21 Oct. 1950 (‘Second Geneva 
Convention’); Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, 
12 Aug. 1949) 75 UNTS 135 287 entered into force 21 Oct. 1950 (‘Third Geneva Conven-
tion’); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949) 75 UNTS 287 entered into force 21 Oct. 1950 (‘Fourth Geneva 
Convention’); together with Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Confl icts (Protocol 
I) (Geneva, 8 Jun. 1977) 1125 UNTS 3 entered into force 7 Dec. 1978 and  Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Confl icts (Protocol II) (Geneva, 8 Jun. 1977) 1125 UNTS 609 
entered into force 7 Dec. 1978.
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Consequently, the provisions of the Chicago Convention does [sic] not, and can-
not, determine whether and to what extent the flight crew of an aircraft is given 
protection by these Conventions’.281
This is also the case in EU aviation law. For example, Regulation (EU) 
2018/1139 (EASA Basic Regulation)282 addresses regulatory matters such 
as airworthiness, environmental certification and flight crew licensing, 
excludes from its scope ‘aircraft… while carrying out military, customs, 
police, search and rescue, fire fighting, border control, coastguard, or similar 
activities or services’.283
Eurocontrol, on the other hand, defines State aircraft and civil aircraft 
for ATM purposes using the terminology of the Chicago Convention. This 
position was clarified by the Provisional Council for Eurocontrol284 in 2001 
when it issued a decision on the definition of State aircraft in which it stated 
that such aircraft are, ‘with reference to article 3(b) of the Chicago Conven-
tion, only aircraft used in military, customs and police services’ and that 
‘civil registered aircraft used by a State for other than military, customs and 
police service shall not qualify as State aircraft’.285 The same definition is 
used in the EU in the framework regulation for the Single European Sky 
(SES),286 and related legislation,287 which was implemented to meet the 
safety and capacity needs of the European ATM network, of which Euro-
control is the network manager.
281 ICAO Secretariat Study on ‘Civil/State Aircraft’ (n 268) Attachment I at 4.6.1 - 4.6.2.
282 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 
on common rules in the fi eld of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation 
Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) 
No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 
and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No 3922/91 (‘EASA Basic Regulation’).
283 EASA Basic Regulation, Article 2(3)(a).
284 This body is ‘responsible for implementing Eurocontrol’s general policy’ and consists 
of representatives of the Member States of the Agency at the level of Director General 
of Civil Aviation (Eurocontrol, ‘Governing Bodies’, available at <www.eurocontrol.int/
info/governing-bodies> accessed 1 August 2020).
285 Eurocontrol, ‘Decision of the Provision al Council – Defi nition of State Aircraft’ (Session 
11, 12 July 2001) Principle 1. 
286 Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 
2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky (the frame-
work Regulation), Article 2(26).
287 Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009 of 16 January 2009 laying down requirements 
on data link services for the single European sky, Article 2(6); Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 1079/2012 of 16 November 2012 laying down requirements for voice 
channels spacing for the single European sky, Article 3(9). Although not related to the 
SES, also consider as an example of a piece of EU legislation that distinguishes between 
civil aircraft and State aircraft strictly in accordance with the terms of the Chicago 
Convention, Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on insurance requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators, 
Article 2(2)(a).
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Unlike EASA, Eurocontrol’s ATM coordination division provides sup -
port to Member States for both civil aircraft and military aircraft and the 
distinction between the two is not for the purpose of excluding the latter 
but instead for ensuring an appropriate provision of ATM services based on 
the specifications of the aircraft involved. In the region under the manage-
ment of Eurocontrol,288 air traffic is divided into general air traffic (GAT) 
and operational air traffic (OAT), where GAT includes ‘all movements of 
civil aircraft, as well as movements of State aircraft (including military, 
customs and police aircraft) when these movements are carried out in 
conformity with the procedures of ICAO’.289 OAT is designed to facilitate 
flights involving aircraft that are not equipped to meet the requirements for 
GAT, such as those that lack certain communication or navigation tools or, 
particularly in the case of military aircraft, those that are expected to under-
take activities that are not addressed by ICAO, such as airborne refueling 
or formation flying.290 Within a State, regulations applying to State aircraft, 
including military aircraft, may be a combination of OAT rules and rules 
determined through bilateral and regional arrangements.
2.4.2.4 Ambiguity of definition not a practical concern for States
Despite the ongoing lack of clarity in the distinction under the Chicago 
Convention, the question is, in recent years, no longer seen as a paramount 
concern to States. This is most evident in the response to a 2016 ICAO ques-
tionnaire on the subject, which was distributed to ICAO Member States in 
response to a Working Paper that was submitted the year prior on behalf 
of ten Member States addressing what they described as ‘an absence of 
clear and generally accepted international rules’ regarding the distinction 
between State aircraft and civil aircraft.291 Fifty-five States responded to the 
288 41 States including all EU Member States (as at November 2020).
289 Eurocontrol, ‘General Air Traffi c’, available at <ext.eurocontrol.int/lexicon/index.php/
General_Air_Traffi c> accessed 20 February 2019.
290 Eurocontrol Specifi cations for Harmonized Rules for Operational Air Traffi c (OAT) under 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) inside Controlled Airspace of the ECAC Area (EUROAT) 
(18 September 2016) 1.1.2.  OAT applies to ‘all fl ights which do not comply with the 
provisions stated for GAT and for which rules and procedures have been specifi ed by 
appropriate national authorities’ (Eurocontrol, ‘Operational Air Traffi c’, available at <ext.
eurocontrol.int/lexicon/index.php/Operational_Air_Traffic> accessed 20 February 
2019). OAT follows ICAO rules as closely as possible and deviations from the rules are 
published by Eurocontrol.
291 ICAO WP/2-6, State/Civil Aircraft Definition and its Impact on Aviation, Presented by 
Poland, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Hungary at the Legal Committee 36th Session, Montreal (29 September 
2015) 1.2.
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questionnaire, with only eight of those reporting any concern.292 As a result, 
at the 37th Session of the Legal Committee in September 2018, the matter of 
the distinction between State aircraft and civil aircraft was removed from 
the Committee’s General Work Programme.293
Of course, at the heart of the matter is the concept of State sovereignty, 
on which some States see a global, harmonised approach as an encroach-
ment. Echoing the words of the Chairman of the drafting committee of 
Article 3, Ecuador, addressing the matter, spoke of ‘the legal straightjacket 
interfering with the sovereignty of States’ and emphasised that ‘[t]he 
breadth with which the Article [Article 3(b)] had been drafted had made 
it possible for Contracting States to maintain their sovereignty and clas-
sify their aircraft under their own legislation’,294 while Argentina likewise 
approved of the ambiguity of the article, which ‘left it to the will of the 
States to determine whether an operation was ‘State’ or ‘civil’ in nature’.295 
At the very least, the pursuit of a definition may be viewed as a losing battle 
by other States, with India having declared, in relation to finding a clear 
definition, that ‘international affairs would always be subject to the problem 
of conflicting interpretations and that no detail of clarification could resolve 
this problem completely’.296
 2.4.3 State aircraft not completely excluded from the Chicago Convention 
and its annexes
Before turning to the framework governing the grant of overflight rights 
in relation to the international operation of State aircraft, the following 
section provides a brief qualification to the statement that State aircraft are 
excluded from the scope of the Chicago Convention. Despite the express 
exclusion of State aircraft from the Chicago Convention under its Article 
3(a), some provisions of the Convention and its annexes apply, or may be 
applied, to State aircraft.
This begins in Article 3 itself where Article 3(c), regarding the require-
ment for State aircraft to receive special authorisation, in effect results in 
the same requirements as the first part of Article 8 applying to pilotless 
aircraft. Furthermore, under Article 3(d), in issuing regulations for their 
State aircraft, contracting States are required to undertake to have due 
292 ICAO WP/2, Consideration of other Items on the General Work Programme of the Legal 
Committee, Presented by the Secretariat at the Legal Committee 37th Session, Montreal (12 
July 2018) 4.4.
293 ibid 4.5 c).
294 ICAO Secretariat Study on ‘Civil/State Aircraft’ (n 268) Attachment 2 (Extract of the Draft 
Summary Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the 140th Session of the Council held on 22 
November 1993) at 15.
295 ibid at 10.
296 ibid at 8.
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regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft. This is, again, consistent 
with the obligation imposed on States under the second part of Article 8 in 
relation to pilotless aircraft.297 ICAO also has a role in achieving coordination 
between military and civil aircraft pursuant to Article 3(d) of the Chicago 
Convention in order to help ensure that States exercise the required due 
regard under the article.
Huang has discussed this matter in relation to Article 3 bis,298 which 
addresses the obligation of States to refrain from the use of weapons against 
civil aircraft in flight, concluding, with reference to Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, that such an interpretation ‘would 
lead to ‘a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ if one were to 
conclude that [the article] is not applicable to state aircraft’.299 In particular, 
Huang highlights the fact that interception of civil aircraft under the article 
would most likely be carried out by State aircraft and so the requirement 
under Article 3 bis (a) – that it be done without jeopardising the lives of 
persons on board and the safety of the aircraft – and the corresponding 
rules for the interception of civil aircraft in the Appendix to Annex 2 are 
directed to any aircraft performing the task, whether it be a State aircraft or 
a civil aircraft.300 The willingness of States to provide ICAO with the power 
to legislate for State aircraft in this instance reflects the States’ recognition 
of the potentially catastrophic consequences for civil aircraft involved in 
interception and the role that regulation can play in helping to avoid such 
consequences.301
Civil aviation rules have also been applied to State aircraft in the case 
of aircraft accident investigation. This occurred for instance after the 2010 
aircraft accident in which the Polish President Lech Kaczyński, his wife, and 
a number of other Polish political and military leaders were killed, when 
the rules on aircraft accident and incident investigation under Annex 13 of 
the Chicago Convention were applied.302
The examples presented here are not comprehensive but are designed 
to demonstrate that, despite being explicitly excluded from the Chicago 
Convention, State aircraft remain subject to some of its provisions.
297 As such, whilst the provisions of Article 8 do not apply to RPAS employed for State 
purposes, similar considerations must be taken into account by contracting States that 
employ such RPAS, as a result of the general State aircraft provisions under the Convention.
298 See also, Section 2.3.2 in relation to Annex 17.
299 Huang (n 127) 111, in part quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 
31(3). See also, Cheng, ‘The Destruction of KAL fl ight KE007’ (n 260) 63.
300 Huang (n 127) 111.
301 The information contained in this sentence was provided by Professor Ludwig Weber 
(McGill University) through an interview with the author on 28 May 2019 at the Institute 
of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal.
302 Piotr Kasprzyk, ‘Legal ramifi cations of the Investigations of the 2010 Polish President’s 
Aircraft Accident’ (2011) 36(3) A&SL 201. 
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 2.4.4 The framework for the overflight of State aircraft
State aircraft operate over the territory of other States on the basis of diplo-
matic clearances. There is no international practice for this and the opera-
tion of State aircraft is instead largely negotiated on a bilateral basis. The 
authority responsible for granting the clearance depends on the structural 
and procedural peculiarities of the State and may also differ based on the 
type of State aircraft involved, that it, whether it is used for police, customs 
or military services. For example, in the US the clearances are granted by the 
Office of International Security Operations in coordination with the Depart-
ment of Transportation, the Department of Homeland Security, the Depart-
ment of Defense, US Secret Service and airport authorities, as relevant.303 In 
Sweden, the government body responsible depends on the purpose of the 
operation: the Department of Defence (Regeringskansliet) grants the clear-
ance for military aircraft, while police and customs aircraft are considered 
by the Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjöfartsverket).304 In Singapore, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the responsible authority,305 in Australia it 
is the Department of Defence,306 and in Switzerland it is the Federal Office 
of Civil Aviation, in agreement with the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
the Swiss Air Force.307 Upon issuing the diplomatic clearance, the granting 
State provides the aircraft with a diplomatic clearance number, which is 
then required to be submitted with the flight plan.
The length of prior notice required for obtaining the clearance differs 
between States, as does the information required by the State of overflight. 
The type of information may include the purpose of the mission, whether 
there are weapons or harmful substances on board, and whether there are 
photographic sensors or cameras attached to the aircraft.308 The requirement 
for States to inform of and obtain permission for the carriage of weapons is 
an obligation that extends beyond bilateral diplomatic clearance arrange-
ments for State aircraft to also include civil aircraft by way of Article 35 
of the Chicago Convention. Under this article, States are prohibited from 
303 US Department of State, ‘Diplomatic Aircraft Clearance Procedures for Foreign State 
Aircraft to Operate in United States National Airspace’, available at <www.state.gov/
diplomatic-aircraft-clearance-procedures-for-foreign-state-aircraft-to-operate-in-united-
states-national-airspace/> accessed 1 August 2020.
304 Swedish Armed Forces, ‘Diplomatic Clearances’, available at <www.forsvarsmakten.se/
en/about/diplomatic-clearances/> accessed 18 March 2019.
305 Aeronautical Information Publication Singapore, GEN 1.2 Entry, Transit and Departure 
of Aircraft – 3.1.1.3 Civil Non-Scheduled Flights – Overfl ight (21 July 2016).
306 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Diplomatic Clear-
ances – Aircraft and Ships’, available at <www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/foreign-embassies/
protocol/Pages/diplomatic-clearances-aircraft-and-ships> accessed 5 January 2019.
307 Switzerland, Federal Offi ce for Civil Aviation (FOCA), ‘Diplomatic Clearances’, available 
at <www.bazl.admin.ch/diplomaticclearances> accessed 1 August 2020.
308 See, for example, the EU Diplomatic Clearance Technical Arrangement (DIC TA) Form, 
available at <dic.eda.europa.eu/> accessed 13 March 2020. 
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carrying ‘munitions of war or implements of war in or above the territory of 
a State in aircraft engaged in international navigation, except by permission 
of such State’.
Clearances under specific circumstances are also governed at a multi-
lateral level, such as for example, those in the scope of the European 
Convention on Extradition.309 Article 21(4) of this Convention requires noti-
fication of overflight and unscheduled landing and a request for transit in 
the case of intended landing, for flights within the scope of the Convention. 
Although the article does not mention the term ‘State aircraft’, the aircraft 
on these flights would likely be classified as State aircraft because, even 
without regard to other relevant factors, extradition is an act of the State.
The result of this system of bilateral agreements is that an international 
flight of a State aircraft involving the overflight of more than one State in 
addition to the State in which the aircraft is registered, must generally be 
organised segment by segment. For example, a State aircraft flying from 
Romania to Spain will, in the absence of harmonised arrangements, as to 
which see below, need to obtain diplomatic clearances for each of the States 
whose airspace it operates over. In order to avoid the burden of having to 
obtain individual diplomatic clearances for each flight, or for each portion 
of territorial airspace for a flight where overflight of multiple countries is 
involved, some States and organisations have harmonised agreements in 
place. These agreements operate as a type of blanket arrangement for the 
operation of certain State aircraft, providing prior permission for the speci-
fied State aircraft of the participating States to operate in the airspace of 
the other participating States. For example, the European Union Defence 
Agency’s (EDA) Diplomatic Clearance Technical Arrangement (DIC TA) 
facilitates the overflight of military transport aircraft of the States involved 
over the other States’ territories.310 Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), which in peacetime uses bilateral agreements for the 
operation of its aircraft,311 has also considered implementing harmonised 
arrangements between NATO member States.312
309 European Convention on Extradition (Paris, 13 December 1957) ETS 24.
310 The DIC TA was fi rst signed by 11 Member States on 19 November 2012 and now, in its 
current form as amended in 2017, it has 17 Member State signatures (European Defence 
Agency, ‘Diplomatic Clearances’, available at <dic.eda.europa.eu/> accessed 3 January 
2019). See also, European Commission, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council – Improving Military Mobility in the European Union’ (Brussels, 10 
November 2017, JOIN(2017) 41 fi nal) 4.
311 ‘NATO Policy for Civil/Military Aircraft Operating in Support of NATO or NATO-led 
Missions and Operations’ (NATO, 2016) 8. See also, ICAO European and North Atlantic 
Offi ce EUR Doc 032, Interim Guidance Material on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffi c 
Management (2nd edn, 2016) 30.
312 European Commission, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council – Improving Military Mobility in the European Union’ (Brussels, 10 November 
2017, JOIN(2017) 41 fi nal) 4.
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2.5 In summary: The grant of overflight rights in national 
airspace
The legal basis for the right of overflight depends on the airspace in ques-
tion – national or international – as well as the type of aircraft involved. 
This chapter so far has established the legal bases for overflight rights in 
national airspace for civil aircraft, taking into account whether the aircraft 
is manned or unmanned and whether the operation is a scheduled service 
or a non-scheduled flight, as well as for State aircraft, which fall outside the 
scope of the Chicago Convention.
Overflight rights are granted by a State in respect to the navigation of 
aircraft in the airspace over its territory. The first part of the chapter exam-
ined the relationship between sovereignty and territory in international civil 
aviation law and the interaction between this area of law and the law of the 
sea and space law in determining the limits of national airspace. Whilst the 
horizontal limits are clear under international law, despite some disputed 
claims to an extended territorial sea, the vertical extent of national airspace 
is yet to be delimited.
Over national airspace, the grant of overflight rights for civil aircraft 
is conducted pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Chicago Convention. 
If the navigation involves manned aircraft on a non-scheduled flight, the 
grant of overflight rights is provided on a multilateral basis under Article 
5 for aircraft of State parties to the Convention. Under Article 6, scheduled 
air services are permitted to fly over the territory of another State only 
with prior permission from that State. This provision forms the basis of the 
framework of ASAs that facilitate international air transport. For the right of 
overflight however, the Transit Agreement provides for the exchange of the 
right on a multilateral basis. Despite this, the right of overflight, together 
with the right to make technical stopovers, is usually reiterated in the 
ASAs of States that are party to the Transit Agreement. For unmanned civil 
aircraft, special permission is required for operation over another State’s 
territory. This is even in the case of unmanned aircraft conducting a non-
scheduled flight because, in the case of Articles 5 and 8 applying, the latter, 
as lex specialis, takes precedence over the former.
State aircraft are explicitly excluded from the scope of the Chicago 
Convention and therefore from the legal framework that governs the 
overflight rights for civil aircraft. State aircraft are instead generally granted 
overflight rights through bilateral ad hoc arrangements. As with the grant of 
special permission to facilitate the overflight of civil unmanned aircraft, in 
some instances arrangements have been put in place for a move towards a 
more harmonised approach to the grant of overflight rights for State aircraft, 
which would decrease the burden on both the granting and requesting 
States. In the case of State aircraft, the discussion surrounding a more 
harmonised approach is at present centred around the operation of aircraft 
within the activities of specific agencies (EDA) and organisations (NATO), 
rather than the international operation of State aircraft on a general basis.
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The chapter up to this point has provided the foundation for the anal-
ysis in the remainder of the chapter which first examines the restriction of 
overflight rights over national airspace and, second, the basis for overflight 
rights in international airspace, where the interaction of the law of the sea 
with overflight is a central consideration. 
 2.6 Restriction and regulation of overflight rights in national 
airspace
2.6.1 Withdrawal, suspension and revocation
The grant of the right of overflight by a State to the aircraft of another State 
is subject to compliance with applicable laws under both international 
law and the domestic law of the granting State. This section will consider 
the general circumstances giving rise to the withdrawal, suspension and 
revocation of overflight rights rather than look at specific ASAs or domestic 
laws. As such, reference to revocation under ASAs will be based on the 
template ASAs (TASAs) provided by ICAO. In the words of ICAO, the 
TASAs ‘include draft provisions on traditional, transitional and most liberal 
approaches to various elements in an air services agreement’ representing ‘a 
distillation of the most common and current usage by States’.313 The TASAs 
have no legal value but are provided as guidance to States in drafting their 
ASAs.
As has been outlined above in Section 2.3.3.1, for international civil avia-
tion most States have exchanged overflight rights for scheduled air services 
in relation to their territory through the Transit Agreement, concluded in 
1944 together with the Chicago Convention. For those States that are not 
party to the Transit Agreement, the exchange is made through ASAs on a 
bilateral basis, to be exercised by the designated carrier under the ASAs or, 
in the case of a more liberalised ASA, by all carriers of each State under the 
agreement.
Regardless of the source of the overflight right, in order for a carrier 
to exercise it, the granting State – or, more accurately, the aeronautical 
authority of the State – must have provided the carrier with operating 
authorisations and technical permissions based on a number of conditions, 
which are set out in the Transit Agreement and ASAs. The circumstances 
that are considered in the initial grant of the authorisation are in turn those 
that give rise to the right to withdraw, revoke or suspend a carrier’s oper-
ating authorisation.314 Of course, further to the right to retract overflight 
rights as a result of the circumstances that will be discussed in this section, 
States also reserve the right to denounce and withdraw from the Transit 
313 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Appendix 5 ‘ICAO Template Air Services Agreements’, 1.
314 ibid 9 and 13.
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Agreement and the ASAs that they enter into, with the standard period of 
notice being twelve months.315
Two overarching scenarios provide a State with the right to withdraw, 
revoke or suspend overflight rights under both the Transit Agreement and 
ASAs: when the State granting the authorisation to the carrier is not satis-
fied that the ownership and control requirements, or equivalent, are met by 
the carrier; and, when the carrier has contravened the domestic law of the 
granting State.316 The latter obligation, to operate in accordance with the 
domestic laws of the State whose territory is being overflown, reflects Article 
11 of the Chicago Convention, which imposes an obligation on aircraft 
operating in the territory of another State to comply with the laws and 
regulations of that State regarding the operation and navigation of aircraft.
The ownership and control requirements on the other hand are imposed 
to determine which carriers are entitled to receive the special permission 
or authorisation referred to in Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, by way 
of allocation as a designated carrier under the ASA. The requirement that 
the carrier is substantially owned and effectively controlled by the State 
or nationals of the State in which it is registered is part of the traditional, 
restrictive approach to air transport governance and while the formula 
is gradually being replaced by more liberal requirements, it persists in a 
majority of ASAs.317 The definitions of ‘substantial ownership’ and ‘effective 
control’ are subject to domestic law in the absence of internationally agreed 
definitions. In many cases though, such as for EU Member States under 
Regulation (EC) 1008/2008, a carrier meets the ‘substantial ownership’ crite-
rion if more than 50 per cent of its equity is owned by the State or nationals 
of the State.318 The US differs in this respect, requiring at least 75 per cent of 
the voting equity to be owned by the State or national of the State in order 
for the carrier to be able to be considered as an US designated carrier.319 
The approach to ‘effective control’ is more varied across jurisdictions and 
measuring it is more difficult. In the EU for instance, again under Regula-
tion (EC) 1008/2008, it involves consideration of ‘the possibility of directly 
or indirectly exercising a decisive influence on an undertaking’, including 
consideration of the right to use its assets and of involvement in decision-
315 This is provided in the Transit Agreement under Article III.
316 ibid Article 1, Section 5.
317 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Appendix 5 (ICAO Template Air Services Agreements), 9.
318 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008, Article 4(f). The same hurdle applies under domestic law, 
for example, in Australia, although there it only applies to carriers fl ying international 
routes and there are no restrictions on foreign ownership for carriers operating purely 
domestic services. 
319 US Department of Transportation, ‘How to become a Certifi ed Air Carrier’ (Information 
Packet, September 2012) 12-13. In Japan, foreign ownership is restricted for all carriers 
to 33%. For a comparison of these rules, see ‘Airline Ownership and Control Rules: At 
Once both Irrelevant and Enduring’ (CAPA – Centre for Aviation), available at <centre-
foraviation.com/analysis/reports/airline-ownership-and-control-rules-at-once-both-
irrelevant-and-enduring-345816> accessed 3 July 2017. 
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making regarding, for example, the composition, voting or running of the 
undertaking.320 Once a carrier has been put forward as a designated carrier 
under an ASA by the State in which it is registered, it is then for the State 
granting the operating authorisation to determine whether the carrier meets 
the first State’s ownership and control requirements. In other words, for the 
purpose of granting the authorisation, the granting State is ‘the sole judge of 
whether the ownership and control criteria have been met’.321
More liberalised agreements typically omit the ownership restrictions 
and require effective regulatory control rather than effective control,322 where 
effective regulatory control entails both safety and financial responsibility. 
As to the former, it involves the State ensuring that the carrier holds a valid 
operating licence or permit issued by the licensing authority, such as an air 
operator certificate (AOC), and for the latter, it includes considerations such 
as the carrier holding a valid air carrier licence and being of sound financial 
fitness. A transitional ASA – in between a traditional and fully liberalised 
ASA – may require, in addition to effective regulatory control, that the carri-
er’s principle place of business is in the State of designation. This involves, 
for instance, that the carrier is established and incorporated in the State in 
accordance with its laws and regulations, that substantial operations and 
capital investment are in the State, and that it pays income tax in the State.
Although they will generally form part of a State’s national laws and 
regulations, ASAs also expressly provide for withdrawal, revocation or 
suspension on the basis of failure to comply with the minimum ICAO 
Standards applying to safety and, more recently, security aspects.323 Annex 
17, ’Security’, to the Chicago Convention was adopted in 1974 but it did 
not immediately become an express basis on which authorisation could be 
revoked under ASAs. For example, the Bermuda II agreement324 between 
the UK and the US, which was adopted in 1977, referred to security in 
both its preamble and in a specifically dedicated article (Article 7) but it 
was not an express basis for revocation or suspension, in contrast to safety 
aspects (under Article 5). In today’s ASAs, security and safety standards are 
expressly provided as bases for revocation.
Finally, under Article 1 of the Transit Agreement, overflight rights 
(along with second freedom rights), are suspended outside of peacetime:
‘in areas of active hostilities or of military occupation, and in time of war along 
the supply routes leading to such areas, the exercise of such privileges shall be 
subject to the approval of the competent military authorities’.325
320 Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008, Article 2(9).
321 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Appendix 5 (ICAO Template Air Services Agreements), 9.
322 ibid 15-16.
323 ibid 21 and 24.
324 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America, 
Agreement Concerning Air Services (with Annexes, Exchange of Letters and Agreed 
Minute dated 22 June 1977) (Bermuda, 23 Jul. 1977) 1079 UNTS 21 (No 16509).
325 Transit Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.
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This provision is consistent with the multilateral exchange of the right 
of overflight for non-scheduled flights under Article 5 of the Chicago 
Convention as a consequence of the fact that the Convention as a whole 
is suspended in case of war or national emergency as declared by a State, 
further to Article 89.326 The distinction between war and national emergency 
is made in this article because, strictly speaking, a State is free to choose 
whether it suspends all or part of the Convention in the case of war but 
in the case of a national emergency it must first make a declaration to the 
ICAO Council notifying it of the intention to suspend the treaty.327 ASAs 
traditionally contained a clause addressing the operation of services during 
armed conflict or a similar change of circumstances,328 but States typically 
omit such a provision from their ASAs today. On this note, Bin Cheng, 
speaking of Article 89 of the Chicago Convention, states that ‘[i]t is believed 
that such a provision is merely declaratory of international law’,329 in which 
case regardless of a treaty’s silence on the matter, a State would have a right 
to terminate or suspend the treaty.330
States also have the right to restrict or prohibit access to their airspace 
under specific circumstances in accordance with Article 9, which will be 
addressed in the following section. The formalities under Article 89 are not 
required for the prohibition or restriction of airspace under Article 9.331
326 Chicago Convention, Article 89. The full provision, titled ‘War and emergency condi-
tions’, reads as follows: ‘In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect 
the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents 
or as neutrals. The same principle shall apply in the case of any contracting State which 
declares a state of national emergency and notifi es the fact to the Council’.
327 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 113.
328 See for example Bermuda II, which provided that ‘[i]f, because of armed confl ict, political 
disturbances or developments, or special and unusual circumstances, a designated 
airline of one Contracting Party is unable to operate a service on its normal routing, the 
other Contracting Party shall use its best efforts to facilitate the continued operation 
of such service…’ (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United 
States of America (n 324) Article 2(5)).
329 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 483.
330 The question of a treaty’s status in the case of war is not as clear in other areas of inter-
national law though and it is a matter that remains heavily disputed. The ICJ has not 
delivered a judgment or advisory opinion to clarify the point the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties only states that it does not address such matters (Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, Article 73: ‘The provisions of the present Convention shall not 
prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a succession of States or 
from the international responsibility of a State or from the outbreak of hostilities between 
States’). State practice indicates that it depends on the object and purpose of the treaty as 
to whether it continues to apply between belligerent States during confl ict (Silja Vöneky, 
‘Armed Confl ict, Effect on Treaties’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law 2011), 1, 3 and 5.
331 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 113.
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 2.6.2 Prohibited and restricted areas
The terms ‘prohibited area’ and ‘restricted area’ are regulated in Article 9 of 
the Chicago Convention, as to which see below, and are defined in Annexes 
2, 4 and 15. The terms refer to areas of ‘defined dimensions, above the land 
areas or territorial waters of a State, within which the flight of aircraft is’ 
prohibited or restricted ‘in accordance with certain specified conditions’.332
A State can restrict or prohibit its airspace in accordance with two 
categories, depending on the situation in response to which the area has 
been established and each involve different conditions.
The first category, under Article 9(a) of the Chicago Convention, is ‘for 
reasons of military necessity or public interest’333 and the second, under 
Article 9(b), is ‘in exceptional circumstances or during a period of emer-
gency or in the interest of public safety’.334
In the first instance, certain areas of airspace may be restricted or 
prohibited if the restriction or prohibition applies in a uniform manner to all 
aircraft conducting international scheduled services, both of the State whose 
territory is concerned and the aircraft of other States. Differential treatment 
is permitted under this article though, between national and foreign aircraft 
engaged in non-scheduled flights. In terms of the size of the prohibition or 
restricted area, it must be of a ‘reasonable extent and location so as not to 
interfere unnecessarily with air navigation’.335 Whilst this leaves the State 
with some discretion in establishing the physical and temporal limitations 
of the area, it is clear that they must be commensurate with the activity for 
which the area has been designated. States reserve significant portions of 
their airspace for military purposes under Article 9(a). For example, India 
allocates 35 per cent of its airspace for military use, while it is estimated that 
Thailand reserves up to 70 per cent of its airspace for these purposes,336 as 
does China, where the situation creates delays to international civil aviation 
and has both economic and environmental consequences.337 This has also 
been problematic in the past in Europe, although a focus on dual use – mili-
tary/civil – airspace has improved the situation.338
332 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Chapter 1, 1-7 and 1-8; Annex 4 (11th edn, July 2009) 
Chapter 1, 1-8; and, Annex 15 (16th edn, July 2018) Chapter 1, 1-8 and 1-9.
333 Chicago Convention, Article 9(a).
334 ibid Article 9(b).
335 ibid Article 9(a). 
336 ICAO WP/04 Secretariat, Civil/Military Cooperation, Presented by the Secretariat at the 1st 
Meeting of the ICAO Asia/Pacifi c Seamless ATM Planning Group, Bangkok (31 January –
3 February 2012) 2.9 and 2.10.
337 Justin Bergman, ‘This is Why China’s Airports are a Nightmare’ (BBC, 29 April 2016), 
available at <www.bbc.com/capital/story/20160420-this-is-why-chinas-airports-are-a-
nightmare> accessed 8 May 2019.
338 Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space (n 193) 45.
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Under the second category, in Article 9(b), the whole of the State’s 
airspace may be restricted or prohibited and with immediate effect, but 
only temporarily.339 The restriction or prohibition must be applied without 
distinction to the aircraft of other States,340 – both scheduled and non-
scheduled services – however ‘national aircraft may be exempt from such 
restriction or prohibition’.341 It is by way of their authority under this article 
that the US and Canada closed their airspace following the attack on the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001342 and that 
parts of EU airspace were closed following the eruption of the Icelandic 
volcano, Eyjafjallajökull, in 2010.343
Under both Article 9(a) and Article 9(b), the State whose territory 
is concerned has a right to ‘effect landing as soon as possible’ of aircraft 
entering restricted or prohibited spaces,344 with Annex 2 providing prin-
ciples that States must observe and actions that intercepted aircraft are 
obliged to adhere to.345
 2.6.3 ICAO Council decisions regarding prohibition of overflight
ICAO’s dispute settlement mechanism under Chapter XVIII of the Chicago 
Convention tasks the ICAO Council with ‘adjudicat[ing] legal disputes 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Chicago Convention 
and its Annexes’.346 Out of the seven cases to have been brought before the 
ICAO Council, five have involved overflight rights and two of those have 
specifically been in respect to Article 9 of the Chicago Convention. The first, 
brought by India in 1952, involved the closure of airspace by Pakistan on 
its western border, which prohibited Indian flights from operating from 
points in India to Kabul over Pakistan. At the same time, Iran’s airline was 
permitted to continue operating over the airspace and as a result, India 
submitted that Pakistan had violated Article 9 (in addition to Article 5 and 
the Transit Agreement). The second case was brought by the UK against 
Spain in 1967 as a result of a prohibited area established by Spain in the 
Bay of Algeciras, which the UK claimed compromised the safety of take-off 
339 Chicago Convention, Article 9(b).
340 ibid.
341 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 124.
342 Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space (n 193) 45.
343 Havel and Sanchez (n 112) 43.
344 Chicago Convention, Article 9(c).
345 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Chapter 3, 3.8 and Appendix 2.
346 Mathieu Vaugeois, ‘Settlement of Disputes at ICAO and Sustainable Development’ 
(McGill Centre for Research in Air and Space Law Occasional Paper Series No IV, June 
2016) 4. This dispute settlement mechanism is established by Article 84 of the Chicago 
Convention. 
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and landing from its nearby airport in Gibraltar. 347 The most recent case 
to have been brought before the ICAO Council – the 2017 disagreement 
between Qatar and a number of Gulf States, as will be discussed in Chapter 
4 – involved claims of violations of Article 9, but as part of a much broader 
series of claims relating to access to national airspace, including in respect 
to the Transit Agreement, relevant ASAs, and Articles 5 and 6 of the Chicago 
Convention.
Despite the India/Pakistan and UK/Spain cases directly addressing 
Article 9, they provide little in the way of legal analysis of the article, or 
further in respect to overflight rights more broadly, for two key reasons. 
Firstly, as with the other cases that have been brought before the Council, 
including the 2017 Qatar case, neither resulted in a final decision based on 
the merits. The India-Pakistan case was resolved in a settlement between 
the two governments and the UK-Spain dispute was deferred sine die by the 
parties in 1969 and is therefore technically an ongoing dispute.348 Secondly, 
the cases themselves and the dispute settlement process are inherently 
political. Bin Cheng highlights the importance of the ICAO Council acting 
‘in an impartial and judicial capacity’ in carrying out its functions as a 
dispute settlement body,349 but in practice the ICAO Council, as an organ 
consisting of representatives of sovereign States following the instructions 
of their governments, is not able to act as an independent, unbiased judicial 
power.350 Furthermore, the cases are founded on political disputes, with 
aviation reflecting just one element in a much wider web of implications. 
As Milde points out in reference to the overflight dispute between India 
and Pakistan in 1971,351 but which applies equally to all of the overflight 
cases brought before the ICAO Council, ‘it is apparent that the centre of 
gravity of the dispute was of a political nature and that the ‘aviation’ aspect 
could not be meaningfully addressed without a more general solution of the 
underlying political issues’.352
347 For a brief summary of these cases see, Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 
204-8, in which the other two cases involving overfl ight are also discussed: (1) Pakistan 
brought a claim against India in 1971 for breach of Article 5 of the Chicago Convention 
and the Transit Agreement after India suspended the overfl ight rights of Indian carriers 
following hostilities between the two countries, including the hijacking of an Indian 
aircraft by pro-Pakistani Kashmiri nationalists; (2) Cuba brought a claim against the US 
after the US suspended the overfl ight rights of Cuban carriers in response to the shooting 
down of a US registered aircraft by Cuban Air Force aircraft over the high seas. Cuba 
submitted that the suspension was a violation of Article 5 of the Chicago Convention and 
of the Transit Agreement.
348 ibid 205-6.
349 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 90) 101.
350 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 203. Bin Cheng also acknowledged these 
inherent challenges in the ICAO Council performing a judicial function (Cheng, The Law 
of International Air Transport (n 90) 104).
351 See above n 347.
352 Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (n 91) 207; See also, Vaugeois (n 346) 7.
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2.6.4 An obligation to close airspace?
The restriction and prohibition of airspace under Article 9 of the Chicago 
Convention is a right and not an obligation.353 According to the Dutch 
Safety Board in its 2015 report on the shooting down of MH17, which was 
published just over a year after the accident, it was not practice for States 
to close their airspace during armed conflict at that time354 and this remains 
the case today.355 After MH17, a group was formed by ICAO to review the 
application of international civil aviation law to conflict zones and as part of 
this review, the group considered whether Article 9 of the Chicago Conven-
tion should be amended to include an obligation to close airspace for safety 
reasons, finding that at this stage there is no need to do so.356 This finding 
is consistent with the typical use by States of Article 9 ‘to maintain national 
interests in the use of their sovereign airspace’. 357
 2.6.5 Danger areas
In addition to prohibited and restricted areas, ICAO provides procedures 
for the notification of ‘danger areas’. 358 These are the only three terms that 
ICAO recognises as internationally agreed to denote areas for which States 
353 This is clear from the wording of Article 9. See also, Marieke de Hoon, ‘Navigating the 
Legal Horizon: Lawyering the MH17 Disaster’ (2017) 33(84) Utrecht J Int’l and Eur L 90, 
101-3; Wouter Oude Alink, ‘How ‘Safe’ Airspace was not Safe: The Downing of Flight 
MH17’ (Leiden Law Blog, 9 September 2014), available at <leidenlawblog.nl/articles/
how-safe-airspace-was-not-safe-the-downing-of-fl ight-mh17> accessed 18 July 2019.
354 ‘Crash of Malaysia Airlines fl ight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014’ (Dutch Safety 
Board, October 2015) 204. 
355 The Dutch Safety Board conducted a follow-up investigation to assess the implementa-
tion of the recommendations it made in its 2015 report on the MH17 crash. It published 
the results of this follow-up investigation in February 2019 and among them: ‘[t]he inves-
tigators found that very few changes relating to airspace management by nations dealing 
with armed confl ict within their territories have been made’ (Dutch Safety Board, ‘More 
Attention Devoted to Overfl ying Confl ict Zones’, available at <www.onderzoeksraad.nl/
en/page/13613/more-attention-devoted-to-overfl ying-confl ict-zones> accessed 10 July 
2019). 
356 ICAO WP/14325, Report on the Outcome of the Meeting of the Special Group to Review the 
Application of ICAO Treaties Relating to Conflict Zones (SGRAIT-CZ), Presented by the 
Secretariat at the Council 206th Session (20 October 2015) 2.2. 
357 Stefan A Kaiser, ‘Legal Considerations about the Loss of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 
in Eastern Ukraine’ (2015) 40(2) A&SL 107, 119.
358 Chicago Convention, Annex 4, 2.13, 7.9.2, 8.9.2, 9.9.2, 10.9.2, 11.10.3, 12.10.3 and 16.9.4, 
17.9.4 and 18.8.3 (Recommendation) and 21.9.2, in relation to their inclusion on aeronau-
tical charts; Annex 2, Chapter 3 3.8 and Appendix 2 Section 1.1, and Appendix 1 Section 
3, respectively for interception and signalling protocol relating to danger areas; Annex 
15, 6.3.2.3 p), regarding the inclusion in NOTAMs of the establishment of or changes to a 
danger area. Danger areas are identifi ed in Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs) 
under ENR 5.1 (ICAO Doc 8126, Aeronautical Information Services Manual (6th edn, 2003) 
Chapter 5, Appendix, 5-A-24).
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can provide warnings and/or limit flight in a given airspace.359 Unlike 
prohibited and restricted areas, the Chicago Convention does not mention 
the term ‘danger area’, which appears only in the annexes to the Conven-
tion, classified as ‘an airspace of defined dimensions within which activities 
dangerous to the flight of aircraft may exist at specified times’.360 ICAO has 
recognised that danger areas involve ‘the least degree of restriction’ towards 
other airspace users out of the three types of areas.361 In accordance with its 
definition, the right to establish a danger area is limited in that it must be 
of defined dimensions, and only for a specified time, as opposed to for an 
indefinite or undefined period.362 As also indicated by its definition, a State 
cannot physically prohibit or restrict the overflight of other States’ aircraft 
through the imposition of a danger area but, in practice, the calculated risks 
in any given airspace will ultimately inform the decision of whether to 
operate an aircraft in the airspace.363 In the past, pilots have avoided danger 
areas but under ‘current safety management practices’ certain aircraft may 
operate in danger areas according to ‘appropriate risk assessment’.364 A key 
difference of a danger area compared to restricted and prohibited areas, for 
the purpose of this research, is that it can be established by a State in inter-
national airspace.365 In order to adequately present the concept of danger 
areas, this section will briefly consider their use in international airspace 
before continuing to address overflight in national airspace, as has been the 
focus of this study up to this point.
359 ICAO SN/12, Harmonised Notifi cation of Areas of Volcanic Ash, Presented by Steven Hill 
at the 5th Meeting of the Aeronautical Information Services – Aeronautical Information 
Management Study Group, Montreal (10 October 2011) 1.1: ‘ICAO Annex 15 permits the 
notifi cation by NOTAM of Prohibited, Restricted or Danger areas, which are the only 
three internationally-agreed terms that States can use to identify the presence of hazards 
which may  affect  air  navigation  or  to  limit  access  to  a  particular  area’.
360 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, 1-5; Annex 4, 1-3; and, Annex 15, 1-4. 
361 ICAO Doc 9426, Air Traffi c Services Planning Manual (1992) 3.3.2.2.
362 This is despite the formal appearance of permanent danger areas on some aeronautical 
charts: ‘The United States (and quite possibly most other major military users of inter-
national airspace) often establishes its version of warning areas on a continuous-use 
basis. The practical reason for not charting each area anew as it recurrently comes into 
use is that extensive, but interrupted, use justifi es neither recharting for each exercise or 
series of activities conducted therein, nor even issuance of Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). 
Unfortunately, the consequence of his practice is an uninterrupted depiction of these 
areas on charts, giving the questionable impression to other users and nations that the 
areas are under the constant use, domination, and control (i.e., de facto) of the United 
States’ (George S Robinson, ‘Military Requirements for International Airspace: Evolving 
Claims to Exclusive Use of a Res Communes Natural Resource’ (1971) 11 Nat Resources J 
162, 174-75).
363 See Section 3.3.3.3.
364 ICAO, ATM Contingency Plan: Africa and Indian Ocean Region (July 2019) 71.
365 ICAO Air Traffi c Services Planning Manual (n 361) 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.2.4; ICAO European and 
North Atlantic Offi ce IP/03, ICAO Provisions Related to Access to the High Seas, Presented 
by the Secretariat at the 3rd Meeting of the European Air Navigation Planning Group 
Flexible Use of Airspace Task Force, Paris (16 January 2009) 2.3. 
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The annexes to the Chicago Convention do not provide examples of 
the circumstances in which danger areas may be established, but over the 
high seas they are commonly implemented for the purpose of conducting 
military exercises.366 The term is also used at ICAO in the context of risk 
management of flight operations in volcanic ash, although this is in a 
slightly different sense from how it is used in its more general application.367 
All States have the right to use international airspace in a manner that 
requires the establishment of a danger area, regardless of which State is 
responsible for the FIR. Recalling Chapter 1, and as will be discussed in 
more detail below in Section 2.7.1, all States, both coastal and landlocked, 
enjoy the high seas freedoms set out in Article 87(1) UNCLOS, including 
freedom of overflight, which also applies in the EEZ.368 The use of the high 
seas for military activities, whilst not explicitly mentioned in UNCLOS as 
a high seas freedom, is accepted as being encompassed by the freedom 
insofar as the purpose is peaceful.369 Military activities are also legitimate in 
a State’s EEZ, although this position is not universally accepted, as will be 
discussed in Section 4.3.3.2. Relevant to this study, military activities include 
those on the surface of the sea that may impact on the safety of overflight in 
the airspace above, as well as aerial military activities as part of the right to 
freedom of overflight.370 Just as the principle of freedom of overflight means 
that a State responsible for an FIR cannot prohibit the aircraft registered in 
another State from operating within the FIR,371 neither can it prevent the 
aircraft of another State from undertaking activities in international airspace 
within its FIR where those activities are accepted as being within the scope 
of the freedoms of the high seas.
This does not give a State an unfettered right to undertake activities 
requiring a danger area in all locations of international airspace, or to do so 
without coordination with the ATS authority in the FIR. Under Article 87(2) 
UNCLOS, freedoms of the high seas must be conducted with due regard 
for the interests of other States in the exercise of their freedoms, which 
366 John R Brock, ‘Legality of Warning Areas as Used by the United States’ (1966-67) 21(3) 
The JAG Journal 69, 71; Pépin (n 90) 69.
367 ICAO Doc 9974, Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash (1st edn, 2012) (x) and 5.4 d) 1); ICAO, ATM 
Contingency Plan: Africa and Indian Ocean Region (July 2019) 71. 
368 UNCLOS, Article 58(1).
369 Myron H Nordquist, Neal R Grandy, Sataya N Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds), United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary – Volume II (Martinus Nijhoff 
1993) 85. 
370 Kay Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 
77 Am J Int’l L 490, 503: ‘Freedom of the high seas includes, inter alia, use of the ocean 
space for military exercises, aerial reconnaissance, and all other activities of civil and 
military aircraft if due regard is paid to the rights and interests of third states’.
371 See Chapter 1. As also discussed in, ICAO European and North Atlantic Offi ce IP/03, 
ICAO Provisions Related to Access to the High Seas, Presented by the Secretariat at the 3rd 
Meeting of the European Air Navigation Planning Group Flexible Use of Airspace Task 
Force, Paris (16 January 2009) 2.1. 
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includes the freedom of overflight of other States’ aircraft.372 Furthermore, 
recalling Section 2.4.3, contracting States are required to have due regard for 
the safety of navigation of civil aircraft in issuing regulations for their State 
aircraft.373 Annex 11 of the Chicago Convention details the type of consider-
ations to be made in respect to these due regard obligations. Standard 2.19.2 
requires that the arrangements ‘avoid hazards to civil aircraft and minimize 
interference with the normal operations of such aircraft’, with the accom-
panying recommendations outlining that the location should, for example, 
be ‘selected to avoid closure or realignment of established ATS routes, 
blocking of the most economic flight levels, or delays of scheduled aircraft 
operations, unless no other option exists’.374 Where potential hazards to civil 
aviation exist, a State undertaking the activity is required under Annex 11 
to coordinate the activity with the State responsible for the FIR. Specifically, 
Standard 2.19.1 provides that:
‘The arrangements for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft, whether 
over the territory of a State or over the high seas, shall be coordinated with the 
appropriate air traffic services authorities. The coordination shall be effected ear-
ly enough to permit timely promulgation of information regarding the activities 
in accordance with the provisions of Annex 15’.375
The ATS authorities are then responsible for the promulgation of the infor-
mation regarding the establishment of the danger area, including by way of 
the issuance of a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). 376
When aerial military activities are conducted by a State in international 
airspace under an FIR for which another State is responsible, prior notifica-
tion and coordination is only required in the case that a defined airspace is 
necessary to protect civil aircraft navigating in the vicinity from potential 
safety hazards arising from the military activities. If the activities can be 
carried out without endangering civil aircraft, there is no obligation on the 
State to coordinate with the authorities of the State responsible for the FIR. 
Danger areas will be returned to throughout this study in both Chapters 3 
and 4.
372 In addition, and once again as will be addressed in Section 4.3.3.2, States must have due 
regard in carrying out their rights in an EEZ for the coastal State’s EEZ rights. 
373 Chicago Convention, Article 3(d).
374 Chicago Convention, Annex 11 (15th edn, July 2018) 2.19.2 and 2.19.2.1 a) Recommendation.
375 ibid 2.19.1. See also, ICAO Provisions Related to Access to the High Seas (n 371) 2.4.
376 ibid 2.18.3. See above n 358 for the specifi c requirements regarding the communication 
of danger areas under Annexes 2, 4 and 15. A NOTAM is defi ned as ‘a notice distributed 
by means of telecommunication containing information concerning the establishment, 
condition or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the timely 
knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned with fl ight operations’ (Chicago 
Convention, Annex 11, 1-6).
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 2.6.6 Closure of airspace under non-aviation specific international law
The ICAO Council dispute settlement mechanism discussed above in 
Section 2.6.3 includes, as a tool of aiming to ensure compliance, the 
enforcement of a prohibition of overflight for any airline that acts contrary 
to the terms of a final decision.377 Another way in which overflight can 
be prohibited multilaterally under international law is through a United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution. In contrast to the enforcement 
of the prohibition of overflight for airlines under the Chicago Convention, 
the sanctions under UNSC resolutions do not necessarily require there to 
have been a breach of international law, but rather they can be adopted 
when ‘it appears conducive to the maintenance of international peace and 
security’.378 Such resolutions are made by the UNSC pursuant to Articles 41 
and 42 of the UN Charter. Under Article 41, the UNSC may take economic 
measures against a State, including the interruption of air services by way 
of a ban on flights. A UNSC resolution of this kind would require States 
to, for example, suspend the transit and traffic rights of aircraft registered 
in the sanctioned State. Article 42 provides that the UNSC may, if the 
measures under Article 41 are inadequate, ‘take such action by air… as may 
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’. It is 
under this article that the UNSC imposes no-fly zones, which are estab-
lished for humanitarian purposes, to facilitate humanitarian relief efforts 
and to prevent attacks on the civilian population from the air.379 A no-fly 
zone achieves this goal by depriving the State of its effective control over 
its airspace, providing that control to another State or States, or an interna-
tional organisation.380 A UNSC resolution may include both a flight ban and 
a no-fly zone, as was the case in the 2011 Resolution applying to Libya.381
377 Chicago Convention, Article 87: ‘Each contracting States ‘undertakes not to allow the 
operation of an airline of a contracting State through the airspace above its territory’. Under 
Article 88, any contracting State that ‘is found in default under the provisions’ of the Chapter 
will have its voting rights in the ICAO Assembly and Council suspended by the Assembly.
378 UN Charter, Articles 39 and 41, as discussed in, Jeremy Farrall, ‘Sanctions’ in Jacob Katz 
Cogan, Ian Hurd and Ian Johnstone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Organi-
zations (OUP 2016) 604. This is a feature of all measures under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the chapter under which this mechanism falls.
379 Stefan A Kaiser, ‘No-Fly Zones Established by the United Nations Security Council’ 
(2011) 60 ZLW 402, 411. This article draws the distinction between, and discusses the 
implications of, UNSC measures applying to airspace taken under Articles 41 and 42 of 
the UN Charter (see, in particular, pp 408-9).
380 ibid 402.
381 UNSC 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/10200, paras 6-12 (no-fl y zone) and paras 
17-18 (ban on fl ights). Other UNSC Resolutions affecting overfl ight include, UNSC Res 
748 (31 March 1992) UN Doc S/RES/748, para 4 (Libya); UNSC Res 917 (6 May 1994) UN 
Doc S/RES/917, para 2 (Haiti), UNSC Res 1127 (28 August 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1127, 
para 4 (Angola) (as discussed in, Nico Krisch, ‘Ch. VII Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 41’ in Bruno Simma, 
Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus, Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The 
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, Volume II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1313).
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Once adopted, it is widely accepted that the terms of the resolution are 
binding and that they override existing obligations of the States, for 
example, to permit overflight under the Transit Agreement.382
A State may also restrict or prohibit overflight of its territory by the 
aircraft of another State as a countermeasure under international law, in 
response to an internationally wrongful act committed by the second State. 
A countermeasure, as conduct which would otherwise be inconsistent 
with international law, may be legitimate when imposed in accordance 
with certain conditions, including that it is proportionate, temporary and 
reversible.383 In relation to a countermeasure targeting aviation, a State 
could, for example, suspend another State’s transit and/or traffic rights. 
In this case, the first State’s responsibility to allow the transit/traffic rights 
to be exercised by the second State in respect to its territory would not 
be terminated, but rather, the wrongfulness of the first State’s conduct in 
prohibiting the exercise of those rights would be precluded.384 In contrast to 
fulfilling an obligation under a UNSC resolution, determining the legality of 
a State restricting or prohibiting overflight through such sanctions involves 
consideration of the actions of and the relationship between the two States, 
including the terms of any treaty relevant to the dispute. It can be made 
more challenging when the decision-making process leading to the counter-
measure is not fully transparent. This is the case in the ban on Qatari flights 
imposed by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) in June 2017, which will be addressed in Section 4.2.2.
2.6.7 In summary: The restriction and regulation of overflight in national 
airspace
Sovereignty over national airspace, as recognised under Article 1 of the 
Chicago Convention, is the cornerstone of international civil aviation law. 
One of the defining features of a State is its capacity to enter into relations 
with other States and it is through this exercise of their sovereign rights that 
States negotiate the grant of access to their airspace for the aircraft of other 
States. The right of overflight, along with the other freedoms of the air, are 
privileges and, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, there are various 
mechanisms through which States can retract or restrict these privileges as 
a result of the complete and exclusive sovereignty that they retain over their 
airspace.
382 Nico Krisch, ‘Ch. VII Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression, Article 41’ in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, 
Andreas Paulus, Nikolai Wessendorf (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commen-
tary, Volume II (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1310.
383 YILC (2001) Vol. II, Part 2, as corrected, 76. 
384 ibid 75 (Commentary para 4 to Article 22).
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Both the Transit Agreement and ASAs provide a State with the right to 
withdraw, suspend or revoke the rights granted to the carriers of another 
State where the domestic laws of the granting State have not been complied 
with. A State may also withdraw from the agreements entirely, in which 
case the rights granted under them also cease. States are also permitted 
under the Chicago Convention, to establish prohibited and restricted areas 
in their airspace in certain circumstances and subject to specific require-
ments. This is not however, an obligation. Finally, pursuant to UNSC resolu-
tions, States may be obliged to prohibit the aircraft of another State from 
operating in their airspace. The obligation of States to adhere to the terms of 
the resolution overrides any existing treaty obligations that the States may 
have towards the State targeted by the sanctions. States make also prohibit 
overflight on the basis of countermeasures against a State. An example of 
this is the sanctions imposed on Qatar in 2017 by its neighbouring States, a 
situation that is complex and intrinsically political.
Having established the basis of overflight rights in national airspace 
in earlier sections of this chapter, for both civil aircraft and State aircraft, 
and the right of a State to close its airspace to the aircraft of other States 
in this section, the chapter will now address the legal basis of freedom of 
overflight, as codified in UNCLOS.
 2.7 Overflight rights in international airspace
This section will consider the legal basis of freedom of overflight and the 
provisions under UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention with implications 
for the right. It will set out the maritime areas over which freedom of over-
flight exists and establish the express rights of coastal States in these areas 
as provided under UNCLOS. The remainder of the study, in subsequent 
chapters, will build on this, examining the more ambiguous aspects of the 
rights of coastal State in respect to overflight in these maritime areas.
 2.7.1 Freedom of overflight
Outside national airspace there is so-called ‘freedom of overflight’. Freedom 
of overflight is founded on the concept of the broader principle of mare 
liberum, or freedom of the seas, as codified in UNCLOS.385 The 1956 ILC 
commentary on the law of the sea recognised that the principle of freedom 
of the seas ‘has governed maritime law since Grotius’386 and the subsequent 
1958 Convention on the High Seas stated in its preamble that the provisions 
in the convention were ‘generally declaratory of established principles of 
385 UNCLOS, Articles 87(1) and 58(1).
386 YILC (1956) Vol. II, 266.
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international law’. 387 The principle means that ‘no state may purport to 
subject any part of them [the high seas] to its territorial sovereignty’.388 As 
a consequence of the principle of freedom of the seas, the law of the sea 
has developed on the basis that, outside the territorial sea, the sea is open 
to all users.389 In addition to recognising the principle, UNCLOS stipu-
lates specific freedoms that are entailed in such enjoyment, including the 
freedom of navigation and, closely tied to this, the freedom of overflight. 
The drafting history of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas considered 
and ultimately concluded that freedom of overflight in international 
airspace has customary status:
‘During the discussions in the International Commission for Air Navigation at 
its extraordinary session of June 1929, the Commission ‘recognized that flight 
over the sea, outside territorial waters, is free’.
The minutes of the Chicago Conference contain no record of any discussion on 
this subject, but the representatives present seem to have regarded the principle 
as already established for, under article 12 of the Convention, the right to make 
rules relating to the flight and manoeuvres of aircraft over the high seas is vested 
not in the Contracting States but in ICAO; furthermore, the rules established by 
ICAO are binding on the said States.
Article 27 of the draft [of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas] contains in its 
second sentence the following statement: ‘Freedom’ of the high seas comprises, 
inter alia: ‘… ‘(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.’ This provision confirms a 
principle of customary international law, which the Commission [the ILC] itself 
emphasizes in the first paragraph of its commentary to article 27: ‘Freedom to 
overfly the high seas is expressly mentioned in this article because the Commis-
sion considers that it follows directly from the principle of the freedom of the 
sea’’.390
Just as with freedom of navigation applying to vessels, freedom of over-
flight means that the aircraft of all States have the right to use the airspace 
within the bounds of international law and, as the reference to Article 12 of 
the Chicago Convention in the citation above indicates, the rules relating 
387 Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, 29 Apr. 1958) 455 U.N.T.S. 455 11, entered into force 
30 Sep. 1962, Preamble (‘Convention on the High Seas 1958’). The Convention on the 
High Seas 1958 was adopted at the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, together 
with three other conventions addressing: the territorial seas and the contiguous zone, the 
continental shelf, and fi shing and the conservation of living resources of the high seas. 
The former three will be referred to at various stages throughout this research. Many 
UNCLOS articles are based on these conventions. The provisions in the 1958 conventions 
are in turn based on the ILC Draft Articles resulting from the ILC’s 8th Session.
388 Jennings and Watts (n 72) 726.
389 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP 2011) 2.
390 Pépin (n 90) 68; Nicholas Grief, Public International Law in the Airspace of the High Seas 
(Springer 1994) 2.
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to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft in international airspace are those 
established by ICAO, not by the contracting States. As to what these rules 
are, Section 2.7.2.2 discusses them in more detail.
The EEZ was formally recognised under international law in 1982, as to 
which see Section 2.7.3.1, which explains why it was not referred to in the 
above quotation. As of the adoption of UNCLOS however, it is indisputable 
that freedom of overflight applies in both the high seas and the EEZ. This 
is codified under UNCLOS, which provides for the freedom of overflight 
in international airspace in two articles, Article 87(1)(b) and Article 58(1) 
reading, respectively,
‘The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. … It com-
prises… (b) freedom of overflight’ (emphasis added)
and,
‘In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, 
enjoy… the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight…’ 
(emphasis added).
ICAO recognition of freedom of overflight applying in the high seas and 
the EEZ can be seen, for example, in this discussion regarding the freedom 
applying in the EEZ, shortly after the adoption of UNCLOS:
‘There is, your Rapporteur would suggest, no need for the Legal Committee to 
become involved in general questions of the status of the EEZ. It is sufficient 
to take note that, without ambiguity, the same right of freedom of navigation 
is enjoyed by aircraft over the EEZ as is enjoyed by aircraft over the high seas, 
which is the plain meaning of Articles 58 and 87 of UNCLOS.391
Figure 2.4 depicts the EEZ and the high seas. In this image they appear to be 
overlapping, which they do not in practice, however this depiction is repre-
sentative of the fact that it is the prerogative of a coastal State to declare an 
EEZ and so, in the case it does not do so, the high seas meet the outer limit 
of the State’s territorial sea.
391 ICAO WP/5-41, Report by the Rapporteur on Agenda Item 5: Consideration of the Report of 
the Rapporteur on ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Implications, if any, 
for the Application of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other International Air Law 
Instruments’, Presented at the Legal Committee 26th Session, Montreal (4 February 1987), 
reproduced in (1987) 3 Int’l Org & L Sea: Documentary YB 262, 269.
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 Figure 2.4: Maritime delimitations of the sea and the airspace above the sea392
Freedom of overflight applies in international airspace independently of 
UNCLOS, on the basis of its customary status. This is relevant for those 
States that are not party to UNCLOS. Although UNCLOS is widely 
ratified,393 around 15 per cent of States are not party to it, including the US, 
Turkey, Colombia, Israel, Peru and Venezuela. As a result, Treves empha-
sises that it is ‘important to assess whether certain provisions of UNCLOS 
correspond to customary international law [because] [w]hen it is so, it 
may be held that the rules set out in UNCLOS are binding also for non-
parties’.394 Article 311(1) of UNCLOS provides that the Convention prevails 
392 The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Department of the Navy 
- Department of Homeland Security and US Coast Guard, August 2017) 1-2.
393 167 State parties and the EU as at November 2020 (United Nations Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘UNCLOS Status Table’, available at <www.un.org/
Depts/los/reference_files/UNCLOS%20Status%20table_ENG.pdf> accessed 13 
November 2020).
394 Tullio Treves, ‘UNCLOS and Non-Party States before the International Court of Justice’ 
in Carlos Espósito, James Kraska, Harry N Scheiber and Moon-Sang Kwon (eds), Ocean 
Law and Policy: Twenty Years of Development under the UNCLOS Regime (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 
367. Further to this though, the provisions under UNCLOS largely refl ect customary 
international law, as to which see, for example, Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction 
in the Law of the Sea (Brill Nijhoff 2007) 4: ‘It is widely understood that the Law of the 
Sea Convention constituted a codifi cation of customary rules, existing at the time, and 
contained also instances of progressive development of international law, which have 
become in a very short period of time customary rules in their own right’.
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over the 1958 conventions between State parties. For those States that are 
not party to UNCLOS but are party to the 1958 conventions though, it is 
the latter conventions that continue to apply.395 Considering this, this study 
will consider the customary status of UNCLOS provisions, as well as the 
1958 conventions in relation to the subject matter being discussed, where 
relevant. The drafting histories of the 1958 conventions are also considered 
in examining the intentions of the drafters of UNCLOS, to examine why 
amendments were or were not made to those provisions in UNCLOS that 
have their basis in the earlier conventions.
Beyond providing for freedom of overflight, UNCLOS does not directly 
regulate it. It does though ‘envisage the use of aircraft’396 including in the 
case of piracy,397 the hot pursuit of foreign ships398 and the right of visit in 
certain instances.399 Hot pursuit will briefly be addressed in Chapter 3 in 
establishing the jurisdiction of a coastal State in a safety zone around its 
maritime construction in its EEZ. However, beyond this, hot pursuit and 
the right of visit are outside the scope of this research as they do not provide 
coastal States with jurisdiction over the operation of foreign States’ aircraft, 
either explicitly or tacitly, and nor have they been used by coastal States in 
an attempt to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over such aircraft.400
395 These include the US, Venezuela and Israel (although Israel has signed but not ratifi ed 
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 
1958). Colombia has ratifi ed the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas 1958 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958 and 
signed but not ratifi ed the Convention on the High Seas 1958 and the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958 (United Nations Treaty Collection, 
‘Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretaty General – Chapter XXI: Law of the 
Sea’, available at <treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=21&subid=A&clang=_en> 
accessed 13 November 2020).
396 Grief, Public International Law in the Airspace of the High Seas (n 390) 3.
397 UNCLOS, Articles 101-107. The defi nition of piracy is set out in Article 101: ‘(a) any illegal 
acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high 
seas against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting 
or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)’.
398 ibid Articles 111(5) and (6).
399 ibid Article 110(4). 
400 Both the right of hot pursuit and the right of visit apply to measures against ships rather 
than aircraft. Insofar as which States have that right, there is a difference between the 
two. The right of visit is for ‘a warship [as well as military aircraft and other duly autho-
rized… aircraft clearly marked and identifi able as being on government service (Articles 
110(4) and (5)) which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship’ (Article 110(1)) and so 
is not restricted to the coastal State. On the other hand, only the ‘competent authorities 
of the coastal State’ have the right to hot pursuit, ‘by warships or military aircraft, or 
other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifi able as being on government service 
and authorized to that effect’ (Article 111(5)).
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The piracy provisions under UNCLOS provide States with the right to 
seize an aircraft or vessel taken by piracy on the high seas or area outside 
the jurisdiction of a State and to arrest the persons and seize the property 
onboard.401 As a threat to national security, an aircraft taken by piracy would 
be a threat that ADIZs are designed to address (Chapter 4), but as a specific 
crime it will not be further discussed in the context of this research. This is 
because the provisions on piracy under UNCLOS, recognised as customary 
international law,402 provide States with jurisdiction over aircraft taken by 
piracy, regardless of ADIZs. Furthermore, States have universal jurisdic-
tion in respect to piracy, 403 and thus, it does not fit within the scope of this 
research which focuses on the balance between coastal State rights and 
freedom of overflight.
 2.7.2 High seas
2.7.2.1 Geographic extent of the high seas
The high seas constitute 64 per cent of the ocean’s overall surface404 and are 
defined under UNCLOS in terms of what they are not, that is, they include 
‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, 
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipe-
lagic waters of an archipelagic State’.405 In fact, this is the geographic scope 
of application of Part VII UNCLOS entitled ‘High Seas’, and is as close 
as UNCLOS comes to defining the area. These maritime zones that are 
excluded from Part VII are not addressed in the Chicago Convention: for 
the purpose of international civil aviation law, airspace is either under a 
State’s sovereignty, or it is international airspace, with the exception of the 
very small portion of the Earth that is of undetermined sovereignty.406 No 
State may claim sovereignty over any part of the high seas.407
401 UNCLOS, Article 105.
402 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 84) 286.
403 UNCLOS, Article 100. This is consistent with the fact that ‘the principle of universal juris-
diction over piracy is well established under customary international law’ (Ved P Nanda, 
‘Exercising Universal Jurisdiction over Piracy’ in Michael P Scharf, Michael A Newton 
and Milena Sterio (eds), Prosecuting Maritime Piracy: Domestic Solutions to International 
Crimes (CUP 2015) 74).
404 Steven Katona, ‘2014 High Seas Regional Assessment’ (Ocean Health Index, 2014), avail-
able at <www.oceanhealthindex.org/news/2014_highseas_assessment> accessed 12 
May 2018.
405 UNCLOS, Article 86. 
406 In areas of undetermined sovereignty, in accordance with the Chicago Convention, 
Annex 11, Chapter 2.1.2: ‘Those portions of the airspace over the high seas or in airspace of 
undetermined sovereignty where air traffi c services will be provided shall be determined on 
the basis of regional air navigation agreements’.
407 UNCLOS, Article 89.
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 Figure 2.5: Global map indicating EEZs (green) and high seas (blue)408 
 2.7.2.2 Application of the Chicago Convention and its annexes to the high seas
2.7.2.2.1 ‘The rules and regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of aircraft’
The Chicago Convention refers to the high seas once, under Article 12, 
which states that ‘over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those estab-
lished under this Convention’. The term ‘high seas’ in this context is to be 
read as referring to ‘international airspace’ and is therefore also applicable 
in the EEZ.409 Although this is now definitive, the codification of the EEZ 
upon the adoption of UNCLOS led to some debate on the matter, which is 
addressed below in Section 2.7.3.2.
Article 12 was adopted because it was recognised by the drafters of 
the Chicago Convention that in the absence of sovereignty over the high 
seas, it is necessary to ensure that aircraft, regardless of their nationality, 
408 Source: Public Library of Science (PLOS), ‘Close the High Seas to Fishing?’, available at 
<doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.1001826.g001> accessed 12 May 2020
409 This interpretation of the term ‘high seas’ is consistent across air law conventions, 
including the Rome Convention, Article 23(2): ‘For the purpose of this Convention a ship 
or aircraft on the high seas shall be regarded as part of the territory of the State in which 
it is registered’; and, the Tokyo Convention, Article 1(2) ‘Except as provided in Chapter 
III, this Convention shall apply in respect of offences committed or acts done by a person 
on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in fl ight or on 
the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State.’; and, 
Article 5(1) ‘The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to offences and acts committed 
or about to be committed by a person on board an aircraft in fl ight in the airspace of the 
State of registration or over the high seas or any other area outside the territory of any 
State unless the last point of takeoff or the next point of intended landing is situated in a 
State other than that of registration, or the aircraft subsequently fl ies in the airspace of a 
State other than that of registration with such person still on board’.
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operate under the same essential rules.410 As to what these rules are, there 
was some debate after the adoption of Article 12: do they refer to Standards 
and Recommended Practices in the annexes to the Chicago Convention or 
just to Standards?; which Standards or SARPs are included in the scope of 
Article 12?; can States file differences to the rules? In terms of which rules 
are included, it was decided that it is those that Article 12 itself refers to in 
its opening: ‘the rules and regulations relating to the flight and maneuver of 
aircraft’. At the time of the adoption of Annex 2, the ICAO Council resolved 
that the ‘Annex constitutes Rules relating to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft 
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Convention’.411 Other annexes also 
contain standards that are relevant to the manoeuvre of aircraft above inter-
national waters. Those rules are primarily contained in Annexes 6, 11 and 
12412 and also 10.413 Annex 11 is particularly relevant to this research, however 
Annexes 2 and 12 will also be revisited throughout the study.
2.7.2.2.1.1 Annex 2: Rules of the air
Annex 2 ‘Rules of the Air’ contains only Standards and, unlike the other 
annexes listed, it applies in its entirety over the high seas, that is, no State 
can derogate from it.414 Some of the provisions in Annex 2 though ‘implicitly 
require strict compliance with other rules of great importance to the safety 
of aircraft over the high seas’. So, whilst other annexes are not mandatory 
in their entirety, certain aspects of those mentioned in the previous para-
graph are required to be followed.415 Annex 2 contains fundamental rules 
for the operation of aircraft from that the pilot-in-command has the final 
authority as to the disposition of the aircraft,416 to that distress signals are 
to be issued in accordance with established protocol.417 Specific to the high 
seas, it sets out, for example, requirements that the lights on aircraft must 
be consistent with the rules established under the International Regulations 
410 Jean Carroz, ‘International Legislation on Air Navigation over the High Seas’ (1959) 26 J 
Air L & Comm 158, 160.
411 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, (v).
412 Mendes de Leon (n 119) 14, addressing, respectively: Operation of Aircraft, Air Traffi c 
Services, and Search and Rescue; Eugène Pépin, The Law of the Air and the Draft Articles 
Concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted by the International Law Commission at Its Eighth 
Session (A/CONF.13/4) – Extract from the Offi cial Records of the United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, Volume I (Preparatory Documents), United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 24 February-27 April 1958, 68.
413 Grief, Public International Law in the Airspace of the High Seas (n 390) 62, addressing Aero-
nautical Telecommunications.
414 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, (v). See also, Pépin (n 90) 68.
415 Pépin (n 90) 67-68; Grief, Public International Law in the Airspace of the High Seas (n 390) 
62-63. For example, under Standard 2.2 of Annex 2, the operation of aircraft must be in 
compliance with the visual fl ight rules or instrument fl ight rules, whichever is relevant, 
the specifi cations of which are contained in Annex 11. 
416 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, 2.4.
417 ibid Appendix 1, 1.1.
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for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs),418 and that the ‘appropriate 
authority’ over the high seas for matters such as the dropping or spraying of 
anything from an aircraft, is the State of Registry of the aircraft.419
2.7.2.2.1.2 Annex 6: Operation of aircraft
Annex 6 provides SARPs regarding the ‘Operation of Aircraft’. In the 
words of the ICAO, ‘the operation of aircraft engaged in international air 
transport must be as standardized as possible to ensure the highest levels of 
safety and efficiency’ and the annex is designed to help achieve this aim.420 
Essentially, it provides rules and regulations for the operation of all types of 
aircraft, from one-seat gliders to long-range jets, including a wide range of 
matters from maintenance to the responsibility of personnel.
 2.7.2.2.1.3 Annexes 11 and 10: ATS and Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 11 of the Chicago Convention, ‘Air Traffic Services’, applies over the 
high seas although States may opt to file differences to the SARPs therein.421 
This decision was ultimately reached on the basis that States are able to file 
differences in relation to the provision of ATS over their territories. If it was 
not therefore also permitted over the high seas, it would result in an unten-
able situation where States responsible for the provision of ATS over parts 
of the high seas would be required to offer two sets of differing services: one 
over their territory and one over the portion of the high seas for which they 
are responsible.422 The conclusion is reflected in the Foreword of Annex 11, 
to which a note was added indicating that a Contracting State ‘accepting 
such responsibility [for providing air traffic services over the high seas or 
in airspace of undetermined sovereignty] may apply the Standards and 
Recommended Practices in a manner consistent with that adopted for 
418 ibid 3.2.6.2, Note 2; The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 
(COLREGs) are issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and set out 
internationally agreed rules for navigation at sea: International Maritime Organiza-
tion, ‘Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGs)’, available at <www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/
Pages/COLREG.aspx> accessed 24 January 2018.
419 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Chapter 1, defi nition of ‘appropriate authority’, read 
together with 3.1.4.
420 ICAO, ‘The Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annexes 1 to 18’, available at 
<www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/NationalityMarks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf> 
accessed 11 November 2017.
421 Chicago Convention, Annex 11, (ix): ‘The Standards and Recommended Practices 
contained in Annex 11 apply… wherever a Contracting State accepts the responsibility 
of providing air traffic services over the high seas or in airspace of undetermined 
sovereignty. A Contracting State accepting such responsibility may apply the Standards 
and Recommended Practices in a manner consistent with that adopted for airspace under its 
jurisdiction’ (emphasis added). 
422 Carroz (n 410) 162. See also, Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air’ (n 370) 491: ‘It was feared 
that mandatory application of the ICAO standards might deter states from supplying air 
traffi c control services over the high seas’.
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airspace under its jurisdiction’.423 The same is also acknowledged in a note 
to Standard 2.1.2. This is not without restriction though. ICAO has stated 
that ‘specific national provisions may only be applied to the extent that 
these are essential to permit the State the efficient discharge of the respon-
sibilities it has assumed under the terms of the regional air navigation 
agreement’.424 Schubert questions the legal basis of States providing ATS 
in international airspace in a manner that deviates from the multilaterally 
adopted SARPs in Annex 11 on the basis that these legal sources providing 
for the deviation – the Foreword to Annex 11 and a note following an ICAO 
Standard – do not carry any legal status.425
Finally, Annex 10, ‘Aeronautical Telecommunications’, is closely related 
to Annex 11 and, as the name suggests, contains technical and operational 
SARPs on aeronautical communication, navigation and surveillance 
systems.
2.7.2.2.1.4 Annex 12: Search and rescue
Annex 12, providing SARPs in relation to search and rescue, was adopted in 
response to an identified need to more quickly locate survivors of aviation 
accidents.426 As the title suggests, the purpose of the annex is ‘the establish-
ment, maintenance and operation of search and rescue services… [and the] 
coordination of such services between States’, as delivered in both the terri-
tories of Contracting States and over the high seas.427 The SARPs in Annex 
12 provide a general framework for search and rescue operations conducted 
by air. However, they are specifically targeted towards search and rescue of 
aircraft in distress and survivors of aircraft accidents. In terms of its applica-
tion to the high seas, it provides that where search and rescue operations 
are conducted over the high seas or areas of undetermined sovereignty, 
the search and rescue services responsible will be determined by so-called 
regional air navigation agreements.428 Annex 12 is supplemented by the 
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) 
423 Chicago Convention, Annex 11, (ix).
424 ICAO Air Traffi c Services Planning Manual (n 361) 1.3.3. As referred to in, ICAO WP/02, 
ICAO Provisions, Policy and Guidance Material on the Delegation of Airspace over the High 
Seas, Presented by the Secretariat at the First Unassigned High Seas Airspace Special 
Coordination Meeting, Lima (22 June 2019) 2.6.
425 Francis Schubert, ‘State Responsibilities for Air Navigation Facilities and Standards - 
Understanding its Scope, Nature and Extent’ (2010) Journal of Aviation Management 21, 
29. This has also been questioned by Carroz who states, in relation to the comment in the 
above-mentioned foreword to Annex 11: ‘Insofar as these rules relate to the fl ight and 
maneuver of aircraft, it is questionable whether such a procedure is in conformity with 
Article 12’ (Carroz (n 410) 162).
426 ICAO, ‘The Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annexes 1 to 18’, available at 
<www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/NationalityMarks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf> 
accessed 11 November 2017.
427 Chicago Convention, Annex 12 (8th edn, July 2004) (v).
428 ibid 2.1.1.1. 
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Manual,429 which aims to, as one of its main objectives, ‘foster cooperation’ 
between aeronautical and maritime authorities in order to ‘promote harmo-
nization of aeronautical maritime services’ in the provision of search and 
rescue services at sea.430 Aeronautical search and rescue and the coordina-
tion of these services with maritime search and rescue, including the role of 
the IAMSAR Manual, will be addressed further in Chapter 4. 
 2.7.3 Exclusive Economic Zone
2.7.3.1 The development of the EEZ as a maritime area and the general rights 
associated with it under UNCLOS
UNCLOS does not explicitly state that the EEZ is not part of the high seas 
but given that the scope of Part VII ‘High Seas’ under Article 86, applies to 
‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone…’ 
(emphasis added), it is accepted as being separate from the high seas. A 
precise legal classification of the EEZ is elusive but it ‘appears a sui generis 
zone, as a transition zone between the territorial sea and the high seas’.431
The EEZ extends the sovereign rights of the coastal State in respect to 
certain matters, but not the territorial sovereignty, to a breadth of up to 
200nm from the baseline of the territorial sea of the State (see Figure 2.4 and 
Figure 2.5).432 The ICJ recognised the customary status of the EEZ in 1982 
in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 
in which the Court stated that the concept of the EEZ ‘may be regarded 
as part of modern international law’.433 The Court reaffirmed the EEZ’s 
customary status in its 1985 judgment of the Case Concerning the Continental 
Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta): ‘[i]t is in the Court’s view incontestable 
that… the institution of the exclusive economic zone… is shown by the 
practice of States to have become part of customary international law’.434 
Although the concept of the EEZ is customary, not all provisions relating to 
the EEZ in UNCLOS are recognised as such.
429 The IAMSAR Manual is jointly published by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and ICAO and provides guidelines for the organisation of search and rescue 
services.
430 International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, Volume 
I: Organization and Management (2016) 1.1.3.
431 Umberto Leanza and Maria Cristina Caracciolo, ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone’ in 
David Attard, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Norman A Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The IMLI 
Manual on International Maritime Law: Vol 1 - Law of the Sea (OUP 2014) 185. Sui generis 
means ‘of its own kind’ and in the context of the EEZ, it refers to it having a distinct 
legal character from other maritime areas (See statement made by Chile upon signature 
of UNCLOS: United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Chapter XXI: Law of the Sea, Declara-
tions and Reservations - Chile’, available at <treaties.un.org/Pages/Declarations.
aspx?index=Chile&lang=_en&chapter=21&treaty=463> accessed 3 February 2020).
432 UNCLOS, Article 57.
433 Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1982 (Feb. 24), p. 18, p. 74 para. 100. 
434 Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1985 (Jun. 3), p. 13, p. 33 para. 34.
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The concept of the EEZ was codified under UNCLOS largely in response 
to State claims, led by the US and soon after taken up by Iceland and a 
number of States in Latin America, for preferential fishing rights within the 
waters adjacent to their territorial sea.435 These early claims resulted in fish-
eries zones, which very few States still possess as a result of the fact that the 
rights attributed to a State in their EEZ encompass fishing rights, together 
with rights in relation to all other natural resources. More specifically, in 
their EEZs, States have sovereign rights ‘for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living 
or non-living’ as well as jurisdiction over marine scientific research and the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment.436 Importantly for 
the purpose of this research, the coastal State also has the exclusive right 
in the EEZ to construct, operate and use artificial islands.437 Third States 
making use of a coastal State’s EEZ have a due regard obligation towards 
the rights and duties of the coastal State and an obligation to comply with 
the laws and regulations of the coastal State adopted in accordance with 
UNCLOS.438 In exercising its rights in the EEZ, a coastal State in turn has 
an obligation to act with due regard for the rights and duties of other States 
in the zone and to act consistently with UNCLOS more broadly.439 One of 
these rights of other States is the right to freedom overflight.440
 2.7.3.2 The EEZ as part of the high seas for the purpose of international civil 
aviation law
As mentioned above,441 the codification of the EEZ in UNCLOS led to 
debate at ICAO, and amongst scholars, as to whether it formed part of the 
high seas for the purpose of international civil aviation law. Ultimately, this 
matter was concluded in the affirmative, however the logic supporting the 
decision was varied.
Heller considered the consequences of the EEZ on freedom of overflight 
in the lead-up to the adoption of UNCLOS. One option he suggested was 
for the law applying to overflight in the EEZ to reflect that of the coastal 
State, that is, for it to be the rules of the air and ‘all the regulations applying 
to operation and navigation, as they apply in the coastal State’, including 
any differences to the rules of the air filed by that coastal State.442 As for 
how that would work over artificial islands in the EEZ, he proposed that the 
435 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 84) 260-61.
436 UNCLOS, Articles 56 (1)(a) and (b)(ii) and (iii).
437 See Chapter 3.
438 UNCLOS, Article 58(3).
439 ibid Article 56(2).
440 ibid Article 58(1). 
441 See Section 2.7.2.2.1.
442 Paul P Heller, ‘Air Space Over Extended Jurisdictional Zones’ in John King Gamble (ed) 
Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues (Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii 1979) 146.
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provision that went on to become Article 60(2) UNCLOS, as to which see 
Section 3.2.3, could ‘grant the coastal state further jurisdiction with regard to 
civil aviation regulation on artificial islands, installations and structures’.443
Hailbronner, considering the safety implications of Heller’s approach, 
highlighted that the uniformity of the rules applying in international 
airspace is important for aviation safety and that this was in fact a driving 
factor in the decision to impose the mandatory uniform application of 
Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention. In the words of Hailbronner, ‘[b]y 
developing a uniform aviation code widely accepted by States, the Chicago 
system has made considerable progress in promoting safe and efficient 
international air transport’.444 On this note, in respect to the impending 
developments prior to the adoption of UNCLOS, he questioned:
‘whether or not a coastal State’s regulatory authority extends to aircraft move-
ments within the EEZ [considering that] [a]n affirmative answer to this ques-
tion would… result in the possibility that coastal State’s [sic] control over aircraft 
movement with respect to large areas of the airspace above the oceans might be 
established, differing from the legal regime of the ICAO Rules of the Air, manda-
tory for the airspace above the high seas’.445
Hailbronner’s interpretation ultimately prevailed although, as will be seen, 
safety was just one factor, along with the scope of coastal State rights in 
the EEZ and freedom of overflight, that contributed to the decision. The 
position as it is accepted today was proposed by the ICAO Secretariat and 
confirmed by the Rapporteur, AWG Kean, in 1987. The Secretariat reached 
the conclusion by consideration of the purpose of the EEZ and the specific 
rights it confers on a coastal State:
‘… the coastal States are not granted by the Convention any rights or jurisdiction 
over the airspace above the EEZ and no regulatory power with respect to flights 
over the EEZ. For all practical and legal purposes, the status of the airspace 
above the EEZ and the regime over the EEZ is the same as over the high seas and 
the coastal States are not granted any precedence or priority. Consequently, for 
the purposes of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other air law instru-
ments, the EEZ should be deemed to have the same legal status as the high seas 
and any reference in these instruments to the high seas should be deemed to 
encompass the EEZ’.446
443 ibid.
444 Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air’ (n 370) 491.
445 Kay Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Regime of the Airspace Above the Exclusive Economic 
Zone’ (1983) 8(1) Air Law 30, 35-36.
446 ICAO WP/5-1, Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5: Consideration of the Report of the Rappor-
teur on ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Implications, if any, for the Appli-
cation of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other International Air Law Instruments’, 
Presented at the Legal Committee 26th Session, Montreal (4 February 1987), reproduced 
in (1987) 3 Int’l Org & L Sea: Documentary YB 243, 256.
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The Rapporteur respected this line of reasoning, reiterating that:
‘UNCLOS grants the coastal State only rights of economic exploration, exploita-
tion, conservation and management of the resources of the waters and of the sea-
bed, together with supporting jurisdiction; it grants no right to regulate air traffic 
over those waters. Your Rapporteur considers this a convincing argument’.447
At the same time though, the Rapporteur reached his conclusion via a 
slightly different line of reasoning, that is, on there being freedom of over-
flight over the EEZ as over the high seas and therefore the Rules of the Air 
should equally apply over the former: ‘[i]t would follow that, as a conse-
quence of Articles 58 and 87 of UNCLOS, the Rules of the Air applying over 
the EEZ are to be identical with those applying over the high seas’.448
Echoing the concerns of Hailbronner, the Rapporteur also recognised 
the validity of the arguments of safety, as put forward by IFALPA, which 
support the application of the rules of the air to the EEZ:
‘Your Rapporteur [is]… impressed by a further argument advanced by the 
International Federation of Airline Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA), which makes 
a valid point of purposive interpretation: ‘The Federation believes that, in the 
interests of international standardization of safety standards, the rules estab-
lished under the Chicago Convention should be applicable not only in the air-
space above the high seas but also in the airspace above any Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) which may have been established by a State either on the basis of 
UNCLOS or in any other manner’’.449
It is now unambiguous that the ‘high seas’ as the term is used under inter-
national civil aviation law, encompasses both the high seas and the EEZ. 
As can be seen from the above, this conclusion was reached as a result of 
the limited scope of a coastal State’s rights and the application of freedom 
of overflight in the EEZ, and is supported by the implications for aviation 
safety.
 2.7.4 Continental shelf
The concept of the EEZ ‘parallels that of the continental shelf in attributing 
certain limited rights to coastal States beyond the reach of the territorial 
sea’.450 In the continental shelf, a coastal States ‘exercises… sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources’,451 where 
the ‘rights and the status of the continental shelf are distinct from the legal 
447 ICAO Report by the Rapporteur on Agenda Item 5 (n 391) 269.
448 ibid.
449 ICAO Report by the Rapporteur on Agenda Item 5 (n 391) 269.
450 Peter-Tobias Stoll, ‘Continental Shelf’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law 2008) 6.
451 UNCLOS, Article 77(1).
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regime governing the water column’.452 This latter point is reflected in the 
definition of the continental shelf: it ‘comprises the seabed and subsoil of 
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory’ (emphasis added) (see Figure 
2.6).453
UNCLOS explicitly provides that a coastal State’s rights over the conti-
nental shelf ‘do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters’ and that 
the exercise of the rights ‘must not infringe on or result in any unjustifiable 
interference with navigation’.454 Despite this, and despite being restricted to 
the submarine areas, the continental shelf is relevant to this research insofar 
as the regime applying to the EEZ in relation to artificial islands, installa-
tions and structures, applies mutatis mutandis to the continental shelf. So, 
although the continental shelf will not be directly addressed in this study, 
the implications for overflight rights in the EEZ in this context are equally 
applicable in the continental shelf. This is particularly relevant when a 
State’s EEZ and continental shelf do not share an outer boundary, that is, 
when a coastal State has either not declared an EEZ or when the continental 
shelf extends beyond the outer limit of the EEZ. In this case, any portion of 
the waters above a continental shelf that does not intersect with an EEZ, if it 
exists, is considered part of the high seas.
 Figure 2.6:  Cross section depiction of a continental shelf, demonstrating the essential 
feature of the shallow ‘natural prolongation’ of the land territory455
452 Stoll (n 450) 1.
453 UNCLOS, Article 76(1). The continental shelf extends to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, as defi ned in Article 76(3), or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the terri-
torial sea baseline in the case that the continental margin does not reach that distance 
(Article 76(1)).
454 ibid Articles 78(1) and (2).
455 Source: World Atlas, ‘What is a Continental Shelf?’, available at <www.worldatlas.
com/articles/what-is-a-continental-shelf.html> accessed 17 November 2016, originally 
sourced from the US Navy.
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 2.7.5 Contiguous zone
A contiguous zone must be claimed by a coastal State456 and if a State does 
so, it will either form part of that State’s EEZ, if the State has also claimed 
an EEZ, and otherwise it will be part of the high seas (see Figure 2.4). The 
zone, which is simply described by UNCLOS as being, in relation to a State, 
‘a zone contiguous to its territorial sea’,457 extends beyond the territorial 
sea up to 24nm from the territorial sea baseline. The contiguous zone is 
dependent upon the territorial sea; its sole purpose is to prevent and punish 
breaches of the law within the territorial sea and it vests the coastal State 
with both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction in this capacity. Within 
its contiguous zone, a coastal State may exercise the control necessary to 
‘prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws 
and regulations within its territory and territorial sea’ and to ‘punish 
infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its terri-
tory or territorial sea’.458 The distinction between ‘prevent’ and ‘punish’ 
may be seen as generally applying to incoming and outgoing ships, respec-
tively.459 Despite UNCLOS being silent on the matter, and the above provi-
sions being exhaustive, some States also act in the contiguous zone on the 
basis of national security.460 In 1956, the ILC considered the question of the 
inclusion of security within the scope of the provisions and concluded that 
it is ‘unnecessary, and even undesirable’ on the basis of two considerations: 
first, in most cases the customs head of power will suffice, and; secondly, 
States have an inherent right to self-defence, under which right they are able 
to act in the case of a threat to their security.461
The travaux préparatoires of the 1958 UN law of the sea conventions iden-
tified a commentator who had described ADIZs as ‘contiguous air space’ 
zones.462 The response to this, also recorded in the travaux préparatoires, was 
that ADIZs ‘can hardly be regarded as airspaces connected with the sea 
areas which the Commission [the ILC] terms ‘contiguous zones’’, based on 
the limited breadth of contiguous zones relative to ADIZ and the fact that in 
the contiguous zone, ‘the coastal State may only exercise control… for the 
purpose of preventing and punishing infringements of its customs, fiscal 
or sanitary regulations’.463 Furthermore, given the silence of UNCLOS in 
this respect and that fact that other provisions of the Convention expressly 
456 Kevin Aquilina, ‘Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’ in David Attard, Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Norman A Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The Manual on International Mari-
time Law: Volume 1 - The Law of the Sea (OUP 2014) 60.
457 UNCLOS, Article 33(1).
458 ibid Articles 33(1)(a) and (b).
459 Aquilina (n 456) 64. 
460 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 84) 251.
461 YILC (1956) Vol. II, 5-6.
462 Pépin (n 90) 70 (the commentator was S/Ldr. Murchison).
463 ibid 71.
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include the airspace in their scope, the rights of the coastal State in the 
contiguous zone are understood to be restricted to the surface of the sea.464 
As a result, the contiguous zone will not be further discussed in the context 
of this study.
2.7.6 In summary: Overflight rights in international airspace
In contrast to national airspace, there is freedom of overflight over interna-
tional airspace. UNCLOS expressly provides for this right, however it also 
codifies certain rights of coastal States in international waters. The rights 
of coastal States associated with the establishment of maritime construc-
tions in the EEZ, applying mutatis mutandis to the continental shelf, form 
the basis of Chapter 3, the focus of which is an examination of whether the 
coastal State has the right to prohibit overflight on the basis of extending 
the safety zones around the construction to encompass the airspace above 
them. Furthermore, certain annexes to the Chicago Convention apply in 
international airspace pursuant to Article 12. The rules on ATS under Annex 
11, which form the foundation of the provision of these services not just 
over national airspace, but also over international airspace by way of FIRs, 
will be addressed in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 will also consider the establish-
ment by some coastal States of ADIZs in international airspace, some 
of whom attempt to justify the zones on the basis of inter alia their rights 
and jurisdiction in their EEZs. Keeping in mind that freedom of overflight 
applies beyond national airspace, these subsequent chapters will examine 
how freedom of overflight applies in practice, in light of the rights and 
responsibilities of the coastal States under UNCLOS and the annexes of the 
Chicago Convention.
2.8 Conclusion to chapter
This chapter has introduced the concept of overflight, drawing the distinc-
tion between overflight of sovereign territory, as national airspace, and of 
the EEZ and the high seas as international airspace, the latter of which is 
the focus of this study. Overflight is regulated in national airspace through 
international treaties, with the Chicago Convention as the foundation of 
this regulatory framework. The basis of overflight rights differs depending 
on whether the overflight involves a scheduled service or a non-scheduled 
flight, a manned aircraft or an unmanned aircraft, and whether the aircraft 
is a State or civil aircraft.
In contrast, in international airspace, the above categories relevant 
to overflight in national airspace are irrelevant to freedom of overflight, 
which applies to all aircraft. As will be addressed in the following chapters 
464 Aquilina (n 456) 59.
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however, the reporting obligations of an aircraft in international airspace 
differ depending on whether it is a State aircraft or a civil aircraft, and the 
rules on interception apply differently depending on whether the inter-
cepted aircraft is a State aircraft or a civil aircraft. Furthermore, recalling 
Chapter 1, coastal States attempt to regulate international airspace in the 
maritime areas adjoining their national airspace for, among other purposes, 
national security reasons. In these instances, although the distinction may 
not be drawn explicitly by the coastal State, State aircraft, usually perceived 
to pose a greater threat, are the key targets of the regulation.
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3 Overflight of maritime constructions 
in international airspace
3.1 Introduction
Outside States’ territorial seas, freedom of navigation and overflight exist 
but this must be balanced by permitted maritime activities. As Mouton 
remarked, ‘[i]n pure theory and ad absurdum we could say that the freedom 
of navigation would only exist if but one ship sailed the oceans. As soon 
as a second appears, the first one might be hindered in its movement’.465 
This statement begs the question: where is the balance between the freedom of 
overflight and jurisdiction over maritime constructions outside territorial sea?
Representatives from ICAO did not play an active role in the negotia-
tions during the drafting of UNCLOS and little attention was paid to the 
rules applicable to the airspace in a State’s EEZ.466 Nevertheless, a number 
of developments in the law of the sea took place with consequences for 
overflight.467 One of these was the codification of a legal regime for the 
construction, operation and use of artificial islands, installations and struc-
tures at sea. The UNCLOS provisions set out the right of the coastal State 
to construct artificial islands and installations or structures in its EEZ and 
continental shelf, a right that is exclusive in relation to artificial islands in 
all instances and to installations and structures in certain circumstances.468 
UNCLOS also provides that the right to construct artificial islands and 
installations for all States – coastal and landlocked – is one of the freedoms 
of the high seas.469
This chapter will examine jurisdiction in international airspace over 
maritime constructions – as artificial islands, installations and structures will 
be collectively referred to – beyond the territorial sea. The primary body of 
465 AMJ Heijmans, ‘Artifi cial Islands and the Law of Nations’ (1974) 21(2) Netherlands Inter-
national Law Review 139, 145; citing MW Mouton, The Continental Shelf (Martinus Nijhoff 
1952) 220.
466 ICAO WP/5-1, Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5: Consideration of the Report of the 
Rapporteur on ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Implications, if any, for the 
Application of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other International Air Law Instruments’, 
Presented at the Legal Committee 26th Session, Montreal (4 February 1987), reproduced in 
(1987) 3 Int’l Org & L Sea: Documentary YB 243, 244; Kay Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Regime 
of the Airspace Above the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (1983) 8(1) Air Law 30, 30.
467 For example, the extension of the territorial sea from 3nm to 12nm, which resulted in a 
number of straits becoming part of a State’s territorial sea, as well as the development of 
the law which led to the recognition of archipelagic States. In response, the law codifi ed 
transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, respectively, to facilitate navigation 
and overfl ight (see Chapter 5). 
468 UNCLOS, Articles 60(1)(a), (b) and(c), and Article 80. See Section 3.2.2.
469 ibid Article 87(1)(d).
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the research will consider the jurisdiction of coastal States over the airspace 
of such constructions in their EEZ through the imposition of so-called 
‘safety zones’, as they are referred to under the law of the sea. Article 
60(4) UNCLOS provides that a ‘coastal State may, where necessary, estab-
lish reasonable safety zones around… artificial islands, installations and 
structures’.470 This article provides coastal States with the right to establish 
safety zones on the surface of the sea, in respect to vessels, but it is unclear 
whether it also includes the right to extend the zones to the airspace over the 
constructions.471
As a point of context, interference with overflight in relation to maritime 
constructions outside territorial seas is a corollary of the existence of the 
constructions, rather than a motivating factor for their construction. The 
reasons for the interference with airspace are varied, including for the safety 
of the constructions and aviation, for security, for political control, or for all 
these reasons.
Section 3.2.1 of this chapter will examine the definitions of ‘artificial 
island’, ‘installation’ and ‘structure’, as the terms are used in UNCLOS. 
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 will then consider the rights under UNCLOS for 
States, both coastal and land-locked, to build maritime constructions and 
their jurisdiction over them. These sections will introduce the concept 
of safety zones as the basis for examining the right of a State to prohibit 
overflight in the airspace based on that State’s establishment of a maritime 
construction. Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 will analyse the legal status and the 
associated rights of maritime constructions with natural features as their 
foundation, with reference to the discussion regarding the legal status of 
Mischief Reef in the South China Sea Arbitration. Section 3.3 forms the central 
study of the chapter and will attempt to determine whether States have a 
right to impose safety zones in international airspace on the basis of their 
maritime constructions, or whether a rule exists more generally under 
international law that could provide this right. In establishing whether 
this right exists, this section will examine the drafting history of UNCLOS; 
the practice of States; whether a legal basis exists under international 
civil aviation law, particularly with reference to Annexes 2 and 11 of the 
Chicago Convention; the context of UNCLOS more widely, analysing in 
particular how freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight are inter-
preted and applied; and, the necessary elements for such a right to arise 
under customary international law, with a focus on specific aspects that 
relate to safety zones in international airspace and the practice of States to 
date. Finally, in Section 3.4, this chapter will briefly consider jurisdiction 
470 This article will be discussed in further detail in Section 3.2.3.5, which will also briefl y 
discuss (together with Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.3) the other contexts in which UNCLOS 
addresses the establishment of safety zones around maritime constructions. 
471 The PCA Arbitral Tribunal addressed the matter of a State’s jurisdiction in its safety zones 
in, In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), P.C.A. Case No 
2014-02, 14 August 2015, p. 49 para. 211, as to which see Section 3.2.3.2.
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over flights to and from a maritime construction, including in the case of 
an artificial island being constructed for the purposes of a civilian airport, 
and in Section 3.5, a related but ancillary matter will be addressed: the legal 
status of islands in the case of human modification in response to rising 
sea levels and erosion, as well as the redrawing of territorial baselines after 
the reclamation of land, both of which involve shifts in the delimitation 
of international airspace. Section 3.6 will draw together the findings and 
conclude the chapter.
This chapter contributes to the overarching analysis in this research 
of the right of a coastal State to prohibit or restrict the overflight of other 
States’ aircraft by way of the coastal State’s jurisdiction arising from their 
rights and responsibilities in the maritime areas off their coasts. In the case 
of this chapter, that is the exclusive right of a coastal State in its EEZ and 
continental shelf to establish artificial islands, and to establish installations 
and structures for purposes related to exercising its EEZ rights and, more 
specifically, whether the corresponding right to establish safety zones 
in respect to those maritime constructions extends to a right to restrict or 
prohibit overflight.472
The impetus for this research was China’s construction of artificial 
islands in the South China Sea. As the area stood in September 2018, the New 
York Times described it as one that ‘presents a kaleidoscope of shifting vari-
ables… a collection of Chinese fortresses’, through which freedom of over-
flight has been curtailed on many occasions.473 For example, in September 
2018, a P-8A Poseidon US Navy reconnaissance plane flew low near Mischief 
Reef and was reported to have been met with the following radio response: 
‘US military aircraft… [y]ou have violated our China sovereignty and 
infringed on our security and our rights. You need to leave immediately 
and keep far out’.474 In December 2015, an American B-52 bomber flying 
over the South China Sea, ‘unintentionally flew within two nautical miles 
of an artificial island built by China… exacerbating a hotly divisive issue 
for Washington and Beijing’ and leading to a diplomatic protest being filed 
by China.475 Concerns about infringements of freedoms under UNCLOS in 
the South China Sea led the UK, France and Germany to issue a joint state-
ment in August 2019, in which they called for the respect of ‘the freedom 
and rights of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea’.476
472 These rights arise from UNCLOS, Articles 60(1)(a) and (b), Article 56 and Article 60(4). 
473 Hannah Beech, ‘China’s Sea Control is a Done Deal, ‘Short of War with the US’’ (The New 
York Times, 20 September 2018), available at <www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/world/
asia/south-china-sea-navy.html> accessed 10 October 2019.
474 ibid.
475 Jeremy Page, ‘US Bomber Flies Over Waters Claimed by China’ (The Wall Street Journal, 
18 December 2015), available at <www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-jet-flies-over-waters-
claimed-by-china-1450466358> accessed 10 October 2019.
476 ‘E3 Joint Statement on the Situation in the South China Sea’ (Press Release, 29 August 
2019), available at <www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-joint-statement-on-the-situa-
tion-in-the-south-china-sea> access-ed 10 October 2019.
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From the outset, it should be clearly stated that, as will be discussed in 
Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.4, China did not have the right to build its maritime 
construction on Mischief Reef. This is in part on the basis that, as concluded 
by the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration, the reef is situated in 
the EEZ of the Philippines.477 Thus, the discussion of China’s jurisdiction 
over the airspace above the construction is a moot point. Rather, the situ-
ation is relevant in that it provides the set of circumstances that gave rise 
to the question instigating this research, of whether a State, in general, 
may exercise jurisdiction over international airspace on the basis of their 
constructions at sea. The study therefore takes the case of Mischief Reef and 
asks, hypothetically, if this situation were to occur in future within the EEZ 
or continental shelf of the State building the maritime construction, and if 
that construction was otherwise consistent with international law, would 
the State have the right to extend the safety zones around the construction 
to the airspace over it, thereby prohibiting the overflight of other States’ 
aircraft? This question has broader resonance considering reports of inter-
ference with overflight in international airspace in the region beyond the 
South China Sea.478 Mischief Reef is also useful for examining the applica-
tion of the laws relating to maritime constructions in respect to, as will be 
explained in Section 3.2.5, the dual application of the legal regime applying 
to the reef in its natural form, and that applying to the maritime construc-
tion built over it. 
3.2 The legal framework under UNCLOS applying to safety zones
3.2.1 Defining artificial islands, installations and structures
Purely in terms of purpose, and at the risk of oversimplification, installa-
tions and structures are most commonly built to explore and exploit natural 
resources in the sea. Most domestic law governing maritime constructions 
targets the offshore oil and gas industry and refers to ‘installations and 
structures’, or an equivalent, as opposed to ‘artificial islands’. Artificial 
islands, in contrast, are constructed for myriad reasons such as building an 
477 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), P.C.A. Case No 2013-
19, 12 July 2016, p. 260 para. 647 (‘South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China)’).
478 Nearby in the East China Sea, US military pilots were hit with lasers more than 20 times 
throughout 2018, although Chinese offi cials have not been defi nitively ruled as being 
behind the actions (Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, ‘American Military Aircraft 
Targeted By Lasers in Pacifi c Ocean, US Offi cials Say’ (The Wall Street Journal, 21 June 
2018), available at <www.wsj.com/articles/american-military-aircraft-targeted-by-
lasers-in-pacifi c-ocean-u-s-offi cials-say-1529613999> accessed 10 October 2019); and, 
lasers were used against Australian Navy pilots in the region in May 2019 (Euan Graham, 
‘Australian Pilots Hit with Lasers During Indo-Pacifi c Exercise’ (Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, 28 May 2019), available at <www.aspistrategist.org.au/australian-pilots-
hit-with-lasers-during-indo-pacifi c-exercise/> accessed 10 October 2019.
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off-shore airport, either civil 479 or military,480 for residential and agricultural 
purposes,481 for commerce and tourism,482 for military use,483 and for envi-
ronmental restoration,484 and most are found off the coast of North America 
– both Canada and the US – and Asia, predominantly in Japan, Singapore 
and China.485 Airports at sea outside territorial seas were discussed as early 
as the 1930s – so-called ‘seadromes’ – to facilitate technical landings in the 
Atlantic Ocean, when technology in aviation did not allow engines to carry 
aircraft the distance in one leg.486 It was not until the 1970s though, that 
States began to plan the construction of large-scale projects for the purposes 
of natural resource exploitation, deep-water ports and airports.487
UNCLOS does not define artificial islands, installations, and structures, 
and in practice they are frequently conflated. This is despite the fact that 
‘the distinction is significant’ because of the different legal regimes applying 
to each under UNCLOS. More specifically, a coastal State, and by extension 
other States in relation to that coastal State, have different rights vis-à-vis 
a maritime construction, depending on whether it is an artificial island, 
on the one hand, or an installation or structure on the other. These specific 
rights will be discussed in detail in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 but at this stage 
a few overarching points will be noted from those sections to establish the 
relevance of this current section.
Firstly, Article 60 UNCLOS provides coastal States with the exclusive 
right to construct artificial islands in their EEZ, as well as the exclusive right 
to construct installations and structures, but only in certain circumstances.488 
Secondly, the article provides that the coastal States may then establish safety 
zones around ‘such artificial islands, installations and structures’ regardless 
479 For example, Kansai International Airport (Osaka, Japan), Hong Kong International 
Airport (Hong Kong), Macau International Airport (Macau), Chūbu Centrair International 
Airport (Tokoname, Japan), Incheon International Airport (Seoul, South Korea). See also, 
the discussion surrounding the construction of an artifi cial island for the purpose of 
building an airport in the EEZ of the Netherlands, plans for which are currently on hold 
indefi nitely. 
480 For example, the construction of an airstrip by China on Fiery Cross Reef in the South 
China Sea.
481 For example, the Flevopolder, the Netherlands, and some new quarters of Singapore.
482 For example, the Palm Jumeirah and World Islands, United Arab Emirates. This land is 
also used for residential purposes. 
483 For example, Willingdon Island, India.
484 For example, Poplar Island and Hart-Miller Island, US. 
485 Iván Cáceres Rabionet, Vicente Gracia García and Montserrat Rubio Galindo, ‘Indicators 
for Evaluating the Impact of Artifi cial Islands on Barcelona Coast’ (2008) 36(3) Coastal 
Management 254, 255. At the time of this article, the waters under the jurisdiction of these 
States contained over 80 per cent of the world’s artifi cial islands. 
486 Pablo Mendes de Leon and Erik Jaap Molenaar, ‘Still a Mile too Far? International Law 
Implications of the Location of an Airport in the Sea’ (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law 233, 235.
487 Heijmans (n 465) 140. These States included the US, Belgium, Germany, the UK and the 
Netherlands.
488 UNCLOS, Article 60(1)(a) and Article 60(1)(b) and (c). See Section 3.2.2.
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of the type of maritime construction involved. That is, there is one legal 
framework for safety zones that applies without distinction to artificial 
islands, installations and structures. Finally, outside these exclusive rights 
of the coastal State, other States have the right to build maritime construc-
tions and indeed, all States have the freedom to ‘construct artificial islands 
and other installations’ in the high seas in accordance with Article 87(1)(d). 
The matters discussed throughout this research in relation to safety zones 
are the same for these maritime constructions as for maritime constructions 
that apply to coastal States within the scope of Article 60. The rationale 
behind the extension of the safety zone provisions under Article 60 to other 
maritime constructions, is provided in Section 3.2.3.5.
In consideration of the above points, the purpose of this section is 
twofold. First, it aims to provide a practical context in which to consider the 
legal framework under which safety zones fall. Secondly, and more specifi-
cally, it endeavours to, together with Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, demonstrate 
how the law applies in practice.
 3.2.1.1 Artificial islands
The term ‘artificial island’ was first included in international law in 
UNCLOS. There is no internationally agreed definition of the term under 
UNCLOS or in the wider body of public international law and it may be 
best defined in terms of what it is not. For this purpose, the definition of an 
‘island’ under UNCLOS will be briefly discussed, as the starting point for 
defining an artificial island.
An island, as distinct from an artificial island, has its own territorial 
sea, EEZ and continental shelf.489 The term ‘island’ is defined as ‘a naturally 
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high 
tide’,490 where the size of the area of land is irrelevant.491 However, in accor-
dance with Article 121(3) UNCLOS, ‘rocks which cannot sustain human habi-
tation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf’,492 that is, they will only give rise to a territorial sea. The ICJ 
confirmed in its 2012 judgment of the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nica-
ragua v. Colombia), that the above definition of an island, its maritime zones 
and the exclusion of certain rocks as outlined, are considered ‘an indivisible 
regime, all of which… has the status of customary international law’.493
489 UNCLOS Article 121(2).
490 ibid Article 121(1).
491 Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Merits, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2001 (Mar. 16), p. 40, p. 97 para. 185. Confi rmed by the Court in 
the Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Reports of 
Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, I.C.J. Rep. 2007 (Oct. 8), p. 659, p. 696 para. 
113; and in, Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 
2012 (Nov. 19), p. 624, p. 645 para. 37.
492 UNCLOS, Article 121(3).
493 Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2012 (Nov. 19), p. 624, p. 674 para. 139 .
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Whilst the definition of an island and the application of its maritime 
zones are generally clear, the determination of which rocks are excluded is 
less so. For example, to be excluded, must the rock be unable to both sustain 
human habitation and economic life, or just one or the other? Considering 
the phrase in its ordinary meaning (despite the use of ‘or’, the phrase is 
framed in the negative) and its teleological interpretation (the potentially 
low hurdle of fulfilling the requirement of ‘human habitation’ or ‘economic 
life’), Franckx argues that both are required for a rock to be an island, that 
is, ‘the absence of either of these two requirements is sufficient to deprive 
it of such maritime zones’.494 In contrast, the Tribunal in the South China 
Sea Arbitration concluded that only one of the two elements is required, 
either human habitation or economic life. On this point, the Tribunal relied 
on a contextual and teleological interpretation of Article 121(3). Regarding 
the former, the contextual interpretation, the Tribunal noted that the 
second part of Article 121(3) – ‘…shall have no exclusive economic zone 
or continental shelf’ – also uses a negation of a disjunction. The Tribunal 
highlighted that it would lead to a manifestly absurd outcome if the ‘or’ 
in this second part was interpreted as meaning ‘one or the other’ and it 
would be implausible to consider that the drafters, employing the same 
construction in the first part of the provision, would have intended for it to 
have been interpreted differently.495 Secondly, it considered that interpreting 
the provision too narrowly, thereby restricting the circumstances in which a 
rock will generate an EEZ and a continental shelf, ‘could well deprive other 
populations, making use of islands.., of the resources on which they have 
traditionally depended’.496
What can be concluded from the above is that an artificial island is ‘an 
area of land that is above water at high tide that is not naturally formed’.497 
As Schofield explains:
‘The ‘naturally formed’ requirement clearly serves to disqualify artificial islands 
such as platforms, for example, constructed on submerged shoals, low-tide ele-
vations or reefs. Island-building activities on the part of states, in an effort to 
enhance their claims to maritime space by creating new islands, is therefore con-
trary to the Convention’.498
Furthermore, we know that, as confirmed in the case of the South China Sea 
Arbitration, as to which see Section 3.2.4, construction on an area of land that 
494 Erik Franckx, ‘The Regime of Islands and Rocks’ in David Attard, Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
and Norman A Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The Manual on International Maritime Law: 
Volume 1 - The Law of the Sea (OUP 2014) 116-17.
495 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), p. 209-10 para. 495-96.
496 ibid p. 211 para. 497.
497 Alex G Oude Elferink, ‘Artifi cial Islands, Installations and Structures’ (Max Planck Ency-
clopedia of Public International Law 2013) 3.
498 Clive Schofi eld, ‘The Trouble with Islands: The Defi nition and Role of Islands and Rocks 
in Maritime Boundary Delimitation’ in Jon M van Dyke, Seoung-Yong Hong (eds), Mari-
time Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes and the Law of the Sea (Brill Nijhoff 2009) 24.
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is below sea level at high tide but above it at low tide – i.e. a low-tide eleva-
tion – that results in the feature remaining above the surface of the water at 
high tide is considered an artificial island.499
Beyond this though, precisely what ‘not naturally formed’ entails is not 
always clear and UNCLOS does not explicitly provide for the situation in 
which an island ‘originated partly from human activity and partly from 
natural processes’.500 Consequently, ‘[t]he distinction between an island and 
an artificial island may require complex assessments of law and fact’.501
At the 1930 Hague Conference in early discussions on the legal status 
of artificial islands, the ambiguity led to proposals for the two – naturally-
formed islands and human-made islands – to be conflated. Gidel,502 for 
example, argued that an artificial island should be assimilated with a 
natural island so long as it fulfilled the conditions of being above the surface 
of the water at high tide and capable of effective occupation and use.503 
These discussions seem anachronistic today with the codification of the 
definition of a natural island under Article 121 of UNCLOS, but as will be 
seen in Section 3.2.5 and again in Section 3.5, the ambiguity between natural 
and man-made is a distinction that the law continues to grapple with.
 3.2.1.2 Installations and structures
The determination of the ordinary meaning of ‘installation and structure’ 
is necessarily tied to that of ‘artificial island’ and vice versa, although not 
all man-made objects at sea are either an artificial island, installation or 
structure. Vessels, for instance, are clearly excluded,504 however even then, 
499 See though Section 3.2.5.3 for the consequences of this in the case of the construction of a 
lighthouse or similar construction in the drawing of straight baselines.
500 Leendert Dorst, Alex G Oude Elferink and Thijs Ligteringen, ‘Recent Changes in the 
Dutch Baseline: The Inseparable Connection of Human Activities and Natural Processes’ 
(2012) 6, available at <www.defensie.nl/downloads/brochures/2012/09/24/changes-
dutch-baseline> accessed 29 September 2018.
501 Oude Elferink (n 497) 4.
502 Described by the author of the quoted article as ‘the French delegate at the conference [that 
is, The Hague Codifi cation Conference in 1930] and the greatest living authority on the 
law of the sea’ (DHN Johnson, ‘Artifi cial Islands’ (1951) 4(2) The Int’l L Quarterly 203, 204).
503 ‘Une île est une élévation naturelle du sol maritime qui, entourée par l’eau, se trouve 
d’une manière permanente au-dessus de la marée haute et dont les conditions naturelles 
permettent la résidence stable de groupes humains organisés. Sont assimilées aux île 
naturelles les île artifi cielles satisfaisant aux mêmes conditions et dont la formation par 
l’action de phénomènes naturels a été provoquée ou accélérée au moyen de travaux’ 
(Gidel, Le Droit International Public de la Mer, Vol. III, Paris, 1934 p. 700 n. 1, as cited 
in Johnson (n 502) 204), translated: ‘An island is a natural elevation of the seabed which 
is surrounded by water and is permanently above the surface of the water at high tide 
and whose natural condition permits the stable habitation of organised human groups. 
Artifi cial islands satisfying the same conditions and whose creation has been formed or 
accelerated by means of human contribution also fall in this category’.
504 A clear distinction is made, for example, under Article 209 UNCLOS, which refers to 
‘vessels, installations and structures’ in relation to pollution from activities in the Area.
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 125
Overflight of maritime constructions in international airspace 107
‘[t]he distinction between ships and structures and installations in certain 
instances may be complex’.505
Before going into further detail, the terms ‘installation’ and ‘structure’ 
will be considered as a single term as there is no apparent relevant differ-
ence in the application of the legal regime between the two. Article 87(1)(d) 
UNCLOS for example, refers only to ‘artificial islands’ and ‘installations’ 
in setting forth a State’s right to construct on the high seas but the author 
has been unable to find any evidence to suggest that this was intended to 
create a discrepancy in the scope of this article compared with Article 60 
UNCLOS.506 As a side note here, Article 87(1)(d) in fact refers to ‘artificial 
islands and other installations’ (emphasis added), suggesting that an artifi-
cial island is a type of installation. This does not detract from the fact that 
Article 60 explicitly requires that there is a distinction between the two and 
that they must necessarily therefore have defining features. The wording of 
Article 87(1)(d) may reflect the fact that no distinction between the two is 
necessary under international law in the high sea: all States have the same 
rights in relation to all maritime constructions.507
Drawing on the extrapolated definition of artificial island as discussed 
in the Section 3.2.1.1 – ‘an area of land that is above water at high tide that is 
not naturally formed’ – the logical distinction between it and an installation 
or structure is that the latter have some man-made foundation that does not 
mimic the seabed. Commentary supports this view, suggesting that it is the 
basis of the construction that is relevant:
‘Installations and structures appear to differ from artificial islands in that the lat-
ter are built from man-made or natural materials that are piled on the seabed to 
form an area of land’.508
And,
‘The term ‘artificial island’ refers to constructions which have been created by 
dumping of natural substances like sand, rocks and gravel’, while ‘‘installation’ 
refers to constructions resting upon the seafloor by means of piles or tubes driv-
en into the bottom, and to concrete structures’.509
505 Oude Elferink (n 497) 7.
506 In addition, Article 147 refers to only ‘installations’, Articles 194(3)(c) and (d) to ‘instal-
lations and devices’, Article 209(2) to ‘installations, structures and other devices’, 
and Articles 258 and 262 to ‘installations or equipment’. The Drafting Committee of 
UNCLOS noted these inconsistencies but ultimately no adjustments were made (Myron 
H Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary – 
Volume II (Brill Nijhoff 2011) 584).
507 Except in those portions of the where a State’s continental self does not intersect with its 
EEZ, in which case that portion is part of the high seas but Article 60 UNCLOS applies 
mutatis mutandis in accordance with Article 80 UNCLOS. See Section 3.2.2.
508 Oude Elferink (n 497) 5.
509 Paul P Heller, ‘Air Space Over Extended Jurisdictional Zones’ in John King Gamble (ed) 
Law of the Sea: Neglected Issues (Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii 1979) 148.
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Although taking a slightly different approach, the UK likewise defines an 
installation in relation to its foundation. Under the UK Continental Shelf Act 
1964, an ‘installation’ refers to ‘any floating structure or device maintained 
on a station by whatever means’,510 which is also the definition employed 
by the UK’s Petroleum Act 1987.
Beyond UNCLOS, other international agreements and supporting mate-
rial provide further guidance on the interpretation of installation and struc-
tures. For example, International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution 
A.671(16) entitled ‘Safety Zones and Safety of Navigation Around Offshore 
Installations and Structures’,511 mentions artificial islands but suggests that 
they are a subset of installations and structures, at least for the purpose 
of the Resolution: ‘[b]eing aware that safety zone regulations are applied 
by coastal States to protect mobile offshore drilling units on stations, 
production platforms, artificial islands… referred to herein as installations or 
structures’ (emphasis added).512 IMO Assembly Resolutions such as this 
are not binding but the IMO has wide international acceptance, with 174 
Member States and its resolutions ‘are usually adopted by consensus or by a 
majority vote among IMO Members [and] may potentially be characterized 
as generally accepted to reach such status by widespread and representative 
practice’.513
The IMO Resolution echoes the US’s proposal at the 1974 Caracas 
Conference, forming part of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
in conflating the terms by suggesting that the term ‘artificial island’ should 
include ‘all offshore facilities, installations or devices other than those 
which are mobile in their normal mode of operations at sea’, including also 
floating installations’.514 Presumably the reference to mobility was designed 
to exclude ships which, as discussed, are not always clearly distinguishable 
even taking into account mobility, which itself can be difficult to define.515 
Heijmans, commenting at the time on the broad-sweeping US position 
compared to that of Belgium, described the latter State’s proposal at the 
Conference as limiting ‘artificial islands’ to ‘to bottom-bearing islands’, 
a view that is consistent with the commentary mentioned above, distin-
guishing between the two based on the construction’s foundation.516
510 Continental Shelf Act 1964 (UK), s. 11A. 
511 IMO Resolution A.671(16) ‘Safety Zones and Safety of Navigation Around Offshore 
Installations and Structures’ (19 October 1989).
512 ibid 3.
513 Robert Beckman and Zhen Sun, The Relationship between UNCLOS and IMO Instru-
ments’ (2017) 2 Asia-Pacifi c Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 201, 226.
514 Heijmans (n 465) 155; citing, respectively, U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/91 dated 11 July 1973; 
and, A/AC 138/SC II, L 35 art. 1,3 dated 16 July 1973 and Mr Stevenson, US Mission 
Press Release 18 July 1973, at p. 4.
515 Oude Elferink (n 497) 7.
516 Heijmans (n 465) 155; citing, respectively, U.N. Doc. A/AC 138/91 dated 11 July 1973; 
and, A/AC 138/SC II, L 35 art. 1,3 dated 16 July 1973 and Mr Stevenson, US Mission 
Press Release 18 July 1973, at p. 4.
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In 1989, the UN Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea published 
a document examining the provisions of UNCLOS that are relevant to base-
lines, in which an ‘installation (offshore)’ is defined as a ‘[m]an-made struc-
ture in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf 
usually built for the exploration or exploitation of marine resources. They 
may also be built for other purposes such as marine scientific research, tide 
observations, etc.’.517 This definition is unusual in its focus on the purpose 
of the structure, at the expense of any requirement regarding the structure 
itself, beyond that it be man-made. The reason for this becomes clear though, 
when the definition is considered in the broader context of the document: 
under the definition of both ‘artificial island’ and ‘structure’, the reader is 
directed to the definition of ‘installation’. Thus, the three terms are treated as 
one for the application of the law in accordance with this document.
Because of the different rights associated with installations and struc-
tures under Article 60 UNCLOS, they necessarily must be distinguished 
from artificial islands, but neither international law nor national law 
provide comprehensive definitions establishing the distinction. What can 
be drawn from the materials examined above is that the foundation of the 
maritime construction is generally the relevant factor to consider. Going 
further than this, although there is no uniformity in the approach, an artifi-
cial island is more likely to be a construction founded on an extension of the 
seabed, while an installation or structure remains distinct from the seabed. 
In any case, as explained at the beginning of this section, the purpose of 
establishing this distinction is to provide context to the legal framework 
under which safety zones fall and how it applies in practice. To reiterate, 
once a State has a right to build a maritime construction under UNCLOS, 
the type of maritime construction is irrelevant to the application of the legal 
regime on safety zones.
 3.2.2 The right of States to construct and operate maritime constructions
Having determined, insofar as possible, what a maritime construction is, 
this section will examine the right of a State under UNCLOS to establish 
one. This provides the foundation for the following chapter, which sets out 
a State’s jurisdiction in respect to their maritime constructions, including 
their right to establish safety zones.
A State’s sovereignty over its territorial sea and archipelagic waters 
naturally encompasses any maritime constructions within these maritime 
zones and a State is only restricted in its construction, operation and use of 
them insofar as it is required to act in accordance with its international obli-
517 United Nations Offi ce for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘The Law of the Sea - 
Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea’ (1989) Appendix I, 56.
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gations.518 On the high seas, the right of States to build maritime construc-
tions, as one of the freedoms of the high seas, is governed only minimally by 
UNCLOS. The rules on installations established for carrying out activities in 
‘the Area’ – i.e. the ‘seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction’519 – are subject to the conditions under Article 
147 UNCLOS, including that they are ‘erected, emplaced and removed’ in 
accordance with the relevant part of UNCLOS (Part XI) and with the rules 
of the International Seabed Authority.520 Furthermore, Part XIII UNCLOS, 
‘Marine Scientific Research’, provides rules for the establishment of installa-
tions for scientific research.521 Each of these sets of rules applying to installa-
tions will be discussed further in Section 3.2.3.3, in respect to their provisions 
on safety zones. Finally, there are also a number of general provisions under 
UNCLOS relating to environmental protection and the management of mari-
time constructions, although these are not further relevant to this study.522
UNCLOS provides more detailed rules on the rights of coastal States 
in establishing and operating maritime constructions in their EEZ and on 
their continental shelf. The relevant provisions under UNCLOS regarding 
maritime constructions in the EEZ are found under Article 60 and apply 
mutatis mutandis to the continental shelf.523 The application of the provisions 
to the continental shelf is relevant in the case that a coastal State has not 
declared an EEZ or if the continental shelf extends beyond the EEZ.524 In 
each of these cases, the continental shelf forms part of the high seas. In this 
situation therefore, elements of Article 60 are applicable to artificial islands, 
installations and structures on the high seas.525 The freedom of the high seas 
to establish maritime constructions does not apply to these portions of the 
high seas that intersect with another State’s continental shelf.
The legal regime of the EEZ (Part V UNCLOS) provides coastal States 
with, under Article 56, sovereign rights for the purpose of,
‘exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing… the natural resources… 
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration 
of the zone, such as the production of energy from water, current and winds’. 526
518 Oude Elferink (n 497) 11. This includes the right of other States’ vessels to innocent 
passage through the territorial sea of another State in accordance with Article 17 
UNCLOS. At the same time, the coastal State may adopt laws to protect installations in its 
territorial sea in accordance with Article 21(1)(b) UNCLOS.
519 UNCLOS, Article 1(1)(1).
520 ibid Article 147(2)(a). Other conditions include that they ‘may not be established where 
interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international 
navigation or in areas of intense fi shing activity’ (Article 147(2)(b)), and they must be 
‘used exclusively for peaceful purposes’ (Article 147(2)(d)).
521 ibid Articles 258-262.
522 ibid Articles 194(3)(c) and (d), 208, 209(2), 214 and 249(g).
523 ibid Article 80. 
524 Under Article 76(1) UNCLOS.
525 Nordquist (ed), UNCLOS: A Commentary – Volume II (n 506) 83.
526 UNCLOS, Article 56(1)(a).
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It also provides the coastal State with jurisdiction over ‘marine scientific 
research’ and ‘the protection and preservation of the marine environment’.527
Under Article 60(1) UNCLOS, a coastal State has ‘the exclusive right to 
construct and to authorise and regulate the construction, operation and 
use of’ (emphasis added) artificial islands528 and of ‘installations and struc-
tures for the purposes provided for in Article 56 and for other economic 
purposes’.529 The lack of qualification for exclusive rights in respect to 
artificial islands suggests that coastal States have the exclusive right to 
construct them regardless of their purpose.530 This interpretation is not 
uncontroversial though. For example, Vella argues that because Article 60 
falls under Part V, Article 60 ‘will only apply to the extent that such islands 
are used for economic purposes’.531 Whilst Vella’s argument is logical, 
consideration of Article 60(1)(a) in relation to Article 60(1)(b) supports the 
former interpretation. Article 60(1)(b) provides States with the exclusive 
right to construct installations and structures but a contrario, Article 60(1)
(a) expressly restricts the exclusivity to instances in which the installation or 
structure is constructed for one of the purposes under Article 56.
In coastal areas in which a continental shelf does not coincide with an 
EEZ – either where a State has a continental shelf but has not declared an 
EEZ or where the continental shelf exceeds the EEZ – the coastal State’s 
exclusive right to construct installations and structures in that area is 
restricted to purposes falling within the scope of Article 77, which sets out 
the sovereign rights of a coastal State in its continental shelf, rather than 
within the scope of Article 56, applying to the EEZ.532 Article 77 provides 
that States have sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting 
its natural resources where those resources consist of ‘the mineral and other 
non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organ-
isms belonging to sedentary species’.533
527 UNCLOS, Article 56(1)(b)(ii) and (iii).
528 ibid Article 60(1)(a).
529 ibid Article 60(1)(b).
530 See also, Tara Davenport, ‘Island-Building in the South China Sea: Legality and Limits’ 
(2018) 8 Asian J of Int’l Law 76, 86.
531 Ivan Vella, ‘A New Advent for Renewable Offshore Resources’ in Norman A Martínez 
Gutiérrez (ed), Serving the Rules of International Maritime Law: Essays in Honour of Professor 
David Joseph Attard (Routledge 2010) 146-47.
532 ibid 148. Vella also claims here though that ‘this means that such a coastal State may not 
construct (etc.) artifi cial islands, installations and structures inter alia for the production of 
energy from water, currents and winds’, which the present author disagrees with. Firstly, 
as discussed, purpose is irrelevant for coastal States when it comes to their exclusive right 
to construct artifi cial islands. Secondly, in respect to installations and structures, the fact 
that their purpose does not fall within one of the areas over which the coastal State has 
sovereign rights means only that the coastal State does not have the exclusive right to 
construct an installation or structure for that purpose – i.e. that any State has the right to 
construct the installation or structure – not that the coastal State does not have the right to 
construct it.
533 UNCLOS, Articles 77(1) and (4).
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 130
112 Chapter 3
Installations and structures for purposes outside the categories under 
Articles 56 and 77 may be established and operated by a State in the EEZ or 
on the continental shelf of another State, respectively, without the authority 
of the latter State534 on the condition that they do not interfere with the rights
of that State in the zone.535 These include installations and structures for 
military purposes.536 The freedom of all States to construct military instal-
lations and structures in the EEZ and on the continental shelf of any other 
State was a right that was closely protected during the drafting of UNCLOS. 
As Hailbronner explains,
‘[p]roposals to cover all installations were rejected since a number of states 
were prepared to accept the EEZ concept only if military activities within the 
EEZ, including the movement of aircraft, were not subject to the coastal state’s 
control’.537
At the same time, States have an obligation to use the sea for peaceful 
purposes and in exercising their rights must refrain from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, as set forth in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and as recognised in 
Article 301 UNLCOS.538
There are two restrictions to the right of a State, including the coastal 
State, to construct artificial islands, installations and structures in an EEZ 
or on a continental shelf. Firstly, a State may not establish a maritime 
construction where it would interfere with recognised sea lanes essential 
to international navigation.539 This restriction is not specifically provided 
for the exercise of the right on the high seas but, as with all freedoms of the 
high seas, it must be exercised with due regard for the interests of other 
States in their exercise of the freedoms of the high seas in accordance with 
Article 87(2) UNCLOS. The requirement to respect international sea lanes is 
not relevant in the case of constructions on natural features, including low 
tide elevations, because sea lanes are established taking into account such 
features in any case.540
Secondly, States are obliged to ensure that the maritime construction 
does not interfere with their other obligations under public international 
law including, for example, the obligation to protect and preserve the mari-
534 James Kraska, ‘Military Activities on the Continental Shelf’ (Lawfare, 22 August 2016), 
available at <www.lawfareblog.com/military-activities-continental-shelf> accessed 10 
October 2019.
535 UNCLOS, Article 60(1)(c).
536 Vella (n 531) 147.
537 Kay Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 
77 Am J Int’l L 490, 203.
538 UN Charter, Article 2(4).
539 UNCLOS, Article 60(7). 
540 Xinjun Zhang, ‘The Latest Developments of the US Freedom of Navigation Programs in 
the South China Sea: Deregulation or Re-balance?’ (2016) 1 J of East Asia & Int’l L 167, 179.
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time environment.541 This was considered by the Tribunal in the South China 
Sea Arbitration, where it was found that, through its island building activi-
ties, China had breached a number of environmental protection obligations 
under UNCLOS. 542 Furthermore, although a condition rather than a restric-
tion, coastal States are also required to give due notice of the construction 
of an artificial island and to provide continual warning of their presence.543
In addition to the environmental concerns, the Tribunal in the South 
China Sea Arbitration concluded that the actions of China in respect to its 
construction on Mischief Reef are in breach of the above provisions based on 
the fact that the reef is situated in the EEZ of the Philippines. The Tribunal 
found that the early activities of China on the reef between 1995 and 2013,544 
which it considered construction of ‘structures’ for fishing purposes, were 
in violation of Article 60(1)(c) because ‘they had the potential to interfere 
with the exercise by the Philippines of its rights in the zone.545 According 
to the Tribunal, from 2015, when the construction evolved into the creation 
of an artificial island, China was in violation of Article 60(1)(a) on the basis 
that the Philippines, as the coastal State, has the exclusive right to establish 
artificial islands in its EEZ.546 
 3.2.3 Jurisdiction over maritime constructions including the establishment 
of safety zones
3.2.3.1 A coastal State’s exclusive jurisdiction over maritime constructions
Having determined when States have the right to build a maritime 
construction, this section sets out the express provisions under UNCLOS in 
541 UNCLOS, Article 192. This provision is to be read together with other provisions under 
UNCLOS regarding the protection of the marine environment: Articles 123, 194, 197, 198, 
200, 204, 205, 206 and 210. 
542 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), p. 397 para. 993. China was found to 
have breached Arts 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, 123 and 206 UNCLOS. For a discussion of 
these matter see, Yoshifumi Tanaka, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration: Environmental 
Obligations under the Law of the Sea Convention’ (2018) 27(1) RECIEL 90. See also, Land 
Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, 
Order of October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10, p. 28. In considering the impact of land 
reclamation on the marine environment, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) issued a provisional measure under Article 290 UNCLOS directing Singapore 
‘not to conduct its land reclamation in ways that might cause… serious harm to the 
marine environment’ in the Straits of Johor. In this case, the reclamation took place in 
Singapore’s territorial sea, with Malaysia’s rights and environment being affected due to 
the cross-border effects of the reclamation work. The case did not involve the construc-
tion of artifi cial islands but may be relevant in considering restrictions to the construc-
tion, operation and use of artifi cial islands where the rights of other States and the marine 
environment are affected.
543 UNCLOS, Article 60(3).
544 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), p. 402 para. 1004.
545 ibid p. 414 paras. 1036-37.
546 ibid pp. 414-15 paras. 1036-38.
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relation to the subsequent jurisdiction States have over them. This section 
introduces the concept of safety zones and enforcement powers within them 
as provided under UNCLOS.
Unlike islands, artificial islands, installations and structures do not 
generate a territorial sea and ‘their presence does not affect the delimitation 
of the territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf’ of a coastal State.547 In terms 
of the constructions themselves, a coastal State has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ 
over the artificial islands, installations and structures it constructs in its EEZ 
and continental shelf under Article 60(2) UNCLOS. This encompasses both 
civil and criminal jurisdiction, including with respect to, but not limited to, 
‘customs, fiscal, health, safety and immigration laws and regulations’.548
 3.2.3.2 Right of the coastal state to establish safety zones and its jurisdiction within 
them
Most importantly for the purposes of this research, under Article 60(4) a 
coastal State is permitted to establish safety zones around its maritime 
constructions. Specifically, the article reads:
‘The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around 
such artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropri-
ate measures to ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands, 
installations and structures’ (emphasis added).
In the view of the PCA Arbitral Tribunal, henceforth referred to as ‘the 
Tribunal’, in the case of In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Nether-
lands v. Russia) (‘Arctic Sunrise Case’), this provides the coastal State with the 
right to enact and enforce laws and regulations that ‘go beyond its rights in 
the EEZ at large’.549 More specifically, the Tribunal stated that Article 60(4) 
UNCLOS:
‘allows the coastal State to take, in the safety zone, appropriate measures in 
the nature of the enactment of laws or regulations, and of the enforcement of 
such laws and regulations, provided that such measures are aimed at ensuring 
the safety of both navigation and the artificial islands, installations and struc-
tures’.550
In this case, a number of inflatable boats were launched from a Greenpeace 
vessel, the Arctic Sunrise, registered as a Dutch vessel, and, whilst the 
Arctic Sunrise remained at a distance, the inflatable boats entered the safety 
zone around a Russian petroleum installation without authorisation. Upon 
547 UNCLOS, Article 60(8).
548 ibid Article 60(2).
549 P.C.A. Case No 2014-02, 14 August 2015, p. 49 para. 211.
550 In the Matter of the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), P.C.A. Case No 2014-
02, 14 August 2015, p. 49 para. 211.
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reaching the installation, two people disembarked and attempted to scale it 
for the purpose of staging a protest. The question was whether the actions 
taken by Russian officials in response to this, including the subsequent 
boarding, seizure and detention of the Arctic Sunrise, were lawful.551 The 
actions of the Russian authorities took place once the inflatable boats had 
returned to the Arctic Sunrise, which was outside the safety zone.552 As a 
result of this, the question was whether the requirements of hot pursuit 
had been met, as to which see Section 3.2.3.6. The Tribunal did not consider 
in further detail the actions constituting a lawful response to breaches of 
domestic law within a safety zone.
As highlighted, Article 60(4) refers to safety zones around maritime 
constructions, as opposed to also over them, suggesting that the zones may 
be restricted to the surface of the sea. This is supported by the fact that 
Article 60(5) refers only to the breadth of the zones, with no mention of alti-
tude, and to the obligation under Article 60(6) of ships to respect the zones 
and comply with generally accepted international navigation standards in 
their vicinity, with no mention of aircraft. This argument will be developed 
in Section 3.3.
 3.2.3.3 Maximum breadth of safety zones and obligation of vessels to respect
As with the maritime constructions themselves, safety zones must not 
interfere with recognised sea lanes essential to international navigation.553 
In accordance with Article 60(5) UNCLOS, the breadth of the safety zone 
may not exceed 500 metres from the outer edge of the artificial island 
unless ‘authorized by generally accepted international standards’ or 
‘recommended by the competent international organization’, in this case 
the IMO.554 As of 2012, the IMO had not authorised the extension of a 
safety zone beyond 500 metres.555 In 2009, the IMO considered whether the 
maximum breadth of a safety zone should be extended, ultimately taking 
no further action on the basis that ‘there are currently no international 
standards to assess such requests’.556 It is for the State to determine the 
breadth of its safety zones within the 500-metre limit and in doing so, it is 
required to consider the nature and function of the maritime construction.557 
551 It is worthy of note that Russia did not participate in the proceedings. 
552 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), p. 64 para. 262-63.
553 UNCLOS, Article 60(7).
554 Nordquist (ed), UNCLOS: A Commentary – Volume II (n 506) 586; Mikhail Kashubsky and 
Anthony Morrison, ‘Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities: Exclusion Zones and 
Ships’ Routeing’ (2013) 5(1) Australia Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 1, 2. 
555 Assaf Harel, ‘Preventing Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do States Have Suffi -
cient Legal Tools?’ (2012) 4 Harvard National Security Journal 131, 152.
556 IMO, ‘Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV)’ (55th Session, 27-31 July 2009), 
available at <www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/NCSR/Pages/NAV-
55th-session.aspx> accessed 20 February 2020.
557 UNCLOS, Article 60(5).
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In contrast to other maritime constructions, installations established for the 
purpose of scientific research under Article 260 UNCLOS do not appear to 
be entitled to a more expansive safety zone.558 The provisions governing 
safety zones for installations built for the purpose of carrying out activi-
ties in the Area under Article 147, differ somewhat from those in Article 60 
and, notably in the context of this discussion, there is no mention of any 
maximum breadth of such zones.559
While Article 60(6) provides that ships must respect safety zones around 
maritime constructions in the EEZ or continental shelf of a State, there is 
no mention in Article 147 of ships being required to comply with the safety 
zones. This says little about the intended physical scope of the safety zones 
though, in particular whether they can extend to the air, as no mention is 
made in Article 147 of any obligations of other States in respect to the instal-
lations and safety zones.
3.2.3.4 Security as an element of safety in establishing and taking measures within 
safety zones
At the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1958,560 the discus-
sion on safety zones centred around the flammability of oil platforms 
and the need to keep vessels at a safe distance. The representative of the 
Netherlands proposed a safety zone of a breadth of 50 metres, based on 
consultation with the oil industry, stating that this distance corresponded 
to the distance around oil installations on land within which a naked flame 
was forbidden.561 The representative of Germany agreed with the Dutch 
proposal of the breadth of the zone, reiterating the Dutch view that ‘the sole 
purpose of safety zones was to prevent fires’.562 States present at the confer-
ence in 1958 then agreed on the greater maximum breadth of 500 metres, to 
provide an ‘ample margin of safety’.563 The specific focus of the drafters was 
based on the perceived threat to maritime constructions at that point:
558 Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1989) 120.
559 UNCLOS, Article 147(2).
560 It was at this conference that the four 1958 law of the sea conventions were adopted, on 
which many UNCLOS articles are based. See Section 2.7.1 (n 387).
561 ‘Summary Records of the 26th to 30th Meetings of the Fourth Committee – Extract from 
the Offi cial Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’ Vol. VI 
(Fourth Committee (Continental Shelf)) A/CONF.13/C.4/SR.26-30 (Geneva, 24 February 
– 27 April 1958) 81.
562 ibid 85.
563 ibid 82. This was the wording of the representative of the United Kingdom, but other 
States supporting the extended breadth included Yugoslavia and Italy (see p. 87). 
This distance was fi rst raised by the ILC: whilst the ILC draft articles did not specify a 
maximum breadth, 500 metres was provided as a reasonable consideration for States in 
the commentary to the articles (YILC (1956) Vol. II, 299).
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‘Drafters of the LOSC did not intend to address the threat of deliberate attacks, 
such as a deliberate ramming of a platform with a ship full of explosives, in the 
provisions pertaining to offshore platforms, as such attacks were not common at 
the time’.564
During the 1960s and 70s there was a rapid rise in offshore oil and natural 
gas production565 and by 2016, it accounted for over 25 per cent of global 
supplies.566 The significant role it plays in energy production as well as 
its economic value has led to offshore platforms involved in this produc-
tion becoming a target for terrorists.567 Recalling Section 2.3.2, security is 
a necessary consideration in meeting safety standards in international 
civil aviation. It is proposed here that risks to security is likewise one of 
the elements a State must take into account in its safety zones in order 
to ensure the safety of its maritime constructions. In other words, as the 
threat to safety changes over time, so too does the focus in protecting that 
safety, within the limitations provided in Article 60, including the maximum 
breadth of the zone. States during the drafting568 and since the adoption569 
of UNCLOS have argued that the 500-metre maximum breadth of safety 
zones is inadequate for protecting the security of maritime constructions, 
a view shared more recently by scholars.570 O’Connell though, writing in 
1989, emphasised that safety zones are just one method of protecting the 
safety of maritime constructions from threats to security, a recognition he 
explains also contributed to the retention of the 500-metre breadth during 
the drafting of UNCLOS.571 In any case, States have the right to establish 
safety zones to protect the safety of their maritime constructions, where the 
considerations involved in that protection now involve risks stemming not 
just from fire or collision, but also from security threats such as terrorism.
564 Harel (n 555) 156; Stuart Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipe-
lines, and Submarine Cables from Attack’ (2007) 31 Tul Mar LJ 377, 406.
565 Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms’ (n 564) 384.
566 ‘Offshore Energy Outlook’ (International Energy Agency, 2018) 13.
567 Harel (n 555) 135.
568 DP O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea – Vol I (OUP 1982) 503. These States 
included the United States, Turkey and India (Harel (n 555) 148).
569 Harel (n 555) 150-51.
570 Kashubsky and Morrison (n 554) 3; Harel (n 555) 157; Kaye (n 564) 405.
571 O’Connell (n 568) 503: ‘The mounting of armament on oil rigs would not be affected by 
limit of the safety zone because if it fi red at an attacker beyond that distance, that would 
be in exercise of the right of self-defence. Nets and traps within the limit of the safety zone 
would be suffi cient for protection against clandestine attachment of sabotage devices to 
the rig. In fact, neither expedient is necessary or likely, short of a major threat, because 
regular surveillance by suitable ships and aircraft suffi ces to ward off the mounting of 
terrorist attacks…’.
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 3.2.3.5 Safety zones in respect to maritime constructions outside an EEZ
It is not clear under UNCLOS whether a State other than a coastal State 
constructing in an EEZ or on a continental shelf, has jurisdiction over its 
maritime constructions or whether it has the right to establish safety zones 
in respect to those constructions. UNCLOS does not provide for jurisdiction 
over maritime constructions in another State’s EEZ or on their continental 
shelf or for any State constructing on the high seas outside another State’s 
continental shelf in accordance with Article 87(1)(d). Aside from coastal 
States under Article 60(4), and all States in relation to maritime construc-
tions for the purposes in Articles 147 and 260, UNCLOS also provides no 
further mention of safety zones over maritime constructions. This is not 
necessarily indicative of an absence of such right though. Article 60 specifi-
cally addresses the rights of coastal States to construct and regulate mari-
time constructions in its EEZ, with the rights of other States to construct 
in the zone being residual.572 In this way, it makes sense that the right to 
construct safety zones is granted to coastal States specifically. Article 87(1)
(d), on the other hand, is general in nature, listing the broad freedoms of the 
sea, which must be read in the context of UNCLOS as a whole.
 3.2.3.6 Enforcement powers in relation to safety zones under UNCLOS
The Tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise Case recognised the right of a coastal 
State to enforce its laws applying in its safety zone, as discussed in Section 
3.2.3.2. This case furthermore considered the right of hot pursuit in connec-
tion with safety zones for the purpose of exercising these enforcement 
powers. Under UNCLOS, enforcement in relation to the breach of the 
law within a safety zone is explicitly addressed only in the context of hot 
pursuit. With reference to safety zones, this is relevant when the State who 
suspects its laws relating to the safety zone have been breached has been 
unable to stop the foreign vessel within the zone. The right of hot pursuit, 
which is accepted as customary international law,573 is recognised under 
Article 111 UNCLOS:
‘The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent 
authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has vio-
lated the laws and regulations of that State’.574
572 The title of Article 60 is ‘Artifi cial islands, installations and structures in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone’ and the article falls under Part V UNCLOS, ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’.
573 Nicholas M Poulantzas, The Right of International Pursuit in International Law (2nd edn, 
Martinus Nijhoff 2002) 39.
574 UNCLOS, Article 111(1). In accordance with Article 111(5), only warships, military 
aircraft or ‘other ships and aircraft clearly marked and identifi able as being on govern-
ment service and authorized to that effect’ have the right of hot pursuit.
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The rules of hot pursuit apply when the pursuit commences in waters over 
which a State has sovereignty – internal waters, archipelagic waters or the 
territorial sea – or in a contiguous zone,575 and also, in accordance with 
Article 111(2):
‘…mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the con-
tinental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of 
the laws and regulations of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this 
Convention to the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including 
such safety zones’.
In addition to the coastal State having good reason to believe that there has 
been a violation of the laws and regulations applying in the safety zone 
and the pursuit having begun while the ship is still within the EEZ or the 
continental shelf, there are two other conditions for hot pursuit to be valid: 
(1) a signal to stop must have been issued to the ship prior to the pursuit 
commencing, and (2) the pursuit may only be continued outside the EEZ 
or continental shelf provided that it is uninterrupted.576 The International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) confirmed in the case of M/V 
‘Saiga’ (No. 2) that these conditions must be cumulatively met in order for 
a legitimate right of hot pursuit to exist.577 Notably for the purpose of this 
research, although aircraft have the right to conduct hot pursuit, Article 
111 provides no basis on which hot pursuit may be commenced against an 
aircraft violating the laws of a safety zone. 
 3.2.4 The South China Sea Arbitration
3.2.4.1 Relevant facts of the case
In the South China Sea Arbitration, the Tribunal addressed inter alia a claim 
by the Philippines that China had inflicted ‘severe harm on the marine 
environment by constructing artificial islands and engaging in extensive land 
reclamation at seven reefs in the Spratly Islands’ (emphasis added).578 The 
Tribunal described the reefs as, ‘in their natural form… largely submerged 
reefs, with small protrusions of coral that reach no more than a few metres 
above water at high tide’.579 Four of those reefs – Cuarton Reef, Fiery Cross 
Reef, Johnson Reef and Graven Reef (North) – are rocks that are not capable 
575 UNCLOS, Articles 111(1) and (4).
576 ibid 111(4) and (1), respectively. 
577 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 
1999, p. 10, p. 59 para. 146; as restated in Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia), 
p. 59 para. 246. For a discussion on why the hot pursuit regulations are impractical in the 
context of safety zones see, Stuart Kaye, ‘International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, 
Pipelines, and Submarine Cables from Attack’ (2007) 31 Tul Mar LJ 377, 406-8.
578 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), p. 3 para. 9.
579 ibid p. 179 para. 397.
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of sustaining human life and habitation, and three – Hughes Reef, Subi Reef 
and Mischief Reef – are low-tide elevations, with the first two situated in the 
Philippines’ territorial sea and the latter in the Philippines’ EEZ.580 As to the 
definitions and legal status of ‘rocks’ and ‘low-tide elevations’, see Section 
3.2.4.2 and in particular, Table 3.1.
Construction on maritime features over which a State has sovereignty is 
not of interest to this research, as the airspace over them is national airspace. 
Therefore, rocks are not relevant to consider and nor are low-tide elevations 
in a State’s territorial sea. The coastal State has sovereignty over the latter, 
including the airspace, and the former when they are situated in a State’s 
territorial sea or when beyond the territorial sea in the case that they are 
subject to a valid claim to sovereignty.
Instead, this research is interested in Mischief Reef, as a natural feature –
a low-tide elevation – outside the territorial sea of any State – in the Philip-
pines’ EEZ – which has been subject to human modification (see Figure 3.1 
and Figure 3.2). As has been addressed in the introduction, this research 
does not set out to argue that China’s actions in prohibiting overflight over 
Mischief Reef could have been justified through the imposition of safety 
zones in the airspace – they could not have – but rather it takes Mischief 
Reef as a starting point for examining whether the prohibition of overflight 
in international airspace over a maritime construction can ever be justified 
on the basis of that maritime construction. The construction on Mischief 
Reef brings with it interesting preliminary considerations regarding the 
legal status of a maritime construction built with an existing maritime 
feature, with its own legal status, as the foundation. In terms of the rights 
over natural maritime features, the UNCLOS framework is generally clear. 
In relation to Mischief Reef, as a low-tide elevation, it has certain rights 
associated with it (see Table 3.1), which vary according to the maritime zone 
in which the low-tide elevation is situated, but in any case, the rights do 
not extend to jurisdiction over the airspace. The question then, is how these 
rights change when the low-tide elevation is subject to human modification.
The efficiency and vast expanse of the construction in the case of 
Mischief Reef was possible, at least in part, because of the use of the low-
tide elevation as a pre-existing foundation for the construction. As the 
Tribunal described the activities:
‘Intense land reclamation began at Mischief Reef in January 2015. Progress was 
rapid… . By November 2015, the total area of land created by China on Mischief 
Reef was approximately 5,558,000 square metres… . The massive scale of China’s 
work at Mischief Reef and the transformation of nearly the entire atoll into an 
artificial island is apparent in satellite imagery’581 (see Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2).
580 ibid p. 259-260 paras. 643-45 and 647.
581 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), p. 397 paras. 889-90.
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 Figure 3.1:  Satellite image of Mischief Reef 
in 2012582
 Figure 3.2:  Satellite image of Mischief Reef 
in 2019 (Google Maps)
The fact that the destruction of the reef as a result of the construction atop 
it was in breach of environmental protection laws, as mentioned in Section 
3.2.2, illustrates that States do not have an unfettered right to employ these 
construction methods. In this way, international airspace may be indirectly 
protected from jurisdictional claims by States in connection with this type 
of use of natural features – namely, that which is destructive to the natural 
environment and that is irreversible – by prohibiting the construction from 
the outset. This does not exclude construction on low-tide elevations in 
general though, for example for use as a base for the construction of revers-
ible artificial islands, i.e. with less environmental impact, or for installations 
or structures which are, as explained in Section 3.2.1.2, generally less inva-
sive.
Three further clarifications on the South China Sea Arbitration are neces-
sary in relation to its consideration in the context of this research. Firstly, the 
Tribunal did not address overflight in its decision, which instead focused 
on ‘the legal basis of maritime rights and entitlements in the South China 
Sea [and] the status of certain geographic features in the South China 
Sea’.583 Secondly, there is no assertion that China has justified its practice 
of interfering with freedom of overflight over Mischief Reef on the basis 
of the human-modified elements of the reef. Thirdly, the research does not 
consider the myriad other legal questions that construction on the reef 
raises, either those considered by the Tribunal, such as those pertaining to 
the protection of the environment, or those outside the scope of the Tribunal 
decision, including questions of sovereignty and maritime delimitation.
582 Matt Liddy and Ben Spraggon, ‘Before and After: China Builds Artificial Island in 
South China Sea’ (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 22 September 2015), avail-
able at <www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-22/south-china-sea-islands-before-and-
after/6794076> accessed 12 June 2018. 
583 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), p. 1 para. 2.
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These matters are beyond the scope of this research. Although there 
are disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea, the Tribunal did not 
consider these matters because the arbitration claim was submitted under 
the dispute settlement mechanism set out in Part XV of UNCLOS and the 
Convention does not contain provisions on State sovereignty over land 
territory.584 Whilst UNCLOS does address maritime delimitation, it was not 
considered by the Tribunal because China has excluded maritime boundary 
delimitation from compulsory dispute settlement, as it is permitted to do 
under UNCLOS.585
On a final note, the Tribunal’s decision has not been received without 
criticism. Tanaka has examined some of the primary arguments against the 
decision, which he characterises as ‘reflecting the progressive development 
of the law of the sea towards universalism’ as opposed to unilateralism.586 
These arguments include that the Tribunal was unable to rely on evidence 
of State practice or a body of jurisprudence to support its interpretation of 
Article 121(3) UNCLOS.
 3.2.4.2 No sovereignty over low-tide elevations or subsequently over the maritime 
constructions built atop them
In the South China Sea Arbitration, the Tribunal considered whether low-tide 
elevations may be subject to claims of sovereignty. If low-tide elevations 
were subject to claims of territorial sovereignty, the ‘artificial islands’ 
created on them would also constitute the territory of the State and the 
regime applicable to artificial islands under UNCLOS would not be appli-
cable. UNCLOS defines a low-tide elevation as ‘a naturally formed area of 
land which is surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at 
high tide’ and is silent on the matter of sovereignty regarding such features 
beyond unequivocally providing that they do not generate territorial sea.587
The ICJ considered the question of whether States have a right to claim 
sovereignty over low-tide elevations in its 2001 judgment on the Case 
Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain),588 
in which it acknowledged that the law did not provide an answer to the 
matter at that time. The Court stated that if outside the territorial sea of a 
State, it is unclear whether a State may claim the land as part of its terri-
tory. In addition to recognising UNCLOS’s silence on the matter, the Court 
acknowledged that State practice does not indicate a customary rule either 
584 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), pp. 1-2 para. 5.
585 ibid p. 2 para. 6.
586 Yoshifumi Tanaka, ‘Refl ections on the Interpretation and Application of Article 121(3) in 
the South China Sea Arbitration (Merits)’ (2017) 48(3-4) Ocean Development & Interna-
tional Law 365, 378-39.
587 UNCLOS, Articles 13(1) and (2).
588 Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2001 (Mar. 16), p.40.
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way.589 The ICJ again considered the legal status of low-tide elevations in 
2012 in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), where it 
confirmed that they do not form part of the land territory of a State in a 
legal sense.590
This decision was affirmed by the Tribunal in the South China Sea 
Arbitration, which Guilfoyle has described as ‘the equivalent of a major 
constitutional decision’.591 On the matter, the Tribunal stated:
‘…notwithstanding the use of the term ‘land’ in the physical description of a 
low-tide elevation, such low-tide elevations do not form part of the land territory 
of a State in the legal sense. Rather they form part of the submerged landmass 
of the State and fall within the legal regimes for the territorial sea or continental 
shelf, as the case may be. Accordingly, as distinct from land territory, the Tribu-
nal subscribes to the view that ‘low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated…’.592
The Tribunal also clarified that what is relevant in determining the status of 
the feature is its ‘natural condition, prior to the onset of significant human 
modification’ and that in this sense, ‘a low-tide elevation will remain a low-
tide elevation under the Convention, regardless of the scale of the island 
or installation built atop it’.593 Regarding the scale of construction in the 
South China Sea Arbitration, the Tribunal described it as being to such an 
extent that ‘[i]n some cases, it would likely no longer be possible to directly 
observe the original status of the feature, as the contours of the reef plat-
form have been entirely buried by millions of tons of landfill and concrete’ 
and, that the actions of the State ‘permanently destroyed… evidence of the 
natural condition’ of a number of the reefs in question.594
The above decisions clarify that construction on or around a natural 
feature does not alter the legal status of that nature feature, regardless of the 
physical alteration of its state. Following from this, such construction cannot 
give rise to a State’s right to sovereignty over the feature. Given that sover-
eignty over airspace arises from sovereignty over territory, as recognised 
in Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Convention, this in turn means that such 
construction cannot give rise to a State’s right to sovereignty over the airspace 
589 ibid p.40, pp. 101-2 paras. 204-5. The question in this case was ‘whether a State can acquire 
sovereignty by appropriation over a low-tide elevation situated within the breadth of 
its territorial sea when that same low-tide elevation lies also within the breadth of the 
territorial sea of another State’ (p. 101 para. 204). 
590 Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2012 (Nov. 19), p. 624, p. 641 para. 26 (‘Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia)’).
591 Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Radio National, Late Night Live), ‘Who Owns 
the South China Sea?’ – Interview with Douglas Guilfoyle (14 July 2016), available at 
<www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/latenightlive/who-owns-the-south-china-
sea/7629968> at 8:09 minutes, accessed 8 June 2018.
592 South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), p. 132 para. 309.
593 ibid pp. 131-132 paras. 305-306 and pp. 214-15 para. 511.
594 ibid pp. 131-2 para. 306 and p. 476 para. 1203.
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above the maritime construction.595 As a result, it can be concluded that a 
State may have sovereignty over the airspace over a maritime construction, 
but only on the basis of existing sovereignty over that airspace, that is, 
where the maritime construction has been built atop a natural feature that 
can be appropriated and over which a State has sovereignty.
 Table 3.1: Overview of naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water and associated 
sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction
Naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water
Area of land and its maritime zones Subject to claims of territorial sovereignty?
Above water 
at high tide
– ‘island’ (Art 121(1))
– has a territorial sea, EEZ and 
continental shelf (Art 121(2))
– BUT, if the land is ‘a rock that 
cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life’, 
it only has a territorial sea (Art 
121(3))
– If in the territorial sea, the coastal State has 
sovereignty over the area of land.
– If outside the territorial sea of a State, 
territorial recognition subject to public 
international law.
Above water 
at low tide 
(submerged 
at high tide)
– ‘low tide elevation’ (Art 13(1))
– has no maritime zones (Art 
13(2)) but if within 12nm of a 
State’s coastline or an island 
may be used as a base point 
for extending the territorial 
sea (Art 13(1), Art 7(4) and 
Art 47(4))
– A low-tide elevation cannot be appropriated.596 
If in the territorial sea though, the coastal 
State has sovereignty over the low-tide 
elevation, as it has sovereignty over the 
territorial sea itself.
– If beyond the territorial sea of a State, but in 
the EEZ or continental shelf, the coastal State 
has sovereign rights and jurisdiction in 
accordance with the applicable regimes under 
Article 56(3) and 77 UNCLOS, respectively. 
Again, the low-tide elevation cannot be 
appropriated.
– If in the high seas beyond any State’s EEZ or 
continental shelf no State may claim any 
sovereign rights over the land. It is part of the 
deep seabed and subject to the applicable law 
under Pt XI UNCLOS.
Below water 
at all times
– part of the bed and subsoil – If in the territorial sea, the coastal State has 
sovereignty over the feature as it has 
sovereignty over the territorial sea itself and 
the bed and subsoil.
– If beyond the territorial sea of a State, but in 
the EEZ or continental shelf, the coastal State 
has sovereign rights and jurisdiction in 
accordance with the applicable regimes under 
Article 56(3) and 77 UNCLOS, respectively.
– If in the high seas beyond any State’s EEZ or 
continental shelf no State may claim any 
sovereign rights over the feature. It is part of 
the deep sea bed and subject to the applicable 
law under Pt XI UNCLOS.597 
595 See Section 2.2.2.1.
596 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), p. 641 para. 26. 
597 ibid p. 127 para. 291.
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 3.2.5 The dual status of a natural feature/maritime construction
In confirming that a natural feature subject to human modification retains 
its prior legal status, the resulting land mass is both a natural feature and a 
maritime construction, with the legal regimes for each applying simultane-
ously. As outlined in Section 3.2.4, in relation to the relevance of Mischief 
Reef to this research to the exclusion of the other features in the South 
China Sea Arbitration, rocks and islands are subject to State sovereignty and 
construction over them does not generate new rights for the State. As such, 
when discussing changes to the rights of a State in relation to a natural 
feature as a result of maritime construction over that feature, it is low-tide 
elevations that are relevant, with the new rights being those under Article 
60 UNCLOS.
Kohl argues that a natural feature’s preservation of its original legal 
status upon human modification is inconsistent with the intention of the 
drafters of UNCLOS in that the drafters would not have created a specific 
legal regime for maritime constructions if those constructions were to retain 
their prior legal status:
‘… it would make little sense for the framers to create a rule for legal entitle-
ments belonging to artificial islands, but nevertheless maintain a belief that enti-
tlements of artificial islands would be defined by the rules attached to each sepa-
rate island’s underlying feature… . Moreover… the framers of UNCLOS likely 
did not intend the legal entitlements affecting artificial islands to be governed by 
some unrelated section of the Convention’.598
Counter to Kohl’s view, the only logical interpretation of the relevant provi-
sions of UNCLOS is that in the case of construction over a natural feature, 
that feature both retains its original legal status and takes on the legal 
status of an artificial island, installation or structure. This interpretation is 
supported by a number of considerations, outlined here below.
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, artificial islands are generally distin-
guished from installations and structures on the basis of the former 
involving an elevation of the seabed, where such construction has long 
been recognised in relation to man-made islands on coral reefs. In 1951, a 
hydrographer for the Admiralty in the UK who was asked to advise the 
Foreign Office on the legal status of artificial islands, acknowledged the 
‘many forms of artificial islands in the Gulf built upon coral, which have 
a close assimilation to small, natural islands’.599 Of course, artificial islands 
598 Adam W Kohl, ‘China’s Artifi cial Island Building Campaign in the South China Sea: 
Implications for the Reform of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ 
(2018) 122(3) Dickinson Law Review 917, 930.
599 Clive Schofi eld and Richard Schofi eld, ‘Testing the Waters: Charting the Evolution of 
Claims to and from Low-Tide Elevations and Artifi cial Islands under the Law of the Sea’ 
(2016) 1 Asia-Pacifi c J of Ocean L & P 37, 44.  
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or maritime constructions more broadly built upon low-tide elevations 
are only a subset of what is within the scope of Article 60 UNCLOS in that 
maritime constructions exist independently of natural features. At the same 
time, there is nothing in the text of UNCLOS to suggest that this subset was 
intended to fall outside the scope of Article 60. Particularly considering the 
generally understood characteristic of an artificial island integrated into the 
natural seabed, the exclusion of construction on low-tide elevations would 
be an unusual omission, even more so given it is not expressly stated.
Furthermore, the provisions under Article 60 have been drafted in a 
manner consistent with the laws applying to the natural state of the feature. 
Of course, in the case of a maritime construction over a natural feature 
certain provisions in Article 60 will not be applicable. These circumstances 
have been mentioned above, for example, in the case of a rock which is 
subject to a State’s sovereignty, or in the case of a low-tide elevation where 
the requirement that the safety zone does not interfere with recognised sea 
lanes will not be relevant. In these circumstances, it is not that the natural 
feature is in conflict with the provisions, but that they are not relevant 
as a consequence of the natural feature already bringing about the result 
intended by the application of the provisions. Article 60 has been drafted to 
address maritime constructions in the EEZ as a whole, including those built 
on natural features, where those provisions are relevant. The broad scope 
of Article 60 reflects the fact that maritime constructions do not necessarily 
and in fact most often do not, rely on natural features.
Reflecting the consistency between the two legal regimes is Article 
60(8), which begins with the statement ‘[a]rtificial islands, installations and 
structures do not possess the status of islands’ and goes on to provide that 
artificial islands, installations and structures ‘…have no territorial sea of 
their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, 
the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf’ (emphasis added). Consid-
ered in context, this provision is clearly intended to ensure that a maritime 
construction does not generate maritime zones and is not used to extend a 
territorial sea baseline. At the same times though, it serves to ensure that 
a natural feature that generates maritime zones – a rock or island – retains 
those zones regardless of any maritime construction that is built atop it.
A consequence of a feature retaining its prior legal status that is 
advantageous to high seas freedoms is that it may help to ensure that arti-
ficial islands do not end up being treated as natural islands over time and 
become subject to State sovereignty. Without the natural state of a feature 
being held as paramount, the passage of time may end up leading to it, in 
its modified form, being treated as a natural island. This new status may be 
de facto, or even de jure by way of the development of customary interna-
tional law.
Despite the above arguments, the simultaneous application of two legal 
regimes to the one body of land in these situations does lead to some anom-
alous circumstances, which are addressed in the two following sections.
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 3.2.5.1 Consequences of a natural feature/maritime construction dual status
As explained in Section 3.2.4.1, the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitra-
tion made it clear that an artificial island built atop a natural feature retains 
its status as it was before human modification, meaning that the artificial 
island is at once an artificial island and a low-tide elevation or rock, as was 
the specific set of circumstances in this case. This raises questions in rela-
tion to the maritime zones pertaining to maritime constructions with these 
features as their foundations.
3.2.5.2 Rocks
As a conclusion extrapolated from Article 121(3) UNCLOS, we know 
that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their 
own generate territorial seas. The logical result under UNCLOS is that a 
maritime construction can be encircled by a territorial sea, by virtue of the 
rock on which it is constructed. At the same time, features permanently 
submerged and low-tide elevations with the exception of those discussed 
below in Section 3.2.5.3, ‘have no zone generative capacity even if a struc-
ture has been built on them, which is itself permanently above sea level’.600 
This makes sense given that neither the natural features themselves nor the 
maritime constructions generate maritime zones. As a result though, two 
identical maritime constructions in size and shape – one constructed over or 
around a rock and the other a low-tide elevation or an entirely submerged 
feature – may possess different maritime zones based on their, potentially 
now unrecognisable, original state. This in itself is logical considering the 
applicable law and the consequences of the alternative, as discussed in 
Section 3.2.5, and it is not necessarily problematic, however it does require 
continuous recognition of the underlying form of the landmass as opposed 
to its existing and developing states.
 3.2.5.3 Low-tide elevations and lighthouses
Lighthouses specifically, as a type of man-made structure, are a recurring 
theme in the records of the development of the law of the sea.601 The basis 
for this is the Fur Seal Arbitration Case of 1893, in which Sir Charles Russell, 
the UK Attorney General at the time, argued that lighthouses should lead 
to the generation of a territorial sea: ‘if a lighthouse is built upon a rock or 
upon piles driven into the bed of the sea, it becomes, as far as that light-
600 Schofi eld (n 498) 27.
601 MW Mouton, The Continental Shelf (Martinus Nijhoff 1952) 233.
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house is concerned, part of the territory of the nation which has erected it, 
and… it has… all the rights that belong to the protection of territory’.602
In contrast, in 1912, in consideration of whether a lighthouse should be 
able to change a ‘mere rock’ into an island by virtue of having a lighthouse 
built upon it, Oppenheimer was unequivocal:
‘If this assertion of Sir Charles Russell were correct’, he said, ‘it would be nec-
essary to grant to any State which has built such a lighthouse a right of sover-
eignty over the territorial sea surrounding this lighthouse; but, in my opinion, 
this assertion is not justified. I believe that the assimilation of lighthouses and 
islands is misleading and that it would be better to treat lighthouses on the same 
footing as anchored flagships. Just as a state does not have the power to claim 
sovereignty over the territorial sea around an anchored flagship, so too does it 
have no power to claim sovereignty over a maritime area surrounding a light-
house in the sea’.603
These discussions took place long before man-made structures and natu-
rally formed islands were distinguished under international law, with only 
602 Oral Argument of Sir Charles Russell on Behalf of Great Britain (10 May 1893), Proceed-
ings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Convened at Paris Under the Treaty Between the 
United States of America and Great Britain, Concluded at Washington February 29, 
1892 for the Determination of Questions Between the Two Governments Concerning 
the Jurisdictional Rights of the United States in the Waters of Bering Sea, Vol. XIII (US 
Government Printing Offi ce 1895), 337; in the case of Award between the United States and 
the United Kingdom relating to the rights of Jurisdiction of United States in the Bering’s Sea and 
the Preservation of Fur Seals (1893) XXVIII R.I.A.A. 263. 
603 Johnson (n 502) 206-7; citing Oppenheim’s report to the Institute of International Law 
for its Christiana session in 1912. Quote translated from the French: ‘Si cette assertion 
de Sir Charles Russell était juste’, he said, ‘il serait nécessaire d’accorder à tout Etat qui 
a bâti un tel phare un droit de souveraineté sur la mer territoriale entourant ce phare; 
mais, à mon sens, cette assertion n’est pas justifi ée. Je crois que l’assimilation des phares 
aux les est de nature à induire en erreur et qu’il vaudrait mieux traiter les phares sur 
le mème pied que les bateaux phares ancrés. De même qu’un Etat n’a pas le pouvoir 
de réclamer souveraineté sur une mer territoriale à l’entour d’un bateau-phare ancré, de 
même il n’a pas pouvoir de réclamer cette souveraineté sur une zone maritime à l’entour 
d’un phare dans la mer’. In 1951, Jessup echoed Oppenheimer’s sentiments: ‘it would be 
a dangerous doctrine in many parts of the world to allow States to appropriate new areas 
of water by means of structures on hidden shoals’ (PC Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters 
and Maritime Jurisdiction (GA Jennings 1927) 69, as cited in, Johnson (n 502) 207). 
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the latter ultimately entitled to maritime zones.604 In this sense, these early 
discussions had added weight regarding claims of sovereignty over inter-
national waters compared with today, as it meant that a State would poten-
tially be able to claim sovereignty over stretches of the high seas on the 
basis of small-scale constructions on tiny maritime features. The solution to 
this was to ‘discover a more general principle of international law’, which 
was ‘to be found in the law relating to islands themselves’.605 Thus, in rela-
tion to the above, the ‘mere rock’ referred to by Russell and Oppenheimer 
may today, if it is a ‘rock’ in the sense of Article 121(3) UNCLOS, generate 
a territorial sea regardless of the installation built upon it, as we have seen.
The development of the law through the three UN conferences on the 
law of the sea in the second half of the twentieth century focused on just 
that: the maritime feature as it exists naturally is generally the source of 
the rights associated with it. The condition ‘generally’ is used here because 
of: (1) the situation of low-tide elevations with lighthouses and similar 
constructions built upon them, which will be discussed directly below in 
this section, and; (2) the rights attributed to a State on the basis of its mari-
time construction, under Article 60, considered in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, in 
particular in relation to the right to establish safety zones.
The South China Sea Arbitration unequivocally confirms the retention of 
the legal status of a natural feature in the case of construction. However, 
a construction over a low-tide elevation can, in specific circumstances, 
affect maritime zones. Under UNCLOS, a territorial sea baseline can be 
measured from a low-tide elevation where that low-tide elevation is wholly 
or partly within the territorial sea.606 This is unremarkable and is consistent 
with other natural features including reefs and bays, being used in such a 
manner.607 However, under Article 7(4) UNCLOS, and in contrast to other 
instances of maritime construction, low-tide elevations that are beyond 
territorial sea may be used for the purpose of drawing straight baselines 
in the specific instance that ‘lighthouses or similar installations which are 
604 YILC (1956) Vol. II, 270. Draft Article 10 read: ‘Every island has its own territorial sea. An 
island is an area of land, surrounded by water, which in normal circumstances is perma-
nently above high-water mark’. Whilst it did not draw a distinction between naturally-
formed and man-made islands in the text of the article, the accompanying commentary 
clearly excludes from the scope of the article low-tide elevations that have lighthouses 
built upon them (as well as low-tide elevations in general) and ‘technical installations’. 
These ILC draft articles formed the basis for the resulting four 1958 conventions on the 
law of the sea, including the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 
with its Article 10 as a revised form of the ILC draft Article 10 (Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Geneva, 29 Apr. 1958) 516 U.N.T.S. 205, entered into 
force 10 Sep. 1964 (‘Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958’)). 
The fi nal version of the article expressly provides that an island must be ‘naturally-
formed’, as was carried over into Article 121 UNCLOS. 
605 Johnson (n 502) 211.
606 UNCLOS, Article 13(1) or Article 47(4) in the case of archipelagic baselines.
607 UNCLOS, Articles 6 and 10. 
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permanently above the sea’ are constructed on them.608 Aside from off the 
coast of Norway, there is little in the way of State practice regarding the 
application of this provision.609 The situation is significant though because, 
keeping in mind that a lighthouse or similar installation will not necessarily 
be a maritime construction for the purpose of Article 60, the provision 
technically serves as an exception to maritime constructions being unable to 
generate maritime zones. It is only by way of the construction of the ‘light-
houses or similar installations’ resulting in the land mass of the low-tide 
elevation being permanently above the surface of the water, that the mass 
is able to be used to draw the straight baseline. In essence, it is the human 
modification that extends the territorial sea and in the case of that modifica-
tion being a maritime construction, it is a case of a maritime construction 
doing so.
The provision leads to the unusual situation where a low-tide elevation 
with a lighthouse or similar installation may contribute to the delimita-
tion of the territorial sea but construction over the low-tide elevation to 
accommodate, for example, an airport, may not. Whether this is the case in 
practice will depend on the interpretation of the vague term ‘similar instal-
lation’ used in Article 7(4) UNCLOS, and whether airports would fall under 
it. Mendes de Leon and Molenaar explain that at the time of the seadromes 
in the 1930s they were ‘considered in the same fashion as beacons and 
lighthouses’ insofar as they were ‘instruments to bridge distances and to 
facilitate air navigation’.610 The standard contemporaneous consideration 
for the construction of airports at sea is as a solution for lack of space rather 
than as an aid for navigation, in which case this comparison becomes more 
tenuous. Furthermore, due to advancements in navigation technology 
leading to increased reliance on tools such as the Global Position System 
(GPS), lighthouses are becoming obsolete and the provisions pertaining to 
lighthouses under UNCLOS are consequently losing their relevance.
As addressed in Section 2.2.3.1, natural features such as deep coastal 
indentations and fringes of islands,611 as well as islets, rocks and reefs,612 are 
legitimate basepoints for the drawing of a straight baseline, depending on 
the circumstances. The above case of construction on low-tide elevations is 
distinguished from these situations in that the defining factor is the human 
modification of the low-tide elevation. Finally, human modification can lead 
608 Or Article 47(4), in the case of archipelagic baselines. The value of a low-tide elevation 
in generating maritime zones is restricted to this instance i.e. when it is in suffi cient 
proximity to the coast of a State. As a result, they are known as ‘parasitic basepoints’ 
(Schofi eld (n 498) 26, with reference to, Clive Symmons, ‘Some Problems Relating to the 
Defi nition of ‘Insular Formations’ in International Law: Islands and Low-Tide Elevations’ 
(1995) 1(5) IBRU Maritime Briefi ng 7).
609 International Law Association, ‘Baselines under the International Law of the Sea’, Final 
Report (2018) 29.
610 Mendes de Leon and Molenaar (n 486) 235.
611 UNCLOS, Article 7(1).
612 Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1951 (Dec. 18), p. 116.
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to the extension of the territorial sea baseline in one other case, although 
this time in the case of construction in territorial sea: coastal land reclama-
tion. This will be considered in Section 3.5. 
 3.3 The right to extend safety zones to encompass airspace
3.3.1 Development of treaty law applying to safety zones
The ‘essential origins’613 of safety zones is the recommendation by the ILC 
in 1953 of such areas around installations in the continental shelf.614 The 
recommendation was part of a draft article that served as an early version 
of what went on to be accepted as Article 5(2) of the 1958 Convention on 
the Continental Shelf,615 which provides that ‘the coastal State is entitled 
to… establish safety zones around such installations and devices and to take 
in those zones measures necessary for their protection’. Article 5(3) further 
states that the zones may extend to a breadth of 500 metres and ships must 
respect them. The wording of this article in respect to safety zones is similar 
to that under Article 60 UNCLOS and provides no indication of whether 
safety zones were intended to extend also to the airspace in addition to the 
surface of the sea. The matter was, however, addressed during its drafting 
at the First UN Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958.
The ILC’s Report to the General Assembly in 1956, which included the 
draft articles on the law of the sea, was considered by the States present at 
the 1958 conference. A document forming part of the travaux préparatoires 
of the 1958 law of the sea conventions and addressing the relationship 
between international civil aviation law and the ILC draft articles, reveals 
support for the position that the draft ILC articles should be interpreted as 
permitting the establishment of safety zones in the airspace over maritime 
constructions. The author of the document, Eugène Pépin, concludes,
‘[n]either article 71 [the draft article on safety zones] nor its commentary… refer 
to air traffic and, consequently, a safety zone established around installations 
situated on the surface of the sea can presumably include part of the superjacent 
airspace. Such a safety zone or space may thus be assimilated to a prohibited, 
restricted or danger area, depending on the regulations enacted by the State con-
cerned, and may even have no upward limit’.616
613 Schofi eld and Schofi eld (n 599) 43.
614 YILC (1953) Vol. II, 213, as draft Article 6(2).
615 Convention on the Continental Shelf (Geneva, 29 Apr. 1958) 499 U.N.T.S. 311, entered into 
force 10 Jun. 1964 (‘Continental Shelf Convention 1958’).
616 Eugène Pépin, The Law of the Air and the Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted 
by the International Law Commission at Its Eighth Session (A/CONF.13/4) – Extract from the 
Offi cial Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume I (Preparatory 
Documents), United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 24 February-27 
April 1958, 73.
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Section 3.3.3.2 will address the reason safety zones are different to these 
spaces – prohibited, restricted and danger areas – in international civil avia-
tion law and therefore why the extension of safety zones to the airspace 
over maritime constructions cannot be justified on these grounds.
In contrast to Pépin’s conclusion, the travaux préparatoires indicate that 
States present at the 1958 conference considered that safety zones were 
limited to the sea rather than extending to the airspace. On consideration of 
the draft article, the representative of Yugoslavia stated that the concept of 
‘safety zone’ should expressly encompass the airspace: ‘since installations 
could be endangered by aircraft even more than ships, the [Yugoslavian] 
proposal also provided for an air safety zone to a height of 1,000 metres’.617 
A vote on this proposal by States present was defeated 18 votes to 17 
though, with 21 abstentions.618 The reason for the defeat is unclear. Was it 
because States believed it should be left open for them to determine through 
their national law? Was it because States believed that safety zones should 
be restricted to the sea? Did States perhaps believe that safety zones could 
extend to the airspace but that a conference on the law of the sea was not the 
correct forum to do so and that this was instead the domain of ICAO?
Regarding the latter point, this was certainly the opinion of the UK, at 
least. The records of the conference state of the representative of the UK, 
that ‘she did not regard the question of air safety zones as falling within 
the competence of a conference on the law of the sea’.619 Although defini-
tive answers to these questions are elusive, the subsequent analysis in this 
chapter will reflect on them in attempting to determine what the legal status 
is today of establishing safety zones in the airspace over maritime construc-
tions.
Following the adoption of UNCLOS, a 1987 ICAO Secretariat Study 
looking into the implications of UNCLOS for the application of the Chicago 
Convention found that ‘since the Convention [referring to UNCLOS] refers 
to the ‘breadth’ of the safety zone, no such restrictions would appear to be 
permitted over the airspace above such installations and the right of over-
flight cannot be, under the Convention, curtailed by the coastal State’.620 It 
reiterated this view in respect to the continental shelf: ‘[t]he coastal State is 
not granted under the Convention [UNCLOS] any special rights or jurisdic-
tion or precedence or priority with respect to the airspace above the waters 
superjacent to the continental shelf’.621 Recalling Section 2.7.3.2, the ICAO 
Secretariat has also made its position clear that the EEZ provides the coastal 
State with no rights or jurisdiction in respect to airspace. 
617 ‘Summary Records of the 26th to 30th Meetings of the Fourth Committee – Extract from 
the Offi cial Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’ Vol. VI 
(Fourth Committee (Continental Shelf)) A/CONF.13/C.4/SR.26-30 (Geneva, 24 February –
 27 April 1958) 84.
618 ibid 90.
619 ibid 85.
620 ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5 (n 466) 255.
621 ibid 257.
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3.3.2 Practice regarding safety zones extending to airspace
3.3.2.1 Support for the extension of safety zones to airspace
Despite the unambiguous statements of ICAO, the alternative position, 
that is, that safety zones may be extended to airspace, is supported by the 
domestic law of France and by commentary.
France extends its safety zones to airspace under its domestic law 
applying to installations in its oil and gas industry.622 Under Article 29 of 
Ordonnance n° 2016-1687 du 8 décembre 2016 relative aux espaces maritimes 
relevant de la souveraineté ou de la juridiction de la République française,
‘The representative of the State at sea may establish a safety zone around arti-
ficial islands, installations, works and their related facilities on the continen-
tal shelf or in the exclusive economic zone, extending up to a distance of 500 
metres’.623
And in determining the extent of the safety zone,
‘Restrictions may be imposed on the overflight of artificial islands, installa-
tions and works and their associated installations and safety zones, within the 
measure necessary for the protection of these artificial islands, installations and 
works and the safety of air navigation’.624
Rothwell argues that the measures that a State may take in the safety zone 
include requesting prior overflight permission and altitude restrictions.625 
He argues that, despite the fact that Article 60 does not explicitly provide 
coastal States with the right to establish safety zones in the airspace above 
622 Ordonnance n° 2016-1687 du 8 décembre 2016 relative aux espaces maritimes relevant de 
la souveraineté ou de la juridiction de la République française, Article 29 (‘Ordonnance nº 
2016-1687’).
623 Translated from the original: ‘Le représentant de l’Etat en mer peut créer une zone de 
sécurité autour des îles artifi cielles, installations, ouvrages et leurs installations connexes 
sur le plateau continental ou dans la zone économique exclusive, s’étendant jusqu’à une 
distance de 500 mètres’.
624 Ordonnance nº 2016-1687, Article 29 7°. Translated from the original in French: ‘Des 
restrictions peuvent être apportées au survol des îles artifi cielles, installations et ouvrages 
et leurs installations connexes et des zones de sécurité, dans la mesure nécessaire à la 
protection de ces îles artifi cielles, installations et ouvrages et à la sécurité de la navigation 
aérienne’.
625 Donald R Rothwell, ‘Artifi cial Islands and International Law’ (Presentation delivered at 
ANU College of Law, Canberra, 28 July 2015) 23 and 27; Frank-Luke Attard Camilleri, 
The Application of the High Seas Regime in the Exclusive Economic Zone (Hamilton Books 
2018) 31: ‘coastal States may still require aircraft fl ying above artifi cial installations and 
structures to observe the coastal State’s regulations regarding those structures’.
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its maritime constructions, construing the provision as implicitly allowing 
for it is consistent with the intent of the article.626
This argument makes sense based on a teleological interpretation of 
Article 60 UNCLOS, a method of interpretation that involves consider-
ation of the terms of the treaty in their context and of the treaty’s object 
and purpose, as set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. This method of interpretation is increasingly relied upon 
by international courts and tribunals.627 The provisions of Article 60 form 
part of the broader Part V of UNCLOS, which sets out the sovereign rights 
of the coastal State in the EEZ and establishes a framework for the State 
to effectively exercise those rights. Safety zones contribute to this aim by 
enabling the coastal State to exercise these rights safely, minimising the risk 
to the maritime construction itself and to other users of the maritime space. 
In terms of who these users are, the Preamble of UNCLOS highlights the 
danger of siloing the approach to managing activities at sea, emphasising 
that ‘the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be 
considered as a whole’, in this case the safety risks to and brought about 
by all users of the maritime space, including those in the airspace and on 
the surface of the water. Consideration of Article 60 in its wider context, 
acknowledging the ‘interrelatedness’ of activities at sea, and the purpose 
of the article in the legal regime governing activities in the EEZ, therefore 
supports the interpretation that safety zones apply equally in the airspace 
as on the surface of the sea.
Rothwell further illustrates his argument through the example of a 
maritime construction extending far into the airspace. Inevitably, a maritime 
construction will occupy airspace and there are no provisions limiting the 
height of such constructions. Rothwell then poses the question: What is 
there to stop a State constructing a tower on an artificial island that would 
occupy considerable airspace? The answer to this is nothing, at least explic-
itly, in which case, he then reasons, ‘an air exclusion zone would seem to be 
an appropriate response to deal with aircraft in the vicinity’ of the maritime 
construction.628 An argument against the right of a State to extend safety 
zones around its maritime constructions is that it is a violation of the right 
to freedom of overflight. This argument will be examined below, in Section 
3.3.3.
Regardless of the method of interpretation favoured – as to which, see 
below in this section – a treaty is binding on all State parties to it, by applica-
tion of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. This principle is customary inter-
626 Correspondence from Donald Rothwell (Professor of International Law, Australian 
National University) to the author, dated 20 December 2019.
627 Irina Buga, Modifi cation of Treaties by Subsequent Practice (OUP 2018) 81.
628 Correspondence from Donald Rothwell (Professor of International Law, Australian 
National University) to the author, dated 20 December 2019.
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national law,629 and is codified under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. It states that a treaty that has entered into force is 
binding on the States that are party to it and that those States must perform 
their obligations under it in good faith (bona fides). The principle is closely 
linked to the interpretation of the provisions of a treaty given that the 
performance of the treaty ‘presupposes the interpretation of the treaty’.630 
As such, rather than lending support to the interpretation of a treaty, Article 
26 requires States to meet their obligations under that treaty and to do so in 
a manner that does not frustrate its object and purpose.
While State parties are bound by their obligations under a treaty, those 
obligations do not bind non-party States. The general principle of law631 of 
res inter alios acta (pacta tertiis nec nocet nec prodest) refers to, in terms of inter-
national treaty law, the ‘well-established’ rule that ‘a treaty cannot impose 
obligations upon a ‘third State’’.632 This is relevant to the interpretation of 
Article 60 because if it is found that this article provides States with the right 
to impose safety zones in international airspace, and thereby prohibit other 
States’ aircraft from operating in that airspace, it will not bind non-parties. 
This is so unless the right has also developed into customary international 
law, as to which see Section 3.3.4. As established in Section 2.7.1, although 
UNCLOS is widely ratified, some key maritime States are not State parties 
to it.
In contrast to the teleological interpretation of Article 60, the textual 
interpretation does not support the extension of safety zones to airspace. 
Article 60 is not only silent on the establishment of safety zones in airspace 
but, in referring to the ‘breadth’ of the zones and the obligation for ‘ships’ 
to respect them, it indicates that they are restricted to the sea.633 The textual 
interpretation is reflected in the reference to the ordinary meaning of the 
text in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
gives less weight to subsequent practice in interpreting the provisions of a 
treaty.634
629 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Preamble. The Preamble speaks of the prin-
ciples of good faith and pacta sunt servanda as being ‘universally recognised’; See also, 
Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach 
(eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2nd edn, Springer 2018) 475; 
Mark Eugen Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Brill 
Nijhoff 2009) 368.
630 Mark Eugen Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Brill 
Nijhoff 2009) 366.
631 David J Bederman, ‘Third Party Rights and Obligations in Treaties’ in Duncan B Hollis 
(ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 328. As one of the sources of international 
law in accordance with Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(San Francisco, 26 Jun. 1945) T.S. No. 993, entered into force 24 Oct. 1945 (‘ICJ Statute’).
632 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (OUP 1986) 310.
633 Section 3.2.3.2.
634 Buga (n 627) 79.
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A treaty’s silence on a point requires consideration of the nature of the 
treaty and in the case that the treaty states broad principles, it will be more 
likely that implied terms will be accepted in interpreting it.635 On this point, 
Gardiner highlights the decision of the Tribunal in Air Services Agreement 
Case (USA v France),636 in which it was concluded that the prohibition on 
the change of gauge ‘within the territory of the two parties’ under the 
ASA between the USA and France meant that the agreement permitted 
the change of gauge in the territories of third States by airlines operating 
services under the agreement. In reaching its decision, the Tribunal consid-
ered the provision within the treaty as a whole and the context in which the 
treaty was negotiated,637 stating that the treaty ‘is silent concerning most of 
the major operational issues facing an air carrier’ and that ‘the Agreement 
leaves to the Parties… the right to decide a wide range of key issues’,638 
without amendment to the agreement having been considered necessary 
to achieve these objectives in the past. Thus, in this context, the Tribunal 
concluded that in interpreting the ASA, it was necessary to read into it an 
implied term permitting the change of gauge in the territory of a third State. 
At the same time, Gardiner emphasises, quoting Lord Sankey LC, that when 
interpreting the terms of a treaty, ‘it is to be assumed that the parties have 
included the terms which they wished to include and on which they were 
able to agree’.639 In contrast to the Air Services Agreement Case, Article 60 
not only addresses a specific matter, rather than being general, it also, as 
mentioned above, includes specific terms that indicate that its application 
does not extend to the airspace.
The subjective method of interpretation of Article 60, reflected in Article 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties through its reference to 
the travaux préparatoires,640 for example, lends further support to the textual 
interpretation. The subjective method aims to determine the intention of 
the drafters at the time of the treaty’s conclusion.641 As addressed in Section 
3.3.1, the inclusion of airspace was discussed in the drafting process at 
the Geneva Conference and was rejected by those present. Recalling this 
discussion above, the article on safety zones accepted at the conclusion of 
this conference formed the basis for Article 60 UNCLOS, and despite the 
635 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2015) 165-66. 
636 Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and 
France (USA v France) (1978) XVIII R.I.A.A. 417. As discussed in, Richard Gardiner, 
Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2015) 166.
637 ibid 435 and 440 (paras. 48 and 66). 
638 ibid 437-38 (para. 54). 
639 Gardiner (n 635) 166, citing Edwards v Attorney General for Canada [1930] AC 124, 136 per 
Lord Sankey LC.
640 Consideration of the travaux préparatoires is also viewed as part of teleological interpreta-
tion insofar as it contributes to establishing the original ‘object and purpose’ of the provi-
sions of a treaty (Buga (n 627) 81).
641 Stefan Kadelbach, ‘International Law Commission and Role of Subsequent Practice as a 
Means of Interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 VCLT’ (2018) 46 QIL 5, 6.
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changes between the two articles, nothing further was added to suggest 
that they were to extend to the airspace. State practice generally reflects 
this interpretation, where the subsequent practice of States is relevant to the 
interpretation of the provisions of a treaty in terms of considering them in 
their context,642 as will be explained in the following section.
 3.3.2.2 Practice supporting restriction of safety zones to the surface of the sea
The subsequent practice of States in applying a treaty provision may be 
used as a tool for interpreting those terms of the treaty, pursuant to Articles 
31(3)(b) and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.643 The 
purpose of considering subsequent practice is to understand as accurately 
as possible the original intention of the drafters, however State interpreta-
tion is a product of the context in which it takes place and so may shift over 
time.644
As indicated in Section 3.3.2.1, some States interpret Article 60 UNCLOS 
as providing the right to extend safety zones to include the airspace over 
maritime constructions. An overwhelming body of domestic legislation 
though, supported by IMO materials, strictly follows the text of Article 60 
UNCLOS in omitting any reference to airspace, in accordance with what 
seems to have been the originally intended application of the provision, as 
discussed in Section 3.3.1.
In the UK, the Petroleum Act 1987 states that,
‘A safety zone… shall extend to every point within 500 metres of any part of the 
installation (ignoring any moorings) and to every point in the water which is 
vertically above or below such point’.645
Offences for entering the safety zone apply only to vessels, with no mention 
of aircraft.646
Under US federal law,
‘A safety zone establishment… may extend to a maximum distance of 500 meters 
around the OCS [outer continental shelf] facility measured from each point on 
its outer edge or from its construction site, but may not interfere with the use of 
recognized sea lanes essential to navigation’.647
642 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(3)(b).
643 Acknowledging the circumstances in which Article 32 applies, that is, ‘when the inter-
pretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) 
Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. See also, Georg Nolte, 
‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty 
Interpretation’ (ILC 65th Session, 19 March 2013) 28.
644 Buga (n 627) 2.
645 Petroleum Act 1987 (UK), Section 21(5). 
646 ibid Section 23(1).
647 33 C.F.R. 147 (2010) § 147.15.
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Keeping in mind that the US is not a party to UNCLOS, the source of its 
international rights and obligations in respect to safety zones outside terri-
torial seas is Article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.
In Australia, under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 
2006 (Cth), the dimensions of a ‘petroleum safety zone’,
‘… may extend to a distance of 500 metres around the well, structure or equip-
ment… where that distance is measured from each point of the outer edge of the 
well, structure or equipment’.648
As under UK legislation, the offences in relation to entering the zone are 
only applicable to vessels.649
The Russian Federal Law on the Continental Shelf of 25 October 1995 
provides that,
‘Safety zones extending for not more than 500 metres from each point on the 
outer edge of artificial islands, installations and structures shall be established 
around such islands, installations and structures.650
IMO Resolution A.671(16), referred to in Section 3.2.1.2,651 provides no 
mention of airspace, suggesting an understanding that safety zones are 
restricted to the sea. This document is the ‘principle IMO resolution 
dealing with safety zones around offshore oil and gas installations’652 and 
the IMO is, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1.2, generally understood to be the 
‘competent international organization’ responsible under Article 60(5) for 
providing recommendations on the extension of the breadth of a safety zone 
beyond 500 metres.
Doctrine has also interpreted the silence as restrictive, declaring that ‘[t]
he safety zone applies only to surface ship navigation’;653 ‘the zone attracts 
no superjacent air rights as it is to be ‘around such installations’;654 and,
‘[t]he right to establish safety zones around those structures is limited to naviga-
tions [sic]. Aerial safety zones in which freedom of overflight may be suspended 
or restricted are not mentioned in Article 60’.655
648 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth), s 616(2).
649 ibid s 616(1) and (3).
650 Federal Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation, adopted by the State 
Duma on 25 October 1995, Article 16. The above is an English translation, available at 
<www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1995_Law.
pdf> accessed 12 February 2019.
651 IMO Resolution A.671(16) (n 511).
652 Kashubsky and Morrison (n 554) 4.
653 Carlos Espósito, James Kraska, Harry N Scheiber and Moon-Sang Kwon (eds), Ocean Law 
and Policy: Twenty Years of Development Under the UNCLOS Regime (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 186.
654 Clive Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
1979) 106.
655 Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air’ (n 537) 510.
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In the absence of an express right to extend safety zones to the airspace 
over maritime structures, the following sections of this chapter will examine 
whether doing so is a breach of codified international law and whether the 
right exists or could develop as customary international law. 
 3.3.3 Is the imposition of safety zones in the airspace in breach of 
international law?
3.3.3.1 Interference with overflight does not necessarily mean violation of the 
freedom
In accordance with Articles 58 and 87(1)(b) UNCLOS, freedom of overflight 
applies in the EEZ and on the high seas, respectively. This freedom ‘follows 
directly from the principle of freedom of the sea’, as explained in Chapter 
1.656 Returning to Mouton’s statement at the start of the chapter, what 
exactly constitutes a violation of the freedom of overflight?
Taking an initial broad approach to answering this question, the rela-
tionship between the right of a State to build maritime constructions and 
the right of other States to freedom of navigation will briefly be examined. 
Lawrence, writing in the mid-1970s, was adamantly against the right to 
establish maritime constructions in the high seas due to his view that the 
physical space they possess and the jurisdiction over them means that they 
are prima facie in conflict with the freedom of the high seas.657 In Lawrence’s 
words, ‘fixed installations on the high seas may offer numerous actual and 
potential benefits. At the same time their construction permanently precludes 
the utilization of the ocean space they occupy for other beneficial purposes’ 
(emphasis added).658 Lawrence’s views were shared by others, with a 
Rapporteur to the Council of Europe declaring that ‘the creation of an artifi-
cial island amounts to exclusive occupancy of a maritime area’.659
These comments address the maritime constructions themselves, but the 
considerations apply equally to their safety zones and, more relevantly here, 
to their extension to airspace. In fact, they apply to the exercise of all activi-
ties of States and not exclusively in international waters. Even in its territo-
rial sea, a coastal State is required to ensure that its actions, including the 
building of maritime constructions, do not interfere with innocent passage.660
656 Myron H Nordquist (ed), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commen-
tary – Volume III (Brill Nijhoff 2011) 81.
657 William H Lawrence, ‘Superports, Airports and Other Fixed Installations on the High 
Seas (1975) 6 J Mar L & Comm 575, 585-86.
658 ibid 591. 
659 Nikos Papadakis, The International Legal Regime of Artifi cial Islands (Sijthoff 1977) 59, citing 
‘Report of the Legal Affairs Committee on the Legal Status of Artifi cial Islands Built on 
the High Seas’ (Doc 3054), presented by Mr Margue, Rapporteur (Council of Europe 
Consultative Assembly, 9 December 1971) 7.
660 UNCLOS, Article 24(1). See also, the discussion on artifi cial islands and innocent passage 
in respect to the 1958 conventions in, Papadakis (n 659) 53.
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Of course, as of the adoption of UNCLOS there is no ambiguity that 
States have the right to establish maritime constructions in the high seas and 
in an EEZ, depending on the purpose of the construction. In exercising their 
freedom to build maritime constructions in the EEZ and on the high seas, 
States are required to have due regard for the interests of other States.661 
This due regard obligation acknowledges that in the exercise of their rights 
States will, to some extent, limit the ability of other States to exercise their 
rights. For example, if State A builds an artificial island at certain coordi-
nates on the high seas State B does not have the right to do so at the same 
coordinates, despite having had the right prior to the construction of the 
artificial island by State A. As Mouton expressed, to interpret an action as 
being in breach of international law because it affects the ability of another 
State to exercise its rights would be absurd. Instead, the due regard obliga-
tion on States acknowledges that the matter is one of a balance between 
the ‘exercise of high seas freedoms [and other rights] and the rights and 
interests of all States’.662
Given the above, is the argument that freedom of overflight exists in 
international airspace sufficient to deny States the right to extend safety 
zones to the airspace? In attempting to answer this question, the question of 
whether international civil aviation law provides any possible mechanisms 
through which safety zones could be justified will first be considered.
 3.3.3.2 Consideration under international civil aviation law
International civil aviation law contains both Standards and Recommended 
Practices to help ensure the safety of civil aircraft in the case of hazardous 
activities at sea. This section will examine whether any of these solutions 
could be interpreted in a manner so as to encompass safety zones over mari-
time constructions. In the alternative, it will consider whether these SARPs 
may serve to meet the requirements of a safety zone – to protect the safety 
of navigation and of the maritime construction – despite having a different 
intended purpose.
As mentioned in Section 2.6.5, ICAO provides procedures for States 
in relation to the establishment of danger areas in international airspace. 
Safety zones cannot be justified using the right to establish danger areas 
though because they do not bring with them a right to prohibit or restrict 
overflight; the zones instead designate areas in which activities potentially 
dangerous to civil aviation take place. Danger areas are also insufficient 
because they must be temporary. This could possibly be suitable for instal-
lations and structures, which are usually established for a task with a fixed 
period, but artificial islands generally exist for a more sustained duration.
661 UNCLOS, Articles 56(2), 58(3) and 87(2). These articles apply respectively to the coastal 
State in the EEZ, other States in the EEZ and all States on the high seas.
662 Nordquist (ed), UNCLOS: A Commentary – Volume III (n 656) 73.
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Annex 11 contains rules for the coordination of activities that are 
hazardous to civil aircraft, where ‘hazard’ is defined by ICAO as ‘a condi-
tion or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft 
incident or accident’.663 Most relevant here is Standard 2.19.1, which reads:
‘The arrangement for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft, whether 
over the territory of a State or over the high seas, shall be coordinated with the 
appropriate air traffic services authorities. The coordination shall be effected ear-
ly enough to permit timely promulgation of information regarding the activities 
in accordance with the provisions of Annex 15’.664
The accompanying Recommendation, provides:
‘If the appropriate ATS authority is not that of the State where the organization 
planning the activities is located, initial coordination should be effected through 
the ATS authority responsible for the airspace over the State where the organiza-
tion is located’.665
As with the establishment of maritime constructions and their safety zones 
on the surface of the sea, Annex 11 further recommends that:
‘the locations or areas, times and durations for the activities should be selected 
to avoid closure or realignment of established ATS routes, blocking of the most 
economic flight levels, or delays of scheduled aircraft operations, unless no other 
options exists’.666
As with the safety zones on the surface of the sea, ‘the size of the airspace 
designated for the conduct of activities should be kept as small as 
possible’.667
There is also in Annex 11 a Standard applicable to air traffic flow 
management (ATFM), in national or international airspace, in the situa-
tion where air traffic demand exceeds ATC capacity, as determined by the 
ATC authority responsible for that airspace.668 In the case of traffic over 
that which has been accepted in a given period of time or over a particular 
location, or where the rate of traffic needs to be managed, ATC is required 
to notify certain parties of the restrictions, including flight crews operating 
in the airspace.669 It is recommended that ATFM be implemented through 
663 ICAO Doc 10084, Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Confl ict 
Zones (2nd edn, 2018) xiii.
664 Where Annex 15 addresses Aeronautical Information Services. 
665 Chicago Convention, Annex 11 (15th edn, July 2018) 2.19.1.1.
666 ibid 2.19.2.1 a). 
667 ibid 2.19.2.1 b).
668 ibid 3.7.5.1 and Note. See Section 4.2.1.1 for the defi nition of ATC and the relationship 
between it and other aspects of airspace management.
669 ibid 3.7.5.3.
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regional air navigation agreements or multilateral agreements.670 These 
ATC provisions are designed to allow coastal States to restrict overflight in 
international airspace and may possibly be used to restrict overflight over 
maritime constructions. The purpose of the SARPs in relation to this matter 
though, is to enable ATC to maintain safe airspace and it only applies in 
the case of airspace demand that exceeds the accepted traffic, when that 
situation arises. In this respect, it requires an initial accepted capacity and 
thus necessarily presupposes that the coastal State has not prohibited all 
flights in the airspace. Where these SARPs might be particularly relevant 
to coastal States in restricting overflight over maritime constructions is in 
the case of the construction of an airport at sea, as to which see Section 3.4. 
In this case, overflight restrictions are likely necessary in order for ATC to 
safely coordinate take-offs and landings.
The ICAO PANS in Doc 4444 (PANS-ATM) complement Annexes 2 and 
11 and contain further guidance on ATM in international airspace, including 
in relation to the coordination of military aeronautical operations with civil 
aviation operations.671 The material in the PANS-ATM does not have the 
same legal status as SARPs, but upon reaching a sufficient level of acceptance 
amongst the international community, provisions within it may eventually 
become SARPs.672 Prior to or in the absence of this occurring, the material 
serves to ‘assist the user in the application of those SARPs’.673 The relevant 
SARPs and accompanying PANS-ATM are solely designed to facilitate the 
safe and efficient operation of civil aviation as opposed to also ensuring 
the safety of the activities in response to which they apply. In contrast, the 
purpose of safety zones under UNCLOS is the safety of both navigation 
and of the maritime construction. The provisions under international 
civil aviation law would at most consequentially fulfil this latter element.
 3.3.3.3 Prohibition of overflight in international airspace inconsistent with 
freedom of overflight
SARPs and PANS for ATS regarding activities in international airspace are 
designed to address the safety and efficiency of international civil avia-
tion. Where activities dangerous to aviation are conducted in international 
airspace, as an exercise of freedom of overflight, the State undertaking the 
activity is not permitted to prohibit other aircraft from the airspace, but 
instead has an obligation to warn of the danger. As such, the rules ‘are 
predicated on the principle of voluntary compliance’674 rather than, in the 
670 ibid 3.7.5.2 (Recommendation).
671 ICAO Doc 4444, ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services on Air Traffi c Management (16th 
edn, 2016) 16.1. 
672 ibid 3.2.
673 ibid 3.2.
674 Lawrence (n 657) 587; citing, Legality of Using the High Seas in Connection with Nuclear 
Weapons Tests in the Pacifi c Ocean, US Delegation Paper, UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, 1958, US/CLS/Pos/48(2)-(3), Annex II, Feb. 20, 1958. 
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words of Lawrence, being ‘assertions of a claim to exclusive use or control 
over an area’.675 Ultimately, as Standard 2.4 of Annex 2 dictates, the final 
authority on the disposition of the aircraft, including whether to enter such 
airspace, rests with the pilot-in-command.
In practice though, hazardous activities conducted in international 
airspace will often result in the exclusive use of the airspace by the State 
conducting the activities on the basis that the pilot-in-command also has an 
obligation, under Standard 3.1.1 of Annex 2, not to operate an aircraft in a 
negligent or reckless manner. Flying through airspace that has a NOTAM676 
issued in relation to it on the basis of the operation of military exercises, 
for example, could constitute negligent or reckless operation of an aircraft, 
depending on the circumstances. In the case of activities in international 
airspace leading to this result, although the airspace is not closed de jure it is 
closed de facto, in that aircraft will not operate in the area due to safety risks 
being too great.
As on the sea, every use of international airspace involves a balance 
between States’ freedom of overflight. Mouton’s single ship example can 
equally be extended to international airspace in relation to aircraft, but 
considering the balance more meaningfully, the legitimate impingement of 
a State’s freedom of overflight as a result of the exercise of another State’s 
exercise of the freedom can be illustrated through the use of airspace for 
military exercises. For example, en route air navigation warnings issued by 
the Netherlands in March 2019 included that in danger areas in interna-
tional airspace en route instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules 
(VFR) GAT ‘shall remain clear of the areas’ and that authorisation for the 
use of the areas will only be granted to pre-scheduled OAT and/or special 
test flights.677 This prohibition is on the basis of military aeronautical opera-
tions in the airspace or, more specifically, ‘certain flying activities [that] are 
not readily adaptable to air traffic control, since specific aircraft – during at 
least part of their flight – cannot maintain a constant profile, heading and 
speed (e.g. test flights, air combat training manoeuvres)’.678
The peaceful use of international airspace for military activities falls 
within the freedom of overflight and in this respect, like all freedoms, 
its lawfulness depends on the balance between the right to exercise the 
freedom and the rights of other States to exercise their rights and free-
doms.679 Provided that the activities in the area of international airspace 
meet the prerequisite of being temporary, whether this balance has been 
achieved rests on a consideration of the reasonableness of the impact of the 
activities. Activities that limit the operation of other States’ aircraft ‘in large 
675 ibid 586.
676 See Section 2.6.5 (n 376) for the defi nition of ‘NOTAM’. 
677 Aeronautical Information Publication Netherlands, ENR 5 Navigation Warnings – ENR 
5.1 Prohibited, Restricted and Danger Areas (28 March 2019) 1.1.
678 ibid.
679 As addressed in Section 3.3.3.1.
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areas of airspace and/or over an excessively long period of time can prob-
ably no longer be regarded as a reasonable enjoyment of a State’s freedom 
of overflight’.680
The above serves to illustrate that although international civil aviation 
law does not expressly permit a State to prohibit the operation of another 
State’s aircraft in international airspace, the activities of States in carrying 
out their freedoms of the high seas can in practice lead to the closure of 
airspace to other States’ aircraft. Furthermore, this situation is generally 
accepted by States, provided it is temporary and that the restrictions are 
commensurate to needs of the activities carried out.
Based on the above, there appears to be a discrepancy in the interpreta-
tion of freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight in international 
law. Under the law of the sea, States are expressly permitted to exclude 
other States’ vessels from certain areas of international waters, in pursuit 
of the exercise of their rights in the area, and violations of the exclusion 
can be enforced by the State imposing the exclusion. Under international 
civil aviation law, no State has the right to prohibit use of the airspace by 
another State’s aircraft. In practice, as we have seen, the use of airspace by 
one State’s aircraft may de facto result in the airspace being avoided by the 
aircraft of other States but even when this occurs, there are strict require-
ments on the extent of the operations that impact freedom of overflight.
 3.3.4 Provision for the right to establish safety zones in airspace through 
the development of customary international law
3.3.4.1 Relevance and approach to section
The US’s action in overflying China’s artificial islands in the South China 
Sea was an explicit message to China and to the international community, 
that the US did not accept China’s proclaimed right to prohibit the opera-
tion of its aircraft in a portion of international airspace. Such actions, when 
undertaken by a sufficient number of States, can inhibit the development 
of customary international law or, in the case of emerging customary law, 
make clear a State’s intention not to be bound by that law in the case it 
crystallises. The first of these results is part of the consideration of what 
constitutes State practice in the case of customary international law and the 
second is an example of a State acting as a persistent objector. Both of these 
matters will be considered in this section.
As has been established so far in this chapter, there is an absence of 
an express right under international treaty law to extend safety zones to 
airspace. There is also currently no evidence that the right exists under 
customary international law. In light of these two positions, could the right 
to do so emerge under customary international law? This section will first 
680 Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Regime’ (n 466) 42.
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address the elements of customary international law, including so-called 
‘particular’ custom, also known as ‘special’ or ‘local’ custom. It will then 
examine the role of the persistent objector in the case of general customary 
law and finally, the emergence of customary international law in violation 
of codified law. This will be considered in light of the argument that the 
extension of safety zones to airspace is a violation of the freedom of over-
flight.
3.3.4.2 The elements of customary international law
Customary international law, as set out in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, 
is ‘evidence of a general practice as accepted as law’ or, in the words of 
the ILC, it ‘means those rules of international law that derive from and 
reflect a general practice accepted as law’.681 For a customary international 
law to exist two elements must be satisfied.682 First, the custom must be a 
general practice of States and secondly, there must be opinio juris, or a belief 
by States that they are bound by the practice. The division of customary 
law into these two elements is widely accepted, including by the ICJ, other 
international courts and tribunals, and in academic literature,683 but differ-
entiating between the two can be difficult as they are ‘closely, if not often 
impossibly, entangled’.684
Sources serving as evidence of State practice are various and include, 
among many others, the physical actions of States, acts of the executive, and 
diplomatic acts and correspondence.685 However, the fact that ‘relatively 
few States compile and publish their practice’686 adds to the challenge in 
determining when a practice becomes general practice. The duration can 
be significant in helping to determine the existence of practice, however it 
need not necessarily be longstanding.687 The practice must be uniform and 
consistent but uniformity does not require all States to adopt the practice.688 
681 Michael Wood, ‘Second Report on Identifi cation of Customary International Law’ (ILC 
66th Session, 22 May 2014) 7.
682 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1985 (Jun. 3), p. 13, 
p. 29 para. 27. In this case, the ICJ stated: ‘[i]t is of course axiomatic that the material of 
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio 
juris of States’.
683 Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 681) 7.
684 Buga (n 627) 202-3. The ILC also recognised this, stating that it would cover them together 
in the same report ‘given the close relationship between the two’ (Wood, ‘Second Report’ 
(n 681) 4).
685 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (9th edn, OUP 2019) 
21-22; Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 681) 22-23.
686 Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 681) 3.
687 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1969 (Feb. 20), p. 3, p. 43 para. 74: ‘the passage 
of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new 
rule of customary international law’.
688 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 685) 22.
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In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ stated that the practice should 
be ‘extensive and virtually uniform’689 but subsequently, in the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities Case, that it ‘does not consider that… practice must 
be in absolutely rigorous conformity’.690 The Court also highlighted in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the importance of considering the practice 
of ‘States whose interests are specially affected’.691 This matter is also central 
to the concept of local custom, as to which see the following section.
The determination of opinio juris, or a State’s acceptance of a practice as 
law, marks the distinction between practice as common usage – for example, 
salute at sea692 – and as custom.693 Evidence of its existence depends on 
the type of practice involved, for example, it may differ ‘between cases 
involving the assertion of a legal right and those acknowledging a legal 
obligation’.694 Whilst general practice may serve to indicate the presence of 
opinio juris,695 it is not determinative of its existence.696
 3.3.4.3 Local custom
The weight given to interested States for the purpose of identifying 
customary law has been the subject of ICJ cases involving practice between 
a small number of States.697 Through these cases, the ICJ has repeatedly 
declared that customary international law can exist locally and even bilater-
ally, binding only on those States involved. This is relevant in the case that 
overflight restrictions emerge as common practice in a specific region, in 
which those States could be bound by the actions through the development 
of it into local customary international law. The 1960 case, Right of Passage 
over Indian Territory, involved transit by Portugal through Indian territory 
to Portuguese territory enclaved by the aforementioned Indian territory, 
without which passage Portugal was unable to exercise its sovereignty over 
the enclaves. The case was brought before the ICJ after India prevented 
Portugal from transiting through its territory ‘contrary to the practice 
689 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1969 (Feb. 20), p. 3, p. 43 para. 74 (‘North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases’). 
690 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, I.C.J. Rep. 1986 (Jun. 27), p. 14, p. 98 para. 186. See Section 4.3.3.4 for 
further discussion on the distinction between the standards in these two cases. 
691 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, p. 43 para. 74. 
692 Dear Kemp and Peter Kemp (eds), The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea (2nd edn, 
OUP 2006), available at <www.oxfordreference.com> accessed 20 November 2019.
693 Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 681) 56.
694 Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 681) 58.
695 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 685) 24-25.
696 For example see, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Rep. 1996 (Jul. 8), p. 226, p. 32 para. 67.
697 Michael Wood, ‘Third Report on Identifi cation of Customary International Law’ (ILC 67th 
Session, 27 March 2015) 54.
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hitherto followed’.698 The Court considered whether, as Portugal claimed, 
a local custom had arisen by way of the ‘practice hitherto’. India on the 
other hand argued that ‘no local customs could be established between only 
two States’.699 The Court ultimately found in favour of Portugal stating, ‘[i]
t is difficult to see why the number of States between which a local custom 
may be established on the basis of long practice must necessarily be larger 
than two’.700 The Court reached its decision considering that India had both 
permitted the actions of Portugal and failed to express any objection to it.701
 3.3.4.4 The persistent objector rule
Once a customary international law has crystallised, a State may not 
withdraw from being bound by it.702 That is, unless a State is a persistent 
objector, in which case the persistent objector rule exempts the State from 
being bound by the law if it has consistently objected to it during the 
process of its formation,703 the onus of proof in relation to which is on that 
State.704 The ICJ has supported the persistent objector rule in its judgments 
in the Asylum Case, the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, 705 although the Court has not used the rule in its 
ratio decidendi. In both the Asylum Case and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case the rule was discussed in obiter dictum and in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases it was indirectly mentioned in that the Court acknowledged the 
importance of State objection.706 It is generally accepted that the persistent 
objector rule applies only in the case of general customary law and not 
also to that of local custom.707 Exactly how the objection must be issued in 
order to fulfil the elements of a persistent objector is unclear,708 but certain 
elements are accepted as a minimum: the objection must be expressed, be 
698 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits, I.C.J. Rep. 
1960 (Apr. 12), p. 6, p. 27. 
699 ibid p. 39.
700 Ibid.
701 ibid p. 40.
702 Elias Olufemi, ‘Persistent Objector’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law 2006) 1.
703 ibid 2.
704 James A Green, The Persistent Objector Rule in International Law (OUP 2016) 66.
705 Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1950 (Nov. 20), p. 266 (‘Asylum Case 
(Colombia/Peru)’); Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1951 (Dec. 
18), p. 116; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.
706 Holning Lau, ‘Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human 
Rights Law’ (2005) 6(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 495, 499-500.
707 Olufemi (n 702) 10. As the author explains on this point however, the ICJ in the Asylum 
Case (Colombia/Peru), pp. 276-77, applied Article 38 of the ICJ Statute which relates to 
general practice, despite the case involving regional custom: ‘the ICJ did not base its 
ruling on a typological distinction between general and regional custom – if such differ-
ence can be said to exist’. 
708 Green (n 704) 66; Olufemi (n 702) 15.
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made known internationally, and be maintained.709 Some publicists have 
argued that an objection may be either verbal or through actions.710 Others, 
in contrast, are of the opinion that actions are required to demonstrate 
persistent objection in addition to verbal opposition, which brings with 
it practical challenges, such as that States may not be presented with the 
opportunity to act or that doing so could be costly.711 These factors poten-
tially present impediments to States functioning in the international legal 
order on the basis of the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as 
recognised in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. Finally, whether a persistent 
objector objects to being bound by the emerging law or to the emergence of 
the law per se, is not necessary for the application of the persistent objector 
rule and in practice, States may expressly do both.712
The US overflight over China’s artificial islands in the South China 
Sea demonstrates that it does not recognise the right of China to impose 
prohibitions in the airspace. Likewise, the statements from the governments 
of the UK, France and Germany, as discussed in the introduction, demon-
strate these States’ explicit objection to China’s actions. If the prohibition of 
airspace over maritime constructions was to develop into general customary 
international law, these States could potentially stand as persistent objectors 
and therefore be exempt from the law. From this point, the States would 
have to maintain their persistent objection to the law in order for the exemp-
tion to continue to apply.713 At the same time, on the basis of their objec-
tions, these States may be estopped from imposing their own safety zones 
above maritime constructions in future. The doctrine of estoppel prevents 
– or estops – a representing party ‘from successfully adopting different, 
subsequent statements on the same issue’.714 International law is dynamic 
though and so subsequent actions would be considered in the context at the 
time. Furthermore, the complications of the situation in the South China 
Sea – the consideration that China in fact declares the artificial islands as 
sovereign territory and bases the prohibition of its airspace on that – could 
be used to the advantage of these States if they were to be estopped in the 
709 Olufemi (n 702) 16.
710 ibid.
711 Both the initial claim and the tensions that arise as a result are identifi ed in, Green (n 704) 
76.
712 Green (n 704) 75. As discussed by the author, this was so for example with Turkey in 
the case of the extension of the territorial sea to 12nm. During the drafting of UNCLOS, 
Turkey argued that this rule had not achieved the status of customary international law 
and then afterwards stated that if it had indeed developed into customary law, Turkey 
was not bound by it on the basis of its persistent objection. 
713 Green (n 704) 80.
714 Thomas Cottier and Jörg Paul Müller, ‘Estoppel’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Interna-
tional Law 2007) 1. Estoppel does not fi t neatly within one of the sources of international 
law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. As the authors explain, ‘it is more suitable to base 
it upon a combination of general principles of law, precedent, and doctrine, resulting in a 
norm of customary international law’ (para 10).
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case that they could sufficiently distinguish the future situation from the 
current situation by way of these specificities.
 3.3.4.5 Customary international law as international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties
In the case that the right to establish a safety zone in the airspace above a 
maritime construction existed in the form of customary international law it 
could either exist independently from Article 60, operating in parallel to it, 
or alternatively, it could demonstrate the application of Article 60. It is the 
latter that will be examined here. Taking into account Rothwell’s interpre-
tation of Article 60 UNCLOS, the practice of States in establishing safety 
zones over maritime constructions involves the application of Article 60.
As mentioned in Section 3.3.2.2, subsequent practice in the application 
of a treaty is relevant to the interpretation of those terms of the treaty in 
accordance with Article 31(3)(b) and Article 32 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. The ICJ recognised in its Namibia Advisory Opinion 
that customary international law, where it is a relevant rule of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties, is also to be taken into 
account, in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. This is a form of systemic integration, as mentioned 
in Section 2.2.2.1.715 Customary international law is relevant in this respect 
whether it is ‘general, regional or local customary rules’716 provided it is 
relevant to the subject matter of the treaty.717
The Court in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, discussing the interpretation 
of the Mandate for German South West Africa, found that it:
‘must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the superven-
ing half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subse-
quent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way 
of customary law. Moreover, an inter-national instrument has to be interpreted 
and applied within the frame-work of the entire legal system prevailing at the 
time of the interpretation’ (emphasis added).718
In the context of this research, customary international law, if it were found 
to exist and had formed through the application of Article 60 UNCLOS, is 
taken into account in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) as a tool for inter-
pretation more directly than the Court’s consideration of it in the Namibia 
715 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Rep. 1971 (Jun. 21), p.16, p. 31 para. 53 (‘Namibia Advisory Opinion’). 
716 Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention (n 630) 433.
717 Mark Eugen Villiger, ‘The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, 
Miscarriage? The ‘Crucible’ Intended by the International Law Commission’ in Enzo 
Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP 2011) 112.
718 Namibia Advisory Opinion, p. 31 para. 53.
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Advisory Opinion. The question before the Court was what the consequences 
were for States involved of the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia719 and the development of law included the demise of the League 
of Nations and the enshrinement of the principle of self-determination 
in the subsequent UN Charter.720 In the present case, the development of 
the law is the hypothetical crystallisation of customary international law 
supporting the, in this case, teleological interpretation of Article 60 which 
provides States with the right to impose safety zones in the airspace over 
maritime constructions. It is recognised that this argument has a circularity 
to it – State practice in interpreting and applying the law in turn feeds back 
in to determining how that law is to be interpreted – and, whilst not ideal, 
the circularity of treaty interpretation has been recognised on numerous 
occasions.721
A final point to note on Article 31(3)(c) is that the principle of systemic 
integration is solely ‘to further the process of interpretation, not to displace 
the treaty’,722 and once the practice constituting the customary law can no 
longer be considered to be an interpretation of the terms of the treaty – in 
the case that it modifies the provision, for instance – the practice no longer 
falls within the scope of Article 31(3)(c).723
 3.3.4.6 Customary international law in violation of treaty law
Customary international law can develop in conflict with treaty law,724 
which is relevant in light of the argument that the establishment of safety 
zones in international airspace is a breach of freedom of overflight.725 The 
ability for customary international law to modify treaty law is a result of 
there being no hierarchy between the two sources under Article 38(1) of 
719 ibid p. 27 para. 42.
720 ibid pp. 28 and 31 paras. 44 and 52.
721 See for example, Michael Beyers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (CUP 1999) 130-31. 
In this instance, Beyers discusses ‘the chronological paradox’ in relation to customary 
international law: ‘States creating new customary rules must believe that those rules 
already exist, and that their practice, therefore, is in accordance with the law’. See also, 
‘Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi culties arising 
from the Diversifi cation and Expansion of International Law’, fi nalised by Martti Kosken-
niemi (ILC 58th Session, 13 April 2006) 190, which addresses the ‘disturbing circularity’ of 
the formulation of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, specifi cally 
the confl ict between jus cogens limiting what can be agreed upon by States under treaty 
law and what States agree upon in a treaty possibly being indicative of the content of jus 
cogens.
722 Gardiner (n 635) 291.
723 Buga (n 627) 219.
724 ibid.
725 Acknowledging that UNCLOS merely recognises the freedoms of navigation and over-
fl ight, which exist independently of the Convention (see Section 2.7.1).
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the ICJ Statute; they are both primary sources of international law.726 The 
order in which the sources are listed under this article reflects ‘the degree 
of certainty with which their existence can be discerned’ as opposed to 
their authority, and in the case of conflict between a customary rule and 
a treaty norm, ‘the norm that will prevail in a given case will depend on 
their normative content, context, and the parties bound by them’.727 The 
determination of customary international law that has developed in conflict 
with a treaty obligation is the same as with other rules of customary law, 
however given that it is created contra legem, or against the existing law, 
the existence of opinio juris may be more difficult to prove. In contrast to 
the emergence of customary international law in general though, customary 
international law modifying treaty law ‘requires the intention of all of [the 
parties]’ rather than just a general practice,728 providing a significant hurdle 
to its crystallisation.
A well-known example of customary international law developing in 
conflict with treaty law is the emergence of the EEZ, which had developed 
as a form of customary international law at the time it was codified in 
UNCLOS.729 The EEZ reserved sovereign rights for the coastal State that 
were in direct conflict with certain freedoms of the high seas codified under 
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, such as freedom of fishing.730
Another example is the launch of the Sputnik 1 satellite in 1957. This 
launch occurred well prior to the existence of the Outer Space Treaty, which 
codified that outer space is not subject to State sovereignty, but after the 
entry into force of the Chicago Convention, which makes clear that a State 
has sovereignty over the airspace over its territory.731 Despite this, no objec-
tions were raised to the orbit of Sputnik 1, which passed over the territories 
of numerous States.732 The absence of opposition is seen as evidence that 
States viewed outer space as having a different legal character to airspace, 
where in outer space States are free to undertake activities without the 
permission of the underlying State733 or, in other words, that ‘customary 
international law did not extend claims of sovereignty into outer space’.734 
726 Jus cogens norms are an exception to this, as recognised under Articles 53 and 64 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
727 Buga (n 627) 213.
728 ibid 198.
729 See Section 2.7.3.1 for the recognition by the ICJ of the customary status of the EEZ in 
1982, which occurred prior to the adoption of UNCLOS. 
730 Convention on the High Seas 1958, Articles 1 and 2. 
731 Outer Space Treaty, Article 2 and Chicago Convention, Article 1. See Section 2.2.4 for 
discussion of these treaty provisions.
732 John Cobb Cooper, ‘Flight-Space and the Satellites’ (1958) 7(1) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 82, 88.
733 Steven Freeland, ‘Fly Me to the Moon: How will International Law Cope with Commer-
cial Space Tourism?’ (2010) 11 Melb J Int’l L 1, 10.
734 Michael G Gallagher, ‘Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative’ (1986) 111 US 
Military Law Review 11, 20.
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Just as the demarcation of the airspace and outer space is still not defined, 
nor is the altitude at which States are permitted to undertake space activi-
ties over the territories of other States. The Manual of International Law 
Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS) excluded the issue 
of the use of airspace at lower altitudes over other States for launches on 
the basis that there was insufficient acceptance by States to consider it as an 
emerging customary international law.735
The determination between subsequent practice demonstrating the 
application of a treaty provision or modifying the terms requires interpreta-
tion itself736 and States are reluctant to recognise that subsequent practice 
modifies a treaty provision, in part because it is seen as a departure from 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.737 As a result, it is generally a last resort, 
when there is ‘genuine incompatibility’ that is ‘irreconcilable through 
interpretation’.738 On this point, a parallel may be drawn between the 
cases of Sputnik 1 and safety zones. Rather than resulting in a modification 
of Article 1 of the Chicago Convention in relation to the former, and the 
principle of freedom of overflight as it is recognised under Article 87(1)(b) 
UNCLOS in relation to the latter, these cases involve interpretation of the 
law. For Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, the new customary interna-
tional law meant that ‘airspace above its territory’ now had a maximum 
altitude, albeit undefined. Similarly, in the case of safety zones, they could 
be understood not to involve a violation of the principle of freedom of over-
flight but to bring about a shift in the interpretation of it, consistent with the 
relationship between the corresponding freedom of navigation and the right 
to construct safety zones on the surface of the sea.
3.3.4.7 Customary international law supporting the restriction of safety zones to 
the surface of the sea
Taking a contrasting view, and merely as a point to note, it could instead be 
argued, considering the wide body of domestic law implementing Article 
60 UNCLOS only on the surface of the sea, that there is State practice – and 
possibly also opinio juris – to suggest that general customary international 
law could develop or even exist in support of the opposite proposition, that 
is, that a State’s right to establish safety zones around its maritime construc-
tions in international waters is restricted to vessels.
735 McGill University, ‘MILAMOS Project’, available at <mcgill.ca/milamos/> accessed 3 
November 2019.
736 Buga (n 627) 2.
737 ‘38th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole – Extract from the Offi cial Records of the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session (Summary Records of the 
Plenary Meetings and the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole)’ A/CONF.39/C.1/
SR.38 (Vienna, 26 March – 24 May 1968) 210-13. States raising this concern included 
Chile, Russia, Guinea, Uruguay, Cuba, Portugal and the Netherlands.
738 Buga (n 627) 219.
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 3.4 Artificial islands facilitating aircraft operations
3.4.1 Jurisdiction in airspace over artificial islands facilitating aircraft 
operations
This section will consider the rights of States to manage the airspace over 
maritime constructions in international waters when those structures 
facilitate the take-off and landing of aircraft. This is the case for example for 
offshore petroleum installations, which rely on helicopter operations as part 
of their activities. It is also the case for artificial islands built for the purpose 
of facilitating airports at sea in international waters. China’s military airport 
on Fiery Cross Reef is one example of this but airports for international civil 
aviation are also likely in future. To-date artificial islands with civil interna-
tional airports have been constructed and are operating in territorial seas739 
but plans for airports in international waters have not yet come to fruition.
In 1979, Heller stated that,
‘[i]t appears to be doubtful (and consequently should be clarified) whether the 
right granted to the coastal state in Article 60(1) to regulate the operation and use 
of artificial islands, installations and structures includes the right to regulate and 
exercise jurisdiction with regard to aviation, because of the reference to particu-
lar governmental interests (customs, fiscal, health, safety, immigration) only in 
Article 60(2).’740
Forty years later, this point seems today to be clarified, at least to an extent. 
Article 60(2), as discussed in Section 3.2.3.1 provides the coastal State 
with exclusive jurisdiction over those maritime constructions that it has the 
exclusive right to construct under Article 60(1) and that exclusive jurisdic-
tion includes jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and 
immigration laws and regulations. The wording in this provision ‘includes 
jurisdiction with regard to…’, suggests that the list is indicative rather 
than exclusive. This is consistent with Article 60(1), which provides that, 
in respect to the relevant maritime constructions, which the coastal State 
‘shall have the exclusive right to… regulate…. the operation and use of…’. 
This interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of the provision in its 
broader context. It is included to enable coastal States to effectively exercise 
their rights in the zone which, given the nature of the activities and the 
distances involved from the shore, were logically intended to encompass air 
transport. In fact, to deny States the right to regulate air traffic to and from 
their maritime constructions would not only be illogical but would also 
have adverse safety consequences. This view is supported by Hailbronner 
who, in 1983, observed that ‘[j]urisdiction in respect of flights to and from 
those structures and islands is inseparably interconnected with the coastal 
739 See above n 479.
740 Heller (n 509) 149.
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state’s exclusive rights to construct and use the installations’.741 Finally, 
although in practice unlikely to be relevant, the provision addresses the 
‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of the coastal State. Even if the regulation of aviation 
operations was to fall outside its scope, it does not preclude the coastal State 
from exercising jurisdiction over it.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the exclusive jurisdiction 
under Article 60(2) is only over the maritime constructions that the coastal 
State has the exclusive right to construct. Recalling Section 3.2.3.1, those 
maritime constructions are: artificial islands, regardless of their purpose, 
installations and structures for the purposes under Article 56 and 77 – that 
is, for carrying out their rights in the EEZ or on the continental shelf, which-
ever the case may be – and other economic purposes, as well as installations 
and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the 
coastal State in the zone. This leaves other States unable to construct artifi-
cial islands in the EEZ or on continental shelf of that coastal State and with 
little incentive to construct an installation or structure. Going further than 
this, considering Article 60(1)(c), the coastal State arguably even has the 
exclusive right to construct airport facilities in its EEZ and continental shelf 
as any construction and operation of an installation or structure by another 
State would be likely to interfere with the rights of the coastal State.742
The argument put forward here is that together, these provisions are 
so broad that coastal States will almost always have exclusive jurisdiction 
over aviation on maritime constructions in their EEZ and on their conti-
nental shelf. This position is supported by a 1987 ICAO Secretariat Study, 
which stated that ‘the interpretation of the text leads to a conclusion that 
the coastal State would have the exclusive jurisdiction over any airports or 
heliports constructed on installations in the EEZ’.743 State practice supports 
this interpretation and the legislation of coastal States worldwide indicates 
that States assume jurisdiction over flights to and from structures on the 
continental shelf, including in terms of licensing, insurance, liability, safety 
regulations and traffic rules.744 For example, through various structures 
and to varying degrees, the US, Norway, the UK, Canada and Australia 
have legislation or memoranda of understanding between departments 
governing the operation of helicopters to and from their offshore petroleum 
facilities.745
As demonstrated above, the legal basis for the regulation of aviation on 
maritime constructions does not involve safety zones, but instead centres 
on the scope of Articles 60(1) and 60(2) UNCLOS. Again returning to Hail-
741 Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air’ (n 537) 509.
742 Camilleri (n 625) 31, with reference to Soons (1974).
743 ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5 (n 466) 255. This also extends to those constructed 
on the continental shelf, through Article 80 UNCLOS.
744 Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air’ (n 537) 510.
745 ‘Review of Selected Offshore Petroleum Regulatory Regimes: Offshore Helicopter Safety 
Inquiry’ (Aerosafe Risk Management, Canada, 2010).
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bronner, ‘… the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 60(2) does not justify 
general restrictions on the freedom of overflight over those installations’.746 
The operation of air services to and from a maritime construction does 
involve risks for airspace users though, and air traffic must be managed 
to mitigate those risks. This is achieved in the same way as in relation to 
any other risks in the airspace, as managed by the responsible authority 
pursuant to arrangements specific to that flight information region.
 3.4.2 Rights of the State in the operation of an airport for international 
civil aviation outside territory
If a coastal State were to establish a maritime construction beyond its 
territorial sea – in its EEZ or on its continental shelf – for the purpose of 
establishing a civil international airport, there are a number of consider-
ations additional to the above that have to be taken into account under 
international civil aviation law.
Firstly, as outlined in the previous section, it is indisputable under Arti-
cles 60(1) and (2) UNCLOS that the coastal State has jurisdiction over the 
airport. Secondly, the negotiation of traffic rights in ASAs is based on each 
State in the ASA designating a location to and from which the rights may 
be exercised, that is, the defined territory of the State. If a State constructs 
an airport on a maritime construction that sits beyond its territorial sea, 
the State would have to demonstrate that it has the right to grant traffic 
rights in its EEZ and the other State or States in the ASA would have to 
be prepared to accept this.747 In addition, and further to the statement of 
ICAO mentioned in Section 3.3.1 that a State does not have jurisdiction over 
the airspace over artificial islands beyond its territorial sea, the State would 
have to negotiate the exclusive use of the airspace above the airport and 
in the approach and take-off corridors with the other States that use the 
airspace, which could be achieved through amendments to the relevant 
regional air navigation agreements, upon approval by the ICAO Council.748 
Recalling Section 3.3.3.3, it would be difficult to see how exclusive use of the 
airspace in this case would be accepted by other States considering freedom 
of overflight. This would most likely require law-making by concluding 
a new international agreement. The above matters, among other relevant 
considerations, have been addressed thoroughly in previous academic 
publications749 and this research will not delve further into them here.
746 Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air’ (n 537) 510.
747 Mendes de Leon and Molenaar (n 486) 240-41.
748 ibid 243.
749 PPC Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Approach 
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 23; Niels van Antwerpen, Cross-Border Provision of Air 
Navigation Services with Specifi c Reference to Europe: Safeguarding Transparent Lines of Respon-
sibility and Liability (Kluwer Law International 2008) 160; Lawrence (n 657); Hailbronner, 
‘Freedom of the Air’ (n 537); Mendes de Leon and Molenaar (n 486).
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 3.5 Changes to international airspace delimitation as a result 
of land fortification and reclamation
The last section of this chapter will highlight some final, ancillary, matters 
with implications for overflight in international airspace. The aim of this 
section is not so much to analyse and find answers to these issues, but to 
draw attention to them as matters that will, in future, need to be addressed 
to ensure clear delimitation of international airspace.
 3.5.1 The legal status of islands in the face of submersion and erosion
This section will address a number of related issues on the legal status of 
islands and their maritime zones in light of human modification in response 
to rising sea levels and coastal erosion. These issues have implications for 
the delimitation of national airspace and correspondingly, consequences for 
international airspace and freedom of overflight.
The first of these is related to the discussion going back to the early 20th 
century on whether international law should draw a distinction between 
natural and man-made islands, as addressed in Section 3.2.1.1. Of course 
this is now well settled in international law under Article 121 UNCLOS, but 
part of the debate questioned where the demarcation lies between natural 
and man-made islands, a matter that has not been resolved but which 
has new significance today in light of rising sea levels and erosion due to 
climate change.750
Recalling Section 3.2.4.2, the Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration 
provided some clarity, confirming that the relevant consideration is the 
natural state prior to human modification. But the question then is what 
exactly constitutes ‘human modification’ and subsequently, ‘whether an 
island of mixed natural and human origin should fall under Article 121’751 
under certain circumstances. This seems to be prima facie a simple matter, 
but there are circumstances with no clear classification. For example, if 
an island has been submerged and is then built back up is it an artificial 
island? What if an island has been eroded so significantly or submerged to 
the point that it can longer sustain human habitation or economic life and 
it is then rebuilt – will it be an artificial island built on a rock or a natural 
750 ‘Regional patterns of sea-level rise have been observed from satellites since 1993 and are 
associated with increased coastal impacts in many regions. It is unknown whether such 
patterns will be transient, arising from natural climate variations, or persistent, driven 
by external climate forcing. Here, using climate model ensembles, we demonstrate that 
forced changes are likely to have contributed signifi cantly to observed altimeter-era 
patterns of rise and that these patterns may persist for decades to come, with increased 
intensity as climate change progresses’ (John T Fasullo and R Steven Neren, ‘Altimeter-
Era Emergence of the Patterns of Forced Sea-Level Rise in Climate Models and Implica-
tions for the Future’ (2018) 115(51) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of 
the United States of America 12944, 12944). 
751 Dorst, Elferink and Ligteringen (n 500).
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island as it was prior to erosion/submersion? And, what would the status 
be of a low-tide elevation in the case of ‘an artificial construction near [that] 
low-tide elevation that leads to the accumulation of materials that change 
the feature into an island’?752 Answers to these questions are not provided 
under Article 121 in relation to naturally formed islands.
This question was similarly posed by Gidel back in 1930:
‘If a natural island is in the process of gradually disappearing beneath the waves 
and it is decided to erect earthworks so as to keep the island above the level of 
the sea, is that island natural or artificial? Again, if, in the well-known case of The 
Anna, the ‘little mud islands composed of earth and trees drifted down by the 
river’, which were the subject of Lord Stowell’s judgment, had been ‘embanked 
and fortified, would they then have been natural or artificial?’.753
Evidently Gidel was not referring to the impact of climate change but his 
words have a new resonance reflecting on these challenges today, as States 
rely on human modification to protect their land. The example that Gidel 
describes may also impact territorial boundaries and therefore airspace 
division when it occurs on a State’s coastline, in an area within its sover-
eignty. This is discussed below in Section 3.5.2.
Secondly, if a natural island becomes submerged due to rising sea 
levels or erosion, does the State also lose the maritime zones that island 
generated? At its most extreme, this may be applied to the case of an entire 
island State becoming submerged in which case that State would either 
lose its territorial sea and other maritime zones or, which is not envisaged 
by UNCLOS, retain its maritime zones despite them being generated by a 
land mass that no longer exists. This matter does not directly involve mari-
time constructions, but closely related is the question of whether artificial 
islands can amount to a ‘defined territory’ for the purpose of statehood in 
these circumstances, the answer to which is unclear.754 For example, the 
Maldives has built an artificial island, Hulhumalé, next to its capital, Malé, 
for the purpose of relocating its population.755 In instances such as this, the 
question of whether an artificial island can constitute territory is relevant 
in order to determine whether a submerged State is able to relocate to an 
artificial island and maintain its statehood.756 Hulhumalé was constructed 
in the territorial sea of the Maldives so it is clearly under the sovereignty 
of the Maldives and thus its construction has no implications for overflight 
752 ibid.
753 Johnson (n 502) 212; in part quoting, The Anna (1805) 5 C.Rob. 373.
754 See, for example, discussion in, Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, Disappearing Island States in 
International Law (Brill Nijhoff 2015) 169-173.
755 Michael Gagain, ‘Climate Change, Sea Level Rise, and Artificial Islands: Saving the 
Maldives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims Through the ‘Constitution of the Oceans’’ 
(2012) 23(1) Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 77, 81-82.
756 A defi ned territory is one of the four necessary elements of a State, as discussed in Section 
2.2.1.
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rights. However, if artificial islands constructed in territorial seas could be 
considered territory – presumably without maritime zones, in accordance 
with UNCLOS, but this too stands to be debated757 – and this recognition 
then became practice in the high seas, it would significantly impact over-
flight rights. Having said this, it is difficult to see how sovereignty over 
artificial islands could be extended to those in the high seas given that no 
State may claim sovereignty over the high seas.758 Once again, this has a 
direct impact on freedom of overflight as, if a State has the right to declare 
sovereignty over an artificial island beyond its territorial sea, the airspace 
over it will correspondingly be considered national airspace.
Without intervention, submerged features have in the past resulted 
in the loss of rights associated with the landmass that had comprised the 
feature and the maritime zones it generated. For example,
‘…[I]n the course of negotiation of the maritime boundary between Belgium and 
the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom was forced to abandon one of its key 
basepoints, a drying bank called the Shipwash, when a new hydrographic sur-
vey revealed that the feature had eroded to the extent that it no longer dried and 
could no longer be regarded as a low-tide elevation.’759
These issues as legal issues, and their significant implications in practice, 
are recognised by the international community. At its 75th Conference of 
the International Law Association (ILA), two resolutions were adopted on 
the impact of rising sea levels on territorial baselines, reflecting the broad 
topics on which the need for future work was acknowledged during the 
conference:
‘6. The implications of the existing law of the normal baseline in situations of ter-
ritorial loss resulting from sea-level rise;
7. The recognition that substantial territorial loss resulting from sea-level rise is 
an issue that extends beyond baselines and the law of the sea, and encompasses 
consideration at a junction of several parts of international law, including such 
fundamental aspects as elements of statehood under international law, human 
rights, refugee law, and access to resources, as well as broader issues of interna-
tional peace and security’.760
So far, these issues are rarely considered in terms of their impact on inter-
national airspace and overflight, despite each of them resulting in the 
redrawing of international airspace.
757 See, for example, discussion in, Grote Stoutenburg (n 754) 173.
758 UNCLOS, Article 89.
759 Schofi eld and Schofi eld (n 599) 65.  
760 Resolution No 1/2012 on Baselines under the International Law of the Sea, adopted at the 
75th Conference of the International Law Association (Sofi a, 26-30 August 2012).
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 3.5.2 Reclaimed land and the effect on the delimitation of international 
airspace
This section will discuss changes to the delimitation of international 
airspace as a result of the redrawing of territorial baselines after the recla-
mation of land. Whilst maritime constructions do not generate maritime 
zones, State practice indicates that coastal land reclamation does generally 
lead to changes in the delimitation of the territorial sea. This is certainly 
so in the case of reclaimed land attached to the mainland. As such, this is 
an example, in contrast to artificial islands, installations and structures, 
of constructions at sea bringing – albeit indirectly – international airspace 
under coastal State sovereignty. For reclaimed land not connected to the 
mainland, it is not generally accepted as being considered for the purpose 
of redefining the baseline of the territorial sea.
The starting point for discussing the legal basis of land reclamation for 
the drawing of territorial sea baselines is Articles 11 and 5 UNCLOS, read 
together.
Article 11 UNCLOS, titled ‘Ports’, states:
‘For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent har-
bour works which form an integral part of the harbour system are regarded as 
forming part of the coast. Off-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be 
considered as permanent harbour works’.
Article 5 UNCLOS, titled ‘Normal baseline’ reads:
‘Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast 
as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State’.
Considering these two together, if construction, including reclaimed land, 
‘forms an integral part of the harbour system’, is will be part of the coast 
and will therefore, in accordance with Article 5, be able to be used as a point 
from which to draw the territorial sea baseline.
Article 11 makes clear that the body must be connected to the coast 
in that ‘offshore’ constructions are excluded but beyond this, UNCLOS is 
silent on the definition of ‘harbour works’ and of what will ‘form an integral 
part of the harbour system’. The term ‘harbour works’ has been defined by 
the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), a body that surveys 
and charts the world’s oceans. It defines the term as:
‘permanent manmade structures built along the coast which form an integral 
part of the harbor system such as … sea walls, etc.’, where ‘harbour’ is defined as 
‘a natural or artificially improved body of water providing protection for vessels, 
and generally anchorage and docking facilities.’761
761 International Hydrographic Organization, Hydrographic Dictionary, available at <hd.iho.
int/en> access-ed 2 February 2018.
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Reclaimed coastal land tends to be within enclosed waters, in which case it 
has no impact on territorial sea delimitation762 and there is relatively little 
State practice on the use of reclaimed land for the drawing of baselines. 
There are sufficient instances to conclude though, that reclaimed land that 
does not contribute to harbour works is accepted under customary interna-
tional law as forming part of the coast and may therefore be used as a base 
point for measuring the territorial sea baseline.763 This has been recognised 
by the ILA:
‘existing international law recognizes harbor works…, any coast protective work 
which extends above the chart datum, and any human-induced extension of the natu-
ral coast, as part of the coast for the purpose of Article 5. As such, the normal 
baseline moves, sometimes seaward, with the resulting changes in coastal 
configuration’.764
Huge land reclamation projects have taken place in Singapore since the 
1970s, with Changi Airport, Sentosa, Jurong Island and Tuas South, all 
resting on reclaimed land, but it is not known whether this land is used 
to measure its territorial sea baseline.765 The Netherlands relies heavily on 
reinforcing its coastline, including through many man-made structures. 
Hoek van Holland, for example, which consists almost entirely of man-
made land, extended the coastline by around five and a half miles and has 
been used to measure the territorial baseline ‘with no objection from the 
international community’.766
Under Article 11 UNCLOS, land that is reclaimed to form part of the 
coastline but is later detached, intentionally or through erosion, will not 
continue to be able to be taken into account in determining the territo-
rial sea baseline. This occurred in the UAE with the construction of Palm 
Jumeirah. At the completion of its construction it was attached to the coast 
but was subsequently severed and connected by bridges.767 A similar situa-
tion exists in the Netherlands, where part of the Rotterdam harbour known 
as the Zandmotor, which is an artificial extension of the coast, was designed 
with the intention of it becoming separated.768 Whereas the Zandmotor is 
considered coastline for the purposes of the territorial sea baseline,769 in 
accordance with Article 11, it would no longer be able to serve as a baseline 
762 Chris Carleton, ‘Problems Relating to Non-Natural and Man-Made Basepoints under 
UNCLOS’ in Clive Ralph Symmons (ed), Selected Contemporary Issues in the Law of the Sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 53.
763 Oude Elferink (n 497) 9.
764 International Law Association, ‘Baselines under the International Law of the Sea’, Final 
Report (2012) 28.
765 Carleton (n 762) 53.
766 ibid 52.
767 ibid 57.
768 Dorst, Elferink and Ligteringen (n 500).
769 ibid.
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point after it separates from the coastline. Some commentators have ques-
tioned whether the fact that its breakaway from the coast involves natural 
erosion might mean that it could continue to be considered as a base point 
for the territorial sea baseline,770 however there is no international practice 
to support this claim. In any case, it is the nautical charts that provide the 
definitive judgment on States’ territorial sea baselines and so until they are 
revised to take into account the change in conditions, they will continue to 
reflect the extended baselines. In the case of the Zandmotor, although the 
territorial baseline was extended as a result of it, the continental shelf and 
the EEZ boundaries remained unchanged as they have been settled by the 
Netherlands and its neighbouring sea States through treaties.771
Although land reclamation is accepted under customary international 
law as contributing to the measurement of a State’s baseline, it is not always 
uncontroversial when a State does so.772 As with the issues raised in Section 
3.5.1, the ILA also recognised the relevance of this matter at its 75th Confer-
ence, listing as one its significant issues: ‘[t]he implications of the existing 
law of the normal baseline in situations of territorial gain resulting from 
human-made structures and the artificial conservation or extension of 
existing coasts’.773
Again, as with the issues raised above in Section 3.5.1, the reclamation 
of land along coastline is rarely considered from the perspective of inter-
national civil aviation law, despite the impact it has on the redrawing of 
international airspace boundaries.
 3.6 Conclusion to chapter
This chapter began by outlining the distinction between artificial islands, 
on the one hand, and installations and structures, on the other, as the 
constructed bodies – maritime constructions – that are the subject of Article 
60 UNCLOS. It demonstrated that there are some obstacles to definitively 
classifying them in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the importance 
of the distinction to the application of Article 60. A coastal State has the 
exclusive right in its EEZ and on its continental shelf to construct artificial 
islands and to construct installations and structures for purposes relating 
to its specific rights and jurisdiction within those maritime areas. In order 
to ensure both the safety of navigation and of the constructions themselves, 
the State also has the right to establish a safety zone around the construc-
tion. This safety zone may extend to a maximum breadth of 500 metres 
from the outer edge of the maritime construction and, as confirmed by the 
770 ibid.
771 Including between the Netherlands and Germany (1964 and 1971), the United Kingdom 
and Northern Ireland (1965) and Belgium (1996) (ibid).
772 Oude Elferink (n 497) 9.
773 Resolution No 1/2012 on Baselines (n 760).
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Tribunal in the case of the Arctic Sunrise Case, the jurisdiction a State may 
exercise in the zone for the protection of the construction and of navigation 
in its vicinity, goes beyond the rights and jurisdiction the State has within 
the EEZ or the continental shelf more broadly. The provisions explicitly 
provide that the safety zones apply to the sea and restrict navigation, but as 
to whether they may also be applied in the airspace over the construction, 
and therefore prohibit overflight, UNCLOS provides no indication.
A legal matter that has, until relatively recently, lacked clarification, 
is that of the legal status of a natural feature combined with a maritime 
construction. This matter was addressed by the Tribunal in the South China 
Sea Arbitration, in which it was confirmed that, where a construction uses 
an existing maritime feature as its foundation, the maritime feature retains 
its legal status as per its original form. This was an important clarification 
for the law of the sea, and for this study, because it confirmed that the 
maritime construction over a low-tide elevation, or a rock, cannot change 
the legal status of that low-tide elevation or rock. For a low-tide elevation, 
this means that any maritime construction on or around it cannot result in it 
being a rock or an island and thereby forming the basis for territorial claims, 
leading to international airspace becoming national airspace. The Tribunal 
also confirmed that no State may appropriate a low-tide elevation outside 
its territorial waters and thus, once again, the question of sovereignty 
over a maritime construction built atop such feature or over the airspace 
above it, is not relevant. Finally, in relation to maritime constructions over 
natural features, the chapter explained that, as a result of the foundations of 
maritime constructions retaining the legal status of their original form, the 
dual nature of these natural features/maritime constructions may result in 
a situation that appears to conflict with Article 60(8) UNCLOS, particularly 
that maritime constructions do not possess a territorial sea or affect the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, both situations with implications for the 
delimitation of national and international airspace.
Having established when a maritime construction necessarily falls 
outside the sovereignty of a coastal State, this chapter then turned to 
examine whether a coastal State has the right to extend the safety zone of 
such maritime construction to the airspace above it, thereby providing the 
State with the right to prohibit the overflight of other States’ aircraft above 
the construction. International law indicates that safety zones are restricted 
to the surface of the sea. This is supported by a number of factors including 
the ordinary meaning of Articles 60(4) and (5); the drafting history of the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and the fact that no significant 
amendments were made to the articles as adopted in UNCLOS; the subse-
quent interpretation of the articles by ICAO and subsequent materials 
published by the IMO; and, by State practice.
The principle of freedom of overflight also supports the argument that 
safety zones are limited to the sea itself. The coastal State does have the 
option, however, of establishing danger areas in the airspace, as does any 
other State in international airspace. A State using international airspace to 
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the exclusion of other States does not necessarily violate freedom of over-
flight, just as a State using the ocean – e.g. through a maritime construction –
is not violating freedom of navigation. Considering other acceptable uses 
of international airspace though, there are specific limitations on the way 
in which a State’s activities is able to legitimately restrict the overflight of 
other States’ aircraft whenever necessary and proportionate. The danger 
area over the maritime construction would need to be temporary, rather 
than a permanent measure and it would not provide the State whose mari-
time construction it is with the right to prohibit the aircraft of other States.
In the absence of an explicit right under UNCLOS to extend safety 
zones to the airspace over maritime constructions, the right to do so may 
still crystallise into customary international law, although there is insuf-
ficient State practice to suggest the emergence of any such customary law. 
If the right were to emerge as customary international law, its conflict with 
freedom of overflight would not necessarily stand as an obstacle to this, as 
discussed.
It is proposed here that the solution to meeting the safety risks presented 
both by maritime constructions to aircraft and by aircraft to maritime 
constructions, just as with any other safety risk regarding overflight, should 
be managed by the ATS provider responsible for the FIR within which 
the maritime construction is located. This management would involve 
coordination of the traffic and perhaps a reasonable restriction of altitude 
to avoid collision with the maritime construction, but nothing beyond this. 
This conclusion is also consistent with the management of air traffic to and 
from a maritime construction, where that forms part of the activities on the 
construction. Whilst a State does not have jurisdiction over international 
airspace above its maritime construction, in the case of aviation operations 
to and from a maritime construction Articles 60(1) and (2) UNCLOS make 
it clear that the coastal State has jurisdiction over those operations insofar 
as matters such as licensing, insurance, liability, safety regulations and 
traffic rules are concerned. In the case of a maritime construction built for 
the purpose of an airport for international civil aviation, the exclusive use 
of international airspace over the maritime construction would need to be 
negotiated with other States and, considering the principle of freedom of 
overflight, it is difficult to see how this will be accepted as a permanent 
measure.
Finally, this chapter briefly raised some ancillary matters regarding 
maritime constructions with implications for overflight in international 
airspace. The purpose of this section was not to attempt to find solutions 
but to raise the issues as ones of significance that require attention going 
forward, particularly given their link to climate change which is affecting 
island States, and indeed coastal areas in general, to an increasing extent 
worldwide. 
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4 Flight information regions and air defence 
identification zones
4.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses two areas in international airspace that do not arise 
from the law of the sea. The first, FIRs, have their basis in international civil 
aviation law, while the second, ADIZs, have no foundation in international 
law but are imposed by a number of States, with various requirements and 
corresponding legal justifications.774
FIRs are established for the purpose of the provision of ATS, which 
is solely a technical and operational function. They are generally not 
controversial but where a State’s FIR encompasses a neighbouring State’s 
territory there can be practical challenges and disputes involving the 
exercise of the ATS responsibility.775 This chapter examines an aspect one 
of these scenarios, specifically the ban imposed by the Gulf States on Qatar 
in mid-2017. Although this case involved both national and international 
airspace, it is the prohibition as it applied to Qatari-registered aircraft in 
international airspace within these States’ FIRs, as applied early on and 
for a short period of time, that will form the foundation for the analysis 
in this chapter. On the basis of freedom of overflight, the ban as it applied 
to international airspace was a violation of international law, as to which 
see the discussion on what the concept of freedom of overflight entails in 
Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.3.2. This chapter instead will step aside from freedom 
of overflight to examine whether there is also a prohibition independently 
under international civil aviation law. From this perspective, the first part of 
the chapter will examine whether a State is prohibited under international 
civil aviation law from discriminating against a foreign aircraft in interna-
tional airspace within the first State’s FIR based on the State of registration, 
i.e. the nationality, of the aircraft. The principle of non-discrimination does 
not apply expressly to the provision of ATS in international airspace under 
international civil aviation law and so this examination will involve deter-
mining whether an implicit prohibition exists.
In contrast to FIRs, there is no clear legal basis for the establishment 
of ADIZs in international airspace and the legality of these unilaterally 
declared zones will be the focus of the research in the second part of this 
chapter. ADIZs have received significant attention in the media and in 
academia, both examining their origin and their possible legal basis in 
international law. This chapter will consider the main arguments used 
774 The States and basic requirements are set out in Section 4.3.2 and the legal bases relied on, 
in Section 4.3.3.
775 See for instance, those addressed in Section 4.2.1.2.
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to justify them, before turning to examine whether the zones are, on the 
contrary, prohibited under international law. Certain features of ADIZ, such 
as military authorities having the right to issue instructions in addition to 
ATS authorities, arguably pose safety risks to international civil aviation. 
This chapter will explore whether ADIZ are in breach of international civil 
aviation law on this basis,776 before finally turning to the matter of whether 
ADIZ are consistent with the principle of freedom of overflight.
Section 4.2 will address the basis of FIRs in international law and ulti-
mately, the scope of a coastal State’s responsibility within the region. This 
section will first set out the legal framework for the establishment of an 
FIR over international airspace and the allocation of responsibility for ATS 
provision within it (Section 4.2.1.1). Closely linked to this, Section 4.2.1.2 will 
make clear that the responsibility for an FIR does not confer sovereignty, 
notwithstanding the association States continue to make between the two. 
The chapter will then discuss the prohibition on Qatari-registered flights 
as an example of States discriminating against aircraft in international 
airspace within their FIRs based on the State of registration of the aircraft. 
These sections will outline the facts of the case, its relevance to this research 
and Qatar’s arguments for the discrimination amounting to a violation of 
international law (Sections 4.2.2.1 – 4.2.2.3). At this point, the chapter will 
turn to the central research question regarding FIRs: does the principle of 
non-discrimination apply under international civil aviation law to prohibit 
a State from discriminating against a foreign aircraft in international 
airspace within the first State’s FIR based on the State of registration of the 
aircraft? This section sets aside the law of the sea to first set out the narrow 
scope of the authority of coastal States within their FIRs over international 
airspace, as prescribed by Annex 11 (Section 4.2.3). The chapter will then 
turn to consider the context of Annex 11 within the Chicago Convention 
more broadly, under Section 4.2.4, to examine whether it is possible to argue 
there is an implicit application of the principle of non-discrimination in the 
provision of ATS over international airspace. This section will consider the 
integral role that the principle of non-discrimination plays in international 
civil aviation law (Section 4.2.4.1), including the relationship of the principle 
with State sovereignty (Section 4.2.4.2) and its purpose in national airspace 
(Section 4.2.4.3). It will then turn to consider whether, based on the fore-
going sections, it is possible to interpret an overarching implied principle of 
non-discrimination applying to navigation in international airspace (Section 
4.2.4.4) and the implications of the principle of non-discrimination in the 
broader Chicago Convention framework on the interpretation of Annex 11 
(Section 4.2.4.5).
Section 4.3 will examine the legality of ADIZ under international law. It 
will begin by discussing the most recent significant developments regarding 
ADIZ, illustrating the relevance of the topic as well as the discrepancies in 
776 As will be discussed in Section 4.3.6.1.
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the regulations that apply to the zones (Section 4.3.1). Section 4.3.2 will 
outline the origins and definition of ADIZ before revisiting the main legal 
bases used to justify them, examining whether these bases are legitimate. 
The justifications that will be addressed in these sections (Sections 4.3.3.1 
– 4.3.3.4) are a State’s laws and regulations relating to admission to terri-
tory, restricting military activities in the EEZ, the right to self-defence, 
and customary international law. Section 4.3.4 will address the Lotus Case, 
examining the contemporary approach towards the Lotus principle and 
thereby considering whether the determination of extra-territorial prescrip-
tive jurisdiction involves demonstrating a legal basis for the exercise of the 
jurisdiction or merely the absence of a prohibition. In either case, the PCIJ 
made clear in Lotus that a State is not permitted to enforce its laws outside 
its territory. This will be addressed in Section 4.3.5, which will demonstrate 
that the actions a coastal State may take against an aircraft in international 
airspace are the same regardless of whether or not the State has established 
an ADIZ over that airspace. Finally, the chapter will examine whether in 
establishing and maintaining ADIZs, coastal States are violating their obli-
gations under international law, considering both the safety obligations of 
States under international civil aviation law (Section 4.3.6.1) and the right to 
freedom of overflight (Section 4.3.6.2).
 4.2 Flight information regions
 4.2.1 Legal framework governing the provision of ATS in international 
airspace
4.2.1.1 Definition of and general responsibility for FIRs777
The world’s airspace is divided into FIRs for the purpose of the provision 
of ATS.778 Over territory, FIRs generally follow territorial borders. Interna-
tional airspace, on the other hand, is divided and allocated to coastal States 
on the basis of those coastal States having accepted responsibility for the 
regions (see Figure 4.1).779 Annex 11, Standard 2.1.2 outlines this arrange-
ment:
‘Those portions of the airspace over the high seas or in airspace of undetermined 
sovereignty where air traffic services will be provided shall be determined on the 
777 The information in this section builds on that in Section 2.7.2.2.1, particularly Section 
2.7.2.2.1.3, addressing the application of Annex 11 to international airspace.
778 Both ‘FIR’ and ‘ATS’ are defi ned below.
779 This is with the exception of one FIR that has not yet been allocated to a State. The FIR sits 
off the west coast of central America and a number of States – Chile, Ecuador, France Peru 
and the US – have put forward their interest in it before ICAO, which is in the process of 
hosting discussions to allocate it (ICAO Summary of Discussions, First Unassigned High 
Seas Airspace, Special Coordination Meeting, Lima (24 July 2019)).
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basis of regional air navigation agreements. A contracting State having accepted 
the responsibility to provide air traffic services in such portions of airspace shall 
thereafter arrange for the services to be established and provided in accordance 
with the provisions of this Annex’.
An FIR is defined by ICAO in Annexes 2 and 11 to the Chicago Conven-
tion as ‘an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight information 
service and alerting service are provided’.780 While the definition of FIR 
refers to ‘flight information service’ and ‘alerting service’, Standard 2.1.2 
noticeably instead refers to ATS, also the title of Annex 11, where ATS 
consists of781 flight information service782 and alerting service,783 but also air 
traffic advisory service,784 and ATC.785 The definition of FIR does not refer to 
ATS as a whole because ATC is not or cannot be provided in all airspace i.e. 
in uncontrolled airspace.
The regional air navigation agreements, or plans (RANPs), referred 
to in Standard 2.1.2 are further defined in the Annex as ‘the agreements 
approved by the Council of ICAO normally on the advice of Regional Air 
Navigation Meetings’.786 Thus, States agree at a regional level787 on the 
responsibilities for the provision of air navigation services in international 
airspace, as published in the RANPs, which are finally approved by ICAO.
780 Chicago Convention, Annex 2 (10th edn, July 2005), 1-5; Annex 11 (15th edn, July 2018) 1-8.
781 In accordance with the Chicago Convention, Annex 11, 1-3.
782 Flight information service is ‘a service provided for the purpose of giving advice and 
information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights’ (Annex 11, 1-8) and 
includes information on, for example, ‘meteorological conditions, volcanic activity, the 
release into the atmosphere of radioactive materials or toxic chemicals, and changes in 
the serviceability of navigation aids’ (Francis Schubert, ‘Air Navigation’ in Paul Stephen 
Dempsey and Ram S Jakhu (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public Aviation Law (Routledge 
2017) 92).
783 Alerting service is ‘a service provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding 
aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organizations as required’ 
(Annex 11, 1-4).
784 Air traffi c advisory service is ‘a service provided within advisory airspace to ensure sepa-
ration, in so far as practicable, between aircraft which are operating on IFR fl ight plans’ 
(Annex 11, 1-3). This service is typically employed as a temporary measure in a portion of 
airspace where the fl ight information service is not suffi cient but where the responsible 
State does not have the means to provide ATC in the portion of airspace (ICAO Doc 4444, 
ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services on Air Traffi c Management (16th edn, 2016) 
9.1.4.1.2).
785 ATC service is ‘a service provided for the purpose of preventing collisions between 
aircraft… and expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic’ (Chicago 
Convention, Annex 11, 1-3). 
786 Chicago Convention, Annex 11, 2.1.2, Note 1.
787 There are nine ICAO Air Navigation Regions: the Asia (ASIA) and Pacifi c (PAC) region, 
the Middle East (MID) region, the African-Indian Ocean (AFI) region, North American 
(NAM) and Caribbean (CAR) region, the South American (SAM) region, the European 
(EUR) and North Atlantic (NAT) region (ICAO, ‘Global Air Navigation Strategy’, avail-
able at <www4.icao.int/ganpportal/GanpDocument#/?_k=d978it> accessed 4 August 
2019).
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 Figure 4.1: Map of the world’s airspace divided into its FIRs788
The ATS provider in an FIR also plays a role in search and rescue. It is 
responsible for collecting and distributing information about aviation 
emergencies, as well as coordinating search and rescue aircraft.789 These 
are the functions that fall within the ‘alerting service’ responsibilities of an 
ATS provider. The ATS provider feeds into the search and rescue function 
through the provision of alerting services but search and rescue does not 
further fall within the scope of the activities of an ATS provider.
For the purpose of search and rescue services at sea, international 
airspace – together with national airspace over maritime areas – is divided 
into aeronautical search and rescue regions (SRRs) pursuant to international 
civil aviation law.790 Like FIRs, the provision of aeronautical SRRs791 in 
788 Source: Created using ICAO GIS, available at <gis.icao.int/> accessed 14 July 2019.
789 Chicago Convention, Annex 11 (15th edn, July 2018) 2.2 e). 
790 Annex 12 establishes the SARPs applying specifi cally to aeronautical search and rescue, 
however other annexes also contain provisions contributing to search and rescue opera-
tions. These include, Annex 11 which sets out the responsibility of ATS in the context 
of search and rescue operations, as well as Annex 10 (Vol III, 2nd edn, July 2007) which 
provides technical standards for communication systems in search and rescue opera-
tions, and Annex 15 which details the search and rescue arrangements that are required 
for the purpose of aeronautical information services.
791 SRR is defi ned as ‘an area of defi ned dimensions, associated with a rescue coordination 
centre, within which search and rescue services are provided’, where ‘search and rescue 
service’ is defi ned as ‘the performance of distress monitoring, communication, coordina-
tion and search and rescue functions, initial medical assistance or medical evacuation, 
through the use of public and private resources, including cooperating aircraft, vessels 
and other craft and installations’ (Chicago Convention, Annex 12 (8th edn, July 2004) 1-2).
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international airspace is determined on the basis of the RANPs.792 Also like 
FIRs, the boundaries of SRRs should be determined solely on the basis of 
technical and operational considerations793 and States are directed to ensure 
that, ‘in so far as practicable’, SRR boundaries align with FIR boundaries 
(see Figure 4.2 for the global division of airspace for each).794 Considering 
the role of the ATS provider in search and rescue operations, the general 
alignment of the two regions is operationally beneficial.795
Maritime SRRs, governed by the Search and Rescue Convention of 1979 
(Search and Rescue Convention),796 partition the sea itself for the purpose 
of carrying out search and rescue operations, where the sea and air regions 
are closely coordinated.797 Maritime SRRs are not aligned with either FIR 
or aeronautical SRRs but many are similar to the latter (compare Figure 4.3 
in relation to the north of the Pacific Ocean). As with FIRs and aeronautical 
SRRs, it is desirable to align aeronautical and maritime SRRs as much as 
possible, at the most basic level to ensure that the responsible authority is 
easily identifiable in the case of an emergency.798
 Figure 4.2: FIRs (blue) and aeronautical SRRs (colour)799
792 Chicago Convention, Annex 12, 2.1.1.1.
793 Chicago Convention, Annex 12, 2.2.1, Note 2.
794 ibid 2.2.1.1 (Recommendation). 
795 International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual, Volume 
I: Organization and Management (2016) 2.3.15 (b) (‘IAMSAR Manual - Volume 1’).
796 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (Hamburg, 27 Apr. 1979) 1405 
U.N.T.S. 118, entered into force 22 Jun. 1985 (‘Search and Rescue Convention’).
797 The IAMSAR Manual provides guidelines to achieve a common search and rescue 
approach. Article 98(2) UNCLOS includes a general statement on the role of all coastal 
States in search and rescue: ‘Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, opera-
tion and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding 
safety on or over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional 
arrangements cooperate with neighbouring States for this purpose’.
798 IAMSAR Manual - Volume I, 2.3.15 (d).
799 Source: Created using ICAO GIS, available at <gis.icao.int/> accessed 2 July 2019.
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 Figure 4.3: Maritime search and rescue regions in the Pacific Ocean800
 4.2.1.2 FIR allocation does not confer sovereignty over airspace
The general alignment of FIR and State territory borders reflects the over-
arching principle in international civil aviation law of sovereignty over 
airspace. As acknowledged in Section 2.2.2.3, national security was a para-
mount concern in the drafting of the Chicago Convention. This is illustrated 
in the Preamble to the Convention: ‘the future development of international 
civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and under-
standing… yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security’ and, 
‘it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between 
nations and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends’. With 
sovereignty as the cornerstone of international civil aviation, the delinea-
tion of FIR boundaries in the years following the conclusion of the Chicago 
Convention, not surprisingly followed national borders.801
800 Source: Compiled from individual maps obtained from US Coast Guard, ‘IMO Maritime 
SAR Regions’, available at <www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/IMO%20
Maritime%20SAR%20Regions.pdf> accessed 25 October 2019.
801 Francis Schubert, ‘Limits in the Sky: Sovereignty and Air Navigation Services’ in Pablo 
Mendes de Leon and Niall Buissing (eds), Behind and Beyond the Chicago Convention: The 
Evolution of Aerial Sovereignty (Wolters Kluwer 2019) 148; Niels van Antwerpen, Cross-
Border Provision of Air Navigation Services with Specifi c Reference to Europe: Safeguarding 
Transparent Lines of Responsibility and Liability (Kluwer Law International 2008) 151.
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However, FIRs do not give rise to sovereignty and nor are they intended 
to be aligned geographically with sovereign airspace.
As to the former, for national airspace, Article 1 of the Chicago Conven-
tion recognises that a State has sovereignty over its territory, as defined in 
Article 2. No additional grounds for sovereignty over airspace are provided 
in the Chicago Convention or further under international law. The only 
airspace over which a State has sovereignty in its FIR therefore, is that 
which also forms part of its national airspace. This conclusion is supported 
by the fact that the definition of ‘FIR’ indicates that the regions are estab-
lished strictly for the provision of ATS. For international airspace, beyond 
the narrow purpose for which FIRs are established, ICAO has emphasised 
that,
‘[t]he approval by the Council of regional air navigation agreements relating 
to the provision by a State of air traffic services within airspace over the high 
seas does not imply recognition of sovereignty of that State over the airspace 
concerned’.802
Regarding the latter point, geographical alignment of FIRs and sovereign 
borders, FIR boundaries should be determined solely to achieve the safest 
and most efficient provision of air navigation services. ICAO is unequivocal 
on this matter:
‘The limits of ATS airspaces, whether over States’ territories or over the high 
seas, shall be established on the basis of technical and operational considerations 
with the aim of ensuring safety and optimizing efficiency and economy for both 
providers and users of the services’.803
Despite this, States continue to pursue the alignment of their FIRs with 
their territorial borders and in some instances, the pursuit has become more 
pronounced.
Nationalist sentiment has resulted in an increased interest in aligning 
FIR and territorial boundaries in Indonesia, where the national airspace is 
802 ICAO Assembly Resolution A38-12, Consolidation Statement of Continuing ICAO Poli-
cies and Associated Practices Related Specifi cally to Air Navigation (4 October 2013), 
Appendix G, 7. 
803 ibid Appendix G, 1. Consider also, Chicago Convention, Annex 11, 2.11.1 (Recommenda-
tion): ‘The delineation of airspace, wherein air traffi c services are to be provided, should 
be related to the nature of the route structure and the need for effi cient service rather 
than to national boundaries’; ICAO Assembly Resolution A38-12 (n 802): ‘Member States 
should seek the most effi cient and economic delineation of ATS airspaces, the optimum 
location of points for transfer of responsibility and the most efficient coordination 
procedures in cooperation with the other States concerned and with ICAO’ (Appendix G, 
Associated Practices – 1); ‘Established ATS airspaces should not be segmented for reasons 
other than technical, operational, safety and effi ciency considerations’ (Appendix G, 2).
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partially encompassed by Singapore’s FIR (see Figure 4.4).804 The leaders of 
each State are in the process of negotiating a revised framework for the FIR 
boundaries. A media report following discussions between Prime Minister 
Lee Hsien Loong and Indonesian President Joko Widodo in October 2019 
declared that,
‘Indonesia wants Singapore to respect ‘Indonesia’s sovereignty over its terri-
tory, including its territorial waters, archipelagic waters and its airspace’ and ‘to 
understand Indonesia’s strong desire to align the FIR in a timely manner which 
corresponds to its territorial sovereignty’’.805
 Figure 4.4: Singapore’s FIR, spanning part of Indonesian territory in the south west806
804 Ida Bagus Rahmadi Supancana, ‘Realignment of FIR from Singapore to Indonesia’ in 
Pablo Mendes de Leon and Niall Buissing (eds), Behind and Beyond the Chicago Conven-
tion: The Evolution of Aerial Sovereignty (Wolters Kluwer 2019) 171: ‘[i]t is clear that the 
realignment of the FIR is not only a purely technical and operational measure designed to 
promote the safety of international civil aviation but also it affects Indonesian sovereignty 
and even dignity’; Chappy Hakim, ‘A Strange Anomaly in Management of Airspace’ 
(The Straits Times, 21 March 2016), available at <www.straitstimes.com/opinion/a-
strange-anomaly-in-management-of-airspace> accessed 13 May 2019: ‘This is a problem 
of dignity! The problem of national awareness, the awareness of the dignifi ed attitude 
of a nation! The pride that I Am An Indonesian!’; Chappy Hakim, FIR di Kepulauan Riau 
Wilayah Udara Kedaulatan NKRI (Penerbit Buku Kompas 2019) 43-45.
805 ‘Leaders’ Retreat: Singapore and Indonesia Agree on Framework to Discuss Airspace 
Management, Military Training’ (The Straits Times, 8 October 2019), available at <www.
straitstimes.com/politics/leaders-retreat-singapore-and-indonesia-agree-on-framework-
to-discuss-airspace-management> accessed 28 December 2019, citing The Jakarta Post. 
806 Source: Karamjit Kaur, ‘Aviation’s Shifting Centre of Gravity’ (The Straits Times, 4 June 
2016), available at <www.straitstimes.com/singapore/aviations-shifting-centre-of-
gravity> accessed 16 March 2020, originally sourced from the Civil Aviation Authority of 
Singapore (CAAS).
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At the same time, Indonesia’s FIR covers East Timor’s territory, as well as 
Australia’s over Christmas Island.807
There are also practical reasons for the recent shift in focus towards an 
alignment of FIR and territorial boundaries. As Boyd explains,
‘…it is anticipated that a need for precise geofencing for drone operations may 
increase the desire to align an FIR ‘perfectly’ with national borders’.808
For instance, he points outs, in reference to Figure 4.5, ‘a drone programmed 
to operate within the NIAMY FIR [Burkina Faso] will be in and out of 
Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire numerous times as it moves along the south 
western FIR boundary’.809
 Figure 4.5: Map showing the discordant territorial and FIR borders between Burkina Faso 
and Côte d’Ivoire (and between Burkina Faso and Mali)810
The above situations demonstrate that, despite ICAO materials reiterating 
otherwise, States continue to associate FIRs with national airspace, whether 
as a matter of perceived national pride as in the case of Indonesia, or 
because of practical implications arising from their interaction, as in the case 
of Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire.
807 Hakim, ‘A Strange Anomaly’ (n 804).
808 Correspondence from Mike Boyd (Technical Officer, ICAO) to the author, dated 3 
December 2019.
809 ibid.
810 Source: Mike Boyd (ICAO).
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Regardless of the association, there is no support in international law 
for any claim to sovereignty arising from a State’s administration of an FIR, 
whether over national or international airspace.
4.2.1.3 Jurisdiction in FIRs
Whilst a State administering an FIR that encompasses international airspace 
does not have sovereignty over that airspace, it does have jurisdiction in the 
airspace to the extent necessary to carry out the services it is responsible for. 
This is functional jurisdiction: jurisdiction in a defined geographical area 
that is for the sole purpose of carrying out a particular right or obligation. 
Csabafi, addressing the concept of functional jurisdiction in the context of 
activities in outer space, highlights that ‘claims to this kind of jurisdiction 
must be founded on the requirements of and contained by the inherent 
nature of a specific activity’ and he furthermore emphasises the essential 
element of a ‘close link’ between the defined geographical space and the 
activity.811
Recalling Section 2.7.2.2.1.3, a State that accepts to provide ATS ‘over the 
high seas or in areas of undetermined sovereignty’ may apply the SARPs in 
Annex 11 ‘in a manner consistent with that adopted for airspace under its 
jurisdiction’,812 that is, subject to differences to the relevant SARPs having 
been filed by the State responsible for the provision of services in the FIR. 
The use of the term ‘jurisdiction’ considers the situation of delegation: 
national airspace of another State in which the provision of air navigation 
services has been delegated to another State comes under the jurisdiction 
of the latter State to the extent necessary for the provision of those services. 
The Foreword to Annex 11 also uses this terminology, stating that the 
SARPs in Annex 11 ‘apply in those parts of the airspace under the jurisdiction 
of a contracting State wherein air traffic services are provided’.
The wording in Annex 11 is ambiguous though. By providing that a 
State is permitted to deliver ATS over the high seas in a manner consistent 
with that in airspace under its jurisdiction, suggests that high seas airspace 
is not under the providing State’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the section 
of the Foreword referred to above continues, ‘…and also wherever a State 
accepts the responsibility... over the high seas’,813 suggesting the same.
Interestingly, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
rephrased the statement in the Foreword to Annex 11 in its Federal Register 
to assume that the coastal State responsible for an FIR exercises jurisdiction 
in that airspace:
811 Imre Anthony Csabafi , The Concept of State Jurisdiction in International Space Law: A Study 
in the Progressive Development of Space Law in the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff 1971) 
131.
812 Chicago Convention, Annex 11, (ix) and 2.1.2 Note 2.
813 ibid (ix).
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‘[t]he SARPs in Annex 11, apply to airspace under the jurisdiction of a Contract-
ing State that has accepted the responsibility of providing air traffic services over 
the high seas (oceanic airspace), or in airspace of undetermined sovereignty’.814
In this respect, an analogy can be drawn between the provision of air navi-
gation services in FIRs and the provision of search and rescue services at 
sea. Article 2(1) of the Search and Rescue Convention sets out that the treaty 
does not prejudice the development of the law of the sea or of coastal or flag 
State jurisdiction. Furthermore, like the boundaries of FIRs, those of SRRs 
have no impact on national borders, but are purely designated as areas ‘of 
defined dimensions in which search and rescue services are provided’.815 
Trevisanut describes the relationship between these areas and the jurisdic-
tion of the States providing the services as follows:
‘SAR regions [SRRs] are non-jurisdictional areas, that is to say in those regions 
states have obligations but not rights. States are thus deemed to be responsible 
for the SAR regions and to exercise a limited jurisdiction, which is exclusively 
functional to the performance of SAR services’.816
The above passage stands equally true for ATS provision in FIRs: if ‘SAR 
regions’ was substituted for ‘FIRs’ and ‘SAR services’ for ‘ATS’, they would 
hold. The limited jurisdiction referred to here is restricted to prescriptive 
jurisdiction and an FIR does not provide the coastal State with any corre-
sponding enforcement jurisdiction. The distinction between these types of 
jurisdiction will be addressed in Section 4.3.4. 
 4.2.2 Gulf States’ prohibition of Qatari-registered aircraft in their FIRs
4.2.2.1 Relevant facts of the case
On 5 June 2017 a number of Gulf States – Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE – issued NOTAMs that imposed a ban on Qatari flights in 
their airspace, as part of a broader severance of diplomatic relations with 
Qatar.817 The ban denied Qatari-registered aircraft entry to the national 
airspace of the States and to international airspace within those States’ FIRs. 
814 US Federal Register, Department of Transportation – FAA, ‘Designation of Oceanic 
Airspace: Notice of Provision of Air Traffi c Services in Oceanic Airspace’ (Volume 80-No. 
126, 1 July 2015) 37711.
815 Search and Rescue Convention, Annex 12, 2.1.7 and 1.3.1, respectively.
816 Seline Trevisanut, ‘Is there a Right to be Rescued at Sea? A Constructive View’ (2014) 4 
QIL 3, 12.
817 Memorial Presented by the State of Qatar to the Application (a) of the State of Qatar – 
Disagreement on the Interpretation and Application of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) and of its Annexes (30 October 2017), c).
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The States also imposed restrictions on non-Qatari registered aircraft using 
their airspace when operating to and from Qatar.818
To the extent that the ban applied to Qatari-registered aircraft, Qatar 
brought the matter before the ICAO Council, invoking the dispute settle-
ment mechanism in Article 84 of the Chicago Convention. In its application, 
Qatar submitted that the prohibition was imposed when the States:
‘… announced, with immediate effect and without any previous negotiation or 
warning, that Qatar- registered aircraft are not permitted to fly to or from the air-
ports within their territories and would be banned not only from their respective 
national air spaces, but also from their Flight Information Regions (FIRs) extend-
ing beyond their national airspace even over the high seas’.819
Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 depict the peninsula of Qatar and its surround-
ings. Figure 4.6 shows, in blue, the boundaries of the FIRs administered 
by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Iran, as well as the delimitation 
of national airspace at the outer edge of the territorial sea, in green. As is 
evident from this image, the territory of Qatar sits wholly within Bahrain’s 
FIR. This heightened the consequences of the ban in that Qatar relies on 
access to Bahrain’s FIR to operate flights in and out of its territory via its 
coast. In announcing its restrictions, Bahrain maintained two entry and exit 
points through its FIR to Qatar’s airspace (Figure 4.8),820 in contrast to the 
thirteen that were in operation prior to the ban (Figure 4.9).
818 ibid. 
819 Application (A) of the State of Qatar – Disagreement on the Interpretation and Applica-
tion of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 1944) and of its Annexes, 
Submitted on behalf of the State of Qatar by its Agent, Essa Abdulla Almalki, Qatar Civil 
Aviation Authority Permanent Representative to ICAO (30 October 2017).
820 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Conven-
tion on Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar) 
I.C.J. Counter-Memorial of the State of Qatar – Vol I (fi led Feb. 25, 2019) 2.9.
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 Figure 4.6:  Delimitation of FIRs and territorial seas in the area821
 Figure 4.7:  FIRs in the region more broadly822
821 Source: Created using ICAO GIS, available at <gis.icao.int/> accessed 14 July 2019.
822 Source: ibid.
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 Figure 4.8: Thirteen routes available to/from Qatari airspace prior to 5 June 2017823
 Figure 4.9: Two ATS routes available as at 6 June 2017824
823 Source: Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the 
Convention on Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. 
Qatar) I.C.J. Counter-Memorial of the State of Qatar – Vol I (fi led Feb. 25, 2019) Figure 1. 
Originally sourced from Qatar Civil Aviation Authority.
824 Source: ibid Figure 2. Originally sourced from Qatar Airways.
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That Qatar is contained within Bahrain’s FIR reflects the fact that both 
States were protectorates of Britain until their independence in 1971 and 
that the FIR was established prior to this date, based on where the radars 
had been installed.825 The FIR arrangement was maintained following inde-
pendence for reasons of safety and efficiency, with the alternative requiring 
multiple ATC handover/takeovers in a short space of time.826 Since the 2017 
blockade, Qatar has requested an amendment to the RANP for the estab-
lishment of its own FIR.827 The amendment process involves addressing 
any objections to the proposal from affected provider and user States and 
international organisations,828 which could be a lengthy process: in the past 
amending RANPs has sometimes taken up to thirty years.829
 4.2.2.2 Relevance of the case to this research
This research is concerned only with the prohibition imposed on: (1) 
Qatari-registered aircraft;830 and, (2) in international airspace, that is, in 
the States’ FIRs in the areas outside their national airspace. The purpose of 
this research is to examine what, under international civil aviation law, if 
anything, prevents a State from discriminating against foreign aircraft in 
international airspace within its FIR based on the State of registration of the 
aircraft.
825 Alex Macheras, ‘Here for the long haul: How Qatar is overcoming the aviation 
blockade’ (The New Arab, 8 January 2018), available at <english.alaraby.co.uk/english/
comment/2018/1/8/how-qatar-is-overcoming-the-aviation-blockade> accessed 12 April 
2019.
826 ibid.
827 CAA (Qatar), Request of the State of Qatar for Consideration by the ICAO Council 
under Article 54(n) of the Chicago Convention: Supplement to our letter reference no. 
2017/15995, dated 15 June 2017, 10: ‘…the State of Qatar urges the ICAO Council to take 
immediate steps for the establishment of a distinct Qatari Flight Information Region 
(FIR), encompassing the area over the exclusive economic zone and contiguous with the 
Tehran FIR’.
828 ICAO Council, Procedure for the Amendment of Regional Air Navigation Plans (18 June 
2014) 5.5.
829 Correspondence from Mike Boyd (Technical Officer, ICAO) to the author, dated 3 
December 2019, in which he also explains that, in previous situations, a vertical separa-
tion of the airspace has provided a workable solution. This model is currently applied 
between Rwanda and Tanzania where the Kigali FIR extends to 24,500 feet in altitude 
and then above that, the Dar es Salaam FIR covers Rwandan territory.
830 Non-Qatari-registered aircraft operating to and from Qatar were not physically prohib-
ited from operating in the States’ airspace but were required to obtain prior approval 
from the CAAs of the States to overfl y their airspace (Counter-Memorial of the State of 
Qatar (n 820) 2.6-2.10).
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There are three preliminary matters to address in order to establish the 
context in which this matter is being examined.
Firstly, as of early January 2021, the restrictions are no longer in place.831 
Up to this point, Qatari-registered aircraft were forbidden to operate in 
the national airspace of the four States, but access to international airspace 
within the FIRs had been reinstated earlier. In fact, this access was reinstated 
relatively quickly, approximately a week after the first NOTAMs were 
issued, when, following closed negotiations at the ICAO Council, Bahrain, 
Egypt and the UAE issued revised NOTAMs which limited the prohibitions 
only to their national airspace.832 As such, this research does not apply to 
the current scenario but is instead an examination of the situation during 
that limited period of time. In this way, this research is relevant in the case 
of discrimination arising in future rather than to this specific case.
Secondly, as mentioned in Section 4.1, this research begins from the 
position that a State is not permitted to prohibit the overflight of aircraft 
registered in a particular State from international airspace within its FIR 
because doing so is a violation of the customary international law principle 
of freedom of overflight, as recognised under UNCLOS. Akbar al-Baker, the 
CEO of Qatar Airways, alluded to this in an interview with Al Jazeera in 
the days following the sanctions, stating that, ‘Bahrain and the UAE have 
illegally blocked that airspace. The airspace that they have blocked does not 
belong to them. It belongs to the international community’.833 The almost 
immediate reinstatement of access to the international airspace within the 
States’ FIRs suggests that this was also the advice of the ICAO Council. The 
following sections will instead take a step back from the interaction between 
the law of the sea and international civil aviation law to examine whether 
the application of the principle of non-discrimination under international 
civil aviation law is implicit in international airspace, as the framework of 
law that is the foundation for FIRs and which subsequently forms the basis 
for the governance of the responsibility of coastal States in international 
airspace.
831 ‘ICAO Welcomes Resolution of Gulf Airspace Restrictions’ (ICAO, 7 January 2021) 
<www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/ICAO-welcomes-resolution-of-Gulf-airspace-
restrictions.aspx> accessed 21 January 2021.
832 Counter-Memorial of the State of Qatar (n 820) 2.16; ‘UAE and Bahrain Grant Qatar 
Airways New Routes’ (Reuters, 9 August 2017), available at <www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/08/uae-bahrain-grant-qatar-airwaysroutes170808161602538.html> accessed 
26 August 2019.
833 ‘Akbar al-Baker on the Gulf Crisis and Qatar Airways’ (Al Jazeera, 14 June 2017), avail-
able at <www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2017/06/akbar-al-baker-qatar-
airways170613020759574.html > accessed 27 August 2018. 
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Thirdly and finally, the States implementing the ban relied on non-
aviation laws834 to support its legality, claiming that it is a response to Qatar 
allegedly breaching the so-called Riyadh Agreements,835 by sponsoring 
terrorism.836 They argued that the sanctions were ‘lawful counter-measures 
authorized by general international law’.837 Further to this, the States 
brought the matter before the ICJ, contesting the ICAO Council’s rejection 
of the States’ objections to the Council’s competence to hear the matter, the 
objections in part resting on the argument that the subject matter is not 
834 Although the basis of these prohibitions is based on the customary international law 
principle, recognised in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, of sovereignty over national 
airspace.
835 These agreements are between the States making up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
and contain measures addressing anti-terrorism and non-interference. The First Riyadh 
Agreement was signed on 23 November 2013 by Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia and, a 
day later, by Bahrain, Oman and the UAE. The second Riyadh Agreement, known as the 
Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement, was signed by the GCC States on 17 
April 2014, in an attempt to ‘strengthen the obligations in the First Riyadh Agreement’. 
Finally, the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement was concluded on 16 November 2014 by 
all GCC States but Oman, and was ‘intended to reinforce the obligations in the earlier 
Agreements’ (Opening Statement of the Agent of the Kingdom of Bahrain, Public sitting 
held on Monday 2 December 2019 – Verbatim Record in the case concerning, Appeal 
Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Convention on 
Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar) I.C.J. 
Joint Application Instituting Proceedings (fi led Jul. 4, 2018), pp. 20-21 paras. 5, 6 9 and 10).
836 For example, the States allege that, ‘[i]n April 2017, Qatar paid a sum of hundreds of 
millions of  US dollars  to terrorist groups, on the pretext that it was a ransom’ (Opening 
Statement of the Agent of the Kingdom of Bahrain (n 835) p. 21 para. 11). See also, ‘Update 
2 – Saudi Arabia says Airspace Ban on Qatari Flights to Protect Citizens’ (Reuters, 13 
June 2017) available at <www.reuters.com/article/gulf-qatar-fl ightsidUSL8N1JA1FK> 
accessed 7 May 2019, which describes the States as accusing Qatar of ‘fomenting regional 
unrest, supporting terrorism and getting too close to Iran’, adding: ‘all of which Doha 
denies’.
837 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Conven-
tion on Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar) 
I.C.J. Joint Application Instituting Proceedings (fi led Jul. 4, 2018) p. 8 para. 9. See Section 
2.6.6.
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within the Council’s competence.838 The ICJ rejected the States’ arguments, 
leaving the matter open to be decided by the ICAO Council.839 A discussion 
of these arguments is outside the scope of this research, as is the legality 
of the bans in general under international civil aviation law, which largely 
focuses on the prohibition of the aircraft from national airspace. Other 
authors have addressed these points though, considering the Chicago 
Convention, the Transit Agreement and the relevant ASAs, and seem to 
conclude that there is little support for the ban.840
 
838 The States brought the matter before the ICJ in two separate cases, which were considered 
jointly by the Court. One related to the ICAO Council’s jurisdiction to hear the matter 
under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention and the other to its jurisdiction under Article 
II, Section 2 of the Transit Agreement: Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO 
Council under Article 84 of the Convention on Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar) I.C.J. Joint Application Instituting Proceed-
ings (fi led Jul. 4, 2018); Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under 
Article II, Section 2, of the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement (Bahrain, 
Egypt and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar) I.C.J. Joint Application Instituting Proceedings 
(fi led Jul. 4, 2018). Saudi Arabia is not a State party to the Transit Agreement and so was 
not involved in the second proceedings. The States brought the matter before the ICJ 
also on two other grounds: (1) that the Council ‘erred in fact and in law’ in its rejection 
of the States’ objection to the Council’s competence which was based on the argument 
that Qatar had not met the precondition of suffi ciently attempting to resolve the dispute 
through prior negotiations; (2) that the Council’s decision in rejecting the States’ objec-
tions to its competence on the two grounds mentioned should be set aside because the 
procedure adopted by the Council in reaching its decision was ‘manifestly fl awed and 
in violation of fundamental principles of due process and the right to be heard’ (Appeal 
Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Convention on 
Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar) I.C.J. 
Joint Application Instituting Proceedings (filed Jul. 4, 2018); Appeal Relating to the 
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article II, Section 2, of the 1944 International Air 
Services Transit Agreement (Bahrain, Egypt and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar) I.C.J. 
Joint Application Instituting Proceedings (fi led Jul. 4, 2018) p. 14 paras. 32 and 30, respec-
tively; Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the 
Convention on Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates 
v. Qatar) I.C.J. Joint Application Instituting Proceedings (fi led Jul. 4, 2018) p. 14 paras. 31 
and 29, respectively).
839 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council under Article 84 of the Conven-
tion on Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar), 
Judgment, I.C.J. 2020 (Jul. 14); Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council 
under Article II, Section 2, of the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement 
(Bahrain, Egypt and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar), Judgment, I.C.J. 2020 (Jul. 14).
840 See, for example, SJ Sreejith, ‘Legality of the Gulf Ban on Qatari Flights: State Sovereignty 
at Crossroads’ (2018) 43(2) A&SL 191; Elena Carpanelli, ‘To Overfl y or Not to Overfl y…? 
Autonomous Sanction in International Civil aviation Amidst the Recent ‘Gulf Crisis’ – 
Part II’ (Blog of Groningen Journal of International Law, 25 September 2017), available 
at <grojil.org/2017/09/25/to-overfly-or-not-to-overfly-autonomous-sanctions-in-
international-civil-aviation-amidst-the-recent-gulf-crisis-pt2/> accessed 2 June 2018. 
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4.2.2.3 Qatar’s arguments for the discrimination as a violation of international law
Further to its primary argument of the ban amounting to a violation of the 
principle of freedom of overflight, Qatar also invoked the principle of non-
discrimination in its Memorial to the ICAO Council. Qatar stated on this 
point, that the respondent States had,
‘… pursuant to a regional air navigation agreement and as a matter of interna-
tional trust, the responsibility of providing air traffic services within their FIRs 
and that function must be performed without discrimination’.841
In national airspace, the Chicago Convention expressly prohibits States 
from discriminating against aircraft on the basis of their State of registry 
in aspects of air navigation.842 However, whether the same principle of 
non-discrimination applies to the provision of ATS in international airspace 
is less clear. At the same time, nothing in the Chicago Convention or its 
annexes provides a State with the right to discriminate against aircraft in 
international airspace within its FIR based on the State of registry of that 
aircraft.
In its Counter-Memorial to the ICJ, Qatar presented the matter as a 
breach of Article 12 of the Chicago Convention:
‘Qatar challenges the aviation prohibitions as violations of multiple provisions 
of the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, including… Article 12 by discrimi-
natory treatment over the high seas within Joint Appellants’ FIRs’.843
Specifically, Qatar relies on the Article 12 stipulation that ‘[o]ver the high 
seas the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention’ 
and that pursuant to this, the Standards in Annex 2 apply without excep-
tion.844 As discussed in Section 2.7.2.2.1, the rules referred to in Article 12 go 
beyond the Rules of the Air in Annex 2 and also include Annexes 6, 10, 11 
and 12. Annex 2 establishes that the responsibility for providing ATC over 
the high seas will be arranged under regional air navigation agreements 
and then the provision of those services is governed by the SARPs in Annex 
11. The Foreword to Annex 11 sets out the relationship between the two 
annexes in stating that,
‘[i]ts [Annex 11’s] purpose, together with Annex 2, is to ensure that flying on 
international air routes is carried out under uniform conditions designed to 
improve the safety and efficiency of air operation’.845
841 Memorial Presented by the State of Qatar (n 817) e) 3 and 4.
842 See Section 4.2.4.1.
843 Counter-Memorial of the State of Qatar (n 820) 2.22.
844 Memorial Presented by the State of Qatar (n 817) e) 4.
845 Chicago Convention, Annex 11, (ix). 
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Beyond this aspect of Annex 2’s relationship with Annex 11 it is difficult to 
see further relevance of Annex 2, or Article 12, in relation to Qatar’s claim. 
The analysis from here will therefore focus on the SARPs in Annex 11 and 
their context within the Chicago Convention legal framework more broadly 
in examining Qatar’s statement, quoted above in this section, that ‘the 
responsibility of providing air traffic services… must be performed without 
discrimination’.
The fact that the States restricted the prohibition to international 
airspace (and national airspace) within their FIRs leads to the conclusion, 
that there was an attempt by them to justify the prohibition on the basis of 
their responsibility for the FIRs.
 4.2.3 The scope of responsibility over international airspace in an FIR 
under Annex 11
ATS is provided in international airspace in accordance with Annex 11 and 
is consistent with any differences to Standards that have been filed by the 
State responsible for the FIR, where it is essential to the efficient discharge 
of responsibilities under the RANP for those differences to apply also in 
international airspace.846
Standard 2.2 of Annex 11 sets out the objectives of ATS, which are as 
follows:
‘to prevent collisions between aircraft; to prevent collisions between aircraft on 
the manoeuvring area and obstructions on that area; to expedite and maintain 
an orderly flow of air traffic; to provide advice and information useful for the 
safe and efficient conduct of flights; to notify appropriate organizations regard-
ing aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organizations as 
required’.847
These objectives are solely related to safety and efficiency. As discussed 
in Section 4.2.1.2, safety and efficiency are correspondingly the only two 
considerations involved in the delimitation of ATS airspace. Consistent with 
this, ICAO has clarified that the extent of responsibility in international 
airspace in an FIR is likewise restricted to the safety and regularity of opera-
tions in the airspace:
‘…any assignment of responsibility over the high seas shall be limited to techni-
cal and operational functions pertaining to the safety and regularity of the air 
traffic operating in the airspace concerned’.848
846 See Section 2.7.2.2.1.3.
847 Chicago Convention, Annex 11, 2.2 a)-d).
848 ICAO Assembly Resolution A38-12 (n 802) Appendix G, 5.
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The limitation of the assignment does not mean that an ATS authority 
does not have the right to restrict the overflight of aircraft in international 
airspace. In fact, on the contrary, in order to adequately deliver ATS services, 
restrictions may be required. Schubert indicates the conditions under which 
such restrictions will be consistent with international civil aviation law:
‘For the purpose of maintaining a safe and an orderly flow of air traffic, a State 
providing ATS in a part of its FIR that extends over the high seas would be enti-
tled to declare some restrictions (e.g. increased separation) on a specific trajec-
tory, including one feeding a particular State. However:
– The provider State must be able to demonstrate that the restrictions serve a 
safety or operational efficiency purpose and are dictated by objective reasons;
– The restriction must apply to all aircraft operating along that trajectory, 
regardless of their nationality’.849
The ICAO PANS-ATM, referred to in Section 3.3.3.2, which complement 
Annex 11, provide technical and operational procedures including for 
instances in which ATS authorities may be required to restrict overflight.850 
The provisions in this document recognise the necessary discretion that 
the ATS authority has in carrying out the services, but in each case, the 
discretion is limited to safety and efficiency considerations. Two examples 
are provided here to illustrate this point, the first in relation to capacity 
management and the second regarding separation methods. The former is 
addressed under Chapter 3 which provides that,
‘to ensure that safety is not compromised whenever the traffic demand in an air-
space or at an aerodrome is forecast to exceed the available ATC capacity, mea-
sures shall be implemented to regulate traffic volumes accordingly’.851
These measures include rerouting and rescheduling,852 in relation to which 
the ATC authority is directed to implement ‘larger separations than the 
specified minima… whenever exceptional circumstances such as unlawful 
interference or navigational difficulties call for extra precautions’, with the 
stipulation that ‘[t]his should be done with due regard to all relevant factors 
so as to avoid impeding the flow of air traffic by the application of excessive 
separations’.853 On this basis, an aircraft or a number of aircraft registered 
849 Correspondence from Francis Schubert (Chief Corporate Officer and Deputy CEO, 
Skyguide, Adjunct Professor, Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University) to the 
author, dated 19 February 2020.
850 ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services (n 784) 16.1. This document also complements 
Annex 2.
851 ibid 3.1.3.3.
852 ibid 3.2.3.1 b) and c).
853 ibid 5.2.1.3.
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in a particular State may temporarily be restricted due to specific circum-
stances that require the restriction on the basis of safety and efficiency 
considerations, but where this occurs the sole consideration must be safety 
and/or efficiency and the restriction must be imposed only to the extent 
necessary to ensure those objectives.
Thus, the measures taken by a State in its FIR in the course of carrying 
out the provision of ATS, including in the exercise of ATC discretion, are 
only justified if they are designed to address the safety and efficiency of 
international civil aviation. Furthermore, considering that the sole function 
of a coastal State in international airspace within an FIR for which that State 
has accepted responsibility is the provision of ATS, there is no other legal 
basis that can serve as a justification for a measure that does not fulfil at 
least one of these two purposes.
The narrow scope of responsibility for an FIR set out under Annex 11 
therefore support’s Qatar’s statement that ‘the responsibility of providing 
air traffic services… must be performed without discrimination’, at least 
insofar as the discrimination is not the result of technical or operational 
functions with a safety and/or efficiency purpose. With this as a foundation, 
this research aims to go further and examine whether it can be argued that 
there is, in addition, an implied principle of non-discrimination applicable 
to the provision of ATS in international airspace, on the basis of the role the 
principle plays in international civil aviation law more broadly. 
 4.2.4 The principle of non-discrimination under international civil 
aviation law
4.2.4.1 The development and application of the principle of non-discrimination in 
international civil aviation law
At the Chicago Conference, the UK emphasised the importance of ‘the great 
principle of non-discrimination’ to the development of international civil 
aviation law.854 The UK delegate said of the principle:
‘Everybody has always paid lip service to it and many indeed have paid more, 
but nobody can pretend that in the past that concept has been of universal appli-
cation. What a great advance it would be if we could all agree, one with the oth-
er, that there shall be no discrimination in our own practices…’.855
854 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt II ‘Verbatim Minutes of Joint Plenary 
Meeting of Committees I, III, and IV, November 22’ (Document 372) 451.
855 ibid. At the outbreak of WWII just 33 States had ratifi ed the Paris Convention (Proceed-
ings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt II ‘Delegation Proposals: United Kingdom 
Proposal on International Air Transport’ (Document 48) 567).
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The principle of non-discrimination, with its basis in the principle of the 
sovereign equality of States,856 has since been referred to as a ‘cornerstone 
of international civil aviation’857 but, as will be considered here below, the 
principle has been adopted only in certain aspects. The term ‘discrimina-
tion’ is only explicitly referred to once in the Chicago Convention, in Article 
44(g), as one of the objectives of ICAO. Specifically, Article 44 provides 
that ICAO, in developing principles for air navigation and in fostering 
the development of air transport, aims to achieve a number of objectives, 
including ‘avoid[ing] discrimination between contracting States’.858 More 
broadly speaking, the principle of non-discrimination has recently been 
at the forefront of discussions in international civil aviation law in respect 
to ICAO’s adoption of its Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Civil Aviation (CORSIA) in 2016. Alongside the principle of 
non-discrimination,859 ICAO has accepted the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) in 
the implementation of these market-based measures (MBMs),860 with the 
process and ultimate decision involving debate on the consistency between 
non-discrimination and CBDRRC.861
Further to being recognised amongst ICAO’s objectives, the principle of 
non-discrimination is implemented in the Chicago Convention a number of 
times: Article 7, prohibiting States from granting exclusive cabotage rights 
to a State or airline of a particular State; Article 9 in relation to prohibited 
and restricted areas in national airspace, as discussed in Section 2.6.2; Article 
856 Vincent Correia, ‘The Legacy of the 1919 Paris Convention Relating to the Regulation of 
Aerial Navigation’ in Pablo Mendes de Leon and Niall Buissing (eds), Behind and Beyond 
the Chicago Convention: The Evolution of Aerial Sovereignty (Wolters Kluwer 2019) 19. See 
Section 3.3.4.4.
857 Alejandro Piera, Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Aviation: Legal and 
Policy Changes (Eleven International Publishing 2015) 51; Benoit Mayer, The International 
Law on Climate Change (CUP 2018) 106.
858 Chicago Convention, Article 44(g).
859 ICAO Assembly Resolution A39-2, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies 
and Practices Related to environmental Protection – Climate Change (27 September – 
6 October 2016) 2 and 9.
860 ibid 9.
861 Alejandro Piera, ‘Reconciling CBDR with Non-Discrimination: A Fundamental Require-
ment for ICAO’s Global MBM Success’ (Green Air, 23 September 2014), available at 
<www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory=1983> accessed 3 November 2019: 
‘CBDR must be reconciled with non-discrimination in a manner compatible with the 
international aviation environment. This is necessary to enhance political acceptance 
and ensure that the system is widely implemented’. On the other hand, Leclerc argues 
that the scope of non-discrimination in international civil aviation law is limited to the 
legal regime of air navigation and, as MBMs come under the distinct legal regime of air 
transport, there is in fact no confl ict between the principle of non-discrimination and the 
principle of CBDRRC (Thomas Leclerc, Les mesures correctives des émissions aériennes 
de gaz à effet de serre. Contribution à l’étude des interactions entre les ordres juridiques 
en droit international public (PhD thesis, E.M. Meijers Instituut, Leiden University, 2017) 
235-69).
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11, setting out the applicability of air regulations for entry and departure 
of national airspace and while operating and navigating therein; Article 12 
regarding the application of the Rules of the Air; Article 15 governing the 
use of airports and air navigation facilities, and charges for such use; and, 
Article 35(b), in relation to a State’s right to regulate the carriage of articles 
above its territory. The principle of ‘national treatment’, as a subset of non-
discrimination,862 is furthermore reflected in Article 9(a), for scheduled 
services, Article 11, Article 15 and Article 35(b), requiring that the law must 
be applied equally to national aircraft and the aircraft registered in other 
States.863 Article 9(a) though does not apply the national treatment principle 
to non-scheduled flights i.e. the article leaves States with the right to treat 
aircraft registered in other States engaged in non-scheduled flights differ-
ently to their national aircraft likewise engaged. It has also been argued that 
the national treatment principle applies under Article 9(b)864 but, in contrast, 
this article states only that it is ‘applicable without distinction of nationality 
to aircraft of all other States’ (emphasis added), thereby allowing for aircraft 
of the State whose territory is involved to be treated differently.865
Finally, the Preamble to the Convention recognises that the States 
agree that, ‘international air transport services may be established on the 
basis of equality of opportunity’. Equality of opportunity, as the reference 
to international air transport indicates, involves the economic aspects of 
international civil aviation, addressing, among other things, market access 
and barriers to entry. Wassenbergh describes the principle as implying ‘an 
equal freedom for every State to build up a civil aviation of its own, i.e. not 
a right to a civil aviation’ (original emphasis).866 Equality of opportunity is 
not the same as non-discrimination but the principle of non-discrimination 
contributes to achieving it, for example in the context of the allocation of 
862 National treatment is a general notion of legal theory in that it is found across different 
fi elds of international law. It is particularly prominent in the law and policy of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) where the non-discrimination obligation is understood 
to consist of two main elements: the national treatment obligation and the favoured 
nations (MFN) treatment obligation (Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law 
and Policy of the World Trade Organization (4th edn, CUP 2017) 342). National treatment is 
also prominent in foreign investment treaty law, where it is ‘designed to complete non-
discrimination goals derived from the MFN treatment’ (Raúl Emilio Vinuesa, ‘National 
Treatment, Principle’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law 2011) 55). 
863 YILC (1970) Vol. II, Part 2, 215. 
864 Pablo Mendes de Leon, Vincent Correia, Uwe Erling and Thomas Leclerc, ‘Possible Legal 
Arrangements to Implement a Global Market Based Measure for International Aviation 
Emissions’ (Study for the Directorate General Climate Action of the EU Commission, 
2 December 2015) 11.
865 Bin Cheng, Law of International Air Transport (Stevens & Sons 1962) 124.
866 Henry Abraham Wassenbergh, Post-War International Civil Aviation Policy and the Law of 
the Air (Springer 1957) 137.
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airport slots pursuant to Article 15 of the Chicago Convention.867 The role of 
the principle of non-discrimination in contributing to the economic aspects 
of international civil aviation will be discussed in Section 4.2.4.3.
 4.2.4.2 Interaction between sovereignty and the principle of non-discrimination in 
national airspace
The specific references to the non-discrimination principle in the Chicago 
Convention only apply in the case that the State of registry has negotiated 
access for its aircraft to the territory of a particular State. This is a direct 
consequence of the ‘complete and exclusive sovereignty’ that sits at the 
heart of international civil aviation law. Non-discrimination in national 
airspace applies subject to the sovereign power of a State to decide who it 
admits to its territory and the terms on which it does so. Once this access 
has been granted however, the principle of non-discrimination under each 
of the articles means that a State cannot provide different treatment to 
aircraft navigating or operating within its territory under these articles. This 
resulting situation, of the simultaneous centrality of non-discrimination to 
international civil aviation law and the requirement that States separately 
negotiate the terms of access to each other’s national airspace, can be 
understood in the context of the distinction between air transport and air 
navigation, recalling Section 2.3.2. This is the approach taken by Leclerc, 
who argues that:
‘…a close reading of the Chicago Convention provides the observation that the 
explicit presence of the principle of non-discrimination is limited to the provi-
sions relating to the law of navigation. This does not mean that the application of 
the principle is definitively restricted to the field of air navigation, but at present 
it seems largely premature to assert the widespread application of this principle 
to international air transport’.868
As addressed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, international air transport is based 
on the exchange of traffic rights, which is still predominantly undertaken 
through bilateral ASAs under which the conditions attached to the exercise 
867 ICAO WP/64, Fair and Equal Opportunities to Access the International Air Transport 
Market and the Problem of Airports’ Congestion, Presented by Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and the Observer from Palestine at the 5th Air 
Transport Conference, Montreal (17 March 2003) 3.4, 4.1 and 5.1 a); Peter PC Haanappel, 
The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Approach (Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 45.
868 Leclerc (n 861) 243, translated from the original: ‘…une lecture attentive de la convention 
de Chicago permet d’observer que la présence explicite du principe de non-discrimina-
tion se trouve limitée aux dispositions relatives au droit de la navigation aérienne. Cela 
ne signifi e pas que l’application du principe soit défi nitivement restreinte au champ de 
la navigation aérienne, mais il apparait aujourd’hui largement prématuré d’affi rmer 
l’application étendue de ce principe en matière de transport aérien international’.
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of those rights are also negotiated.869 While States are increasingly adopting 
more liberal provisions in their ASAs, and negotiating them on a multilat-
eral or regional basis,870 the system establishes a framework that necessarily 
results in discrimination.
The interaction of the non-discrimination principle under Article 15 
with Article 68 of the Chicago Convention provides an example of the 
application of the non-discrimination principle subject to the exception of 
the conditions on which the exercise of the rights has been granted. While 
the non-discrimination principle in Article 15 applies to all aircraft, the 
exception to the principle in Article 68 applies only to scheduled services, 
a matter that will be addressed below. Article 15 of the Chicago Conven-
tion applies the non-discrimination principle to the use of airports and air 
navigation service facilities, and charges for such use. Regarding the former, 
the article requires that ‘every airport in a contracting State which is open 
to public use by its national aircraft shall likewise… be open under uniform 
conditions to the aircraft of all the other contracting States’.871 The excep-
tion under Article 68 at the same time reserves States the right to ‘designate 
the route to be followed within its territory by any international service and 
the airports which such service may use’ (emphasis added). So, although a 
State cannot provide use of its airports in a discriminatory manner to those 
aircraft that have access to the airport, the State has the right to provide 
access to the airport to only certain services and in this respect may distin-
guish between aircraft based on their State of registry. This is consistent 
with route schedules in ASAs sometimes specifying routes not only in 
terms of the city-to-city points, but also the airports within those cities. For 
example, Bermuda II provided that ‘[n]onstop services by a United States 
869 See Section 2.3.3 (n 195), for the exchange of traffi c rights in relation to non-scheduled 
services. As mentioned, States usually regulate the operation of these services unilater-
ally under their national legislation, but some include charter services in their ASAs, 
leading inevitably to different conditions for services between States.
870 See Section 2.3.3 (n 190) on the EU single aviation market and MALIAT, and Section 
2.3.3.2 for a brief discussion on the liberalisation of ASA provisions. 
871 For example, the procedures for the approach and departure sequence of aircraft clearly 
exclude the option to discriminate between aircraft in these decisions, making clear that 
in the case of arrival the sequence is to be determined so as to ‘facilitate arrival of the 
maximum number of aircraft with the least average delay’ and in the case of departure, 
aircraft ‘shall normally be cleared in the order in which they are ready for take-off’, but 
that this can be adjusted to, as with arrivals, maximise the number of aircraft that can 
take off with the least delay (ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services (n 784) 6.5.6.1.1 
and 7.9.1).
 As a side note here, given that this article specifi cally applies to airports in a State’s terri-
tory, an airport constructed in a State’s EEZ is not within its scope. If, or perhaps when, 
the construction of international civil airports in EEZs and even on the high seas becomes 
commonplace, it will be interesting to see how international civil aviation law adapts to 
meet these lacunas.
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airline or airlines between Atlanta and London and between Houston and 
London will serve London-Gatwick Airport’.872
In addressing route designation, Article 68, as cited above, allows 
a State to designate the routes both for aircraft engaged in services to or 
from its territory and for those exercising the first freedom. As a result, the 
exercise of the first freedom, i.e. overflight, is also subject to the conditions 
under which it was negotiated in terms of the route to be followed, which 
may differ depending on the State of registration. In essence, there is no 
non-discrimination principle applying to overflight insofar as the route to 
be followed is concerned. In discussing Article 68, Bin Cheng stated that the 
regulation of routes is ‘one of the most potent instruments in the bargaining 
of transit and traffic rights in bilateral air services agreements’ (emphasis 
added).873 The implications of this in the case of Canada and Russia desig-
nating North Pole routes over their territories was seen in Section 2.3.3. The 
Wall Street Journal, reporting at the time, addressed the need for States to 
negotiate access to the routes independently with the two States:
‘…airlines must seek Russian permission to fly over northern Siberia from Can-
ada, and some have done so on a month-by-month basis. Even after July 1, per-
mission can be denied at anytime [sic]. Canada, with an open-skies policy, would 
be unlikely to deny access’. And, ‘…snags in getting airlines access to them [the 
routes] could still develop. Bilateral overflight agreements with Russia will have 
to be negotiated on a country-by-country basis. Even Canada needs an overflight 
agreement with Russia. However, State Department officials in Washington say 
they’re optimistic that once talks begin, they will be easy to conclude’.874
Whilst States might be able to use route designation as a bargaining chip 
in negotiating an ASA, those States that have multilaterally exchanged 
the right of overflight over their territories under the Transit Agreement 
equally have the right to subsequently designate the route to be followed by 
aircraft engaged in scheduled services in their airspace.875 The inclusion of 
this provision in the Transit Agreement, which is a restatement, in part, of 
Article 68 of the Chicago Convention, was pursuant to a proposal from the 
872 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America, 
Agreement Concerning Air Services (with Annexes, Exchange of Letters and Agreed 
Minute dated 22 June 1977) (Bermuda, 23 Jul. 1977) 1079 UNTS 21 (No 16509), Annex 1. 
More liberal ASAs do not determine routes so precisely, instead only naming cities or, in 
the case of the particularly liberal ASA between Australia and New Zealand, only that 
it applies to ‘points’ in each country (Agreement between the Government of Australia 
and the Government of New Zealand Relating to Air Services Auckland, Australia-New 
Zealand, signed 8 August 2002, [2003] ATS 18 (entered into force 25 August 2003), Annex 
s 1).
873 Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (n 865) 124.
874 Joel Baglole, ‘Canada, Russia’s Decision to Permit Polar Routes Promises to Cut 
Hours’ (The Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2000), available at <www.wsj.com/articles/
SB960415817821812909> accessed 4 March 2018.
875 Transit Agreement, Section 4(1). 
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UK during the Chicago Conference.876 The case is different for overflight for 
non-scheduled flights for which, under Article 5 of the Chicago Convention, 
States may require aircraft to follow prescribed routes over their territo-
ries only ‘for reasons of safety’ when the aircraft wishes to operate over 
‘regions which are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation facili-
ties’.877 Despite the exchange of overflight rights for non-scheduled services 
under Article 5 of the Chicago Convention, not all States act consistently 
with the provision: the ASA between Canada and Russia provides that 
‘[a]uthorization of overflights for air carriers of either Contracting Party 
operating charter services shall be considered on the basis of comity and 
reciprocity’.878
These provisions indicate that sovereignty over national airspace 
governs when, and in some respects how, the aircraft of certain States are 
permitted to access the airspace and facilities of that State. The principle of 
non-discrimination then applies further to these considerations.
 4.2.4.3 Purpose of the non-discrimination principle in national airspace
The safety objectives of international civil aviation law have been empha-
sised in Section 2.3.2, which also addressed the central role of SARPs 
in facilitating the safety of civil aviation through the harmonisation of 
regulation. The non-discrimination principle in the Chicago Convention 
contributes to the safety of international civil aviation law by requiring that 
all aircraft are subject to the same rules – for example, under Articles 11 and 
12 – and by ensuring that all aircraft have access to air navigation facilities –
Article 15 – a significant part of the role of which is to ensure the safety of 
aircraft.
The non-discrimination principle also has an economic purpose. For 
example, under Article 7 of the Chicago Convention, a State cannot grant 
cabotage rights to another State on an ‘exclusive basis’. The non-discrimina-
tion principle in this article does not prohibit a State from granting cabotage 
rights to one State and not to another, but specifically from granting the right 
to the exclusion of other States. Considering that cabotage stems from the 
‘mercantilist purpose of protecting domestic commerce from foreign compe-
tition’, Havel and Sanchez have described the non-discrimination clause 
under Article 7 as ‘a restraint on the degree of sovereignty the Convention’s 
State parties can trade away’.879 For a weaker aviation State, they explain, 
this prevents it from being pressured by stronger States in the exchange of 
876 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt II ‘Minutes of Meeting of Subcommit-
tees 1 and 2 of Committee I, December 2’ (Document 465) 653.
877 Chicago Convention, Article 5. As discussed in Section 2.3.3.
878 Air Services Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Russian Federation, 18 December 2000, Annex II, A) 5).
879 Brian Havel and Gabriel Sanchez, The Principles and Practice of International Aviation Law 
(CUP 2014) 50-51.
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these rights, to the detriment of the domestic market of the former State and, 
for a stronger State, the article alleviates it from the concern that other strong 
aviation States are granted cabotage rights in a State to its exclusion.880
The non-discrimination principle as an expression of protectionism, as 
it applies in Article 7, is in contrast to the role that the US delegation envi-
sioned the principle playing in the Chicago Convention. The US delegate 
at the Chicago Conference, arguing for a highly liberalised multilateral 
exchange of privileges under the Chicago convention, as discussed in 
Section 2.2.2.3, compared the need to avoid discrimination in the operation 
of international air services over national airspace to the significance of 
access to the high seas for economic purposes:
‘You will recall that for a time nations forgot the famous Roman observation, I 
think it was the Emperor Gaius, that the law was lord of the sea, and endeavored 
to establish great closed zones from which they attempted to exclude all inter-
course except through their own ships, or to place any other nation permitted 
to enter these zones at a discriminatory disadvantage… . These zones became 
fertile breeding grounds for great commercial monopolies, which sought to levy 
tribute on the commerce of the world or to exclude or discriminate against the 
trade of other nations... . The dangers of closed air, where it lies across estab-
lished or logical routes of commerce, are not dissimilar from the dangers which 
arose through the closing of sea lanes.881
Leaving aside Article 7, the non-discrimination principle in other articles 
under the Convention serves to restrict the sovereignty of a State by 
preventing it from imposing regulations to the detriment of the air services 
of a particular State or States. This economic focus of Article 9(a) for 
instance, is demonstrated by the fact that national treatment applies specifi-
cally to scheduled services, with the commercial potential of non-scheduled 
services considered to be minimal at the time of the drafting of the Conven-
tion.882 Other instances of non-discrimination in the Convention that 
apply to air navigation matters but which have economic consequences, in 
protecting the air services of other States by allowing them to exercise their 
transit and traffic rights unimpeded by discriminatory regulations of the 
State whose territory is involved, are found under Articles 9(b), 11, 12 and 
15.
Equally in international airspace, there are both safety and economic 
arguments to be made for the application of the law in a non-discriminatory 
manner. Qatar’s claims in relation to the prohibitions imposed by the Gulf 
States reflect this:
880 ibid 51.
881 Proceedings to the Chicago Convention: Vol I, Pt I ‘Verbatim Minutes of Second Plenary 
Session, November 2’ (Document 42) 56-57.
882 Rigas Doganis, Flying Off Course: Airline Economics and Marketing (4th edn, Routledge 
2010) 38.
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‘The blocked FIRs forced the Qatar Airways to use limited airways, leading to 
danger of congestion. The safety, security, regularity and economy of civil avia-
tion have been seriously compromised’.883
There is no doubting the economic importance of access to international 
airspace to airlines operating international air services. Without access to 
international airspace, the non-discrimination principle as it applies in the 
Chicago Convention would be of little value to many airlines which rely 
on services that operate across the oceans. McDougal and Burke wrote, in 
reference to the period in the late 1950s and early 1960s:
‘[t]he oceans have perhaps been most efficiently employed as an avenue of trans-
port…’ and, ‘travel in space above many parts of the ocean has quickly become 
highly intense, especially in the movement of people’.884
Since this time, international civil aviation has grown exponentially, as has 
the corresponding economic importance of the use of international airspace.
The non-discrimination principle has been adopted in the Chicago 
Convention for economic and safety purposes. These objectives are equally 
important in international airspace in the sense that international civil 
aviation relies on a global network where the segments of operation over 
international airspace are indivisible from those over national airspace for 
the purpose of delivering services that span the two.
 4.2.4.4 Non-discrimination principle in international airspace on the basis of its 
application in national airspace
Based on the above, is it possible to interpret an overarching implied prin-
ciple of non-discrimination applying to navigation in international airspace, 
including the right to access the airspace? One way of approaching this 
would be to consider the contrast between access to national airspace and 
international airspace, in terms of the fact that no State has sovereignty over 
the latter and that the baseline principle is freedom of overflight, thereby 
resulting in a situation where the preliminary negotiations over access to 
airspace, and conditions attached to such rights, are irrelevant and therefore 
that the principle of non-discrimination applies without preconditions. The 
logic of this argument is flawed, however.
Firstly, whilst it is a central aspect, the non-discrimination principle is 
not a blanket principle in international civil aviation law. The principle of 
non-discrimination in national airspace does not apply to the right to access 
national airspace, or operate routes to and from it, which are governed by 
the States externally to the Chicago Convention. Therefore, there seems 
883 Memorial Presented by the State of Qatar (n 817) c).
884 Myres S McDougal and William T Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary 
International Law of the Sea (New Haven Press 1987) 732-33.
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little basis to subsequently interpret that the non-discrimination principle 
can be implied as applying in international airspace to prohibit States from 
banning the aircraft of other States from accessing their FIRs. The Conven-
tion also reserves States the right to determine the routes that any air service 
may operate on, i.e. the non-discrimination principle does not apply to the 
designation of routes in national airspace. Further to this, the non-discrim-
ination principle in Article 9(a) in relation to prohibited areas applies only 
to scheduled services as opposed to aircraft in general. It would, as a result, 
be illogical then to rely on the non-discrimination principle in the Chicago 
Convention to argue that a State administering an FIR is restricted from 
discriminating in these aspects against an aircraft navigating in interna-
tional airspace within its responsibility.
Furthermore, the principle of non-discrimination in national airspace 
has both safety and economic purposes. These objectives are equally impor-
tant in international airspace, but the principle of non-discrimination is not 
necessarily needed to achieve these aims. State sovereignty over national 
airspace entails the corresponding legal competence of the State in respect 
to that airspace, including jurisdiction over the operation and navigation 
of aircraft within its territory to the extent that the laws and regulations are 
consistent with international law. It is for this reason that the non-discrimi-
nation principle is expressly required in the Chicago Convention in respect 
to national airspace. In contrast, no State has sovereignty over international 
airspace and the jurisdiction of a coastal State over international airspace 
within its FIR is found solely in its responsibilities based in Annex 11 as 
developed and agreed upon under the relevant RANP.
As a result, it is both unhelpful and misguided to consider whether, 
on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination applying to national 
airspace, there may be an implied principle of non-discrimination in Annex 
11 of the Chicago Convention that prohibits discrimination in international 
airspace. This does not mean though that a State has the right to discrimi-
nate against aircraft in international airspace within its FIR. Rather, as was 
demonstrated above in Section 4.2.3, the narrow scope of FIR responsibili-
ties under Annex 11 provides a State with no legitimate grounds on which 
to discriminate against aircraft on the basis of the State of registry of the 
aircraft. This position is supported by the discussion in the following 
section, which addresses the principle of good faith in interpreting the 
responsibilities set forth in Annex 11.
 4.2.4.5 Interpretation of Annex 11 consistent with non-discrimination in 
international airspace
As mentioned in Section 4.2.4.1, one of the objectives of ICAO is ‘to develop 
the principles and techniques of international air navigation… so as to… 
avoid discrimination between contracting States’.885 ICAO’s normative 
885 With specifi c reference to Article 44(g).
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powers within the development of principles and techniques for interna-
tional air navigation include ‘air traffic control practices’886 for which it 
is responsible for adopting SARPs. Annex 11 is adopted pursuant to this 
article.887
The provision of ATS in a discriminatory manner based on the State of 
registration of an aircraft, with no legitimate basis in safety and efficiency 
objectives, not only goes beyond the provision of the services that the State 
accepting responsibility is tasked with delivering, but it goes against the 
non-discriminatory context of the legal framework that the SARPs fall 
within. To read into the provisions any right to discriminate would be a 
violation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda,888 which applies to every 
treaty, including its annexes. 889 The main element of pacta sunt servanda is 
good faith890 and in accordance with good faith, ‘[p]arties are required to the 
best of their abilities to observe the treaty stipulations in their spirit…’.891 
The ICJ, in its Nuclear Tests Case, addressed the concept of good faith:
‘One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and con-
fidence are inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when 
this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just as the 
very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so 
also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral 
declaration. Thus interested States may take cognizance of unilateral declara-
tions and place confidence in them, and are entitled to require that the obligation 
thus created be respected’.892
The Chicago Convention and its annexes, Annex 11 being most relevant to 
this research, together with the RANPs that are developed pursuant to the 
Convention, set out the legal framework governing the establishment of 
FIRs and the responsibilities for the provision of ATS within them. Although 
the framework does not reference the principle of non-discrimination in 
setting out its rules for ATS over international airspace, the principle under-
pins ICAO’s law-making capacity and in establishing the responsibilities 
for the provision of ATS, ICAO has accordingly so narrowly defined the role 
so at to leave no right for discrimination based on the State of registry of an 
aircraft.
886 Chicago Convention, Article 37(c).
887 Annex 11 used to be titled, ‘Air Traffi c Control’, which is now considered an element of 
ATS, as described in Section 4.2.1.1.
888 See also Section 3.3.2.1.




892 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1974 (20 Dec.), p. 253, p. 268 
para. 46.
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4.2.4.6 Overflight fees in international airspace
Although outside the scope of this research – which focuses on prohibi-
tion or restrictions on the operation of an aircraft in international airspace 
– the charging of air navigation fees for services provided in international 
airspace cannot be considered alongside the provision of those services 
when it comes to non-discrimination.
In its Policies on Charges for Air Navigation Services, ICAO has stated 
that,
‘[t]he system of charges must not discriminate between foreign users and those 
having the nationality of the State or States responsible for providing the air nav-
igation services and engaged in similar international operations, or between two 
or more foreign users’.893
For charges for services used by aircraft when not over the provider State, 
however, including in international airspace, ICAO is less prescriptive. 
Recognising that the collection of such fees in this case ‘poses difficult 
and complex problems’, ICAO provides that ‘it is for the States to find the 
appropriate kind of machinery on a bilateral or regional basis’ to facilitate 
the rates and method of collection.894 In this respect, the provision of ATS 
is distinguishable from the imposition of the fees for those services, in the 
degree to which it is regulated by ICAO and also, it appears, in the right to 
discriminate.
4.2.5 In summary: Non-discrimination in international airspace
International airspace is divided into FIRs for the purpose of ATS provision. 
A State that accepts responsibility for an FIR over international airspace, 
pursuant to a RANP, provides those services consistently with the SARPs 
under Annex 11. A State’s acceptance of responsibility for an FIR confers 
no sovereignty on that State over the airspace within the FIR and, whilst 
FIR boundaries over national territory often follow State borders, the 
intention is that they are delimited based only on technical and operational 
considerations and it is not uncommon for the FIR of one State to encom-
pass the territory of another. In the case of Qatar, its territory is entirely 
encompassed by Bahrain’s FIR and so when Bahrain, together with other 
Gulf States, prohibited Qatari-registered aircraft from the FIRs, including 
in international airspace, the consequences were particularly severe for the 
operation of flights to and from Qatar.
893 ICAO Doc 9082, ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services (9th edn, 
2012) 6 iv).  
894 ibid 11.
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Prohibiting an aircraft from international airspace on the basis of the 
State of registration of the aircraft is indisputably a violation of freedom 
of overflight. Leaving this freedom aside, Section 4.2 set out to determine 
whether there is a prohibition on doing so specifically under interna-
tional civil aviation law, as the body of law under which FIRs and the 
responsibility for ATS within them is established. Whilst the principle of 
non-discrimination applies in the Chicago Convention, the application is 
to specific aspects, to the exclusion of others, rather than being a corner-
stone principle. Furthermore, whilst the safety and economic goals that 
non-discrimination helps to meet in national airspace are important in 
international airspace, the principle is not necessary to meet these goals 
in international airspace on the basis that, cumulatively, no State exercises 
sovereignty over the airspace and that the terms of Annex 11 provide the 
State responsible for an FIR with a limited scope of jurisdiction in its provi-
sion of ATS. State responsibility for the provision of ATS services, as set out 
in Annex 11 and the corresponding PANS-ATM are narrow – purely for 
safety and efficiency – and all decisions must be justifiable on one of these 
two bases. Supporting this is the consideration that the SARPs in Annex 
11 of the Chicago Convention are legislated by ICAO and one of its main 
objectives in developing its principles for international air navigation is to 
avoid discrimination between States. To interpret the SARPs as permitting 
discrimination in the absence of an express permission to do so would be a 
breach of good faith. 
 4.3 Air defence identification zones
4.3.1 Recent developments shed light on inconsistent approach to ADIZ
In November 2013 China announced895 that it had established an ADIZ, 
reaching more than 300 miles off its coast.896 The announcement was met 
with opposition from a number of States, including the US, Japan, South 
895 Announcement of the Aircraft Identifi cation Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identifi cation Zone of the People’s Republic of China’, issued by the Ministry of National 
Defense, China (23 November 2013).
896 Roncevert Almond, ‘Clearing the Air above the East China Sea: The Primary Elements of 
Aircraft Defense Identifi cation Zones’ (2016) 7 NSJ 126, 129.
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Korea, Australia, Canada and the UK.897 Despite this, China’s actions within 
its ADIZ are ‘largely in line with international norms regarding ADIZs’.898
Some of the most vehement opposition to China’s ADIZ stemmed from 
consequences beyond the restrictions that the ADIZ places on aviation.899 
The airspace within China’s ADIZ controversially includes disputed terri-
tory: the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai Islands, which are claimed by Japan, 
China and Taiwan;900 and the Ieodo/Suyan Reef, claimed by South Korea 
and China.901 This issue contributes to demonstrating the political nature of 
ADIZs, but the territorial disputes themselves are outside the scope of this 
research.
The dimensions of the ADIZ are also problematic in that the zone over-
laps with the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.902 It is not excep-
tional in this respect though: the extension of Japan’s ADIZ in 2010 resulted 
in overlap with Taiwan’s,903 while the extension of South Korea’s in 2015 
897 See respectively, ‘Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone’ (John 
Kerry, Secretary of State – Press Statement, 23 November 2013), available at <2009-2017.
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm> accessed 3 November 2019; United 
States of America Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 113th Congress 
– Second Session (Volume 160-Part 8, June 20-July 15 2014) 11803; ‘China’s Air Defense 
Identifi cation Zone: Impact on Regional Security’ (Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, 26 November 2013), available at <www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-air-defense-
identification-zone-impact-regional-security> accessed 3 November 2019; ‘China’s 
Announcement of an Air-Defence Identifi cation Over the East China Sea’ (Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, Press Release, 26 November 2013), available at <www.
foreignminister.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/media-release/chinas-announcement-air-
defence-identification-zone-over-east-china-sea> accessed 3 November 2019; ‘Baird 
Concerned over China’s Announcement of Air Defence Identifi cation Zone’ (Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, News Release, 2 December 2013), available at 
<www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2013/12/baird-concerned-china-announcement-
air-defence-identifi cation-zone.html> accessed 3 November 2019; HL Deb 16 January 
2014, Vol 751, col 444. 
898 Ian E Rinehart and Bart Elias, ‘China’s Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ)’ (Congres-
sional Research Service Report, 31 January 2015) 10. Notwithstanding the signifi cant 
variation in practice in the establishment of ADIZ, as will be demonstrated throughout 
Section 4.3.
899 ‘China Establishes ‘Air Defence Zone’ over East China Sea’ (BBC, 23 November 2013), 
available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25062525> accessed 5 May 2018.
900 Almond (n 896) 129; Susan V Lawrence et al, ‘US-China Relations’ (Congressional 
Research Service Report, 3 September 2019) 29.
901 Christopher K Lamont, ‘Confl ict in the Skies: The Law of Air Defence Identifi cation 
Zones’ (2014) 39(3) A&SL 187, 188.
902 Lawrence et al (n 900) 29. 
903 ‘Japan Extends Air Defence Identifi cation Zone into Taiwan Space’ (BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacifi c, 26 June 2010), text of report in English by Shih Hsiu-chuan on Taiwanese 
newspaper Taipei Times website on 26 June 2010 written, available at <www.taipeitimes.
com/News/front/archives/2010/06/26/2003476438> accessed 3 November 2019; 
Christopher K Lamont, ‘Confl ict in the Skies: The Law of Air Defence Identifi cation 
Zones’ (2014) 39(3) A&SL 187, 191.
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led to overlap with Japan’s.904 Necessarily, overlapping ADIZs also involve 
ADIZs crossing FIR boundaries. In addition to the overlapping ADIZs of 
China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, ICAO has referred to an unnamed 
ADIZ established in 2018, which crossed over into two adjacent FIRs,905 and 
Canada’s ADIZ crosses very slightly into the FIRs of Greenland and the US, 
as does Thailand’s ADIZ with FIRs under the responsibility of Malaysia and 
Vietnam.906 The consequences of ADIZs that result in an overlap in respon-
sibilities or authority in airspace will be addressed in relation to the safety 
implications of ADIZs in Section 4.3.6.1.
The element of China’s ADIZ that caused particular concern amongst 
States907 when it was announced, was that the State would be prepared to 
use force in the case that its ADIZ requirements are not complied with. The 
announcement specifically stated on this matter, that ‘China’s armed forces 
will adopt defensive emergency measures to respond to aircraft that do not 
cooperate in the identification or refuse to follow the instructions’.908 As 
will be discussed in Section 4.3.5, a coastal State has very limited powers to 
enforce non-compliance of its ADIZ within international airspace. Despite 
China’s claim, however, it has so far not resorted to taking defensive 
measures against non-complying aircraft, although whether this is a calcu-
lated decision is unclear.909
A key criticism of the US of China’s ADIZ is the fact that it applies to all 
aircraft in the zone, including those that remain in international airspace.910 
As will be demonstrated in Section 4.3.3.1, there is no legal basis to 
suggest that the territorial connection claimed by the US legitimises ADIZ. 
Furthermore, China is once again not unusual in requiring all aircraft to 
904 Chang-Hoon Shin, ‘South Korea’s Inevitable Expansion of its ADIZ’ (Asian Maritime 
Transparency Initiative 8 December 2014), available at <amti.csis.org/south-koreas-
inevitable-expansion-of-its-adiz/> accessed 19 August 2019.
905 ICAO WP/295, Establishment of Military Requirements and Restrictions on International 
Civil Aviation, Presented by IATA and IFALPA at the 13th Air Navigation Conference, 
Montreal (28 September 2018) 2.3. 
906 Jinyuan Su, ‘The Practice of States on Air Defense Identifi cation Zones: Geographical 
Scope, Object of Identifi cation, and Identifi cation Measures’ (2019) 18 Chinese JIL 811, 
829.
907 See for example, ‘Declaration by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf 
of the European Union on the establishment by China of an ‘East China Sea Air Defence 
Identifi cation Zone’’ (European Union, Press Release, 28 November 2013), available at 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139752.
pdf> accessed 13 February 2016.
908 Announcement issued by the Ministry of National Defense, China (n 895).
909 Edmund J Burke and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, ‘In Line or Out of Order? China’s Approach 
to ADIZ in Theory and Practice’ (RAND Project AIR FORCE Strategy and Doctrine 
Program, 2017) 1: ‘whether the lack of enforcement is an operational choice or the result 
of insuffi cient capabilities is an open question’.
910 Announcement issued by the Ministry of National Defense, China (n 895). The US voiced 
its concern immediately upon China’s announcement: ‘We don’t support efforts by any 
State to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter its national 
airspace’ (Statement on the East China Sea ADIZ – US Secretary of State (n 897)).
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comply with its ADIZ requirements; Su’s comparative research on national 
regulations in ADIZs found that many States that have imposed ADIZs in 
international airspace have required aircraft transiting the airspace without 
entering national airspace to comply with the regulations.911
The above comments on the characteristics of China’s ADIZ are not 
statements on the legality of its ADIZ. The comments here are instead 
included to: (1) address the inconsistencies in the approach States take to 
ADIZs, which is relevant to the discussion in Section 4.3.3.4 on the lack of 
clear State practice for the purpose of establishing customary international 
law, and; (2) to bring attention to the political motivations surrounding 
ADIZs. These political incentives underlie the basis on which States justify 
and distinguish ADIZ practices. In the words of the South China Morning 
Post, in part quoting Alan Tan, ‘politics, nationalism and sovereignty ‘lurk 
in the background, and that reality simply has to be acknowledged’’.912 
While in reality the political and legal aspects of ADIZs are inextricable, 
this research aims to set to one side the political considerations to undertake 
an – insofar as possible – objective legal analysis of the legality of the zones 
under international law.
 4.3.2 Defining ADIZ
In 1950,913 the US was the first State to claim an ADIZ,914 which extended, 
and still does, up to 400 miles off its coast in parts.915 Canada established 
its ADIZ soon after, in 1951,916 while in the same year the US established 
Japan’s during its administration of the country following World War II, 
911 Su (n 906) 820-822. Su identifi ed the following States as falling within this category: 
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Taiwan, India, Iran, South Korea, 
Myanmar, Pakistan and Thailand.
912 Toh Ee Ming, ‘Explained: What’s Behind Indonesia’s Move to Reclaim Control of 
Riau Islands Airspace from Singapore?’ (South China Morning Post, 22 August 2019), 
available at <www.scmp.com/week-asia/explained/article/3023918/whats-behind-
indonesias-move-reclaim-control-riau-islands> accessed 30 September 2019.  
913 Elizabeth Cuadra, ‘Air Defense Identification Zones: Creeping Jurisdiction in the 
Airspace’ (1978) 18 Va J Int’l L 485, 492; Pratik Jakhar, ‘Analyisis: Why is Airspace in East 
Asia becoming Contentious?’ (BBC Monitoring, 31 July 2019), available at <monitoring.
bbc.co.uk/product/c200zen7> accessed 14 November 2019.
914 ‘US ADIZ’ will be used throughout this chapter as a collective term for the four ADIZ that 
surround US territory: Contiguous US ADIZ, Alaska ADIZ, Guam ADIZ, and Hawaii 
ADIZ.
915 Rinehart and Elias (n 898) 5. The breadth of ADIZ apparently developed to mirror the 
contiguous zone for vessels. The distance of 400 miles represented the approximate 
distance an aircraft could travel over the duration of one hour in the 1950s when ADIZ 
were fi rst implemented. At the time, the concept of a contiguous zone was beginning to 
emerge – although was far from being customary international law – and the breadth 
of it was in general the distance a vessel could travel in one hour (Ivan L Head, ‘ADIZ, 
International Law, and Contiguous Airspace’ (1964) 3 Alta L Rev 182, 188). 
916 Pai Zheng, ‘Justifi cations and Limits of ADIZs under Public International Law’ (2015) 
14(2) Issues in Aviation Law and Policy 183, 197.
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and South Korea’s during the Korean War.917 Towards the end of the 1970s 
around twelve States had declared ADIZs918 and this number was main-
tained through to the end of the 20th century.919 There has been a renewed 
focus on ADIZs since the events of September 11920 and to-date approxi-
mately thirty States 921 have imposed an ADIZ off their coasts at some 
point .922 Some States, such as Sri Lanka and Turkey, have restricted their 
ADIZs to territorial sea.923 These ADIZs, along with those that are restricted 
to national airspace over land,924 are not relevant to this research, which is 
interested in ADIZs in international airspace. A number of States have also 
recently extended their ADIZs. In addition to the extensions of Japan and 
South Korea’s ADIZs, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1, Canada extended its 
ADIZ in 2018 to encompass Ellesmere Island.925
ICAO defines an ADIZ as a ‘special designated airspace of defined 
dimensions within which aircraft are required to comply with special iden-
tification and/or reporting procedures additional to those related to the 
917 Kimberly Hsu, ‘Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater 
Flexibility to Enforce East China Sea Claims’ (US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 14 January 2014) 3. 
918 Cuadra (n 913) 495 and 507.
919 Michel Bourbonniere and Louis Haeck, ‘Military Aircraft and International Law: Chicago 
Opus 3’ (2001) 66(3) J Air L&C 885, 954, Note 255 (citing, Barry E Carter and Phillip R 
Trimble, International Law (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer 1999) 1028).
920 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (OUP 2011) 60; Pratik Jakhar, 
‘Analyisis: Why is Airspace in East Asia becoming Contentious?’ (BBC Monitoring, 
31 July 2019), available at <monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200zen7> accessed 14 
November 2019, quoting a Russian newspaper Izvestiya from 25 July 2019: ‘The trend 
of ‘self-appointed seizure’ of international airspace and the expansion of identifi cation 
zones has become apparent in the past decade’.
921 These include Australia, Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Cuba, France, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Myanmar, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, the 
Philippines, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States and Vietnam, as to which see, variously, Su (n 906) 814-819; 
Cuadra (n 913) 495 and 507; J Ashley Roach, ‘Air Defence Identifi cation Zones’ (Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2017) 6 and 14; Zoltán Papp, ‘Air 
Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ) in the light of Public International Law’ (2015) 2 Pécs 
Journal of International and European Law 28, 33.
922 ADIZ may be temporary, such as when they are imposed for security purposes for 
a certain event. See for example, the two ADIZ established off the coast of Brisbane, 
Australia, during the 2018 Commonwealth Games: Australia Aeronautical Information 
Service – AIP Supplement (SUP), XXI Commonwealth Games, Gold Coast, April 2-18 
2018, 7.2; Airservices Australia, ‘Commonwealth Games Airspace Procedure Guide’, 
available at <www.airservicesaustralia.com/wp-content/uploads/17-0067-BRO-
Commonwealth-Games-airspace-new.pdf> accessed 23 May 2019.
923 Su (n 906) 814.
924 ibid 814-15. Such as Poland, Finland, Libya, Peru and Brazil. 
925 Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone Now Aligned with Canada’s Sovereign 
Airspace’ (Canada National Defence, News Release, 24 May 2018), available at <www.
canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2018/05/canadian-air-defence-
identifi cation-zone-now-aligned-with-canadas-sovereign-airspace.html> accessed 26 
June 2018. 
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provision of air traffic services’.926 Little else is provided by ICAO on ADIZs 
but for requirements that States identify them in their aeronautical charts 
and aeronautical information publications (AIPs).927 The broad definition 
provided by ICAO is indicative of the variation in practices associated with 
the imposition and administration of the zones. The purpose of ADIZs is 
generally to enhance national security,928 but they are also arguably used in 
an attempt to bolster territorial claims through the exertion of control over 
an area of international airspace.929 Considering ICAO’s role is to ensure 
the safety of international civil aviation it is perhaps not surprising that it 
has not adopted further SARPs in the area. ADIZs do however, have safety 
implications for international civil aviation, as will be addressed in Section 
4.3.6.1.
As an indication of the types of procedures that apply in an ADIZ, 
China and the US both require that in order to operate an aircraft within the 
zone a pilot must file a flight plan,930 and maintain a two-way radio connec-
tion931 and an operating radar transponder.932 The definition of a flight plan 
according to ICAO is a ‘[s]pecified information provided to air traffic services 
units, relative to an intended flight or portion of a flight of an aircraft’ 
926 Chicago Convention, Annex 4 (11th edn, July 2009) 1-1 and Annex 15 (16th edn, July 2018) 
1-2. The inclusion of the defi nition is a recognition of the potential safety implications for 
international civil aviation as opposed to being a statement on their legality (Papp (n 921) 
37).
927 Chicago Convention, Annex 4, 7.9.3.1.1 l), 16.9.5.2, 17.9.5.2, 18.8.4.2, and Annex 15, 6.2.1 
a) 6). An aeronautical information publication (AIP) is, ‘a publication issued by or with 
the authority of a State and containing aeronautical information of a lasting character 
essential to air navigation’ (Chicago Convention, Annex 15, 1-2).
928 ICAO WP/295, Establishment of Military Requirements and Restrictions on International Civil 
Aviation, Presented by IATA and IFALPA at the 13th Air Navigation Conference, Montreal 
(28 September 2018) 1.3: ‘IATA and IFALPA… recognise that, often the establishment of 
an ADIZ is driven by military or political sensitivities attributed to national security’; See 
also, in relation to the US and Canada ADIZs, Head (n 915) 183.
929 See for example in the East Asia maritime region,  Rinehart and Elias (n 898) 12: ‘The 
ECS ADIZ did not involve aggressive actions by the PLA in the initial phase, but some 
observers view the declaration of the ADIZ as another of the PRC’s incremental law-
enforcement and military actions, especially since 2005, to advance its national interests’; 
‘Military Experts Explain China’s Air Defense Identification Zone’ (People’s Daily 
Online, 24 November 2013), available at <en.people.cn/90786/8464466.html> accessed 
15 March 2019: ‘Military expert Yin Zhuo said that China’s establishment of the zone 
is based on the need to tackle a more complex security environment, and the move is 
a justifi ed act to maintain the sovereignty and security of the country’s territory and 
airspace’; Lamont (n 901) 191 and 200.
930 14 C.F.R. § 99.11 (2015); Announcement issued by the Ministry of National Defense, 
China (n 895).
931 14 C.F.R. § 99.9; Announcement issued by the Ministry of National Defense, China (n 
895).
932 14 C.F.R. § 99.13, referring to a ‘coded radar beacon transponder’; Announcement issued 
by the Ministry of National Defense, China (n 895): ‘if equipped with the secondary radar 
transponder’.
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(emphasis added),933 however in the case of China’s ADIZ, the flight plan is 
to be submitted to the CAA or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.934 No further 
direction is provided in the announcement as to which body applies to 
which flight, but it is logical to assume that flight plans for civil aircraft are 
required to be submitted to the CAA while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
applies in the case of State aircraft. The US regulations state that the flight 
plan must be filed with ‘an appropriate aeronautical facility’.935 It defines 
this body as ‘a communications facility where flight plans or position 
reports are normally filed during flight operations’, suggesting that it refers 
to the ATC unit applicable in the airspace.936
Pilots must also comply with the instructions of the relevant authori-
ties in each State’s ADIZ. In China’s ADIZ that authority is the Ministry of 
National Defence.937 In the case of the US, these ‘special security instruc-
tions’, as they are termed, are issued by ‘the Administrator’.938 The US 
ADIZ, together with the Canadian ADIZ, is jointly administered by the 
ATC authorities and militaries of each State, through a body known as 
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).939 In both 
cases, failure to comply with these instructions, or failure to comply with 
the ADIZ requirements in general, may result in action being taken against 
the aircraft in international airspace. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, China’s 
ADIZ announcement stated that its armed forces would be prepared to 
adopt defence measures, and the US AIP on interception of aircraft states 
that,
‘[p]ilots of aircraft that do not adhere to the procedures [which include ADIZ 
procedures]940… may be intercepted, and/or detained and interviewed by fed-
eral, state, or local law enforcement or other government personnel’.941
These requirements, and their deviation from standard ATC procedures, 
will be discussed further in Section 4.3.6.2 but at this point, they serve to 
demonstrate that ADIZs impose additional obligations on pilots operating 
in the airspace, and that these obligations can be issued by defence, who 
may also enforce them if they are not complied with.
933 Chicago Convention, Annex 2 (10th edn, 2005) 1-6.
934 Announcement issued by the Ministry of National Defense, China (n 895).
935 14 C.F.R. § 99.11.
936 14 C.F.R. § 99.3.
937 Announcement issued by the Ministry of National Defense, China (n 895).
938 14 C.F.R. § 99.7.
939 Rinehart and Elias (n 898) 3. There is no ADIZ between the US and Canada (US FAA, 
‘Entering, Exiting and Flying in United States Airspace’, available at <www.faa.gov/
air_traffi c/publications/us_restrictions/airspace/> accessed 14 February 2020).
940 ‘ENR 1.12 National Security and Interception Procedures – National Security’, 1.4, 
available at <www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aip_html/part2_enr_
section_1.12.html#Para_1_8_4> accessed 2 July 2019.
941 ibid 1.2.5. 
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 4.3.3 Examination of international law used to support establishment 
of ADIZ
Both in terms of State response to ADIZs and academic argument, Cuadra 
notes that ‘[t]here is considerable weight of opinion on both sides of the 
question whether ADIZ’s [sic] are legitimate under international law’, 
whilst concluding that ‘[i]nternational law provides no support for such 
coastal-State jurisdiction’.942 Conversely, States that impose ADIZs not 
surprisingly argue that there is no prohibition on doing so under inter-
national law.943 Both of these arguments may be correct and the first does 
not necessarily mean that ADIZs are prohibited, while the second does not 
necessarily legitimise them, as will be explained in Section 4.3.4. In light 
of this complexity, Haanappel describes ADIZs as being ‘on the margin 
of unilateral illegality’.944 Consistent with the diversity in the procedures 
adopted in ADIZs, States use various arguments to justify the zones.
 4.3.3.1 A State’s laws and regulations relating to admission to territory
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the US only applies its ADIZ requirements 
to aircraft – both State and civil – that are entering or departing its national 
airspace. That is, the ADIZ regulations do not apply to aircraft operating 
in the ADIZ without the intention of entering US national airspace, or 
without having departed US national airspace. This is stipulated in the 
Code of Federal Regulations that sets the rules for the US ADIZ (14 C.F.R. 
§ 99), which states that it ‘prescribes rules for operating all aircraft… into, 
within, or out of the United States through an Air Defense Identification Zone’ 
(emphasis added).945
Secretary of State John Kerry, in his statement on the denouncement of 
the US of China’s ADIZ, clarified the State’s position: ‘[t]he United States 
does not apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter 
U.S. national airspace’.946 Furthermore, the Commander’s Handbook on 
the Law of Naval Operations confirms that the legal basis of the US ADIZ 
regulations rests on this territorial connection:
942 Cuadra (n 913) 505 and 507.
943 See, for example, the US: The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 
(Department of the Navy – Department of Homeland Security and US Coast Guard, 
August 2017) 2.7.2.3: ‘International law does not prohibit States from establishing air 
defense identifi cation zones (ADIZs) in the international airspace adjacent to their territo-
rial airspace’.
944 Peter Haanappel, ‘Aerial Sovereignty: From Paris 1919, Through Chicago 1944, to Today’ 
in Pablo Mendes de Leon and Niall Buissing (eds), Behind and Beyond the Chicago Conven-
tion: The Evolution of Aerial Sovereignty (Wolters Kluwer 2019) 28.
945 14 C.F.R. § 99.1(a). At the same time, Su questions the wording of §§ 99.9(a), 99.11(a) and 
99.15(a) (2015), which seem to require all aircraft in the ADIZ, regardless of any connec-
tion of their operation to US national airspace, to maintain a two-way radio connection, 
to have submitted a fl ight plan and to submit position reports.
946 Statement on the East China Sea ADIZ – US Secretary of State (n 897).
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‘The legal basis for ADIZ regulations is the right of a State to establish reason-
able conditions of entry into its territory. Accordingly, an aircraft approaching 
national airspace can be required to identify itself while in international airspace 
as a condition of entry approval…’.947
This includes State aircraft, on which the US government has explicitly 
stated its position:
‘… in accordance with the norm of airborne innocent passage [sic],948 the United 
States does not recognize the right of a coastal nation to apply its ADIZ proce-
dures to foreign state aircraft not intending to enter national airspace nor does 
the United States apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign state aircraft not intend-
ing to enter United States airspace’.949
Based on this, the Commander’s Handbook directs US military aircraft not 
intending to enter another State’s national airspace to ‘not identify them-
selves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures established by other 
States, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so.’950
In practice though, the US does not necessarily adhere to the exclu-
sion of State aircraft from its ADIZ procedures. For instance, in March 
2020 Russian fighter jets were intercepted and ‘escorted’ through the US 
ADIZ off the coast of Alaska for the duration of their four-hour flight.951 
This response is difficult to reconcile with the US’s stated exemption of 
foreign State aircraft from its ADIZ procedures. It indicates that while the 
US does not expressly impose its ADIZ procedures on State aircraft that 
do not intend to enter national airspace, practice – at least on this occa-
sion – suggests that it acts towards such aircraft in the same manner as if 
it would in the case that the ADIZ procedures did apply to them and had 
been breached. Having said this, and as will be discussed in Section 4.3.5, 
there is no express prohibition under international law on intercepting State 
aircraft in international airspace, or rules regulating the action.
947 The Commander’s Handbook (n 943) 2.7.2.3. 
948 The use of this term is peculiar given that States have freedom of overfl ight outside 
national airspace. Under international law there is no ‘airborne innocent passage’ and 
innocent passage applies only to vessels and only in territorial seas.
949 United States of America Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 113th 
Congress – Second Session (Volume 160-Part 8, June 20-July 15 2014) 11803.
950 The Commander’s Handbook (n 943) 2.7.2.3; Peter A Dutton, ‘Caelum Liberum: Air 
Defense Identifi cation Zones Outside Sovereign Airspace’ (2009) 103 Am J Int’l L 691, 700.
951 ‘US and Canadian Jets Intercepted Russian Reconnaissance Planes near Alaska’ (Busi-
ness Insider, 10 March 2020), available at <www.businessinsider.com/us-canadian-jets-
intercept-russian-reconnaissance-planes-near-alaska-2020-3?international=true&r=US&
IR=T> accessed 11 March 2020. 
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The US952 and some academics953 have referred to the Chicago Conven-
tion as providing a legal basis for ADIZs in the case that a State only applies 
the procedures to aircraft bound for, or exiting, national airspace.
For civil aircraft, Article 11, ‘Applicability of air regulations’, reads,
‘…the laws and regulations of a contracting State relating to the admission to or 
departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation,… 
shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from… the 
territory of that State’.
The US legitimises the application of ADIZs to State aircraft through Article 
3(c) of the Chicago Convention.954 Although State aircraft are excluded from 
the scope of the Chicago Convention, Article 3(c) requires ‘authorization 
by special agreement’ to have been obtained for a State aircraft to operate a 
flight over the territory of another State.955 The argument proceeds that the 
coastal State may impose the ADIZ requirements through the terms of the 
diplomatic arrangements that have been made between the States pursuant 
to Article 3(c) of the Chicago Convention. Given that States decide on the 
terms of these agreements bilaterally, this section will instead focus on the 
scope of application of Article 11.
Kaiser956 and Papp957 argue that, while Article 11 is to be interpreted 
literally, it does not extend to providing a legal basis for ADIZs. The 
grounds on which Kaiser and Papp reach this conclusion are different, 
however.
Kaiser argues that that Article 11 ‘expressly permits national identifica-
tion procedures which bind aircraft… in international airspace, provided 
they are entering or departing national airspace’ but that ADIZs go beyond 
this and cannot therefore be justified under this article.958 He points out, in 
support of this line of reasoning, that it is standard practice in international 
civil aviation to require identification and reporting of aircraft at certain 
locations and that there is no need to establish a zone to do so.959
Papp argues that Article 11 does not provide ‘explicit legal grounds for 
regulating acts/events occurring abroad’ and that it therefore cannot serve 
as an express rule permitting ADIZs. Papp’s initial statement is accurate, 
952 Stefan A Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of Air Defense Identifi cation Zones: Tensions over the 
East China Sea’ (2014) 63 ZWL 527, 538.
953 Roach (n 921) para 7: The author argues that a State does not have the right to require 
aircraft to comply with ADIZ requirements if they are not intending to enter national 
airspace; Head (n 915) 189-90.
954 Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 538.
955 See Section 2.4 for discussion on Article 3(c).
956 Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 529.
957 Zoltán Papp, ‘Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ) in the light of Public International 
Law’ (2015) 2 Pécs Journal of International and European Law 28, 38-39.
958 Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 530 and 542.
959 ibid 530. See also, Su (n 906) 824: ‘Under international law, a State need not establish an 
ADIZ so as to require identifi cation of entering aircraft’.
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however the conclusion is non sequitur. Article 11, when considered in the 
context of the Chicago Convention as a whole, implicitly includes laws and 
regulations that make entry conditional upon obligations fulfilled abroad. 
For example, Annex 9 of the Chicago Convention, ‘Facilitation’, which 
mentions Article 11, among others, as having ‘special pertinence’ to the 
SARPs it contains, includes provisions recognising that States may establish 
prior obligations for flights to be permitted to enter their territory.960
The above arguments cannot be used by States with an ADIZ that also 
applies to aircraft not intending to enter national airspace. There are two 
main, more general, arguments that are relied upon to support a State’s 
right to establish an ADIZ in this case. First, that coastal States have the 
right to restrict the military activities of other States in their EEZs and 
secondly, the right of self-defence, as to which see the discussion in the 
following sections.
 4.3.3.2 Restricting military activities in the EEZ
China is one of approximately twenty States asserting what it claims as its 
right as a coastal State, to regulate or prohibit military activities in its EEZ,961 
a position which objection to has resulted in serious consequences.962 In 
practice, the conflict that has arisen in relation to China’s ADIZ has centred 
on the restrictions it places on foreign military aircraft.963 China’s establish-
ment of its ADIZ is possibly in pursuance of this interpretation of coastal 
State power in the EEZ to restrict the operation of foreign military aircraft 
in the zone. Burke and Cevallos present this view more bluntly, stating that 
the Chinese government saw the establishment of its ADIZ as ‘a means to 
legitimize and promote this interpretation and limit US and other foreign 
and military surveillance activities above the EEZ’.964 In 2018, Bangladesh, 
960 Chicago Convention, Annex 9 (15th edn, October 2017) Foreword (ix) and 2.33, respec-
tively. 
961 States include Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cape Verde, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritius, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, North Korea, and 
Uruguay. See, variously: Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacifi c Region 
(Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 22, Sea Power Centre Australia, 2008) 8-12; 
Euan Graham, ‘Southeast Asia’s Neglected Navigational and Overfl ight Challenges’ (The 
Interpreter, 27 February 2017), available at <www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/
southeast-asia-s-neglected-navigational-and-overfl ight-challenges> accessed 13 August 
2018; Dutton (n 950) 696-97; Raul Pedrozo, ‘Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone: East Asia Focus’ (2014) 90 Int’l L Stud 514, 521-22. 
962 In 2001 a mid-air collision between an F-8-II fi ghter aircraft from China and an EP-3E 
Aries aircraft from the US, led to the death of the pilot of the Chinese aircraft. China 
intercepted the US aircraft on the basis that it was an intelligence gathering fl ight in its 
EEZ, which China views as being a violation of international law. For a discussion of this 
case see, Stuart Kaye, ‘Freedom of Navigation, Surveillance and Security: Legal Issues 
Surrounding the Collection of Intelligence from Beyond the Littoral’ (2005) 24 Aust YBIL 
93, 102-4.
963 Burke and Cevallos (n 909) 8.
964 ibid 11.
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another State declaring the right of a coastal State to control foreign military 
activity in its EEZ, established an ADIZ that coincided with the dimensions 
of its EEZ. In commenting on this feature, the ICAO Secretariat reiterated 
that the EEZ has no effect on airspace.965
The interpretation of coastal State powers to include the right to regu-
late military activities in the EEZ is problematic as a justification for ADIZs 
on a practical level for two reasons. Firstly, it fails to legitimise the applica-
tion of the zones to civil aircraft and secondly, even if the ADIZ procedures 
were applied solely to military air operations, the argument still does not 
hold for those States whose ADIZs extend beyond their EEZs, which is the 
case for China.966
Beyond these practical reasons the interpretation is, more crucially, 
problematic because there is no legal basis for restricting military operations 
in the EEZ, provided they do not interfere with the coastal State’s exercise 
of its EEZ rights and jurisdiction. UNCLOS regulates military activities of 
foreign States in the territorial seas but it provides little in the way of further 
regulation. 967 In the high seas, military activities are accepted as a high 
seas freedom968 provided that they are conducted for peaceful purposes.969 
In the EEZ, both the explicit, limited sovereign rights and jurisdiction of 
the coastal State and the freedoms enjoyed by other States in the zone, 
including freedom of overflight, support the conclusion that the coastal 
State does not have the right to interfere with peaceful military activities.970 
965 ICAO WP/29, Civil/Military Cooperation Update, Presented by the Secretariat, 9th Meeting 
of the South Asia/Indian Ocean ATM Coordination Group, Bangkok (26 – 29 March 
2019) 2.15. See also, Section 2.7.3.2.
966 China’s ADIZ extends more than 300 miles from its coast (Section 4.3.1), which amounts 
to more than 260nm and therefore exceeds China’s EEZ by more than 60nm.  
967 Making clear that innocent passage does not include: research or survey activities, which 
is understood to include military surveillance; the launching, landing or taking on board 
of any military device; interference with systems of communication or other facilities or 
installations; or, ‘any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage’ (UNCLOS, 
Article 19(j), (f), (k) and (l)). In addition, submarines and other underwater vehicles are 
required to surface when navigating in territorial seas (UNCLOS, Article 20. This applies 
to all underwater vehicles, military and non-military alike). Finally, Article 30 provides 
that a coastal State may require a warship to leave its territorial sea in the case that the 
warship ‘does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning 
passage though the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance’.  
968 Myron H Nordquist, Neal R Grandy, Sataya N Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne (eds), United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary – Volume II (Martinus Nijhoff 
1993) 85.
969 UNCLOS, Article 88.
970 Bernard H Oxman, ‘The Regime of Warships under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’ (1984) 24 Va J Int’l L 809, 838; Umberto Leanza and Maria Cristina 
Caracciolo, ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone’ in David J Attard, Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
and Norman A Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The IMLI Manual on International Maritime Law: 
Volume 1 – The Law of the Sea (OUP 2014) 192-93; Klein (n 920) 46-47; Pedrozo (n 961) 524. 
See Section 3.2.2 for a discussion on the sovereign rights and jurisdiction granted to the 
coastal State under the EEZ regime.
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The purpose of the EEZ is, as the name indicates, for the economic benefit 
of the coastal State through the State’s protection and exploitation of the 
natural resources in the area and beyond this, it does not have a national 
security purpose. From the perspective of the rights of the other States in 
the zone, UNCLOS stipulates that freedom of overflight applies in the EEZ 
which, as mentioned previously, applies to both State and civil aircraft and 
includes the right to conduct aerial military activities.971 The only excep-
tion to this is that freedom of overflight in the EEZ, as with the rights and 
freedoms of other States in general in the EEZ, must be exercised with due 
regard to the coastal State’s rights and duties in the zone.972 It is in this 
limited context that the coastal State has the right under UNCLOS to regu-
late activities, including military activities, in its EEZ. Whilst it is perhaps 
more relevant to vessels rather than aircraft, considering that interference 
with EEZ rights are more likely to occur from activities on or under the 
surface of the sea, it applies equally to aircraft. It is unclear to what extent 
coastal States are permitted to regulate activities, including whether certain 
activities, such as the use of weapons, are per se prohibited.973 The beginning 
of this section noted that there are a number of States who claim a right, to 
varying extents, to regulate military activities in their EEZs. Some practices 
of these States may be justified as regulations to protect their coastal State 
EEZ rights and obligations, however other practice goes beyond the scope 
of this right, for example, to serve purely national security interests, which is 
considered by Klein as a position that ‘at present… could well be construed 
as in violation of international law’.974 The establishment of ADIZs are not 
justified as measures to protect the limited EEZ rights and jurisdiction 
provided to the coastal State under UNCLOS and would instead need to 
be justified on the basis of a customary international law right to regulate 
military activities beyond the scope of UNCLOS, the formation of which, as 
suggested here, there is currently insufficient evidence to support.
 4.3.3.3 The right to self-defence
ADIZs are predominantly explained as a tool for protecting national 
security, the idea being that a State will be able to perceive a threat from 
the air in advance. The right to self-defence is frequently explored as a 
971 See Sections 1.3.1 and 2.6.5.
972 UNCLOS, Article 58(3).
973 Charlotte Beaucillon, ‘Limiting Third States’ Military Activities in the EEZ: ‘Due Regard 
Obligations’ and the Law of the Use of Force Applied to Nuclear Weapons’ (2019) 34 
IJMCL 128, 133; Klein (n 920) 49-50.
974 Klein (n 920) 47.
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 230
212 Chapter 4
possible legal basis for ADIZs on these grounds and whilst it is still used as 
a justification,975 it meets widespread criticism.976
The right to self-defence is recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which states:
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations…’.977
Both the threat that the right to self-defence is designed to address and the 
act of self-defence, are not those that apply in the case of the establishment 
of ADIZs. It is the former of these that this section will examine in more 
detail. Specifically, it will demonstrate that even if the right to self-defence 
includes the right to act in the case of an imminent threat – as opposed to 
an armed attack – the ‘threat’ that ADIZs are designed to address is not the 
type of threat giving rise to the right to self-defence.
In terms of the latter, the right of self-defence exists as an exception to 
the prohibition against the use of force: it justifies the use of force by a State 
where that force would otherwise not be permitted under international 
law.978 The principle of self-defence exists as an interim measure for States 
to protect themselves pending action by the UN Security Council, not as 
an ongoing tool to mitigate the risk of breaches of national security.979 It 
does not envisage the establishment of a zone in international airspace for 
reporting and notification of aircraft, even if those aims are for the purpose 
of national security.
975 Peace and Security Research Unit at East Asia Institute, Interview with Min Gyo Koo, 
Associate Professor, Seoul National University (10 December 2013), available at <www.
eai.or.kr/main/english/search_view.asp?intSeq=8929&board=eng_multimedia> 
accessed 17 January 2019.
976 See for example, Head (n 915) 192; Kay Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Regime of the Airspace 
Above the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (1983) 8(1) Air Law 30, 42-43; Papp (n 921) 45-47; 
Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 531-33; Cuadra (n 913) 501-4; Eugène Pépin, The 
Law of the Air and the Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted by the International 
Law Commission at Its Eighth Session (A/CONF.13/4) – Extract from the Offi cial Records 
of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume I (Preparatory Documents), 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 24 February-27 April 1958, 70.
977 UN Charter, Article 51. The armed attack need not necessarily be carried out by regular 
armed forces for a State to have recourse to the right of self-defence (Christopher 
Greenwood, ‘Self-Defence’ (Max Planck Encylcopedia of Public International Law 2011) 
11, referring to, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States of America), Merits, I.C.J. Rep. 1986 (Jun. 27) p. 14, p. 103 para. 195 (‘Military 
and Paramilitary Activities Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America)’)).
978 YILC (2001) Vol. II, Part 2, 74.
979 UN Charter, Article 51: ‘…until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security’. See also, Christine Gray, International Law and 
the Use of Force (4th edn, OUP 2018) 48; Greenwood (n 977) 2.
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4.3.3.3.1 Not an imminent threat
The right to self-defence arises in the case of an armed attack but, depending 
on interpretation, it may also apply in the case of an imminent threat. The 
former – an armed attack having occurred – is clearly not relevant when 
talking of the establishment of an ADIZ, and so if customary international 
law does allow for acts of self-defence in the case of an imminent attack, the 
question then is whether the establishment of ADIZs can be justified on the 
basis of an ‘imminent threat’.
There is ongoing debate about whether the right to self-defence includes 
the right to act against an imminent threat as opposed to an armed attack.980 
The question of imminence is seen as an element of consideration of the 
necessity of the act of self-defence,981 with necessity and proportionality 
being the well-established criteria for determining its legality.982 States 
including the US, the UK and Australia claim that under customary inter-
national law the right to self-defence applies to an imminent threat.983 The 
position is controversial not least because it goes against the literal interpre-
tation of Article 51, which clearly requires that the right be exercised only 
‘if an armed attack occurs’. Opponents of an interpretation that includes the 
right to act against an imminent threat argue that ‘the limits imposed on 
self-defence in Article 51 would be meaningless if a wider customary law 
right to self-defence survives unfettered by these restrictions’.984 In pursuit 
980 See for example, David Kretzmer, ‘The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality 
in Jus Ad Bellum’ (2013) 24(1) EJIL 235, 247; Daniel Bethlehem, ‘Principles Relevant to the 
Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by 
Non-State Actors’ (2012) 106 Am J Int’l L 1, 1; Marko Milanovic, ‘The Solemani Strike and 
Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed Attack’ (EJIL:Talk! 7 January 2020), available at 
<www.ejiltalk.org/the-soleimani-strike-and-self-defence-against-an-imminent-armed-
attack/> accessed 27 June 2019.
981 Jeremy Wright, ‘The Modern Law of Self-Defence’ (Speech delivered at the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 11 January 2017).
982 Military and Paramilitary Activities Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America), p. 103 para. 
194. 
983 Brian J Egan, ‘International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign’ 
(Speech delivered at the American Society of International Law, Washington DC, 1 
April 2016): ‘Under the jus ad bellum, a State may use force in the exercise of its inherent 
right of self-defense not only in response to armed attacks that have occurred, but also 
in response to imminent ones before they occur’; Wright (n 981): ‘…the long-standing 
UK view is that Article 51 of the UN Charter does not require a state passively to await 
an attack, but includes the ‘inherent right’ – as it’s described in Article 51 – to use force 
in self-defence against an ‘imminent’ armed attack, referring back to customary inter-
national law’; George Brandis, ‘The Right of Self-Defence Against Imminent Armed 
Attack in International Law’ (Public Lecture delivered at the University of Queensland, 
Brisbane, 11 April 2017), available at <www.ejiltalk.org/the-right-of-self-defence-
against-imminent-armed-attack-in-international-law> accessed 27 June 2019, 6: ‘…it is 
now recognised that customary international law permits self-defence not only against 
an armed attack that has occurred but also against one that is imminent. It has certainly 
been the long-held Australian position that acting in self-defence does not require a State 
passively to await attack’.  
984 Gray (n 979) 124.
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of considering whether the establishment of ADIZs can be justified on the 
basis of the right to self-defence, this section will proceed on the basis of the 
more generous interpretation, encompassing an imminent threat.
A State’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter is 
a recognition of the right under customary international law.985 Those in 
favour of the right of self-defence in the case of an imminent attack point 
to the Caroline case of 1837 as providing the foundation of the customary 
international law of self-defence.986 This case involved the destruction of the 
US vessel, the Caroline, by British forces in US territory, and ultimately in 
the vessel being sent over Niagara Falls. The legal test that has endured was 
part of a series of notes that formed the subsequent negotiations between 
the two States. In the correspondence, both States agreed that the exercise 
of the right of self-defence ‘should be confined to cases in which the neces-
sity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation’, a statement that established the 
concept of anticipatory self-defence, or self-defence in response to an immi-
nent threat, in international law.987
Based on this, returning to the initial question of whether the estab-
lishment of ADIZs can be justified on the basis of an imminent threat, 
the short answer is no. If a State does indeed have a right to self-defence 
in the case of an imminent threat, it does not apply in the case of a mere 
possibility of a future attack by air, as ADIZs are established to address. 
The ambiguity around imminence instead arises in the case that a ‘highly 
probable and severe threat exists’, in which case a State might have the right 
to self-defence even if the threat is temporally remote.988 Considering this, 
ADIZs fail to meet the test of necessity to be justified through the principle 
of self-defence and more so, the future threat that ADIZs are employed to 
mitigate are so far removed from what can be considered as imminent, that 
the principle of self-defence is not relevant.
4.3.3.3.2 Self-defence in the case of non-compliance with ADIZ procedures
Another way of considering the legality of ADIZs under the principle of 
self-defence is in relation to the measures taken within ADIZs, where the 
armed attack or imminent threat is the failure of an aircraft to follow the 
procedures within the zone and the act of self-defence is the measure taken 
against the aircraft in response.
985 Military and Paramilitary Activities Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America), p. 94 para. 
176.
986 HL Deb 21 April 2004, Vol 660, col 370: ‘Article 51 recognises the inherent right of self-
defence that states enjoy under international law. That can be traced back to the ‘Caroline’ 
incident in 1837’.
987 Letter from Mr Webster to Lord Ashburton (Department of State, Washington, 6 August 
1842).
988 Dapo Akande and Thomas Liefl änder, ‘Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportion-
ality in the Law of Self-Defence’ (2013) 107(3) Am J Int’l L 563, 565.
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This proposition cannot be supported by international law, however. 
Whilst the term ‘armed attack’ is not defined under international law, it 
is uncontroversial that it does not include non-military threats ‘no matter 
how damaging they may be to that State’s rights and interests’.989 Failure 
to comply with ADIZ procedures cannot be framed as an armed attack 
or, consistent with the above analysis, as an imminent threat, at least not 
without accompanying factors that suggest such intent. As Kaiser has 
noted, ‘[n]on-compliance with unilateral procedures within such an ADIZ 
does not in any instance indicate a hostile intent’.990
If an aircraft’s failure to comply with orders is perceived as constituting 
a threat to national security, just as if it is seen as being a threat to the safety 
of other airspace users, there are protocols to follow under international 
civil aviation law to manage the threat, as will be explained in Section 
4.3.5. ADIZs are irrelevant to implementing these protocols. Similarly, if an 
aircraft is used to conduct an armed attack or pose an imminent threat, as 
determined under international law, the right to self-defence applies regard-
less of an ADIZ being in place.
 4.3.3.4 The right to establish ADIZs as customary international law
4.3.3.4.1 Academic consideration
There is mixed opinion in academia as to whether a State has the right to 
establish an ADIZ under customary international law. Cuadra, writing in 
1978, saw the practice as ‘customary law in the making’,991 whilst Hail-
bronner, writing soon after, believed that this was doubtful.992 Both authors 
indicated that the crystallisation, if it were to occur, would be in conflict 
with codified international law.993 As discussed in Section 3.3.4.6, customary 
law can develop in conflict with codified international law, but the standard 
required to show its formation is more rigorous. In the context of ADIZs, 
Cuadra noted this, stating that,
‘any legal basis for ADIZ’s [sic] extending over the high seas must derive from 
some aspect of customary international law that is so fundamental a principle as 
to prevail over the will of the community of nations as expressed in these con-
ventions’.994
989 Greenwood (n 977) 9.
990 Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 531.
991 Cuadra (n 913) 485.
992 Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Regime’ (n 976) 43.
993 Cuadra in reference to, among others, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone 1958, and the fact that ‘security’ is not included amongst the purposes 
for which coastal States may exercise jurisdiction in their contiguous zones (Cuadra (n 
913) 499); Hailbronner referring to the impending UNCLOS, in particular the decision 
to exclude security from the list of purposes for which States may act in their contiguous 
zone (Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Regime’ (n 976) 43).
994 Cuadra (n 913) 500-1.
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This is relevant in the case that, in establishing an ADIZ off its coast, the 
coastal State is acting in breach of a codified norm of international law. This 
will be considered below in Sections 4.3.6.1 and 4.3.6.2 in the context of, 
respectively, safety obligations under international civil aviation law and 
the principle of freedom of overflight under UNCLOS.
In contrast to Cuadra, O’Connell, arguing that the freedom of the seas 
is a fluid concept that shifts in accordance with the changing balance of the 
needs of the international community, states that ‘the abstract freedom of 
the sea will not stand in the way’ of States imposing ADIZs.995 He further-
more describes ADIZs as an example of ‘where it is generally thought 
acceptable that States should insist upon certain conduct on or over the high 
seas’.996 As discussed in Section 1.2.1, freedom of the seas and specifically 
freedom of overflight in this context, is not static; it must and it does adapt 
as our uses of the sea develop over time. Although it is abstract, in that 
there is no defined, exhaustive list of permitted or prohibited activities that 
fall within it, it is a foundational principle of the law of the sea and the 
unilateral exercise of jurisdiction over international airspace for the purpose 
of national security must be carefully considered in light of other rights and 
freedoms, which will be further examined in respect to ADIZs in Section 
4.3.6.2. Seemingly contradictorily, O’Connell also recognises this, asserting,
‘…self-defence or national security is an insecure foundation for seeking to qual-
ify the freedom of the seas, for it could lend plausibility to restraints that would 
not sustain the balance of the interests of the international community’.997
In any case, O’Connell’s comment suggests that he was of the opinion that 
the establishment of ADIZs had become customary international law, which 
is the purpose for which his observations above have been included at this 
point.
Today, views range from the right to establish an ADIZ having been 
crystallised as customary international law,998 to it possibly having been 
crystallised,999 to there being no evidence to support its crystallisation.1000 
The lack of comprehensive, publicly available ADIZ procedures from some 
States contributes to this absence of a consensus.1001
995 DP O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea – Vol II (OUP 1982) 796-97.
996 ibid 797.
997 ibid.
998 Roach (n 921) 6; Su (n 906) 812-13.
999 Papp (n 921) 347.
1000 Haanappel, ‘Aerial Sovereignty’ (n 944) 28; Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 537.
1001 Su (n 906) 813-14 and 822-23. Cuba, Iceland, Indonesia, Panama, and the Philippines are 
mentioned, specifi cally in relation to whether their ADIZ procedures apply to transiting 
aircraft or only to aircraft that intend to enter national airspace (pp 822-23). More gener-
ally, the author explains that ‘some States have not published their rules for ADIZs in 
AIPs and some AIPs are diffi cult to access for the public’ (p 814).
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4.3.3.4.2 State practice
As discussed in Section 3.3.4.2, the ICJ demonstrated a shift in its determi-
nation of State practice between the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
and the 1986 decision in the Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, to what 
seems to be a less rigorous threshold. Recalling this section, in the former, 
the practice was required to be ‘extensive and virtually uniform’ whilst in 
the latter, it was determined that it ‘should, in general, be consistent with 
such rules’.1002 Balancing these statements, the ILC has indicated that the 
practice ‘must be generally consistent’ and ‘sufficiently widespread and 
representative [but]… need not be universal’.1003
Kaiser argues against the right to establish an ADIZ being customary 
international law on the basis that, although a number of States have estab-
lished them, there is too great a variation in them for there to be sufficiently 
formed State practice and furthermore, the response of States to ADIZs does 
not reflect the existence of opinio juris, as to which see Section 4.3.3.4.3.1004 
Referring back to Section 4.3.1, Kaiser points out that in contrast to there 
being a customary international law, ‘there is discrepancy in the under-
standing of States about the legal nature of an ADIZ [and] the positions of 
the US and Canada signify the archetypes of this discrepancies [sic]’.1005
The determination of whether State practice in the case of ADIZs is 
sufficient for the purpose of customary international law depends on 
how the divergence between States is viewed in terms of its significance. 
Arguing for the existence of sufficient State practice in the establishment of 
ADIZs, we know that there are a number of States1006 that currently have, 
or have in the past established, ADIZs outside their territorial boundaries 
and that the purpose of these ADIZs is, at least formally, national security. 
In general, the zones require reporting conditions, radar and transponder 
requirements, and the obligation to follow the orders of certain national 
authorities. Beyond this though, there are significant variations in the prac-
tice, including in relation to: the breadth of the ADIZ; its confinement to the 
State’s FIR or extension beyond into another State’s; whether its procedures 
apply to transiting aircraft or only to aircraft flying into or out of the State’s 
territory; whether they apply to military aircraft or civil aircraft, or both; 
purported enforcement measures in the case of non-compliance; whether 
an aircraft is required to report to the CAA or to a particular government 
ministry; whether an aircraft is obliged to follow orders from a national 
1002 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Denmark), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1969 (Feb. 20), p. 3, p. 43 para. 74; Military and 
Paramilitary Activities Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America), p. 98 para. 186.
1003 Michael Wood, ‘Second Report on Identifi cation of Customary International Law’ (ILC 
66th Session, 22 May 2014) 45.
1004 Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 537.
1005 ibid 537.
1006 See Section 4.3.2 (n 921). Noting that the number of States adopting the practice is only 
one element for consideration and a small number of States adopting the practice or a 
large number, is not determinative either way (Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 1003) 38).
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authority and which body that is; how transparent the procedures are, 
including how and to what extent they are communicated to airspace users; 
whether the ADIZ is temporary or permanent; whether prior approval is 
required for aircraft to operate in the zone; and, of course, what information 
the procedures require the commander of the aircraft to impart and through 
which method.1007
When the ICJ, in the Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, determined 
that State practice ‘should, in general, be consistent with such rules’, it also 
added that it need not be in ‘absolute rigorous conformity’ (emphasis added). 
Although this latter statement is in the negative, it indicates a high threshold 
in determining when State practice is considered ‘consistent’: the practice 
does not have to demonstrate absolutely rigorous conformity, but it should 
meet a significant degree of conformity. As an example of what does not 
constitute sufficiently consistent practice, the ILC refers to the Asylum Case, 
in which the ICJ referred to practice which displays ‘so much uncertainty 
and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy… it is not possible 
to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law, with 
regard to the alleged rule’.1008 This is not to say that this is the standard 
required for practice not to be sufficient; State practice in this category is 
clearly not State practice that gives rise to customary international law.
There are significant variations in the practice of ADIZ establishment. 
On the other hand, if the core elements of ADIZ – a zone extending into 
international airspace for the, at least formal, purpose of national security – 
are evidence of State practice, with all of the surrounding discrepancies put 
aside, then on this basis alone, State practice may be sufficiently consistent 
for the purpose of customary international law.
 4.3.3.4.3 Opinio juris
One of the factors that Cuadra raises as support for the development of 
customary international law in respect to ADIZs is the lack of protest 
against the zones that existed back then.1009 Certainly this seems to have 
been the initial response to the US ADIZ, which has been described as ‘one 
of quiet compliance’.1010 In examining whether this has been the case in 
intervening decades, and what the current state of opinio juris is in relation 
to ADIZ, it is necessary to draw a distinction between compliance with the 
zones by military aircraft and other, predominantly civil, aircraft.
1007 Many of these factors are considered and State practice compared in, Su (n 906) 834-35. 
As mentioned earlier, Su concludes that the right to establish ADIZ is customary inter-
national law despite these discrepancies in the establishment and operation of ADIZ 
between States. This is consistent with the divergence in academic opinion on the matter, 
where the opposite conclusion is reached based on the same factual circumstances.
1008 Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 1003) 41, citing Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Rep. 1950 (Nov. 20), p. 266, p. 277.
1009 Cuadra (n 913) 504.
1010 Head (n 915) 182.
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Whilst highlighting the fact that military aircraft are the primary 
subjects of ADIZs, as the predominant security threat vis-à-vis civil aircraft 
and other State aircraft, Su states that military aircraft transiting ADIZs 
‘usually do not comply with voluntary identification measures in foreign 
ADIZs, except perhaps out of courtesy or cooperation between military 
allies’.1011 This is consistent with reports of Russian and Chinese military 
aircraft operating in the ADIZs of South Korea and Japan, 1012 as well as 
Russia’s fly-overs in the US’s ADIZ, mentioned in Section 4.3.3.1. US mili-
tary aircraft are, again as discussed in Section 4.3.3.1, only compliant with 
a State’s ADIZ procedures when they intend to enter the State’s airspace. 
Given that most ADIZs also apply to transiting aircraft,1013 US military 
aircraft also contravene ADIZs under these circumstances, for instance in 
China’s ADIZ: the US has continued to ‘assert US prerogatives’ by operating 
its military aircraft in the ADIZs without complying with the prescribed 
procedures.1014 On this basis, there is no evidence to suggest that there is 
opinio juris insofar as ADIZs apply to military aircraft. Considering both the 
national security purpose of ADIZs and that ATC procedures under inter-
national civil aviation law independently of ADIZs lead to the identification 
of civil aircraft in international airspace, this results in a peculiar situation 
insofar as the practical contribution of ADIZs in protecting national secu-
rity. This is all the more so considering that coastal States have no greater 
enforcement jurisdiction in their ADIZs than they do in any other portion of 
international airspace.
The determination of opinio juris in respect to civil aircraft is more 
ambiguous. A State that believes its rights have been infringed by the 
unilateral exercise of jurisdiction will usually object upon the exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, that is, in this case, upon the declaration of the 
establishment of an ADIZ:
1011 Su (n 906) 825.
1012 Josh Smith, ‘Explainer: Competing Claims Make Northeast Asia Sea a Flashpoint’ 
(Reuters, 25 July 2019), available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-russia-
aircraft-explainer/explainer-competing-claims-make-northeast-asian-sea-a-fl ashpoint-
idUSKCN1UK0NO> accessed 28 November 2019; Jakhar (n 920). 
1013 Su (n 906) 832.
1014 ‘China’s Air Defense Identification Zone: Impact on Regional Security’ (Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, 26 November 2013), available at <www.csis.org/
analysis/chinas-air-defense-identifi cation-zone-impact-regional-security> accessed 3 
November 2019: ‘China Says US Should Respect China’s Air Defense Zone’ (Reuters, 
23 March 2017), available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usa-defence-idUSK-
BN16U0SB> accessed 26 October 2018: ‘China said on Thursday the United States should 
respect its air defense identifi cation zone (ADIZ), after Chinese offi cials warned a U.S. 
bomber it was illegally fl ying inside China’s self-declared zone in the East China Sea. The 
Pentagon rejected the Chinese call and said it would continue its fl ight operations in the 
region’.
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‘…a State ordinarily protests as soon as another State makes undesirable asser-
tions of prescriptive jurisdiction. The former State will not wait until the enforce-
ment of these assertions, because it will believe that the latter will sooner or later 
go on to effectively enforce its laws’.1015
The State’s initial objection may not necessarily correspond with the State’s 
subsequent actions however, and indeed a State’s ongoing verbal objections 
may not be consistent with their actions. Taking China’s ADIZ again as an 
example, many States protested against the zone when it was established1016 
but airlines of these same States comply with the procedures in the ADIZ. 
Whilst the US specifically rejects China’s ADIZ, it informed its commercial 
aircraft that it expected them to comply with the procedures in the zone.1017 
South Korea’s aircraft also comply with the reporting requirements in 
China’s ADIZ despite the State objecting to the zone. Korean Airlines and 
Asiana Airlines initially failed to comply but then did so once the South 
Korean government provided that its airlines may decide to comply 
for safety reasons.1018 On the other hand, Japan Airlines and All Nippon 
Airways initially adhered to the procedures but then changed their position 
after pressure from the Japanese government to ignore them.1019
The discord between States’ verbal protests and practical adherence to 
China’s ADIZ procedures no doubt arises out of the States’ primary obliga-
tion to ensure the safety of civil aviation.1020 It may also be a recognition by 
States of the fact that failing to comply with China’s ADIZ requirements 
could conflict with the procedures they impose in their own ADIZs, or that 
they comply with in another State’s ADIZ. As outlined in Section 4.3.1, the 
vigorous protest of a State against a feature of one State’s ADIZ may illicit 
little or no response from the first State in relation to the ADIZ of another 
State with the same feature. In an area that is heavy with political intentions, 
ascertaining opinio juris is particularly difficult and the above examples 
demonstrate that the assessment of opinio juris needs to take into account 
not just the protest or adherence by States but also the reasons behind them. 
This has been emphasised by the ILC in its statement that adherence to a 
rule, regardless of the frequency with which the adherence occurs, is not 
sufficient to indicate the existence of opinio juris but rather, ‘the motivation 
1015 Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP 2015) 41.
1016 See Section 4.3.1.
1017 Rinehart and Elias (n 898) 16; Jennifer Thompson, Simon Mundy and Jung-a Song, ‘Japan 
to Take up Spat over China Air Zone with US’ (Financial Times, 2 December 2013), avail-
able at <www.ft.com/content/d4be05c6-5a61-11e3-942a-00144feabdc0> accessed 16 
March 2019.
1018 Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘Q&A: What is an Air Defence Identifi cation Zone?’ (Financial 
Times, 12 December 2013), available at <www.ft.com/content/26cf55ce-58da-11e3-a7cb-
00144feabdc0> accessed 10 May 2019.
1019 ibid. Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacifi c and Taiwanese airlines complied from the outset.
1020 See Section 2.2.2.3.
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behind a certain practice must be discernible in order to identify a rule of 
customary international law’.1021
It is proposed here, based on the above analysis, that there is currently 
insufficient evidence to argue that there is a customary international law 
right to establish an ADIZ. Both elements of customary international law 
– State practice and opinio juris – present hurdles in terms of the approach 
of States being inconsistent and conflicting, although demonstrating a 
sufficient standard of opinio juris at this stage is particularly problematic. 
Certainly, it is not present in relation to State aircraft and for civil aircraft, 
the subjective intentions of States remain ambiguous.
 4.3.4 The persistence of the Lotus principle
The 1927 Lotus Case of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) is 
still the only case in which the PCIJ/ICJ has directly addressed the matter of 
jurisdiction.1022 Despite the particular context of the case,1023 the judgment 
became ‘the main standard of reference for such conflicts [i.e. jurisdictional 
conflicts] in all legal areas’ and continues to be ‘the basic framework of 
reference for questions of jurisdiction under international law’.1024 The ICJ 
has recognised the Lotus principle in subsequent decisions1025 and most 
recently, although not explicitly referring to the case, was seen to have reaf-
firmed the reasoning in Lotus in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion.1026
In the Lotus Case, France asserted the argument that ‘the Turkish Courts,
in order to have jurisdiction, should be able to point to some title to juris -
1021 Wood, ‘Second Report’ (n 1003) 58 and 56, respectively.
1022 Ryngaert, Jurisdiction (n 1015) 4.
1023 On this point, President Bedjaoui stated in his Declaration to the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion that: ‘The Court’s decision in the ‘Lotus’ case, which some people will inevitably 
resurrect, should be understood to be of very limited application in the particular context 
of the question which is the subject of this Advisory Opinion. It would be to exaggerate 
the importance of that decision of the Permanent Court and to distort its scope were it 
to be divorced from the particular context, both judicial and temporal, in which it was 
taken. No doubt this decision expressed the spirit of the times, the spirit of an international 
society which as yet had few institutions and was governed by an international law of 
strict coexistence, itself a refl ection of the vigour of the principle of State sovereignty’ 
(Declaration of President Bedjaoui on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1996 (Jul. 8), p. 226, p. 270 para. 12 (‘Nuclear Weapons Advi-
sory Opinion’)).
1024 Ryngaert, Jurisdiction (n 1015) 30 and 31.
1025 See for example, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, p. 238 para. 21; Military and Paramili-
tary Activities Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America), p. 24 para. 29.
1026 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Rep. 2010 (Jul. 22) p. 403, pp. 425-426 para. 56 (‘Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion’). For discussion on the Court’s reasoning in this Opinion as based 
on the Lotus Case see, Photini Pazartzis, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self Restraint’ 
in Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Christian J Tams (eds), Legacies of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 332-33; Helmut Philipp Aust, 
Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (CUP 2011) 68.
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diction recognised by international law in favour of Turkey’, whereas Turkey
argued, in contrast, that a State is permitted to exercise jurisdiction ‘when-
ever such jurisdiction does not come into conflict with a principle of 
international law’.1027 In addressing the matter, the Court drew a distinc-
tion between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction or, respectively, the 
capacity to make law and the capacity to ensure compliance with the law, as 
outlined in Section 1.2.1.
Addressing enforcement jurisdiction, the Court made clear that it 
‘cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a 
permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention’.1028 
However, a State does have the right, the Court went on to declare, 
failing the existence of a rule under international law prohibiting it, to 
exercise jurisdiction in its territory for acts committed outside its national 
borders.1029 In other words, a State may prescribe laws for acts outside its 
territory provided that there is no prohibition under international law.
The Lotus principle, as the Court’s approach to extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion is referred to, has met widespread criticism for its positivist approach 
to international law. Positivist theory, at its most simplistic, says that the law 
consists of that which has been posited; depending on the system this may 
include for example, legislation, common law and custom.1030 A positivist 
understanding of international law says that the law is made by States for 
States; they ‘enjoy unrestricted authority and freedom on the international 
plane, which flows from their statehood status and as an ontological conse-
quence of (external) sovereignty’.1031 The Lotus principle has continued to 
influence the reasoning of the ICJ, but more broadly it is viewed as being 
outdated in an international legal order that has evolved into a more 
complex and collective-interest oriented system.1032
In its Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the ICJ asked the question not of whether 
Kosovo had a right under international law to unilaterally declare indepen-
dence from Serbia but, consistent with the Lotus principle, whether it was 
prohibited from doing so by a rule of international law.1033 Judge Simma in 
his Declaration on the Opinion, criticised the Court’s approach:
1027 The Case of S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) (1927) P.C.I.J. Series A, no. 10, p.18.
1028 ibid pp. 18-19.
1029 ibid pp. 19.
1030 Leslie Green and Thomas Adams, ‘Legal Positivism’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy, 17 December 2019), available at <plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/#> 
accessed 2 February 2020.
1031 Stéphane Beaulac, ‘The Lotus Case in Context: Sovereignty, Westphalia, Vattel, and 
Positivism’ in Stephan Allen, Daniel Costelloe, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Paul Gragl and 
Edward Guntrip (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP 2019) 
48.
1032 ibid 54; See also, as will be discussed below, Declaration of President Bedjaoui on Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, p. 270-71 para. 13.
1033 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, p. 438 para. 83: ‘To answer that question, the Court need only 
determine whether the declaration of independence violated either general international 
law or the lex specialis created by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)’.
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‘The Court’s reading of the General Assembly’s question and its reasoning, leap-
ing as it does straight from the lack of a prohibition to permissibility, is a straight-
forward application of the so-called Lotus principle. …Under this approach, 
everything which is not expressly prohibited carries with it the same colour of 
legality’.1034
Rather, he opines, the Court could have,
‘explored whether international law can be deliberately neutral or silent on a cer-
tain issue, and whether it allows for the concept of toleration, something which 
breaks from the binary understanding of permission/prohibition and which 
allows for a range of non-prohibited options. That an act might be ‘tolerated’ 
would not necessarily mean that it is ‘legal’, but rather that it is ‘not illegal’. …
The neutrality of international law on a certain point simply suggests that there 
are areas where international law has not yet come to regulate, or indeed, will 
never come to regulate’.1035
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ, expressly referring to the 
Lotus decision, considered that ‘States are free to threaten or use nuclear 
weapons unless it can be shown that they are bound not to do so by reference 
to a prohibition in either treaty law or customary law’ (emphasis added).1036 
President Bedjaoui, in his Declaration on the opinion, expressed his opposi-
tion to the Court’s approach:
‘The resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international law still current 
at the beginning of the century – and which the Permanent Court did not fail 
to endorse in the aforementioned Judgment [Lotus] – has been replaced by an 
objective conception of international law, a law more readily seeking to reflect 
a collective juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of States 
organized as a community’.1037
Finally, in their separate joint decision in the Arrest Warrant Case, Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, made clear their position that 
the Lotus principle is no longer the reference point for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, stating that ‘the dictum represents the high water mark of 
laissez-faire in international relations, and an era that has been significantly 
overtaken by other tendencies’.1038 These views are supported by those of 
academics who argue that State practice suggests that the Lotus principle 
may no longer be valid and that instead, it seems that ‘the international 
community has embraced a more restrictive approach, by requiring that the 
1034 Declaration of Judge Simma on Kosovo Advisory Opinion, p. 480 para. 8.
1035 ibid p. 480 para. 9.
1036 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, p. 238 para. 21.
1037 Declaration of President Bedjaoui on Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, p. 270-71 para. 13.
1038 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. 
Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2002 (Feb. 14) p. 3, p. 78 para. 51 (Joint Separate Opinion 
of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal). 
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asserting state rely on a permissive principle for the exercise of jurisdiction 
to be lawful’.1039 These permissive principles refer to bases of jurisdiction 
including territoriality, personality, the protective principle, and univer-
sality.1040
If the Lotus principle stands, States have prescriptive jurisdiction to 
impose ADIZ unless prohibited by international law.1041 Section 4.3.6 will 
examine whether there is a prohibition under international law on a State 
to establish an ADIZ. In doing so, it will consider the safety and proce-
dural regulations under international civil aviation law and the principle 
of freedom of overflight. These have been chosen, once again, as the most 
commonly raised matters in international law in respect to ADIZs.
On the other hand, if we have moved beyond the Lotus principle, a 
permissive rule of international law is required for States to establish ADIZ 
in international airspace. This view is supported by Cuadra who claims that 
‘[e]ven if there had been no protests whatever [to ADIZs], the unilateral 
adoption of any aspect of sovereignty on or above the high seas must have 
some foundation in international law if it is to be lawful’.1042 Hailbronner 
also argues in favour of this view: ‘States claiming to have acquired new 
rights have a burden of proof. They may rely on the Convention [UNCLOS] 
only to the extent that it explicitly grants regulatory competence and 
enforcement power’.1043 As has been established in Section 4.3.3, there is no 
legal basis for coastal States to rely on to justify the establishment of ADIZs.
Before turning to consider the possible prohibitions on establishing an 
ADIZ, the following section will briefly address the coastal State’s right to 
respond to foreign aircraft in their ADIZs in the case of non-compliance. 
As has been made clear here in this section, regardless of whether the Lotus 
approach to prescriptive jurisdiction is accepted or not, States may only 
exercise enforcement jurisdiction in their territories in respect to acts that 
take place in their ADIZs, unless there is a permissive rule under interna-
tional law providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction.
 4.3.5 No enforcement jurisdiction in international airspace
The Court in Lotus held that a State is not permitted to enforce their laws 
outside its territory unless there is a permissive rule in international law – a 
treaty law or customary law – providing them with the right to do so. This 
1039 Cedric Ryngaert, ‘The Concept of Jurisdiction in International Law’ in Alexander 
Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on Jurisdiction and Immunities in International 
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 55; See also, Rain Liivoja, Criminal Jurisdiction over 
Armed Forces Abroad (CUP 2017) 60: ‘Ultimately, the claims that Lotus is invalid seem well 
grounded in State practice’; Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP 2008) 656.
1040 Ryngaert, Jurisdiction (n 1015) 29.
1041 For a brief discussion on the Lotus decision in relation to ADIZ see, Papp (n 921) 33-34.
1042 Cuadra (n 913) 505.
1043 Kay Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 
77 Am J Int’l L 490, 520.
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is true even in the case that the State has jurisdiction to prescribe their laws 
extraterritorially.1044 The basis for this is the principles of non-intervention 
and the sovereign equality of States.1045
As a result, the prosecution of crew in the case of failure to comply 
with ADIZ procedures can only occur upon entry into the coastal State’s 
national airspace. In the absence of being able to rely on any international 
law as a legal basis for ADIZs, including the enforcement of them, States are 
only able to justify actions taken against aircraft in their ADIZs that would 
otherwise be justified under international law. This section will examine the 
measures that States are permitted to take against aircraft in their ADIZs 
and the purposes for which they are permitted to do so.
International civil aviation law makes clear that States have a right to 
intercept aircraft in certain limited circumstances. Beyond these, including 
in the case of a failure to fulfil ADIZ requirements, there are no provisions 
for interception. Further to interception, the use of force against aircraft is 
expressly prohibited and the only justification for the use of force against 
them is the right of self-defence entailing, as it does, the stringent circum-
stances for it to be legitimate, as discussed in Section 4.3.3.3.
The prohibition on the use of force against civil aircraft is set out in 
Article 3 bis (a) of the Chicago Convention:
‘… every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil 
aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board 
and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered’.
This article begins with the words ‘[t]he contracting States recognize…’, 
suggesting that it is a restatement of customary international law. This is so 
insofar as the article applies to an attack attributable to one State against an 
aircraft registered in another State, which amounts to a breach of the prohi-
bition on the use of force, recognised as customary international law1046 
and as codified under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.1047 Cheng argues that 
Article 3 bis also applies more broadly than this though, as a prohibition 
against the use of force towards all civil aircraft, including a State’s against 
its own, which is not within the scope of Article 2(4).1048 Milde disagrees 
1044 Ryngaert, ‘The Concept of Jurisdiction’ (n 1039) 58.
1045 The sovereign equality of States has been mentioned previously in Sections 3.3.4.4 and 
4.2.4.1.
1046 Military and Paramilitary Activities Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America), pp. 98-101 
paras. 187-190; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 2004 (Jul. 9) p. 136, p. 171 para. 87. 
1047 As discussed in Kimberly Trapp, ‘Uses of Force Against Civil Aircraft’ (EJIL:Talk! 28 June 
2011), available at <www.ejiltalk.org/uses-of-force-against-civil-aircraft/> accessed 12 
July 2017.
1048 Bin Cheng, ‘The Destruction of KAL fl ight KE007’ in JWE Storm van ‘s Gravensande 
and A van der Veen Vonk (eds), Air Worthy: Liber Amicorum Honouring Professor Dr IHPH 
Diederiks-Verschoor (Kluwer 1985) 63. 
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with this position however, arguing that the scope of Article 3 bis is 
restricted to foreign aircraft on that basis that if it were to be interpretated 
otherwise, ‘such regulation would have exceeded the scope of the Conven-
tion which deals with international civil aviation’.1049
The rules for the interception of civil aircraft are set out in Annex 2 to 
the Chicago Convention.1050 There are two elements to the interception rules 
that are key to ADIZs. The first is that interception is only to be performed 
as a last resort.1051 The second is that the purpose for doing so should be 
limited to determining the identity of the aircraft or ‘to return the aircraft to 
its planned track, direct it beyond the boundaries of national airspace, guide 
it away from prohibited, restricted or danger areas or instruct it to effect a 
landing at a designated aerodrome’.1052 The first two of these – identifica-
tion and returning an aircraft to its planned track – are possibly relevant 
in the case of ADIZs. Beyond these two purposes a State cannot justify the 
interception of a civil aircraft in its ADIZ. Keeping in mind that interception 
is only to be used as a last resort, States would be required to first ascertain 
the aircraft’s identification or direct the aircraft back to its stated flight plan, 
as the case may be, through communication with the aircraft via the appli-
cable ATC unit. In the case that interception is necessary, given the specific 
purposes for which it may be conducted, it should be undertaken only to 
the extent required to achieve these purposes and the method of intercep-
tion, including the proximity of the intercepting aircraft, should ‘avoid any 
hazard for the intercepted aircraft’.1053 A failure to adhere to these measures 
could also amount to the intercepting aircraft, as a State aircraft, breaching 
its obligation of due regard to the civil aircraft, which it owes under Article 
3(d) of the Chicago Convention.1054
Furthermore, when it comes to the violation of the rules referred to in 
Article 12 of the Chicago Convention – recalling Section 2.7.2.2 – that is, 
those rules of international civil aviation law applicable in international 
airspace, the coastal State has no greater power to prosecute than any other 
State. Article 12 provides this expressly: ‘[e]ach contracting State under-
takes to insure [sic] the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations 
applicable’. Thus, if a civil aircraft conducting a flight in international 
airspace fails to comply with, for example, its position reporting obligations 
1049  Michael Milde, ‘Interception of Civil Aircraft vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation’ (1986) 11 
Annals Air & Space L 126.
1050 See also, ICAO Doc 9433, Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft (1990). This 
manual is a consolidation of ICAO provisions and special recommendations related to 
the interception of civil aircraft, which have been extracted from Annexes 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 
and 15, as well as PANS-OPS and PANS-ATM.
1051 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, Appendix 2, 1.1 a).
1052 ibid Appendix 2, 1.1 b).
1053 ibid Appendix 2, 3.1.
1054 See Section 2.4.3 for discussion on the due regard obligation owed by State aircraft to civil 
aircraft.
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pursuant to Standard 3.6.3 of Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention, the article 
clearly provides that it is formally the role of each State to take the relevant 
steps to prosecute the persons responsible.1055
State aircraft operating in another State’s ADIZ are not protected by 
the above prohibitions and limitations relating to the use of force and 
interception, given that these aircraft fall outside the scope of the Chicago 
Convention and its annexes.1056 In this environment, interception of military 
aircraft is not infrequently carried out in international airspace, whether in 
a State’s ADIZ or beyond.1057 There is no right to do so under international 
law but at the same time, there is no prohibition. Further to interception, 
the engagement of, i.e. the use of force against, a State aircraft may be justi-
fied under the right to self-defence. Outside this exception though, State 
practice demonstrates that the use of force against a State aircraft amounts 
to a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.1058
The opposition by States to China’s announcement that it would be 
willing to exercise enforcement jurisdiction within its ADIZ in the case of 
non-compliance with its ADIZ procedures, is based on the fact that if it were 
to do so it would be exceeding its jurisdictional powers. A State has no right 
to enforce its ADIZ in international airspace and any action it takes in its 
ADIZ against another State’s aircraft, be it a civil aircraft or a State aircraft, 
must be justified under international law as it applies in international 
airspace more broadly. 
1055 Niels van Antwerpen notes, in regard to the provision of air navigation services over 
international airspace, that the laws of the coastal State are relevant. In the case of an 
act or omission of an air navigation services provider, a victim may bring a claim for 
damages in the instance that the national law of the State providing those services (a 
coastal State) allows for such a claim. Reference here is made to Blumenthal v. United States 
of America, (1960) 189 F. Supp. 439, in which damages were awarded by the US govern-
ment in the case of wrongful death over the high seas (van Antwerpen (n 801) 98-99).
1056 Although, as recognised in the previous paragraphs and as addressed in Section 2.4.3, 
State aircraft are not completely excluded from the scope of international civil aviation 
law. For example, it is State aircraft that carry out the interception of civil aircraft and 
Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention and the interception provisions under Annex 2 
apply to them in carrying out these operations. 
1057 In addition to the interception of Russian aircraft off the coast of Alaska in March 2020, 
as mentioned in Section 4.3.3.1, see for example, ‘Allied Fighter Jets Intercept Russian 
Aircraft’ (NATO, 11 March 2020), available at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_174349.htm> accessed 14 April 2020; Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee, ‘Taiwan 
Again Scrambles Jets to Intercept Chinese Planes, Tensions Spike’ (Reuters, 9 February 
2020), available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-china-defence/taiwan-again-
scrambles-jets-to-intercept-chinese-planes-tensions-spike-idUSKBN2030AE> accessed 
14 April 2020.
1058 Oliver Dörr, ‘Prohibition of Use of Force’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Interna-
tional Law 2015) 24.
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 4.3.6 Prohibition under international law
4.3.6.1 Safety regulations under international civil aviation law
The potential negative safety consequences of ADIZs most often stem from 
particular aspects of their management and of surrounding circumstances, 
including the political climate of the region, rather than from the presence 
of the zone itself. Furthermore, whilst nothing in international civil aviation 
law expressly provides States with the right to establish ADIZs, there is also 
nothing to prohibit them from doing so, either directly or indirectly. Based 
on these factors, ICAO’s approach to ADIZs is to mitigate the safety risks 
they pose to the safety of international civil aviation. This approach is also 
consistent with the fact that ICAO is a political forum,1059 primarily tasked 
with the promotion of the safety of international civil aviation, and that 
ADIZs are attached to national security, a highly sensitive area sitting at the 
heart of State sovereignty.
This section will examine the safety implications of ADIZs in respect to 
the relevant SARPs in the Chicago Convention’s annexes. It will consider 
whether ADIZs are consistent with the SARPs in Annex 11, setting out rules 
for the provision of ATS, particularly in the case of a State imposing an 
ADIZ that overlaps another State’s ADIZ or FIR. The section will further 
discuss how the global approach towards greater civil-military integration 
aims to reduce the safety risks of ADIZs to international civil aviation by 
simplifying procedures. Finally, it will briefly explain why Article 12 of the 
Chicago Convention does not prohibit States from establishing ADIZs.
In a joint Working Paper to ICAO, the International Air Transport Asso-
ciation (IATA) and IFALPA raised the issue of an (unidentified)1060 ADIZ 
that crossed the boundaries of two FIRs, leading to confusion of the ATC 
authorities in those FIRs.1061 In addition, it reported, the ADIZ requirements 
were not clear, which created additional uncertainty regarding the proce-
dures to be followed, both for the aircraft operating in the zone and the 
ATC. As a consequence, flights were ultimately arranged along alternative 
routes to avoid the area due to fear of interception in the zone.1062 This is an 
extreme example of lack of coordination in the establishment of an ADIZ 
but, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1, the ADIZs of China, Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan overlap and this necessarily also involves the overlap of ADIZs 
with FIRs. Overlapping ADIZs and ADIZs that extend across FIRs are less 
problematic when there is cooperation in their management, when there 
are good relations between the authorities administering the zones, such 
1059 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Regulation of Air Transport: The Slumbering Sentinels (Springer 
2014) 209.
1060 In consideration of the period around which it was established, and the general concerns 
expressed, it possibly refers to the ADIZ of Bangladesh, as discussed in Section 4.3.3.2.
1061 ICAO Establishment of Military Requirements and Restrictions (n 905) 2.3. 
1062 ibid 2.9.
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as between Japan and Taiwan,1063 but they become a heightened safety risk 
when this is not the case.1064 The increased cooperation required in the case 
overlapping ADIZs and FIRs adds to a matter that requires attention even 
where delimitation is clear: the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation 
(CANSO) has reiterated through various best practice guides the need to 
improve ‘the safe and efficient crossing of Flight Information Regions’ and 
has highlighted this as a particular priority in the Asia-Pacific region.1065
Coordination complexities are also relevant within the boundaries of a 
coastal State’s FIR where the ADIZ procedures require aircraft to follow the 
requests of, or report to, an authority additional to the ATC unit, such as in 
the ADIZs off the coasts of China and the US.1066 In accordance with ICAO’s 
definition of ‘ADIZ’, provided in Section 4.3.2, an ADIZ necessarily imposes 
on aircraft ‘…special identification and/or reporting procedures additional 
to those related to the provision of air traffic services’.1067 The additional 
authority that an ADIZ introduces into the affected portion of airspace 
requires consideration in respect to two main aspects of international civil 
aviation law. The first is the Standards contained in Annex 11, governing 
the responsibility of the control of flights and airspace, and the second is 
ICAO’s aim to achieve global enhanced civil-military coordination.
There are two Standards in Annex 11 of the Chicago Convention that 
are relevant to the management of airspace by more than one authority.1068 
Standard 3.5.1 states that ‘[a] controlled flight shall be under the control 
of only one air traffic control unit at any given time’ and Standard 3.5.2 
provides that ‘[r]esponsibility for the control of all aircraft operating within 
a given block of airspace shall be vested in a single air traffic control unit’ 
(emphasis added). Unlike Annex 2 in international airspace, a State may file 
differences for the Standards in Annex 11, meaning that these Standards are 
not necessarily fixed. Notwithstanding this however, a literal interpretation 
of the terms does not necessarily prohibit the exercise of control by an addi-
tional authority. Specifically, they both refer to an air traffic control unit as 
opposed to using more general phrasing, in order to restrict the control to a 
1063 ‘Japan Extends Air Defence Identifi cation Zone into Taiwan Space’ (BBC Monitoring 
Asia Pacifi c, 26 June 2010), text of report in English by Shih Hsiu-chuan on Taiwanese 
newspaper Taipei Times website on 26 June 2010 written, available at <www.taipeitimes.
com/News/front/archives/2010/06/26/2003476438> accessed 3 November 2019.
1064 Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 536: ‘… overlapping ADIZ lead to a non-
coordinated practice of ICAO Member States which is detrimental to the safe, effi cient 
and regular air navigation’.
1065 ICAO IP/13, Automation Interface Between Flight Information Regions, Presented by 
CANSO at the 28th Meeting of the Asia/Pacifi c Air Navigation Planning and Implemen-
tation Regional Group, Bangkok (11 – 14 September 2017) 1.1 and 2.1.  
1066 See Section 4.3.2 for details of the specifi c authorities.
1067 Chicago Convention, Annex 4, 1-1 and Annex 15, 1-2.
1068 Kaiser briefl y mentions what he refers to as ‘the single control unit principle’, in reference 
to the Standards that are discussed in this paragraph (Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ 
(n 952) 536).
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single authority regardless of its purpose and thereby take into account the 
possibility of the operation of a military authority, for example, exercising 
control alongside the ATC unit. Secondly, as emphasised, Standard 3.5.2 sets 
out that responsibility must be vested in one unit, which does not neces-
sarily restrict the provision of services or orders by additional units. Thus, 
despite the fact that the Annex seems to recognise the importance of aircraft 
communicating with only one authority in a given airspace, it falls short of 
considering this situation in respect to a non-ATC authority.
ICAO has however addressed this matter beyond the annexes, by 
encouraging coastal States to minimise the burden ADIZ requirements 
place on flight crew through enhanced coordination between the civil and 
military authorities administering the airspace.1069 In this manner, aircraft 
would provide information to the ATC unit which would then communi-
cate it directly to the military authority without further input being required 
from the aircraft. From an airline/pilot perspective, more streamlined 
communication channels are advantageous both in terms of efficiency and 
safety. IATA and IFALPA have, in the context of achieving greater civil/
military cooperation, called for changes to ADIZ practices. They suggest 
that the flight plan and movement information is readily forwarded to the 
relevant military authorities, where required, and that States work towards 
the automation of authorisation procedures, an example of this being the 
generation of a clearance code in advance upon the initial submission of 
the flight plan.1070 There is a strong preference expressed by IATA and 
IFALPA though, for military clearances and other authorisation procedures 
to be forgone and they ultimately request States ‘to obviate the need for 
pre-authorization for civil flights’.1071
Cuadra has suggested that ADIZs may, in one respect, lower the safety 
risk to aircraft by obviating the need for coastal States to conduct intercep-
tions to identify aircraft as a result of the identification obligations that the 
zones impose.1072 Given that identification and reporting procedures are 
common practice in aviation independently of ADIZs,1073 it seems unlikely 
that this safety benefit would result but even if it were to, it would be along-
side the above coordination complexities and potential safety consequences 
that they entail.
One further matter under international civil aviation law is raised in 
relation to ADIZs regarding the management of airspace: the exclusive juris-
diction of ICAO pursuant to Article 12 of the Chicago Convention. Recalling 
Section 2.7.2.2, the relevant part of Article 12 reads, ‘[o]ver the high seas, the 
rules in force shall be those established under this Convention’.
1069 ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Update (n 965) 2.18.
1070 ICAO Establishment of Military Requirements and Restrictions (n 905) 1.3, 2.10, 2.10 a) and b). 
1071 ibid 2.10. 
1072 Cuadra (n 913) 496.
1073 See Section 4.3.3.1.
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As a result of this article, Head concludes that the only laws applicable 
to civil aviation in international airspace are those rules referred to in 
Article 12 and that therefore, coastal States are not permitted to exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction to establish ADIZs: ‘[t]hus one state does not have 
the power within itself to enact regulations effective over the high seas’.1074 
Kaiser appears to agree with Head, stating that the purpose of this section 
of Article 12 is to ‘prevent States from unilaterally mandating compliance 
with any other or additional rules which contravene this purpose’.1075 Papp 
also raises the issue of Article 12 and considers its scope – noting that ADIZs 
relate to national security, which is outside the jurisdiction of ICAO – but he 
ultimately leaves the question open.1076 Article 12 does provide ICAO with 
exclusive jurisdiction over the high seas but only in respect to those rules 
that fall within the scope of the article, including the Standards in Annex 
2 together with the SARPs in Annexes 6, 10, 11 and 12, as to which see 
Section 2.7.2.2. ADIZs are not addressed by these annexes, either expressly 
or impliedly, and as a result, they are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
ICAO or otherwise governed by the scope of Article 12.1077 As Cuadra notes 
on this matter,
‘When ICAO is silent on a given topic States are not precluded from formulating 
rules they have adopted on such topics, nor is it mandatory that States notify 
ICAO of rules they have adopted on such topics’.1078
In the absence of a prohibition under international civil aviation law, ICAO 
policy materials instead aim to encourage States to impose their ADIZ 
procedures in the safest possible manner.
 4.3.6.2 Freedom of overflight
As discussed in Sections 2.6.5 and 3.3.3, legitimate restrictions to freedom 
of overflight are viewed narrowly by the international community. Whilst 
airspace can be used in a way that leads to it being exclusive in practice, the 
exclusive use must be restricted geographically and in duration to what is 
strictly necessary for the activity. For portions of ADIZs that extend into the 
high seas, this can be understood on the basis of the ‘due regard’ obligation 
1074 Head (n 915) 186. 
1075 Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 535-36. Kaiser in fact refers to the ‘third 
sentence of Article 11 of the Chicago Convention’ here, but given the context – including 
the fact that he discusses Article 12 in the previous sentence – it is most likely that he is 
referring to Article 12. 
1076 Papp (n 921) 40-41.
1077 See also, Section 3.3.3.1 for discussion on the distinction between the rules referred to in 
Article 12 and the rules applying to the provision of air navigation services in interna-
tional airspace.
1078 Cuadra (n 913) 491. See Sections 2.6.5 and 3.2.2 for previous consideration of Article 87(2) 
UNCLOS.
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under Article 87(2) UNCLOS, which requires States to have, in exercising 
their freedoms of the high seas, a ‘due regard’ obligation for the interests 
of other States in their exercise of freedoms of the high seas.1079 The right 
to establish ADIZs cannot be considered a freedom of the high seas. A high 
seas freedom applies – at least de facto – equally to all States, whilst the 
ability to establish ADIZs in international airspace necessarily only applies 
to coastal States. Thus, whilst determining the legality of ADIZs involves 
a balance of State interests, a consideration of the balancing of interests 
between the exercise of two high seas freedoms is not relevant to the discus-
sion here. For ADIZ that extend into the coastal State’s EEZ, as discussed 
in Section 4.3.3.2, the zone cannot be justified by arguing that it achieves a 
balance between the rights established by UNCLOS of the coastal State in 
the zone and the freedom of overflight exercised by other States therein. 
The EEZ regime under UNCLOS provides no support for this argument 
without the formation of a customary international law to support such an 
interpretation.
Relying on the analysis of what exactly freedom of overflight entails, 
as presented in Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.3.2, the question must first be asked 
of whether ADIZs do in fact interfere with freedom of overflight. This is 
particularly so given that – leaving aside the matter of enforcement jurisdic-
tion which, as has been established, is the same in international airspace 
with or without an ADIZ – ADIZs do not per se physically prohibit or restrict 
aircraft from the airspace within the zone. The consideration of whether the 
establishment of an ADIZ is inconsistent with the right to freedom of over-
flight is not limited to physical restriction though and requires a broader 
perspective. Is it a violation of freedom overflight because it involves the 
unilateral imposition of requests or orders by one State in international 
airspace?1080 Or does a violation require a certain degree of burden in its 
variation from standard procedure?1081 Is it relevant that the unilateral 
measures are primarily for national security purposes, rather than being for 
the purpose of enhancing safety?
Freedom of overflight does not mean freedom from regulation,1082 as is 
evident from Article 12 of the Chicago Convention. As indicated previously, 
identification and reporting procedures are standard at points throughout 
an international flight. Of course then, the requirement of ‘mere identifica-
1079 UNCLOS, Article 87(2).
1080 As Kaiser argues: Kaiser, ‘The Legal Status of ADIZ’ (n 952) 532.
1081 As considered by Cuadra: Cuadra (n 913) 496: ‘The procedural requirements themselves 
are not burdensome when viewed in the context of the system of air navigational 
aids, control, and aircraft-to-ground communication to which international (and even 
domestic) fl ights are normally subject’.
1082 ‘Law, Conflict and Airspace: Understanding Air Defense Identification Zones’ 
(Groningen University Blog, 17 January 2014), available at <www.rug.nl/research/
east-asian-studies/blogs/blog/blog-17-01-2014-law-confl ict-and-airspace-under-
standing-air-defense-identifi cation-zones> accessed 13 May 2019.
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tion by foreign aircraft cannot be regarded as a restriction on the freedom 
of overflight’.1083 It is also standard practice for pilots to file flight plans in 
advance, 1084 and to maintain radio contact en route. The issuing of clear-
ances is also common practice for civil aircraft but under international civil 
aviation law, they are to be issued by ATC and are ‘solely for expediting and 
separating air traffic’.1085
On top of standard ATC procedures, ADIZs impose additional param-
eters. As addressed in Section 4.3.6.1, ATC should be the only authority to 
which flights plans need to be submitted, as opposed to defence authorities, 
as seems to be required by China for certain flights. ADIZs also involve the 
obligation to comply with the orders of designated authorities, both when 
operating in the airspace and prior to entering the airspace, often defence 
bodies. For example, with reference to Section 4.3.2, a person operating an 
aircraft in the US ADIZ ‘must… comply with the special security instruc-
tions… in the interest of national security’, as issued by NORAD,1086 while 
in China’s ADIZ, they must comply with orders of the Ministry of National 
Defence.1087 Furthermore, Bangladesh requires aircraft to receive military air 
defence clearance (ADC) numbers prior to entry into its ADIZ,1088 as does 
India.1089
Drawing an analogy with vessels on the sea, the need to obtain prior 
clearance has been viewed as a violation of the right of innocent passage. 
UNCLOS provides a number of military activities that are prohibited 
from being carried out by a ship in another State’s territorial sea,1090 but 
the mere passage of a military ship is not deemed to be inconsistent with 
innocent passage.1091 China, among many others, but as a high profile State, 
requires prior authorisation for warships entering its territorial sea.1092 The 
US has criticised this on the basis that it ‘considers the establishment of 
1083 Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Regime’ (n 976) 43.
1084 Chicago Convention, Annex 2, 3.3.1.4: ‘Unless otherwise prescribed by the appropriate 
ATS authority, a fl ight plan for a fl ight to be provided with air traffi c control service or 
air traffi c advisory service shall be submitted at least sixty minutes before departure, or, 
if submitted during fl ight, at a time which will ensure its receipt by the appropriate air 
traffi c services unit at least ten minutes before the aircraft is estimated to reach: a) the 
intended point of entry into a control area or advisory area; or, b) the point of crossing an 
airway or advisory route’.
1085 ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation Services (n 784) 4.5.1.1.
1086 14 C.F.R. § 99.7.
1087  Announcement by the Ministry of National Defense, China (n 895).
1088 ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Update (n 965) 2.15.
1089 ‘ENR-1.12 Interception of Civil Aircraft – Identifi cation and Interception Procedures’, 
available at <aim-india.aai.aero/eaip/PUB/2012-04-01/html/eAIP/EC-ENR-1.12-en-
GB.html> accessed 2 July 2019.
1090 As mentioned in Section 4.3.3.2 (n 967). 
1091 Unlike the high seas freedom in Article 87, the instances in which the passage of a foreign 
ship ‘shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the 
coastal State in the territorial sea’, in accordance with Article 19 UNCLOS, are exclusive.
1092 Kaye, ‘Freedom of Navigation’ (n 961) 8-12 (table) and 13.
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an advanced authorisation or prior notification a ‘hindrance’ to innocent 
passage’.1093 Of course, this example involves the territorial sea as opposed 
to international airspace, and innocent passage rather than freedom of over-
flight. In this example though, it is the requirement itself that is relevant, 
and it is this that is transferable to the current context. The criticism from 
the US stems solely from the imposition of the requirement: the context and 
the effect that it has in practice is irrelevant.
It is proposed here that the additional requirements that are placed on 
aircraft in ADIZs differ from the regulations that apply to the operation of 
aircraft in international airspace in one principal manner. The regulations 
that apply, those SARPs in the applicable annexes pursuant to Article 12, 
apply to facilitate the freedom of overflight. By harmonising identification 
and reporting requirements, the provision of ATS, emergency procedures, 
among many other areas, these rules enable aircraft to exercise the right to 
freedom of overflight. As has been discussed, States may file differences 
to these SARPs with the exception of Annex 2,1094 and in this respect a 
degree of unilateral prescription is permitted, but the varied practices are 
no less part of the legal framework to facilitate the operation of civil avia-
tion in international airspace. In contrast, ADIZ procedures are unilaterally 
imposed for the purpose of national security and, in some cases, for other 
national interests such as territorial control. Furthermore, the procedures 
imposed can jeopardise the safety of international civil aviation, as 
addressed in Section 4.3.6.1.
The above considerations address civil aircraft. Freedom of overflight 
also applies to State aircraft, as do some States’ ADIZ procedures. The above 
points focused on the additional impositions that ADIZs place on the opera-
tion of a civil aircraft in the zone. Whilst ‘many air navigation facilities and 
services are provided for and used by both civil and military aviation’,1095 
State aircraft are not required to follow SARPs and are not subject to any 
reporting procedures in international airspace, as a result of their exclusion 
from the scope of the Chicago Convention and its annexes.1096 On this basis, 
any requirement imposed in respect to the flight of a State aircraft in inter-
national airspace within an ADIZ is a violation of freedom of overflight.
The exclusion of State aircraft from obligations that apply to civil 
aircraft, such as identification and reporting, are necessary in order to be 
able to fulfil certain mission requirements. In these cases, it is the respon-
sibility of the State aircraft to maintain separation from civil aircraft as the 
State aircraft can be effectively invisible to ATC, having not filed a flight 
plan, established radio connection, or identified itself through cooperative 
1093 Sébastien Colin, ‘China, the US, and the Law of the Sea’ (2016) 2 China Perspectives 57, 
60.
1094 See Section 2.7.2.2.1.
1095 ICAO Cir 330, Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffi c Management (2011) 1.3.2.
1096 See Section 2.4.1.
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surveillance systems.1097 ADIZ procedures imposed on State aircraft restrict 
their operation in international airspace in a manner that the exclusion of 
this category of aircraft from the Chicago Convention protected them from. 
In doing so, ADIZ procedures interfere with a State aircraft’s freedom of 
overflight by restricting the international airspace in which it is able to 
undertake certain missions which are permitted under international law.
For these reasons, ADIZs are inconsistent with freedom of overflight, 
both for civil aircraft and State aircraft. They are an anomaly in international 
airspace as unilateral extensions of coastal State power, serving the interests 
only of that State, and to the detriment of other airspace users, at times in 
terms of safety, but necessarily in terms of limiting freedom of overflight.
4.3.7 In summary: Legality of ADIZ
ADIZs have existed since the 1950s but there has been a renewed interest in 
them since the events of September 11 and States continue to establish and 
extend them today.
ADIZs have no foundation in international law and States justify them 
using different legal bases, where the justifications reflect the requirements 
that the States impose in their own ADIZs. Although a State has the right 
to regulate the admission to or departure from its territory, and aircraft 
identification requirements are an accepted aspect of this, the establish-
ment of a zone, as opposed to a point or a line as is standard for reporting 
requirements, is unnecessary to achieve this aim and thus, ADIZs cannot 
be justified on this ground. Neither can an ADIZ be justified on the basis of 
what a number of States claim to be their right to regulate military activities 
in their EEZ. The EEZ regime under UNCLOS is established for a specific 
purpose,1098 and the coastal State’s rights within the zone do not extend to 
restricting the mere exercise of freedom of overflight of military aircraft. 
The right to self-defence is a widely referred to but frequently rejected legal 
basis for ADIZs. The establishment of the zone is not self-defence under 
the definition of self-defence, which is an exception to the use of force, and 
the type of threat which gives rise to the right is not the type ADIZs are 
established in response to. Finally, the right to establish ADIZs does not 
have customary status. State practice remains varied but, more so, there is 
little evidence of opinio juris to indicate that the right is in the process of 
crystallising as a customary international law.
The international community is moving away from the Lotus principle, 
in which case a legal basis is required under international law for the 
exercise of prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction. The preceding sections 
have demonstrated that there is no legal basis that can be relied on to justify 
1097 ICAO, Guidelines to Airspace Users in Order to Raise their Awareness on State Aircraft Opera-
tions Especially in the High Seas Airspace over the Baltic Sea (Eur Ops Bulletin, 15 December 
2015) 1.
1098 See Section 2.7.3. 
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ADIZs. In the alternative, if the Lotus principle still stands, a coastal State 
has the right to establish an ADIZ provided it is not prohibited by interna-
tional law. In any case, in terms of enforcement jurisdiction, the actions a 
coastal State may take against an aircraft in international airspace within its 
ADIZ are the same as in any other international airspace.
Finally, ADIZs are prohibited by international law. Although they may 
pose a risk to the safety of civil aviation, they are not in violation of interna-
tional civil aviation law, but rather of the principle of freedom of overflight. 
As a unilateral exercise of State power over international airspace for the 
purpose of, among other objectives, mitigating risks to national security, 
they impose control over the operation of civil aircraft and State aircraft 
that is not intended by, or consistent with, the understanding of freedom 
of overflight. As has been illustrated throughout this research, freedom of 
overflight does not mean freedom from regulation or even, in practice, free 
access to all international airspace at all times. The regulations and restric-
tions to access to international airspace though, are specific and narrowly 
applied, relating to either safety and efficiency of international civil aviation 
or to the balancing the right of States to exercise their freedoms of the high 
seas. ADIZs are an anomaly in international airspace, with no legal basis 
in international law and in violation of the customary international law 
principle of freedom of overflight.
4.4 Conclusion to chapter
This chapter examined coastal State jurisdiction in respect to FIRs and 
ADIZs, considering its interaction with freedom of overflight in interna-
tional airspace and whether the exercise of the jurisdiction is legitimate. 
It approached the question in relation to FIRs from a specific perspective: 
that of the application of the principle of non-discrimination to Annex 11, 
as the legal framework forming the basis for the responsibility of States in 
FIRs, including international airspace. The question regarding ADIZs was 
essentially whether they are legitimate under international law.
Contrary to the actions of Bahrain and the UAE, FIR responsibility 
does not give a coastal State the right to prohibit aircraft from interna-
tional airspace within the FIR on the basis of the State of registration of 
the aircraft. This was clear as a result of there being freedom of overflight 
in international airspace, but this research set out to examine how inter-
national civil aviation law, considered in isolation, might prohibit such 
discrimination, specifically through there being an implied principle 
of non-discrimination in the rules applying to ATS provision. The rules 
forming the legal foundation for the allocation of responsibility for FIRs in 
Annex 11 do not include the principle of non-discrimination, and there is 
little support for an implied application of the principle on the basis of its 
importance to the rules governing air navigation in national airspace, but 
coastal State jurisdiction is very specific in the context of FIRs and must 
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always be drawn back to technical and operational decisions for safety and 
efficiency purposes. Furthermore, the SARPs under Annex 11 are adopted 
by the ICAO Council whose objectives in developing principles for air 
navigation include avoiding discrimination between States. On this basis, 
if a State responsible for an FIR interprets its responsibility as permitting 
it to discriminate, without that decision being based solely on safety and 
efficiency considerations within the scope of Annex 11, it would be a breach 
of good faith.
In terms of ADIZs, it is clear that their presence does not affect the 
coastal State’s enforcement jurisdiction in international airspace. The 
enforcement measures that a State may take in international airspace exist 
independently of ADIZs and are not specific to coastal States. The question 
of coastal State prescriptive jurisdiction in respect to ADIZs is more compli-
cated and rests on the legitimacy of ADIZs. Even if no basis of jurisdiction 
is required for prescriptive jurisdiction in international airspace, ADIZs 
are a violation of the freedom of overflight, as has been demonstrated, and 
are therefore prohibited by international law. In the case that a legal basis 
is required for ADIZs under international law, the only possible grounds 
would be if the right of a coastal State to establish one has developed as 
a customary international law, in which case they would be legitimate 
regardless of any breach of freedom of overflight. This study has concluded 
that, whilst evidence of sufficient uniformity of State practice could present 
a hurdle, establishing opinio juris currently stands as the greatest barrier 
to the demonstration of the right to establish ADIZs as being customary 
international law. This research concludes therefore that, based on the 
circumstances as they currently stand and the evidence available, ADIZs 
are not legitimate and that consequently, they do not provide coastal States 
with a basis for exercising jurisdiction in international airspace.
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5 Overflight of international straits and 
archipelagic sea lanes
5.1 Introduction
UNCLOS recognises, in addition to innocent passage through territorial 
sea, two other passage regimes: transit passage through international 
straits (hereafter ‘transit passage’) and archipelagic sea lanes passage. 
Whilst innocent passage does not apply to aircraft, both transit passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage have significant implications for overflight 
rights. In the lanes of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage the 
airspace retains its status as national airspace but the aircraft of other States 
have the right to fly through it without prior permission. As a result, these 
passage regimes are an exception to the special permission required under 
Articles 3(c), 6 and 8 of the Chicago Convention, applying respectively to 
State aircraft, scheduled services of civil aircraft and pilotless aircraft.1099 
Whilst this research is focused on the rights of coastal States in international 
airspace, this chapter will briefly examine these two regimes applying to 
national airspace to the extent that they too – like the regimes in previous 
chapters – involve the consideration of anomalous and sometimes ambig-
uous rights of the coastal State vis-à-vis the overflight of aircraft of other 
States in the maritime areas off their coast.
Both passage regimes are applicable to State aircraft and civil aircraft 
alike, however in practice they serve to provide access for State aircraft. This 
is because most States have negotiated overflight of each other’s territory 
for civil aircraft through the Transit Agreement or through bilateral agree-
ments for scheduled services, and through Article 5 of the Chicago Conven-
tion for non-scheduled flights.1100 These sources of overflight rights are 
suspendable in the case of war though, as addressed in Section 2.6.1, and 
can be withdrawn in peacetime in the case a State denounces the relevant 
treaty.1101 In these situations, the transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage 
would allow for the continued right of overflight for civil aircraft through 
these portions of the suspending or withdrawing State’s territory, as will be 
discussed in Section 5.5.
As a consequence of State – military – aircraft benefiting more so from 
the right of overflight under these passage regimes, the examples used 
throughout this chapter relate to events involving military aircraft. Further-
1099 See Sections 2.3.3, 2.3.4 and 2.4.3.
1100 Only Dominica and Tuvalu are State parties to UNCLOS but not to the Chicago Conven-
tion. 
1101 For example, Article III of the Transit Agreement provides that ‘…any contracting State… 
may denounce it on one year’s notice’. 
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more, despite the application of the regimes to both civil aircraft and State 
aircraft, a closer examination of the provisions governing the designation 
of archipelagic sea lanes in Section 5.4.4.1, demonstrates that State aircraft 
were intended as the primary beneficiaries of the overflight provisions.
This chapter will begin, in Section 5.2, by outlining the common rights 
and duties in transit lanes and archipelagic sea lanes, for both aircraft and 
the State whose territorial sea the lanes fall within. The chapter will then 
examine the regime applying specifically to transit passage. Section 5.3.1 
will first address the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage that 
applied prior to UNCLOS, with Section 5.3.2 demonstrating how concur-
rent developments under UNCLOS made the introduction of a more liberal 
passage regime particularly important for aircraft. The following section of 
the chapter (Section 5.3.3) will briefly consider the international straits that 
do not fall within the transit passage regime under UNCLOS before turning 
to examine its implications for overflight (Section 5.3.4). Lastly in relation to 
transit passage, Section 5.3.5 will address the case of the Strait of Hormuz, 
which is an anomaly in that Iran, as one of the bordering States, applies 
the regime of innocent passage in the strait for States that are not party to 
UNCLOS.
The chapter will then turn to consider the regime under UNCLOS 
applying to archipelagic sea lanes passage. It will first briefly explain what 
an archipelagic State is under UNCLOS and why there are so few such 
States (Section 5.4.1), before outlining the implications for overflight of the 
recognition in UNCLOS of the concept of an archipelagic State (Section 
5.4.2). The next section of the chapter will consider the main ambiguities 
in the text of UNCLOS insofar as archipelagic sea lanes passage concerns 
overflight. These include two matters that are tied to the military – State 
aircraft – basis of these provisions, as mentioned above. First, that the text 
indicates that air routes must be aligned with sea lanes through archipelagic 
waters (Section 5.4.4.1) and second, that only approval from the IMO, as 
opposed to also ICAO, is required under UNCLOS for the designation of 
archipelagic sea lane air routes (Section 5.4.4.2). The final issue that will be 
considered specifically relating to archipelagic sea lanes passage, is ‘partial 
designation’ and the implications of this for access to airspace by military 
aircraft. Finally, Section 5.5 will examine the right of overflight in transit and 
archipelagic sea lanes in the case of wartime, before concluding by high-
lighting the remaining areas of ambiguity in this area of law (Section 5.6).
The consequences of the lack of uniformity in the rules applying to 
transit passage in respect to some international straits, on the one hand, 
and in the ambiguity in the application of the UNCLOS rules for archipe-
lagic sea lanes passage, on the other, results in a situation where there are 
conflicting views between the coastal States and the States whose aircraft 
use the airspace over these maritime areas. This chapter complements the 
previous chapters of this research on this basis. The matters discussed in 
this chapter are not highly topical at this point in time, in that there are not 
frequent incidents arising out of the lack of uniformity or ambiguity in the 
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application of the law, or particularly grave repercussions that stem from 
incidents that do occur. This will not necessarily always be the case though. 
For example, in the context of heightened political tensions between two of 
more States (for example, South China Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Eastern Medi-
terranean Sea), such an incident could be the impetus for something much 
more serious. As stated in the previous chapter, an attack on an aircraft 
amounts to the use of force against the State of registry of the aircraft.1102
 5.2 Rights and duties of aircraft in passage and of coastal States
The key duties of the coastal States and of aircraft operating in each of these 
forms of passage are identical and are set out in Article 39 UNCLOS.1103 
Aircraft in transit passage and in archipelagic sea lanes passage must 
observe the rules of the air, as adopted by ICAO1104 and the coastal State 
may not file differences to them as they apply over the transit or archipe-
lagic sea lanes.1105 The article also provides that State aircraft ‘will normally 
comply with such safety measures’ and will operate with due regard for 
the safety of navigation.1106 Soon after the adoption of UNCLOS, ICAO 
noted that ‘normally’ was not defined in the convention but that a vote 
during the drafting process for its deletion from the article was defeated.1107 
Aircraft exercising their right of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes 
passage are also required to ‘monitor the radio frequency assigned by the 
competent internationally designated air traffic control authority’ (emphasis 
added),1108 as they are required to do over the high seas. This refers to the 
authority approved by the Council of ICAO under the applicable regional 
air navigation plan,1109 consistent with the arrangements in international 
airspace. Aircraft also have the duty to proceed without delay; to refrain 
from the threat or use of force against the coastal State and from any other 
1102 See Section 4.3.5.
1103 Under Article 54 UNCLOS the key duties of aircraft and ships in transit passage, and the 
duties of the States that border straits, apply mutatis mutandi to archipelagic sea lanes 
passage. The key duties are those in Articles 39, 40, 42 and 44. Article 40 applies only to 
vessels and is therefore not relevant to overfl ight.
1104 UNCLOS, Article 39(3)(a) for transit passage and Articles 39(3)(a) and 54 for archipelagic 
sea lanes passage.
1105 ICAO WP/5-1, Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5: Consideration of the Report of the Rappor-
teur on ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – Implications, if any, for the Appli-
cation of the Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other International Air Law Instruments’, 
Presented at the Legal Committee 26th Session, Montreal (4 February 1987), reproduced 
in (1987) 3 Int’l Org & L Sea: Documentary YB 243, 252.
1106 UNCLOS, Article 39(3)(a). The latter of which is a restatement of their obligation under 
Article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention.
1107 ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5 (n 1105) 254. 
1108 UNCLOS, Article 39(3)(b) for transit passage and Articles 39(3)(b) and 54 for archipelagic 
sea lanes passage.
1109 ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5 (n 1105) 252. 
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 260
242 Chapter 5
violation of the UN Charter; to refrain from any other activities external to 
expeditious transit unless necessary by force majeure; and, to comply with 
the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.1110
Coastal States bordering an international strait or archipelagic sea lane, 
whichever the case may be, are not permitted to impose their national civil 
aviation regulations in the areas of passage.1111 They are restricted in their 
prescriptive jurisdiction concerning the passage to a limited scope of areas 
including, for the purposes of aviation, pollution control and, although far 
less relevant than to vessels, the prohibition of unloading commodities, 
currency or persons in contravention of certain national laws.1112 The coastal 
States have the obligation not to hamper the passage, the requirement to 
adequately publicise danger to navigation or overflight that they are aware 
of within the strait or archipelagic waters; and, the inability to suspend 
the passage.1113 Furthermore, UNCLOS provides the coastal State with 
very limited enforcement jurisdiction in transit lanes and archipelagic sea 
lanes, none of which relate to aircraft.1114 As a result, Caminos explains, the 
coastal State is required to ‘pursue the matter as a breach of international 
law through diplomatic channels and through other dispute settlement 
procedures’.1115 
1110 UNCLOS, Articles 39(1)(a)-(d) for transit passage and Articles 39(1)(a)-(d) and 54 for 
archipelagic sea lanes passage.
1111 P de Vries Lentsch, ‘The Right of Overfl ight Over Strait States and Archipelagic States: 
Developments and Prospects’ (1983) 14 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 165, 
200.
1112 UNCLOS Articles 42(1)(b) and (d) for transit passage and Articles 42(1)(b) and (d) and 54 
for archipelagic sea lanes passage. These articles address, respectively, ‘the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulations 
regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait’; 
and, ‘the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person in contravention 
of the customs, fi scal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of States bordering 
straits.
1113 UNCLOS, Article 44 for transit passage and Articles 44 and 54 for archipelagic sea lanes 
passage.
1114 UNCLOS, Articles 233 and 234 both apply only to vessels. Article 233 provides the 
States with enforcement jurisdiction in transit lanes over foreign ships – excluding those 
entitled to sovereign immunity (Article 236) – regarding protection of the marine envi-
ronment (this also arguably also applies in archipelagic sea lanes, as to which see, Hugo 
Caminos and Vincent P Cogliati-Bantz, The Legal Regime of Straits (CUP 2014) 285). Article 
234 provides prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of non-discriminatory laws 
applying to vessels for the protection of the marine environment in ice-covered areas.
1115 Hugo Caminos, ‘The Legal Régime of Straits in the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’ (1987) 205 Recueil des Cours 19, 150. See also, for discussion on the 
absence of enforcement jurisdiction, Donald R Rothwell, ‘International Straits’, in Donald 
R Rothwell, Alex G Oude Elferink, Karen N Scott and Tim Stephens (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of the Law of the Sea (OUP 2015) 123.
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5.3 International straits
5.3.1 Aircraft excluded from non-suspendable innocent passage
The beginning of the law applying to international straits under modern 
international law can be marked by reference to the 1949 case of Corfu 
Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania) (‘Corfu Channel Case’), in which the ICJ 
recognised as customary international law, the right of innocent passage 
through straits used for international navigation:
‘It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with 
international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send their war-
ships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the 
high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the 
passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention, 
there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through straits in 
time of peace’.1116
This principle of customary international law was codified in the 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.1117
The ‘non-suspendable’ element of innocent passage in the straits 
under customary international law, as referred to in the Corfu Channel 
Case, is distinct from the power of the coastal State to act against non-
innocent passage. As Guilfoyle explains, ‘it is clearly arguable that under 
the non-suspendable innocent passage regime a coastal State retains its 
right to prevent non-innocent passage by individual foreign vessels’.1118 
Non-suspendable innocent passage instead refers to a prohibition on the 
non-discriminatory cordoning off of any part of the strait. In contrast, under 
standard innocent passage the coastal State has the right under UNCLOS 
to suspend the passage, in the form of a temporary restriction, ‘if such 
suspension is essential for the protection of its security, including weapons 
exercises’.1119
1116 Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1949 (Apr. 9), p. 4, p. 28. In this case, Greece considered itself 
to be at war with Albania and considering this, the Court concluded that Albania was 
permitted to regulate the passage of warships through the strait but not to prevent the 
passage or impose an obligation of special authorisation (p. 29). See Section 5.5.
1117 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958, Article 16(4).
1118 Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Iran and the Strait of Hormuz: Some Initial Thoughts’ (EJIL: Talk! 
2 February 2012), available at <www.ejiltalk.org/iran-and-the-strait-of-hormuz-some-
initial-thoughts/> accessed 17 January 2018.
1119 UNCLOS, Article 25(3).
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Consistent with innocent passage, the non-suspendable innocent 
passage for international straits under customary international law does 
not apply to aircraft.1120 Despite this, if both the State of registration of 
the aircraft and the State whose national airspace the aircraft is operating 
within – i.e. whose territorial sea the strait is a part of – are parties to the 
Chicago Convention and the Transit Agreement,1121 then both civil non-
scheduled and scheduled flights, respectively, have the right to overfly the 
airspace, notwithstanding any other restrictions that might be imposed by 
the State. Recalling Section 2.4, State aircraft are excluded from the Chicago 
regime and so, without further arrangements between the relevant States, 
such flights would not be permitted to operate through international straits 
under the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage.1122
 5.3.2 Shifting territorial sea boundaries: The heightened need for transit 
passage
The codification of a more generous right of passage through international 
straits under UNCLOS occurred simultaneously with the codification under 
this Convention of the right of a coastal State to claim a territorial sea of 
12nm, as opposed to the 3nm which was previously recognised under 
customary international law.1123 Most international straits are wider than 
6nm and so had high seas running through them prior to this change,1124 but 
the extension led to over 100 straits being encompassed by territorial sea,1125 
1120 As indicated by the US in the context of transit passage in, United Nations Offi ce for 
Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Law of the Sea - Straits Used for International 
Navigation: Legislative History of Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea’ (1992) 33. This is also refl ected – through absence of mention of aircraft – in the 
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Confl icts at Sea, adopted 
12 June 1994 (International Review of the Red Cross, November-December 1995, no 309, 
pp 583-94) (‘San Remo Manual’): ‘In addition to the exercise of the rights of transit and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage, belligerent warships and auxiliary vessels may… exercise 
the right of innocent passage through neutral international straits …’ (emphasis added) 
(para 31) and, ‘Neutral vessels may likewise exercise the right of innocent passage through 
belligerent international straits …’ (para 32).
1121 Recalling Section 2.3.3.1, this agreement, also known as the ‘two freedoms agreement’, 
provides for the exchange of the fi rst two freedoms of the air i.e. overfl ight and stops for 
technical purposes.
1122 United Nations Offi ce for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Legislative History of 
Part III of UNCLOS’ (n 1120) 30-31 (Spain) and 62 (US).
1123 See Section 2.2.3.1 for discussion of the extension of the territorial sea from 3nm to 12nm.
1124 Bernard Oxman, ‘Transit of Straits and Archipelagic Waters by Military Aircraft’ (2000) 4 
S J Int & Comp L 377, 384. The Singapore and Sunda Straits are, however, narrower than 
6nm.
1125 Karin M Burke and Deborah A DeLeo, ‘Innocent Passage and Transit Passage in the 
United National Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 9 Yale J World Pub Ord 389, 
400, quoting Ronald P Cundick, ‘International Straits: The Right of Access’ (1975) 5 Ga J 
Int’l & Comp L 107.
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including ones that are strategically important for maritime States such as 
Gibraltar, Hormuz (Figure 5.1), Bab el Mandeb, Dover and Malacca.1126
 Figure 5.1: Strait of Hormuz, indicating the loss of the high seas corridor with the extension 
of the territorial sea
The coinciding adoption of these two elements – a comprehensive regime 
of transit passage and an increase in the breadth of the territorial sea – was 
aimed at ensuring that the extension of the territorial seas did not prohibit 
passage through certain straits that lost their high seas passage, particularly 
for military aircraft, which are regarded under Article 3 of the Chicago 
Convention as State aircraft. For those straits that are part of a State’s EEZ 
or part of the high seas, the freedoms of the high seas – including freedom 
of overflight – apply as in any other part of the high seas and so are not rele-
vant to the discussion on transit passage.1127 Straits in this category are one 
of the four types of international straits excluded from the transit passage 
regime under UNCLOS, as will be addressed in the following section.
1126 Kay Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 
77 Am J Int’l L 490, 493.
1127 Provided the high seas or EEZ route is of similar convenience to the routes through the 
territorial sea (see Section 5.3.3). 
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 5.3.3 Exclusion of certain international straits from transit passage regime
Before considering the application of the transit passage regime and its 
implications for overflight, this section will briefly set out the extent of 
transit passage in terms of the geographical requirements of an interna-
tional strait in which transit passage applies. In addition to the type of strait 
mentioned above, that is, straits through which there are high sea routes 
or EEZ routes that are of similar convenience,1128 UNCLOS excludes three 
other types of international straits from the transit passage regime: straits 
through which passage is subject to existing conventions; 1129 straits formed 
by an island off the coast of the mainland of a State, where there is a passage 
of similar convenience through the high seas or EEZ on the seaward side of 
the island;1130 and, straits providing access between the high seas or an EEZ 
and territorial sea of a foreign State. 1131 The second of these four categories – 
straits subject to existing conventions – was adopted to maintain ingrained 
pre-existing treaties at the time of the drafting of UNCLOS and is not in 
wide application today. 1132 Passage through straits in this category is deter-
mined according to the relevant conventions. For straits in the final two 
categories non-suspendable innocent passage applies, in the same manner 
as discussed above in relation to the Corfu Channel Case.1133 In these two 
types of straits, as in other areas of the territorial sea where no passage is 
provided, overflight rights are obtained as for any other national airspace, 
1128 UNCLOS, Article 36. This article applies in the case that an international strait is suffi -
ciently wide so that at its narrowest point there is EEZ or high seas running through it. 
In this case, if those EEZ or high seas routes are ‘of similar convenience’ to the routes in 
the territorial sea portions of the international strait, the standard regimes of freedom of 
navigation and overfl ight in the EEZ/high seas and innocent passage in the territorial 
sea, will apply (Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 42).
1129 UNCLOS, Article 35(c). For example, the Turkish Straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles, 
which are governed by the Montreux Convention of 1936, giving Turkey control over 
the straits in return for free passage. The original signatory States to this Convention are 
(in addition to Turkey) Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, the USSR, the UK and 
Yugoslavia (Jon M Van Dyke, ‘Transit Passage Through International Straits’ in Aldo 
Chircop, Theodore McDorman and Susan Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-
Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M Johnston (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 204).
1130 UNCLOS, Article 38(1). Also known as the ‘Messina exception’, in recognition of its 
application to the strait between Sicily and mainland Italy. 
1131 ibid Article 45(1)(b). For example, the Straits of Tiran, which connect the Red Sea and the 
Gulf of Aqaba, the latter of which is made up of the territorial seas of Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia.
1132 Stuart Kaye, ‘Freedom of Navigation, Surveillance and Security: Legal Issues 
Surrounding the Collection of Intelligence from Beyond the Littoral’ (2005) 24 Aust YBIL 
93, 97. See above n 1129 for discussion of the Montreux Convention, as an example of a 
treaty of this kind currently in force.
1133 UNCLOS, Articles 45(1) and (2).
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that is, prior authorisation from the coastal State is required.1134 Passage 
through the first category however, is subject to the freedom of the high seas 
and applies as such to both ships and aircraft.1135 As a result, aside from any 
conventions governing individual straits, such as the Montreux Conven-
tion of 1936, there are only two instances where overflight without prior 
permission exists through international straits: firstly, where there is transit 
passage and secondly, when there is a high seas or EEZ route through the 
strait.
 5.3.4 The result of transit passage on overflight
UNCLOS expressly extends the regime of transit passage to aircraft: ‘all 
ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage’.1136 Like non-suspend-
able innocent passage, and as mentioned in Section 5.2, the coastal State 
cannot suspend the right of transit passage. This is unequivocally provided 
under Article 44 UNCLOS – ‘[t]here shall be no suspension of transit 
passage’ – and it means that States are not permitted to restrict or prohibit 
overflight in the airspace over straits in accordance with Article 9 of the 
Chicago Convention, as they are in other national airspace.1137 Caminos and 
Cogliati-Bantz point out that the closure of the airspace in the Sunda Strait 
and the Lombok Strait by Indonesia in 1988 for ‘the purpose of conducting 
air and sea tactical exercises’ was consequently a violation of Article 44.1138
Transit passage through an international strait does not change the 
status of the seas that make up the strait, that is, they retain their status as 
the internal waters and territorial seas of the bordering States. UNCLOS 
makes this clear in stating that the transit passage regime ‘shall not in other 
respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits’.1139 It also 
stipulates that the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the 
straits over such waters – the airspace, bed and subsoil – shall not in other 
respects be affected, but that it is to be exercised subject to the applicable 
part of UNCLOS (Part III) and to other rules of international law.1140
Transit passage under UNCLOS reflects the codification of the EEZ and 
so, further to the rule in the Corfu Channel Case which applies only to straits 
connecting specifically high seas, transit passage applies in straits that are 
‘used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an 
1134 For Israel, in relation to the passage of its vessels, the application of non-suspendable 
innocent passage to the Straits of Tiran (see above n 1131) was particularly important 
considering that it would otherwise likely not have had the right of access to its territory 
through this body of water (Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 54-55).
1135 UNCLOS, Article 36. 
1136 UNCLOS, Article 38(1).
1137 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 232.
1138 ibid.
1139 UNCLOS, Article 34(1). 
1140 ibid Article 34(1) and (2).
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exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone’.1141 Through these straits, in accordance with the regime of 
transit passage, aircraft and vessels enjoy ‘freedom of navigation and over-
flight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the 
strait’.1142 Despite the use of the term ‘freedom’ in this article, aircraft do not 
enjoy freedom of overflight in transit lanes. The obligations on aircraft to, 
for example, proceed without delay and refrain from engaging in activities 
that are not related to expeditious transit, as mentioned in Section 5.2, are 
indicative of this.
The regime finally adopted for transit passage in UNCLOS reflects a 
compromise between coastal States bordering international straits, who will 
have more control over the straits in order to protect their marine resources 
and security interests, and maritime States, who benefit from fewer restric-
tions in passing through the straits.1143 The limitations on overflight that 
prevent transit passage from constituting freedom of overflight are one 
side of this compromise, in favour of States bordering international water-
ways such as Spain, Morocco, Malaysia and Indonesia, who contended 
during the drafting process that the regime of non-suspendable innocent 
passage should be maintained in international straits.1144 These States were 
particularly concerned about the implications of providing access to foreign 
military aircraft. As Spain put forward,
‘…if a military aircraft overflew the waters of a narrow international strait at 
high altitude, it would be easy for it to carry out observations for military pur-
poses of the territory and installations of the coastal States. The latter would be 
helpless to prevent such threats to their national security. In addition, of course, 
the territory of the coastal State would also be at serious risk in the case of an 
accident to such a military aircraft’.1145
The adoption of the transit passage regime and its equal application to 
aircraft, in spite of these concerns, demonstrates the compromise from the 
other side. The fact that the rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage continue to apply during armed conflict (see Section 5.5),1146 
make these concerns particularly acute.
As will be seen in the following section, despite the ultimate adoption of 
an international codified transit passage regime, Iran has been reluctant to 
yield control in the Strait of Hormuz.
1141 ibid Article 37.
1142 ibid Article 38(2).
1143 Burke and DeLeo (n 1125) 401.
1144 United Nations Offi ce for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Legislative History of 
Part III of UNCLOS’ (n 1120) 31-32, 94, 36 and 134, respectively. Consider, for example, 
the Strait of Gibraltar and the Straits of Malacca. 
1145 ibid 32. For further discussion on this matter in the drafting history see, Van Dyke, 
‘Transit Passage Through International Straits’ (n 1129).
1146 San Remo Manual, para 27. 
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 5.3.5 The Strait of Hormuz
Some States, including the US and the UK, support the view that transit 
passage under UNCLOS has attained customary status,1147 but this is by no 
means widely accepted.1148 This situation poses a problem considering that 
some States are not party to UNCLOS and do not recognise the customary 
status of the transit passage regime.
Oman has ratified UNCLOS but Iran has not, and neither State is a party 
to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.1149 
As States bordering the Strait of Hormuz, they have also not concluded a 
specific treaty governing transit through the strait.
Both Iran and Oman dispute the applicability of the rule of non-
suspendable innocent passage in the Corfu Channel Case to the Strait of 
Hormuz on the basis that it applies to straits connecting one part of the 
high seas to another part of the high seas, whereas the Persian Gulf does not 
contain high seas.1150 Iran has also repeatedly voiced its opposition to the 
transit regime under UNCLOS having developed into customary interna-
tional law.1151
Despite not being a State party, Iran is a signatory to UNCLOS and 
upon signing it, issued an interpretive declaration that it would grant the 
right of transit passage under Article 38 UNCLOS but only to those States 
that are parties to the said convention.1152 Otherwise, Iran applies innocent 
passage to its area of territorial sea in the strait, as it applies in any other 
area of territorial sea.1153 Notably, the US is not a party to UNCLOS. In June 
2019, a US drone flying through the Strait of Hormuz was shot down by 
1147 Guilfoyle (n 1118). 
1148 Van Dyke, ‘Transit Passage Through International Straits’ (n 1129) 186-87.
1149 Iran is a signatory to the convention though, as of 28 May 1958. 
1150 Andrea Gioia, ‘Persian Gulf’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2007) 
31. This is presumably on the basis that Iran has declared an EEZ, which encompasses 
what existed of the high seas in the Gulf. This does of course mean that the Persian Gulf 
contains international airspace. Being encompassed by national airspace though, this 
makes little difference to overfl ight rights in the absence of transit passage for aircraft 
through the strait.
1151 ibid.
1152 United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Chapter XXI: Law of the Sea, Declarations and 
Reservations’, available at <treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/
Chapter%20XXI/XXI-6.en.pdf> accessed 26 July 2019. This is despite the fact that Article 
38(1) UNCLOS provides that ‘all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage’, 
not just State parties to the treaty. See also, Nilufer Oral, ‘Transit Passage Rights in the 
Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block the Passage of Oil Tankers’ (ASIL Insight, 3 
May 2012), available at <www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passage-
rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage> accessed 1 February 
2020.  
1153 Geir Ulfstein, ‘How International Law Restricts the Use of Military Force in Hormuz’ 
(EJIL:Talk! 27 August 2019), available at <www.ejiltalk.org/how-international-law-
restricts-the-use-of-military-force-in-hormuz/> accessed 3 November 2019.
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Iranian forces.1154 The US declared that they were in international airspace 
at the time.1155 As is so often the case with these highly politicised incidents, 
the facts are vague, and this event is just one of many arising out of ongoing 
tensions between the US and Iran, and one that goes beyond the interpreta-
tion of the law of the sea. It does, however, serve to illustrate that despite a 
widely accepted international legal framework for transit passage, which 
is generally uncontroversial, the application of the relevant law in certain 
straits and with regard to certain maritime States is complex, with poten-
tially significant consequences for overflight.
Finally, although the above is presented as a problem in part arising 
from Iran not having ratified UNCLOS, doing so does not necessarily result 
in a harmonised approach considering that ratification of a treaty does not 
necessarily mean that a State adheres to all aspects of that treaty. Regarding 
transit passage under UNCLOS, Spain declared upon ratification that it 
did not adhere to the transit passage regime and that it would continue to 
apply its national laws in international straits.1156 In addition, Greece, a State 
party to UNCLOS issued a declaration that in practice provides that it has 
the responsibility to designate routes throughout its islands off its coast, 
in effect writing into the convention additional or varied rules for transit 
passage by, as Turkey stated in its reply, allowing it to ‘retain the power to 
exclude some of the straits which link the Aegean Sea to the Mediterranean 
from the regime of transit passage’.1157
The transit passage regime under UNCLOS has resulted in substantial 
uniformity for the passage of aircraft through international straits without 
the need for prior permission. Some coastal States, however, such as Iran, 
Spain and Greece, that border international straits falling within the scope 
of the UNCLOS transit passage regime, do not apply this regime to the 
strait. This has implications for both navigation of vessels and overflight 
of aircraft through the strait. Whilst uniformity in the rules is preferable for 
the safety and efficiency of both navigation and overflight, it is the conflict 
between the coastal State, in applying a different regime, and the State of 
nationality of the aircraft or vessel operating through the strait, in failing to 
accept, and therefore adhere to, the different regime, that potentially results 
in detrimental consequences. The incident above between the US and Iran 
provides an example of the implications for overflight. 
1154 ‘Strait of Hormuz: US Confi rms Drone Shot Down by Iran’ (BBC, 20 June 2019), available 
at <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48700965> accessed 3 November 2019.
1155 ibid.
1156 United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Declarations and Reservations’ (n 1152).
1157 ibid.
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 5.4 Archipelagic waters
5.4.1 What is an archipelagic State?
UNCLOS defines an archipelagic State simply as ‘a State constituted wholly 
by one or more archipelagos’, where an archipelago is ‘a group of islands, 
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely 
interrelated [that they]… form an intrinsic entity’.1158 Although this defi-
nition might suggest that there are a large number of archipelagic States, 
further conditions go some way in explaining why there are only nine 
States that have deposited charts or lists or geographical coordinates with 
the Secretary-General of the UN, as required under UNCLOS for an archi-
pelagic State. 1159 These conditions apply to the drawing of the baselines of 
an archipelagic State and include, for example, that the water to land ratio 
inside the archipelagic baseline must be between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1, and that 
the length of baselines may not exceed 100nm. 1160 Furthermore, as is clear 
from the definition of ‘archipelagic State’, it excludes States that comprise 
an archipelago in addition to land connected to a continent: the State must 
be wholly constituted by an archipelago or archipelagos.
 5.4.2 Coastal State sovereignty over archipelagic waters and sea lanes
Returning to the definition of an archipelagic State, surrounding this 
‘intrinsic entity’ is the territorial sea baseline, seaward of which the terri-
torial sea begins.1161 Prior to UNCLOS, an archipelagic State was required 
to delimit its territorial sea on the basis of each of its individual islands in 
accordance with the law applying to islands in general.1162 As a result of the 
archipelagic sea regime under UNCLOS, States have, in addition to their 
territorial sea and their internal waters, sovereignty over their archipelagic 
waters,1163 from the bed and subsoil up to and including the airspace.1164 
1158 UNCLOS, Articles 46(a) and (b).
1159 ibid Article 47(9). These States are: Bahamas, Fiji, Indonesia, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, 
the Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and Trinidad and Tobago. Despite 
this, other States have made archipelagic claims, including: Antigua and Barbuda, Cape 
Verde, Comoros, Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. On these points, see, Carlos Jiménez 
Piernas, ‘Archipelagic Waters’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
2009) 20 and 21, respectively. 
1160 UNCLOS, Articles 47(1) and (2).
1161 UNCLOS, Article 48.
1162 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958, Article 10. Indonesia 
has not ratifi ed this convention though, and in 1957 declared its archipelago part of its 
internal waters subject to innocent passage (P de Vries Lentsch, ‘The Right of Overfl ight 
Over Strait States and Archipelagic States: Developments and Prospects’ (1983) 14 Neth-
erlands Yearbook of International Law 165, 180).
1163 UNCLOS, Article 49(1). 
1164 ibid Article 49(2). 
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As with the territorial seas forming international straits under the transit 
passage regime, archipelagic waters are considered part of the territory of 
a State under Article 2 of the Chicago Convention, with the airspace above 
being national airspace.
ICAO has described the archipelagic State framework under UNCLOS 
as representing ‘a profound innovation and progressive development of 
international law’,1165 not least in that it has led to the concept of ‘territory’ 
under Article 2 encompassing a far greater geographic expanse than was 
intended at the time of the drafting of the Chicago Convention. Despite this, 
upon the adoption of UNCLOS, ICAO did not consider an amendment to 
Article 2 to be necessary in light of the archipelagic waters regime. ICAO 
concluded that the archipelagic waters regime under UNCLOS instead 
resulted in an implicit shift in the interpretation of the term ‘territory’ under 
the Chicago Convention:
‘Vast areas of the sea which were part of the high seas will become ‘archipelagic 
waters’ over which the archipelagic States will have sovereignty extending also 
to the airspace thereabove. Without any need for a textual amendment of the 
Chicago Convention, its Article 2 will have to be read as meaning that the ter-
ritory of a State shall be the land areas, territorial sea adjacent thereto and its 
archipelagic waters’.1166
Recalling Section 2.2.2.1, Article 2 stipulates that ‘territory of a State shall 
be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters… under the sovereignty 
of such State’. It is proposed here that the term ‘territorial waters’, which 
is not used in UNCLOS and was also not used in the 1958 Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, necessarily refers more 
broadly to the maritime areas under the sovereignty of the State, rather 
than being synonymous with the more specific term of ‘territorial sea’, as 
used in UNCLOS and the 1958 Convention. This is the logical conclusion 
considering that internal waters, which are neither land areas nor territo-
rial sea, have never been controversial in their inclusion within Article 2 of 
the Chicago Convention. Following this interpretation, ’territorial waters’ 
under Article 2 of the Chicago Convention are those maritime areas referred 
to in Article 2(1) UNCLOS, setting out the extent of sovereignty of a coastal 
state beyond its land territory:
‘The sovereignty of a coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and inter-
nal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea’.
1165 ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5 (n 1105) 253.
1166 ibid 254.
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This issue is still occasionally raised at the level of ICAO. In 2008, Indonesia 
brought the matter before the Legal Committee, arguing for a need to amend 
Article 2 of the Chicago Convention, but no further action on this has been 
recorded.1167
 5.4.3 Archipelagic sea lanes
The right of innocent passage is enjoyed by ships through archipelagic 
waters outside sea lanes1168 but, consistent with innocent passage in terri-
torial seas,1169 the right does not extend to aircraft. Archipelagic sea lanes 
provide aircraft (and vessels) with a right of passage through the archipe-
lagic waters without affecting the archipelagic State’s sovereignty over the 
lanes.1170
Archipelagic sea lanes passage is defined in Article 53(3) UNCLOS as,
‘the exercise… of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode 
solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another 
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone’.
Importantly for overflight, the above definition necessarily means that 
aircraft also have the right to archipelagic sea lanes passage in the terri-
torial sea surrounding a State’s archipelagic waters, as further expressly 
provided in Articles 53(1) and (4).1171 If this were not the case, the right to 
exercise archipelagic sea lanes passage for aircraft would be subject to the 
1167 ICAO WP/8-2, Draft Report on the Work of the Legal Committee During its 33rd Session (1 
May 2008) 4.5-4.14.
1168 UNCLOS, Article 52(1). Although ships have the right to innocent passage through 
archipelagic waters, the designation of archipelagic seas lane passage is signifi cant as 
there are a number of distinctions between the two, which make sea lanes more favour-
able. For example, the right of innocent passage can be suspended by the coastal State 
(Article 25(3)) but the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage cannot, although lanes can 
be substituted; and, when exercising their right to innocent passage, submarines and 
other underwater vehicles must surface and show their fl ag (Article 20) whereas in in 
archipelagic seas lanes this is not required. In addition, prior notifi cation and sometimes 
authorisation is required by some States for the innocent passage of warships, but this 
does not apply to the use of archipelagic sea lanes. For a discussion on these distinc-
tions see, Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Navigational Freedoms’ in 
Donald R Rothwell and Samuel Grono Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms, 
and the New Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2000) 9.
1169 See Section 2.2.3.2.
1170 UNCLOS, Article 49(4).
1171 ‘An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for 
the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its 
archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea’ (emphasis added) (Article 53(1)); and, 
‘Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent terri-
torial sea…’ (emphasis added) (Article 53(4)). See also, ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda 
Item 5 (n 1105) 253.
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negotiation of access to the airspace in the territorial sea, as with access to 
national airspace in general. This is clear from Figure 5.2, which depicts the 
archipelagic State of the Philippines surrounded by its band of territorial 
sea. Having said this, the Philippines made a declaration upon signing 
UNCLOS that it considers archipelagic waters as similar to internal waters 
and thus, that there is no passage through its territorial waters providing 
access to its archipelagic waters.1172 The declaration was met with opposi-
tion by a number of States, including Russia and Australia.
 Figure 5.2: The archipelago of the Philippines surrounded by the Philippines’ territorial sea1173
1172 United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Declarations and Reservations’ (n 1152).
1173  Source: Roel Balingit (username: Namayan), available at <commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Ph_Territorial_Map.png> accessed 12 February 2020.
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 273
Overflight of international straits and archipelagic sea lanes 255
As with transit passage, some States – such as the US – claim that archi-
pelagic sea lanes passage is customary international law, but the variation 
in State practice in applying the regime suggests that this is unlikely to be 
the case.1174 All States noted above in Section 5.4.11175 that have met the 
formal requirements of an archipelagic States, or that have registered but 
not met the formal requirements, are parties to UNCLOS, and therefore 
bound by its provisions. Like the Philippines though, Cape Verde and Sao 
Tome and Principe registered declarations to the archipelagic regime, in 
their case indicating a tacit rejection of archipelagic sea lanes passage.1176 
Indonesia’s administration of its archipelagic sea lanes provides another 
example of what some States view as a variation from what is provided 
under UNCLOS, a matter that will be further discussed in Section 5.4.4.3. 
5.4.4 Ambiguities in the application of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
to overflight
5.4.4.1 Designation of air routes
The archipelagic sea lanes passage regime under UNCLOS has, in practice, 
resulted in little conflict regarding its application to overflight. This may 
be in part because the number of archipelagic States is only small, and that 
just one of those States, Indonesia, has designated sea lanes through its 
archipelagic waters. As will be seen below, the UNCLOS provisions relating 
to designation are not entirely unambiguous insofar as they relate to over-
flight. More significantly though, like in international straits, international 
civil aviation generally operates through archipelagic waters on the basis 
of prior permission as it does through other national airspace,1177 and the 
application of archipelagic sea lanes passage to overflight is predominantly 
intended for the purpose of providing State aircraft access through the seas.
Under UNLCOS, an archipelagic State has the right to designate sea 
lanes and air routes through the archipelago and once established, all ships 
and aircraft enjoy the right of passage in such sea lanes and air routes.1178 
Aircraft are required to adhere to the air routes, with deviations of up to 
25nm permitted either side of the route.1179 In its designation of air routes, 
an archipelagic State must include ‘all normal passage routes used as routes 
1174 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 472.
1175 See n 1159.
1176 United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Declarations and Reservations’ (n 1152).
1177 Pursuant to Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the Chicago Convention, as addressed in Chapter 2. 
1178 UNCLOS, Articles 53(1) and (2). Article 41 UNCLOS governs the designation of sea lanes 
within international straits. Unlike its equivalent for archipelagic seas lanes, it does not 
provide States with the right to designate air routes over international straits. Greece and 
Morocco objected to this omission prior to the conclusion of UNCLOS, calling for coastal 
States to have the right to impose corridors for overfl ight in international straits, but their 
opposition on this point failed to impact the fi nal outcome (Caminos (n 1115) Note 386).
1179 UNCLOS, Article 53(5).
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for international navigation or overflight’.1180 If the State ‘does not designate 
sea lanes or air routes’, aircraft have the right to exercise passage ‘through 
the routes normally used for international navigation’, in accordance with 
Article 53(12).
The wording in Article 53(12) requires attention in terms of its implica-
tions for overflight in that it provides only for the ongoing use of routes 
normally used for international navigation, which is specifically used 
in UNCLOS in respect to ships, whereas the term ‘overflight’ is used for 
aircraft. This is despite the fact that the first part of the article establishes 
that it applies in the case that either sea lanes or air routes have not been 
designated. Commentators have thus questioned whether this means that 
air routes are tied to sea lanes.1181 The apparent coexistence is heightened by 
the wording of Article 53(1): ‘an archipelagic State may designate sea lanes 
and air routes thereabove…’ (emphasis added).
ICAO has not commented on Article 53(1), but on Article 53(12) it 
stated, soon after the adoption of UNCLOS, merely that the provision 
‘preserves the factual status quo’, meaning that ‘the existing air routes will 
continue’ in the case that the archipelagic State takes no action to expressly 
designate air routes. This suggests that ICAO either takes as a given that 
air routes follow the routes of navigation, or that the phrase ‘routes for… 
navigation’ as it is used in Article 53(12) refers also to air routes. The latter is 
unlikely given that UNCLOS throughout is clear in its distinction between 
routes for navigation and air routes, and navigation and overflight.
De Vries Lentsch has considered the ambiguity, pointing out that 
in practice air routes and sea routes are established in accordance with 
the considerations of each mode of transport – air routes cover land, for 
example – and requiring them to be aligned has no practical benefit.1182
However, Kwiatkowska and Agoes provide logic to the literal interpre-
tation of the text:
‘The requirement that air routes must be above archipelagic sea lanes was dic-
tated… by the necessity to provide maneuvering possibilities for military aircraft 
while the naval forces of a particular fleet are passing through the sea lanes’.1183
Thus, the symbiotic relationship between the sea lanes and air routes is 
intentional, but not relevant to international civil aviation. Quoting Kwiat-
kowska and Agoes once again:
1180 ibid 53(4).
1181 Barbara Kwiatkowska and Etty R Agoes, ‘Archipelagic Waters: An Assessment of 
National Legislation’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Ursula E Heinz and Denise A Bizzarro (eds), 
Law of the Sea at the Crossroads: The Continuing Search for a Universally Accepted Regime - 
Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Symposium of the Kiel Institute of International Law, 10-14 
July 1990 (Duncker & Humblot 1991) 144; de Vries Lentsch (n 1162) 211. 
1182 ibid.
1183 Kwiatkowska and Agoes (n 1181) 144.
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‘Civil aircraft could clearly not fulfill the condition of zigzagging above the 
archipelagic sea lanes and of overflying archipelagic waters without passing 
above archipelagic land (island) territory’.1184
Whilst international civil aircraft have a right to operate through air routes 
designated as archipelagic sea lanes pursuant to UNCLOS, in practice, these 
routes are not designed with their navigation in mind and their flight paths 
will instead be dictated outside the scope of UNCLOS as for the operation 
of foreign aircraft in any other national airspace.
 5.4.4.2 ICAO’s role in approving air routes
Under Article 53(9), an archipelagic State is required to refer its proposals 
of designated sea lanes to ‘the competent international organization’, in this 
case the IMO,1185 for adoption before the State designates them. The article 
refers only to sea lanes though, rather than also air routes, an omission 
ICAO addressed shortly after the adoption of UNCLOS. Whilst it must be 
considered intentional, ICAO concluded, it noted that there is no record of 
the purpose of the omission and therefore,
‘the prima facie interpretation must be that the archipelagic States would have 
no conventional duty to refer proposals on the designation of air routes over the 
archipelagic waters to ICAO for adoption’.1186
For practical reasons though, ICAO indicated that archipelagic States 
should submit their air route proposals to their Regional Air Navigation 
Conference ‘for eventual approval by the ICAO Council’.1187 This also 
makes sense from a safety perspective given ICAO’s role in approving 
regional air navigation plans and the fact that air routes are the foundation 
for the coordination of the provision of air navigation services as set out in 
those plans.1188 The IMO has since formally recognised ICAO as a relevant 
party in considering archipelagic sea lanes proposals.1189 Noting ICAO’s 
consideration that there is no recorded intention for the omission, the reason 
1184 ibid.
1185 Caminos (n 1115) 166.
1186 ICAO Secretariat Study on Agenda Item 5 (n 1105) 254. 
1187 ibid.
1188 ‘Safety of Navigation: Designation of Certain Sea Lanes and Air Routes Thereabove 
Through Indonesian Archipelagic Waters – Note by Indonesia’ (MSC 67/7/2 30 August 
1996), in Barbara Kwiatkowska, Eric Molenaar, Alex Oude Elferink and Alfred Soons 
(eds), International Organizations and the Law of the Sea – Documentary Yearbook 1996, Vol 12 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996) 727.
1189 IMO Resolution A.572(14), as amended, ‘Amendments to the General Provisions on 
Ship’s Routeing’ (19 May 1998), Annex 2, 3.3: ‘Upon receipt of a proposal for designating 
archipelagic sea lanes and before consideration for adoption, the IMO shall ensure that 
the proposal is disseminated to all Governments and ICAO so as to provide them with 
suffi cient opportunity to comment on the proposal’.
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may lie with the explanation above regarding the designation of air routes 
in archipelagic sea lanes being for the purpose of a military aircraft: given 
that State aircraft are outside the competence of ICAO, its involvement was 
not considered relevant.1190
 5.4.4.3 Partial designation
The rules for designation involving routes normally used for navigation 
and overflight, are designed to help ensure archipelagic States maintain 
traditional routes through their archipelagos. It is in an archipelagic State’s 
interest to minimise the designation of sea lanes through their archipelago 
though, as it retains greater control over non-sea lane designated waters.1191 
On the other hand, there are the interests of the States whose aircraft and 
ships benefit from a greater network of sea lanes to support both their 
commercial and military interests.1192
This tension has led to disagreements regarding Indonesia’s designa-
tion of sea lanes. Indonesia designated north-south sea lanes through its 
archipelagic waters in 2002 but has not designated east-west lanes.1193 The 
US and Australia object to the designation on the basis that they claim 
the east-west sea lanes to be routes normally used for navigation under 
Article 53(4) UNCLOS.1194 Recalling Article 53(12), a State can use the routes 
normally used for navigation in the case that the archipelagic State has not 
designated routes, but this is the only permitted circumstance for the use of 
undesignated routes. In the case of Indonesia however, the IMO has classi-
fied its designation of sea lanes as a ‘partial designation’ on the basis that it 
does not include the east-west lanes1195 and, as a consequence, States are still 
permitted to use the east-west designation on the basis of Article 53(12).1196 
Indonesia has acknowledged that its designation is partial and accepts 
1190 Kwiatkowska and Agoes (n 1181) 144. Having said this, ICAO plays a role in the coordi-
nation of civil and military traffi c and its involvement today in the designation process 
alongside the IMO is in this sense consistent with serving the interests of safety.
1191 Chris Forward, ‘Archipelagic Sea-Lanes in Indonesia – Their Legality in International 
Law’ (2009) 23 Aust & NZ Mar LJ 143, 150-51.
1192 Carlos Jiménez Piernas, ‘Archipelagic Waters’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Inter-
national Law 2009) 25.
1193 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 199-200.
1194 Tara Davenport, ‘The Archipelagic Regime’ in Donald R Rothwell, Alex G Oude Elferink, 
Karen N Scott and Tim Stephens (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (OUP 
2015) 151.
1195 Arif Havas Oegroseno, ‘Archipelagic States: From Concept to Law’ in David J Attard, 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Norman A Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The IMLI Manual on 
International Maritime Law: Volume 1 - The Law of the Sea (OUP 2014) 135.
1196 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 201. See also, Sam Bateman, ‘Australia and Indo-
nesia at odds at sea’ (East Asia Forum, 26 June 2015), available at <www.eastasiaforum.
org/2015/06/26/australia-and-indonesia-at-odds-at-sea/> accessed 20 May 2018; 
Carlos Jiménez Piernas, ‘Archipelagic Waters’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Inter-
national Law 2009) 27.
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the right of vessels and aircraft to operate though ‘routes normally used 
for navigation’, but this public position is contrary to its domestic legisla-
tion.1197 As acknowledged in Section 5.4.4.1, there is no evidence that this 
situation has resulted in concern for the operation of international civil avia-
tion, however it has impacted on foreign military operations, particularly 
those of the US who have operated in the east-west lanes, asserting what the 
US claims as its right to do so.1198 In October 2016 the US reiterated its objec-
tion to the lack of designation by way of a diplomatic note to Indonesia.1199 
As of May 2020, this author is not aware of further steps having been taken 
towards a resolution of this matter between the two States.
 5.5 Overflight through transit and archipelagic sea lanes 
during armed conflict
Sections 5.1 and 5.3.4 indicated that transit passage and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage continue to apply during a time of armed conflict. This is with 
the exception that a belligerent coastal State has no obligation to provide 
passage during an armed conflict for a vessel or aircraft of an enemy 
State.1200
Insofar as the passage of aircraft of neutral States1201 is concerned, as a 
result of Article 44 UNCLOS, any provisions under air law that may lead 
to the suspension of the right of overflight during war, such as Article 89 
of the Chicago Convention and Article I, Section 1 of the Transit Agree-
ment, do not permit the coastal State to close an international strait1202 and 
this applies equally to archipelagic sea lanes.1203 In the case of suspension 
under these circumstances, transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage 
would continue to serve the operation of international civil aviation where 
1197 ‘Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes’ (Semaphore – Newsletter of the Sea Power Centre 
Australia, April 2005), available at <www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/fi les/documents/
Semaphore_2005_6.pdf> accessed 25 June 2016.
1198 Davenport, ‘The Archipelagic Regime’ (n 1194) 151; Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 
200-1. A US military aircraft was met by Indonesia military aircraft whilst operating 
through the east-west sea lane.
1199 Robert Beckman, ‘The Legal Regime Governing Passage on Routes used for International 
Navigation through Indonesian Waters’ (Presentation delivered at the 42nd Annual 
Conference of the Centre for Oceans and Policy Cooperation and Engagement in the Asia 
Pacifi c Region, Beijing, 24-26 May 2018).
1200 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 21. As with many other aspects regulating the law 
of war, this is determined as a result of State practice. Note also, ‘[b]elligerents in transit 
or archipelagic sea lanes passage may not… conduct offensive operations against enemy 
forces’ (San Remo Manual, para 30).
1201 That is, States that are not party to the confl ict (San Remo Manual, para 13(d)).
1202 Caminos (n 1115), 161.
1203 UNCLOS, Article 54. This article provides that Article 44, inter alia, applies mutatis 
mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes passage.
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overflight through other parts of the territory of the bordering States or 
archipelagic State would not be permitted.
The ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case made clear though that during a 
state of war, a belligerent State bordering a strait has the right to regulate 
– but not prohibit – the passage of warships through the strait,1204 refer-
ring to neutral warships, and this is understood to extend also to merchant 
ships.1205 Likewise, for neutral aircraft today, State practice suggests that a 
belligerent coastal State, whilst it may not prevent passage, has the right 
to impose regulations on overflight through transit lanes and archipelagic 
sea lanes during armed conflict, such as subjecting aircraft to visit and 
search.1206
Notwithstanding the above, Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz argue that in 
extreme circumstances the State may be able to justify the closure of transit 
lanes or archipelagic sea lanes, with the legality of doing so determined 
on the basis of the rules on State responsibility, specifically circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness.1207
 5.6 Conclusion to chapter
As a result of the regimes established under UNCLOS, the airspace over 
international straits and in archipelagic sea lanes is an anomaly in that it 
is part of sovereign airspace but the rules applying to overflight are closer 
to those in international airspace. Like in the EEZ and the high seas, the 
Rules of the Air under Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention apply without 
exception and the coastal State cannot impose its national civil aviation 
regulations in the airspace. Furthermore, the coastal State may not hamper 
or suspend passage, even in the case of war, although State practice indi-
cates that there is no obligation to permit the aircraft of an enemy State to 
pass through the lanes, and, possibly, in the case of exceptional circum-
stances, the coastal State also has the right to close the lanes to the aircraft 
of other States on the basis of the action being justifiable as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness.1208
Aircraft passing through an international strait or archipelagic sea 
lane do not require prior authorisation to pass through the airspace but 
neither do they have the right to freedom of overflight: unlike in the EEZ 
or over the high seas, they must proceed without delay and, in doing so, 
they are forbidden from activities that are external to expeditious transit. 
Whilst transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage apply to both 
1204 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 1949 (Apr. 9), p. 4, 
p. 29.
1205 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 26.
1206 San Remo Manual, paras 115 and 125. 
1207 Caminos and Cogliati-Bantz (n 1114) 30.
1208 YILC (2001) Vol. II, Part 2.
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civil aircraft and State aircraft, the regimes are, in practice, to the benefit 
of State – usually military – aircraft and as a result, the issues addressed 
in this chapter have consequences for these aircraft where they have little 
or no impact on international civil aviation. As discussed in Section 2.4.4, 
overflight of national airspace for State aircraft is largely negotiated on an 
ad hoc basis. Transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage enable such 
aircraft to operate freely between areas of international airspace without 
either the need for authorisation from the coastal States whose national 
airspace includes the international straits or archipelagic sea lanes they 
pass through or, the impractical detours that would be required if they were 
forced to avoid the airspace.
The regime under UNCLOS brings substantial uniformity to the legal 
framework applying to navigation in the airspace over international straits 
and archipelagic sea lanes. However, as demonstrated in this chapter, the 
application of the laws is not without conflict. In the case of transit passage, 
some coastal States have not accepted the application of the regime to their 
national airspace in the international strait. Where this is the case, the poten-
tial for conflict exists – as displayed in the Strait of Hormuz between the US 
and Iran – where the State of registry of the aircraft does not recognise the 
purported right of the coastal State to regulate the operation of the aircraft. 
In the case of archipelagic sea lanes passage, the designation of air routes 
has resulted in conflicting views between the coastal State, in this case 
Indonesia, and the States whose military aircraft operate in the airspace. As 
the case of Indonesia demonstrates, there is some ambiguity in the archi-
pelagic sea lanes passage regime resulting from the failure to establish a 
contingency for the situation arising out of an archipelagic State designating 
some sea lanes but not including all normal passage routes. The concept of 
‘partial designation’ has been accepted by the IMO to address this and to 
allow maritime States to operate in normal passage routes. In doing so, the 
IMO has arguably gone beyond the intention of UNCLOS1209 and, although 
Indonesia has publicly accepted it, both its domestic legislation and actions 
in response to military aircraft operating in the east-west sea lanes indicate 
otherwise.
The tension between the conflicting rights asserted by the coastal 
State and the State of registry of aircraft navigating through international 
airspace, as has been addressed in the preceding chapters of this study, 
extends also to the context of archipelagic sea lanes and international straits 
which, despite constituting national airspace, involve rights that more 
closely resemble that of freedom of overflight. The consequences of this are 
negligible for international civil aviation but it remains to be seen whether 
and to what extent, these legal issues result in greater conflict between 
States in future regarding the navigation of State, particularly military, 
aircraft.
1209 Davenport, ‘The Archipelagic Regime’ (n 1194) 151.
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6 Conclusions and recommendations
6.1 Conclusions
The central research question of this study was: What jurisdiction does a 
coastal State have over the operation of the aircraft registered in other States in 
international airspace adjacent to its coast? In attempting to answer this ques-
tion, this study addressed three principal matters, as those that were identi-
fied as involving ambiguity in terms of where the balance sits between the 
rights of the coastal State and the rights of the users of the airspace in the 
exercise of their freedom of overflight. This chapter will briefly address the 
main conclusions in the research on each of these matters before presenting, 
as the focus of the chapter, the overarching conclusions of the study. It will 
also provide some observations and recommendations based on these over-
arching conclusions.
6.1.1 Safety zones
Article 60 UNCLOS provides the coastal State with the exclusive right to 
construct, regulate and use artificial islands, and installations and structures 
related to the exercise of its EEZ rights or that interfere with those rights, in 
its EEZ. This exclusive right exists mutatis mutandis on the continental shelf. 
This Article also permits the coastal State to impose safety zones around 
their maritime constructions, to up to 500 metres from the perimeter of the 
construction, a distance which may be greater with the approval of the IMO, 
and which is required to reflect the nature and function of the construction. 
Within these safety zones the jurisdiction of the State extends beyond that 
which the coastal State has in the EEZ or continental shelf more broadly, 
that is, outside the safety zones.
There were three broad matters that were discussed in Chapter 3 
relevant to determining jurisdiction of the coastal State over the operation 
of aircraft in international airspace adjacent to its territorial sea. The first is 
the circumstances in which construction changes the legal status of a feature 
at sea in terms of shifting the delimitation of national and international 
airspace. The second is whether Article 60 can be interpreted as providing 
the right to extend safety zones to the airspace over maritime constructions 
or whether this has developed as a customary international law indepen-
dently from the regime under UNCLOS. The third is, in the case that no 
such right exists to extend safety zones to the airspace, what rights does the 
coastal State have, if any, to prohibit, restrict or otherwise manage the over-
flight of the aircraft of other States in order to facilitate air traffic movement 
in and out of a maritime construction? This is particularly relevant in the 
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case a State were to establish an artificial island in its EEZ for the purpose 
of a civil international airport, which would involve a consistent flow of 
traffic and therefore a need to impose measures to manage overflight on a 
sustained basis.
The potentially changing legal status of the sea was addressed in two 
ways: human modification to natural features beyond the territorial sea and 
human modification to the coastline of a landmass under the sovereignty 
of a State in the case that there are resulting changes to the delimitation 
of the airspace. The first of these discussed a series of cases culminating, 
most recently, in the South China Sea Arbitration, in which it was confirmed 
that a maritime feature retains its original legal status despite human 
modification. As a result of this, for example, a low-tide elevation in the 
EEZ or on high seas, cannot become a natural island through construction 
and it instead continues to exist in law as a low-tide elevation whilst also 
becoming an artificial island. This position is significant because it means 
that a State cannot use a low-tide elevation, or a permanently submerged 
reef, in order to claim national airspace over a maritime feature that, prior 
to the construction, did not generate claims to sovereignty. Furthermore, for 
the purposes of this study, it means that these features are relevant to the 
discussion on safety zones. The chapter also drew attention to the implica-
tion for the delimitation of national, and therefore international, airspace, as 
a result of human modification within a State’s territorial sea. This discus-
sion was raised in the context of its expected increasing relevance in light of 
rising sea levels as a result of climate change, where coastal construction and 
even island creation has been undertaken to protect affected communities.
The main body of Chapter 3 considered whether a coastal State may 
have jurisdiction in the airspace above its maritime construction through 
there being a right to extend safety zones around those constructions in 
its EEZ or on its continental shelf to the airspace above them. This chapter 
first considered the wording of Article 60, particularly Articles 60(4), (5) 
and (6), which suggest that the safety zones are restricted to the sea itself. 
This conclusion was reached on the basis of the reference to ‘navigation’, as 
opposed to also ‘overflight’, the reference to ‘ships’ and not ‘aircraft’, and 
to the stipulation regarding the extent of the zones, that is, that it refers to a 
breadth around them but not to an altitude above them. Despite this, there 
are instances1210 in which these laws have been interpreted as allowing for 
the extension of safety zones to the airspace above maritime constructions 
pursuant to these provisions. This is supported by a teleological inter-
pretation of the laws: they are designed to protect the safety of both the 
construction and of users of the maritime space operating in the vicinity. 
On the other hand, the subsequent practice of States in implementing the 
law into their domestic jurisdiction overwhelmingly supports the literal 
interpretation of the text of the treaty, in applying only to vessels on the 
1210 France, for example, as to which see Section 3.3.2.1, as well as in academic opinion, as to 
which see Rothwell, discussed in the same section.
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surface of the sea. This is furthermore supported by the drafting material to 
the 1958 provisions on safety zones, which form the basis for the UNCLOS 
provisions, and the fact that no amendments were made in respect to 
airspace in the provisions as they were included in UNCLOS. Based on the 
actions of the US in repeatedly overflying the ‘prohibited airspace’ above 
the artificial islands constructed by China in the South China Sea, this study 
also considered the possibility of the right to establish safety zones in the 
airspace above maritime constructions becoming customary international 
law and, in particular, it considered the role of the persistent objector and 
the development of regional custom, where only a small number of related 
States engage in the practice. In any case, this analysis was hypothetical as 
the present set of circumstances does not suggest that the right is forming 
as customary law.
A State has jurisdiction over the aviation operations themselves that are 
conducted to and from its maritime construction as a result of Articles 60(1) 
and (2) UNCLOS. The management of air traffic is governed as it is with 
any other users of the airspace. In the case that a State constructs an artificial 
island in its EEZ or on its continental shelf for the purpose of establishing 
a civil international airport on it, a State would also undoubtedly have 
jurisdiction over that airport as a result of Articles 60(1) and (2) UNCLOS. 
The State would not have jurisdiction over the airspace as a result of the 
construction of the artificial island though. It remains to be seen how States 
would respond to a proposal by a State to manage the airspace above an 
airport outside its territory, which would involve sustained use of the inter-
national airspace above it. At the least, it would involve amendments to the 
applicable RANP.
6.1.2 Flight information regions
This matter was examined in the scope of this study slightly differently to 
the other aspects. Instead of determining whether a costal State has jurisdic-
tion in international airspace, it considered the scope of the coastal State’s 
jurisdiction in the provision of its ATS, specifically in the context of whether 
the coastal State is prohibited under international civil aviation law from 
discriminating against aircraft operating in international airspace within 
the FIR for which it is responsible. In the absence of an explicit principle of 
non-discrimination applying to the provision of ATS under Annex 11 to the 
Chicago Convention, the chapter set out to examine whether there was an 
implied principle that applied, considering the context of Annex 11 within 
the broader international civil aviation law framework and the significance 
of non-discrimination to air navigation aspects in national airspace. The 
non-discrimination principle appears in the Chicago Convention several 
times. It is not an overarching principle though, as air transport matters are 
outside of its scope and, relying on a framework of, mostly, bilateral agree-
ments, they are necessarily discriminatory. On this basis, access to national 
airspace from the outset is granted on a discriminatory basis.
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Furthermore, the principle of non-discrimination, where it applies to 
air navigation, still leaves States with the discretion to discriminate against 
aircraft based on their State of registry in some instances. For example, the 
non-discrimination principle in Article 9(a) applies only to aircraft engaged 
in scheduled services, while the access to air navigation facilities under 
Article 15 is subject to the exception in Article 68, that States have the right 
to designate the routes that any scheduled service may followed. The same 
right is included in the Transit Agreement in respect to the right of over-
flight. On this basis, it is difficult to argue that there is an overarching prin-
ciple of non-discrimination in international civil aviation law which may 
implicitly apply to navigation in international airspace. In addition, whilst 
there are safety and economic arguments to be made for non-discrimination 
in international airspace, as are the purposes of non-discrimination in 
national airspace, the application of the principle is, in contrast to national 
airspace, not necessary to avoid discrimination in international airspace. 
Unlike in national airspace, jurisdiction in respect to air navigation in 
international airspace is narrowly defined: it is restricted to the provision of 
ATS, which involves decisions relating to technical and operational matters 
only for the purpose of safety and efficiency. This involves regulating the 
operation of air traffic and even, under certain circumstances, imposing 
temporary measures that restrict the operation of aircraft in certain parts 
of international airspace. These measures are consistent with the scope of 
jurisdiction of the coastal States provided that they are imposed for safety 
or efficiency purposes. Finally, Annex 11, as the legal foundation for the FIR 
responsibility in international airspace, is adopted by ICAO whose objec-
tives in developing principles of international air navigation include the 
avoidance of discrimination between contracting States. For a State to carry 
out its responsibility in international airspace in a discriminatory manner 
would subsequently also be a breach of the principle of good faith.
6.1.3 Air defence identification zones
Jurisdiction of the coastal State in respect to ADIZs was addressed in terms 
of prescriptive jurisdiction, or the right to establish ADIZs and thereby 
impose domestic regulations in the international airspace to which the zone 
applies, and enforcement jurisdiction, or the right to enforce the regulations 
in international airspace. As was made clear, even if a State has the right to 
establish an ADIZ, the zone does not provide the coastal State with enforce-
ment jurisdiction in international airspace. On this basis, the coastal State 
has no right to act in international airspace in response to an aircraft that 
does not comply with its ADIZ requirements beyond the rights it has under 
international law in the absence of the ADIZ. These include, for example, 
limited circumstances under which a State is permitted to intercept a civil 
aircraft and, in the case of the use of force, the right to self-defence. This 
is so also for State aircraft, although there are no codified rules governing 
the interception of State aircraft and States frequently intercept the State 
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aircraft of other States. As a consequence, the coastal State has no right in 
international airspace to act against an aircraft in the case it fails to comply 
with ADIZ procedures.
ADIZs are presented by coastal States as national security measures. 
They involve the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction of the coastal State 
in international airspace in the case that the zone extends beyond national 
airspace. The specific procedures that apply to the zone differ between 
States but in any case, by definition, they involve ‘special identification 
and/or reporting procedures additional to those related to the provision 
of air traffic services’.1211 In determining whether a coastal State has the 
right to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in international airspace by way 
of the establishment of an ADIZ, this study, on the one hand, considered 
whether there is a permissive rule under international law to serve as a legal 
basis for the right to establish ADIZs or, in the case that a permissive rule 
is not necessary, whether the establishment of such a zone is prohibited by 
international law. It found that there was no permissive rule and that ADIZs 
are not consistent with freedom of overflight.
In consideration of a permissive rule, four justifications for ADIZs were 
examined: the right of a State to establish conditions of admission to or 
departure from its territory based on the interpretation of Articles 11 and 
3(c) of the Chicago Convention; the right of self-defence under customary 
international law, as recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter; the right 
of a coastal State to restrict military activities in its EEZ based on the EEZ 
regime under UNCLOS, or in light of the right under customary interna-
tional law; and, consideration of whether the right to establish an ADIZ is 
customary international law.
Regarding a State’s right to establish the rules relating to entry and 
exit of its territory, it necessarily includes obligations that must be fulfilled 
outside the territory of the State but the identification purpose of ADIZs 
can be achieved through ATS and the creation of a zone is not a reason-
able measure to achieve this purpose. Furthermore, most States apply 
their ADIZ procedures not just to aircraft entering or exiting their national 
airspace, but also to aircraft with the intention of remaining in international 
airspace within the ADIZ. In terms of self-defence, the analysis clearly 
concluded that both the threat that the right to self-defence is designed to 
address and the act of self-defence are not those that apply in the case of the 
establishment of ADIZs.
The right of a State to regulate military activities in its EEZ was 
discussed in relation to ADIZs as far as the zones are limited to the EEZ 
boundary and only in terms of its application to military aircraft. In this 
respect, even if this basis was valid, it would not justify the establishment of 
ADIZs beyond the boundary of the EEZ or its application to civil aircraft or 
non-military State aircraft. Many coastal States regulate the military activi-
1211 Chicago Convention, Annex 4 (11th edn, July 2009) 1-1 and Annex 15 (16th edn, July 2018) 
1-2. See Section 4.3.2.
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ties of other States in their EEZ in some way, including the overflight of mili-
tary aircraft, although this is controversial and there is no express ground 
for doing so under UNCLOS. This chapter examined whether the obligation 
to have due regard for the coastal State’s EEZ rights in the zone could be 
interpreted as encompassing the right to regulate military activities in the 
EEZ more generally. If the activities associated with the overflight impacted 
on the coastal State’s rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ, this would be justi-
fied, as it would be for civil aircraft, but regulating overflight on the basis 
of national security interests would not fall within the scope of this right. 
Unlike vessels, aircraft are less likely to interfere with the coastal State’s EEZ 
rights, even when undertaking military exercises. It is difficult to see how 
ADIZs, which apply to aircraft merely passing through the airspace, could 
be justified on this basis. On the other hand, the right of a coastal State to 
regulate the military activities of other States could develop as a customary 
international law to allow for regulation beyond instances interfering with 
the EEZ rights of the coastal State. At this stage, this is not the case however.
If a permissible law exists to support the right of the coastal State to 
establish ADIZs, the crystallisation of it as a customary international law is 
the most convincing argument, a matter that is reflected in the attention it 
has garnered in academic discussion. At the same time, there is great varia-
tion in State practice and finding that there is sufficiently uniform practice 
for the purpose of customary international law will depend on where the 
emphasis is placed on the elements of the establishment of the zones. The 
variation in practice is reflected in the very general definition of ADIZ 
provided by ICAO. Furthermore, there seems to be insufficient evidence 
of opinio juris for the purpose of customary international law. State aircraft 
rarely comply and, whilst civil aircraft tend to do so, discord between 
States’ verbal objections to certain ADIZ and their expectation that their 
civil aircraft comply, suggests that the intention behind the compliance may 
have more to do with ensuring the safety of international civil aviation than 
reflecting a belief that they are bound under international law to meet the 
requirements.
If the Lotus principle stands and coastal States are not required to rely on 
a permissive rule to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in establishing ADIZs, 
they are still not legitimate as they are a violation of freedom of overflight. 
ADIZs cannot be validly construed as a balance of rights under UNCLOS, 
either in terms of freedoms of the high seas or in terms of coastal State rights 
in relation to other airspace users under the EEZ regime. Well-accepted 
instances of ‘restrictions’ that are consistent with freedom of overflight 
are all for one purpose: they facilitate freedom of overflight or the other 
accepted uses of the maritime space beyond territorial borders. This study 
also considered the consistency of the zones with international civil avia-
tion law, considering the possible negative safety implications that ADIZs 
can bring about as a result of adding complexity to the procedures in the 
airspace. It ultimately found, despite this, that there was no inconsistency 
with the SARPs that govern the aspects of safety that ADIZs pose a risk to.
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6.1.4 Transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage
UNCLOS provides a regime for overflight through international straits 
and archipelagic waters as a response to, respectively, the extension 
of the breadth of the territorial sea and the recognition of the concept of 
the archipelagic State that it codified. The correlating transit passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage ensured that States were still able to freely 
navigate from one body of the high seas, or the EEZ as was codified at 
the same time, to another. As explained in the chapter, whilst the right of 
passage applies to both State aircraft and civil aircraft, it is the former that 
generally exercises the right and who the passage is primarily designed 
to facilitate. Like in international airspace, aircraft do not require prior 
permission to fly through the airspace and the coastal States may not 
impose their national regulations to the operation of the aircraft; Article 12 
of the Chicago Convention applies without exception, as in international 
airspace. Like in international airspace, the coastal States attempt to exercise 
greater control over the airspace that is subject to these passage regimes 
and, as with ADIZs, national security was a concern of States in the drafting 
process of the transit passage regime. This is demonstrated, for example, in 
the declarations and reservations that coastal States bordering international 
straits have with respect to the regime, as well as by the so-called partial 
designation by Indonesia of its archipelagic sea lanes.
6.1.5 General conclusions and recommendations
6.1.5.1 Fragmentation of the law governing the use of international airspace
The law of the sea and international air law are specialised areas of public 
international law. The contours of both areas are well recorded in treaty law, 
most notably UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention. They each contribute 
to the governance of overflight in international airspace. However, there 
are some areas that are not addressed by either, leaving States to interpret 
the silence or ambiguity through national legislation to complement the 
codified law. This was seen throughout this study in terms of the absence 
of an explicit statement on the application of safety zones to the airspace 
above maritime constructions and in relation to consideration regarding 
the legality of ADIZs, neither of which fit squarely within the competence 
of either authority. ICAO’s lack of contribution to the drafting process of 
UNCLOS at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, from 1973 to 
1982, was recognised in Chapter 1.1212 On the other side, as was addressed 
in Chapter 3, the UK delegate during the drafting of the Second UN Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, in 1960, was against explicitly providing the 
coastal State with the right to extend safety zones to the airspace over 
1212 See Section 1.4.
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maritime constructions on the basis of it not falling within the scope of the 
subject matter of the conference. It is difficult to know, as a result of this 
situation, whether subsequent silence by the IMO in its guidance material 
on safety zones1213 in terms of their possible application to airspace, is recog-
nition that they are restricted to the sea or whether it is because it considers 
this aspect outside its competence relating to the seas and the oceans. 
Furthermore, like with the regulation of passage through international 
straits and archipelagic sea lanes, ADIZs are focused on military aircraft, 
which generally pose a greater risk to national security than civil aircraft. As 
State aircraft fall outside the scope of the Chicago Convention, they are also 
outside the competence of ICAO.
These positions present a problem for the development of the law in 
that States are left to interpret the law without further guidance. Ambiguity 
in the law will always exist, and States are left to interpret the provisions 
of treaties in order to apply them in any case. The inclusion of subsequent 
practice in the application of a treaty as an element of the general rule of 
interpretation of that treaty in establishing agreement of the parties in 
its interpretation reflects this fact.1214 At the same time, this is where an 
authority such as the IMO or the ICAO could play a constructive role in 
providing guidance on the text of the treaty. This is particularly so in the 
context of the topic of this study where the interests of coastal States collec-
tively, in extending their jurisdiction into international airspace, are in direct 
opposition to users of the airspace, that is, State and civil aircraft exercising 
their freedom of overflight. The risk to freedom of overflight is even greater 
when justifications for the extension of jurisdiction are based on such broad 
concepts as ‘national security’. A reduction in the fragmentation in the law 
between the law of the sea and international civil aviation law when it 
comes to governance of international airspace would help to alleviate this 
‘gap’ in the law. On matters where this is possible, joint guidance material 
issued by the IMO and ICAO would help States to interpret the provisions 
of UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention.
6.1.5.2 ATS providers as the authority over international airspace
Freedom of overflight is not defined in international law and what it entails 
is determined by the rights of other users of the maritime space. In the mari-
time areas adjacent to a State’s territorial sea, the rights of the coastal State 
are relevant in determining what freedom of overflight involves. ICAO 
stated, upon the adoption of UNCLOS, that the EEZ regime has no impact 
on the rights of airspace users but coastal States have, nevertheless, sought 
to extend their jurisdiction over the operation of aircraft in international 
airspace, at times justifying it based on their rights under UNCLOS, and 
1213 Considering, specifi cally, IMO Resolution A.671(16) ‘Safety Zones and Safety of Naviga-
tion Around Offshore Installations and Structures’ (19 October 1989) (see Section 3.2.1.2).
1214 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(3)(b), as discussed in 3.3.2.2. 
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at times relying on legal bases under international civil aviation law and 
public international law more broadly. There is no doubt that freedom of 
overflight, as a broad principle, is designed to evolve to fit the interests of 
States as their use of the maritime space develops. This study set out to 
determine where the balance sits at present in relation to areas that were 
identified as being ambiguous. It concluded, based on the areas it exam-
ined, that freedom of overflight is still narrowly defined, that is, the inter-
national community is reluctant to acknowledge the exercise of jurisdiction 
by States in international airspace. The exercise of jurisdiction by coastal 
States is presently restricted to the facilitation of the exercise of the freedom 
of overflight and achieving a balance between the freedom of overflight and 
other maritime freedoms.
Coastal States have prescriptive jurisdiction in international airspace 
within their FIRs in order to fulfil their responsibility for carrying out 
the provision of ATS in the area. Their responsibilities have their legal 
foundation in Annex 11 of the Chicago Convention and the RANP, which 
is established pursuant to the Annex. States that accept to provide ATS in 
international airspace may do so in a manner consistent with this Annex 
over its national airspace but again, this is restricted to circumstances in 
which the State deems it essential to enable it to fulfil its responsibility.1215 In 
any case, the provision of ATS is for the purpose of the safety and efficiency 
of international civil aviation, thereby contributing to the facilitation of 
freedom of overflight.
A State may establish a danger area in international airspace for the 
purpose of notifying aircraft of potential safety risks resulting from use of 
the maritime area. These danger areas are generally established in coordina-
tion with the ATS authority responsible for the FIR, but this is not an obliga-
tion when it is deemed by the State performing the activity that civil aircraft 
will not be at risk as a result of the absence of coordination.1216 In addition 
to the requirements that the dimensions of a danger area are defined and 
that it is for a specified period of time, a State is not permitted to restrict 
or prohibit aircraft from international airspace by way of establishing a 
danger area. In practice though, a danger area will likely result in aircraft 
avoiding the affected airspace, on account of the risk to safety. Despite this, 
danger areas are accepted as being consistent with freedom of overflight 
and even more so, they are in some cases part of the corresponding obliga-
tion in exercising the freedom. Aerial military activities are part of freedom 
of overflight and in exercising this freedom, as with all freedoms, State have 
a due regard obligation under Article 87(2) to the interests of other States in 
carrying out their freedoms, whether freedom of overflight or otherwise. 
Danger areas may of course be established to protect international civil 
aviation from non-aviation related maritime activities, but once again, the 
danger area is required as a result of the due regard obligation and further-
1215  See Section 2.7.2.2.1.3.
1216  See Section 2.6.5.
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more, its establishment facilitates international civil aviation by ensuring all 
aircraft are aware of safety risks.
Having said this, this study sees the possible development of customary 
international law in two areas as providing a significant shift in the concept 
of freedom of overflight if they were to crystallise. The first is the right of a 
coastal State to regulate military activities in its EEZ and the second is the 
right of a State to establish an ADIZ. Clear opposition to the former by the 
US provides a strong voice against the development of the law, positioning 
it as being in conflict with the freedom of overflight and navigation in the 
EEZ, but many States impose the practice, restricting the freedom of both 
navigation and overflight for national security purposes. These matters 
require assessment as they evolve.
Finally, a shift in the mentality of governments away from the idea of 
FIRs being linked to sovereignty, and towards prioritizing them for the sole 
purpose of the provision of ATS – the purpose for which they exist – would 
assist in achieving the highest level of safety and efficiency for international 
civil aviation. This is particularly important over international airspace 
considering, as has been examined throughout this study, coastal States at 
times demonstrate a willingness to assert jurisdiction without a clear legal 
basis in international law.
6.1.5.3 Environmental implications protecting freedom of overflight
 Environmental law may serve indirectly to protect freedom of overflight 
by restricting the establishment of larger and more permanent maritime 
constructions. Whilst safety zones do not extend to the airspace above 
maritime constructions, the construction of airports or launch pads beyond 
the territorial sea, as expected in future, will require the establishment 
of danger areas in the airspace, at the very least. As has been identified, 
freedom of overflight at present is understood to be consistent with tempo-
rary danger areas that are restricted in their dimensions in relation to what 
is reasonable for the activity being undertaken. Furthermore, aircraft cannot 
be prohibited from the airspace: the danger area serves merely as a safety 
warning to other airspace users. At the same time, recognising that freedom 
of overflight is an evolving concept and that coastal States tend to attempt 
to expand their jurisdiction in the maritime areas adjacent to their national 
airspace, this position may undergo a shift. If, as identified in Chapter 3,1217 
a State wishes to construct a civil international airport beyond its territorial 
sea, a danger area would not be appropriate to ensure the safety of aircraft 
operating in the area and the State would need to negotiate with other States 
to establish jurisdiction for exclusive use of the airspace up to a certain 
altitude over the airport and in the airspace in its vicinity. This also applies 
to the launch of rockets if the platform was to be used on a regular basis. 
1217 See Section 3.4.2.
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Closer examination on how this could be facilitated considering a balance 
of rights between the coastal State and users of international airspace in the 
case of such maritime constructions requires further attention.
States are required under Article 192 UNCLOS, among other environ-
mental obligations, ‘to protect and preserve the marine environment’. The 
Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration noted that China had, through 
its island building activities, acted in violation of this provision, along with 
several other environmental protection provisions under UNCLOS. ITLOS 
similarly ordered Singapore not to engage in land reclamation that would 
result in significant harm to the marine environment.1218 These regulations 
restrict the ability of a State to establish maritime constructions, certainly 
on a large and permanent scale, and may therefore serve, inadvertently, to 
minimise the subsequent jurisdiction over international airspace.
6.1.5.4 Political considerations and the limitations of international law
The circumstances discussed in this study are highly political, as was 
established in Section 1.2.2, and reiterated throughout. National security 
unambiguously plays a key role for States in the imposition of ADIZs and 
in the desire to restrict traffic through international straits and archipelagic 
sea lanes. It is also a motive for a State to restrict overflight of maritime 
constructions where these constructions are part of a State’s critical infra-
structure, from oil rigs to airports. With reference to the notion of ‘creeping 
jurisdiction’ as raised in Chapter 1, States are also driven by a desire to 
achieve greater control over the maritime domains adjacent to their coasts. 
State aircraft are often the targets of coastal State jurisdiction in interna-
tional airspace both because they pose a greater risk to national security 
and because it is with State – military – aircraft that other States challenge 
the overflight restrictions and requirements imposed by coastal States. In 
the case of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage the regimes 
are designed to facilitate, primarily, the movement of State aircraft. Each of 
these considerations contributes to the politicised context in which the legal 
questions that have been addressed throughout this study are placed.
At a fundamental level, the involvement of State aircraft means that, 
insofar as international civil aviation is unimpeded, the matter falls outside 
of ICAO’s normative powers. Even where international civil aviation is 
concerned, however, such as in the case of ADIZs, ICAO has not taken a 
position on their legality under international law. At the same time, ICAO 
appears to have contributed to the timely reversal of the prohibition of 
Qatari-registered aircraft from international airspace within the FIRs of its 
neighbouring States, with the change occurring soon after consultations 
took place. The law does not exist in a vacuum though and so violations 
1218 Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional 
Measures, Order of October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10, p. 28 (see Section 3.2.2 (n 542)).
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of the law with strong political undercurrents tend not to be followed by 
unequivocal statements from ICAO clarifying the law.
On the other hand, freedom of overflight for both State aircraft and civil 
aircraft forms part of the law of the sea, being codified in UNCLOS. Section 
6.1.5.1 addressed the issue of fragmentation and the fact that many of the 
legal questions addressed in this research sit on the boundaries of interna-
tional civil aviation law and the law of the sea. In some respects though, the 
circumstances impact international civil aviation but the legal questions are 
more squarely positioned within the law of the sea. For answers to these 
questions under UNCLOS, adjudication of a dispute before ITLOS would 
be the ultimate procedure. The reach of this mechanism is restricted though, 
considering that key States such as the US and Turkey are not State parties 
to UNCLOS.1219 Until, or if, clear statements are issued on these legal ques-
tions by the competent international organs, and even perhaps in spite of 
this, the interests of coastal States will continue to govern practical, and 
even legal, developments in this area.
Freedom of overflight is a fundamental principle in international 
airspace. At the same time, the interests of coastal States in extending their 
jurisdiction at sea, as considered in this study, are in direct opposition to the 
enjoyment of this freedom by other States. The practices of coastal States 
must, as a result, be closely scrutinised by the international community as 
to their legitimacy under relevant international law, including international 
civil aviation law and the law of the sea.
1219 Statute of the International Law of the Sea Tribunal (UNCLOS, Annex VI), Article 20.
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Summary
The central research question of this study is: What jurisdiction does a 
coastal State have over the operation of the aircraft registered in other States 
in international airspace adjacent to its coast? It explores the concept of 
freedom of overflight and considers the legality of coastal State jurisdiction 
in international airspace in respect to overflight of the aircraft of other States 
in instances where there is no explicit basis for the jurisdiction.
The first chapter of the study sets out the context and scope of the 
research as well as the structure and methodology used. The second chapter 
introduces the international legal framework that is relevant to the study. 
It does so in two parts. Firstly, it considers the concept of overflight and its 
facilitation for civil aircraft under international civil aviation law as well 
as, more broadly, for State aircraft by way of diplomatic arrangements. 
Secondly, it sets out the maritime areas under the law of the sea that are 
relevant to this research and the key rights associated with them, as well as 
the application of the Chicago Convention and its annexes to international 
airspace. The central legal analysis of this study sits in chapters three and 
four which consider coastal State jurisdiction in the airspace over maritime 
constructions, in respect to the provision of air traffic services (ATS) in inter-
national airspace and in relation to air defence identification zones (ADIZ). 
Chapter five briefly addresses coastal State jurisdiction in the airspace over 
international straits and archipelagic sea lanes which, while not interna-
tional airspace, involve rights for aircraft with similarities to freedom of 
overflight.
The overarching conclusions and observations of this study are as 
follows.
Fragmentation in the law – between the law of the sea and international 
civil aviation law – when it comes to governance of international airspace 
presents a problem for the development of the law in that States are left to 
interpret it without further guidance. This is particularly so in the context 
of the topic of this study where the interests of coastal States collectively, 
in extending their jurisdiction into international airspace, are in direct 
opposition to users of the airspace, that is, State and civil aircraft exercising 
their freedom of overflight. The risk to freedom of overflight is even greater 
when justifications for the extension of jurisdiction are based on such broad 
concepts as ‘national security’.
Freedom of overflight is still narrowly defined in that the exercise of 
jurisdiction by coastal States in international airspace is presently restricted 
to the facilitation of the exercise of the freedom of overflight and achieving 
a balance between the freedom of overflight and other maritime freedoms. 
Coastal States have prescriptive jurisdiction in international airspace within 
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their FIRs in order to fulfil their responsibility for carrying out the provision 
of ATS in the area, pursuant to Annex 11 of the Chicago Convention. In the 
high seas and in a State’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a State may estab-
lish a danger area to notify aircraft of potential safety risks resulting from 
use of the maritime area but a State is not permitted to restrict or prohibit 
aircraft from international airspace by way of establishing a danger area 
and the area must be of defined dimensions and for a specified time, as 
opposed to being indefinite or undefined. Having said this, this study sees 
the possible development of customary international law in two areas as 
providing a significant shift in the concept of freedom of overflight if they 
were to crystallise. The first is the right of a coastal State to regulate military 
activities in its EEZ and the second is the right of a State to establish an 
ADIZ.
Environmental restrictions that limit or prohibit the establishment 
of maritime constructions may serve to protect freedom of overflight by 
obviating the reason for further management of overflight in international 
airspace in respect to the would-be constructions. This is more so a consid-
eration for the future, particularly considering the construction of airports 
in a coastal State’s EEZ, for example, where a danger area as a traditional 
airspace management mechanism to help ensure airspace safety in the case 
of increased risk, would not be sufficient.
Coastal State jurisdiction is not just a legal issue, but it is also heavily 
political. National security and the pursuit of maritime power are motives 
for both coastal States and States operating their aircraft in international 
airspace. The involvement of State aircraft in these matters, which is 
frequently the case, means that they fall largely outside the normative 
powers of ICAO. Even where international civil aviation law is concerned 
though, ICAO tends to be reluctant to issue unequivocal statements on the 
law where there are strong political undercurrents. Where the legal ques-
tions involve interpretation of UNCLOS, a decision by ITLOS would be the 
ultimate procedure. The reach of this mechanism is restricted though as a 
result of key maritime players not being State parties to UNCLOS.
The above conclusions and observations exist alongside the more 
specific conclusions relating to the matters that form the central analysis of 
the study in chapters three and four.
Chapter three establishes that the right to impose a safety zone around 
a maritime construction under Article 60 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is restricted to the sea and does 
not provide the coastal State with the right to exercise jurisdiction in the 
airspace over the construction. This is based on a literal interpretation of 
Article 60, specifically Articles 60(4)(5) and (6), and is supported by subse-
quent practice of States as well as the drafting history of the article. Articles 
60(1) and (2) UNCLOS make it clear that a State has jurisdiction over the 
maritime operations themselves that are conducted to and from its maritime 
constructions and thus, if a coastal State were to construct an airport in its 
EEZ or on its continental shelf it would have jurisdiction over that airport. 
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On the basis of safety zones not extending to the airspace above a maritime 
construction, the State would not have jurisdiction over the airspace as 
a result of the construction of the airport though. Management of the air 
traffic is governed in accordance with the international airspace in the flight 
information region (FIR) in general.
Chapter four demonstrates first, in respect to the provision of ATS in 
international airspace, that the provision of the services is not subject to 
an implied principle of non-discrimination but that the State responsible 
for the FIR has such narrowly defined jurisdiction in the airspace that 
any discrimination must be justifiable in accordance with safety and 
efficiency considerations. Secondly, this chapter considers the legality of 
ADIZ, concluding that even if a State has the right to establish an ADIZ 
(prescriptive jurisdiction), it does not have the right to act (enforcement 
jurisdiction) in international airspace in the zone in response to an aircraft 
that does not comply with its ADIZ requirements beyond the rights it has 
under international law in the absence of the ADIZ. In determining whether 
a coastal State has the right to establish an ADIZ, the study, on the one 
hand, considers whether there is a permissive rule under international law 
to serve as a legal basis for the right to establish ADIZs or, in the case that a 
permissive rule is not necessary, whether the establishment of such a zone 
is prohibited by international law. It finds that there is no permissive rule at 
present and that ADIZs are not consistent with freedom of overflight.
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 326
560458-L-bw-Stewart
Processed on: 26-5-2021 PDF page: 327
Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
Vrijheid van overvliegen: een studie van de jurisdictie 
van de kuststaat in het internationale luchtruim
De centrale onderzoeksvraag van deze studie betreft de jurisdictie van een 
kuststaat over de uitvoering van vluchten in het internationale luchtruim 
grenzend aan dienskust met luchtvaartuigen, die zijn geregistreerd in 
andere Staten.
Deze studie verkent het concept ‘vrijheid van overvliegen’ en behandelt 
de rechtsgeldigheid van kuststaatjurisdictie in internationaal luchtruim 
met betrekking tot het overvliegen van luchtvaartuigen van andere Staten, 
wanneer er geen expliciete basis voor de jurisdictie is.
Het eerste hoofdstuk van deze studie bespreekt de context en het 
toepassingsbereik van het onderzoek, alsmede de structuur en methodo-
logie. Het tweede hoofdstuk introduceert, in twee delen, het internationale 
juridische kader. Allereerst wordt ingegaan op de regeling van het recht 
van overvliegen onder het internationale luchtrecht, alsook, in bredere zin, 
voor staatsluchtvaartuigen in het kader van diplomatieke afspraken. Ten 
tweede worden de verschillende maritieme gebieden met de daarbij beho-
rende bepalingen van het zeerecht uiteengezet, alsook de toepasselijkheid 
van het Verdrag van Chicago (1944) en zijn bijlagen die betrekking hebben 
op het internationale luchtruim. Hoofdstukken drie en vier bevatten de 
meest wezenlijk juridische analyse van deze studie. In deze hoofdstukken 
wordt kuststaatjurisdictie in het luchtruim boven maritieme constructies 
nader onderzocht, met betrekking tot luchtverkeersdienstverlening in 
internationaal luchtruim en de vestiging van identificatiezones voor de 
verdediging van het luchtruim, hierna: ADIZ (Air Defence Identification 
Zones)). Hoofdstuk vijf behandelt de kuststaatjurisdictie in het luchtruim 
boven internationale zeestraten en archipelagische scheepvaartroutes, die, 
hoewel dat luchtruim geen internationaal luchtruim betreft, rechten voor 
luchtvaartuigen met zich mee brengen die gelijkenis vertonen met de vrij-
heid van overvliegen.
De conclusies van deze studie zijn de volgende:
Fragmentatie in het recht – het zeerecht versus het internationale 
luchtrecht – met betrekking tot het beheer over internationaal luchtruim 
is problematisch voor de ontwikkeling van het internationale recht omdat 
het aan Staten is overgelaten dit recht te interpreteren zonder te beschikken 
over verdere duiding in de vorm van nadere regels en definities. Dit is met 
name het geval wanneer kuststaten hun jurisdictie uitbreiden in interna-
tionaal luchtruim. In die situatie kunnen hun belangen botsen , met die 
van de gebruikers van dit luchtruim, dat wil zeggen staatsluchtvaartuigen 
en civiele luchtvaartuigen die aldaar gerechtigd zijn de vrijheid van over-
vliegen uit te oefenen. Het risico van de beperking van de vrijheid van 
overvliegen is nog groter wanneer de rechtvaardiging voor uitbreiding van 
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rechtsmacht is gebaseerd op een breed concepten zoals ‘nationale veilig-
heid’ wanneer kuststaten dat belang inroepen.
Vrijheid van overvliegen is nog steeds eng gedefinieerd in de zin dat 
de uitoefening van rechtsmacht door kuststaten in internationaal luchtruim 
momenteel beperkt is tot het faciliteren van het uitoefenen van de vrijheid 
van overvliegen en het bereiken van een balans tussen de vrijheid van 
overvliegen en andere, maritieme, vrijheden. Kuststaten hebben prescrip-
tieve rechstmacht binnen hun vluchtinformatiegebieden (Flight Information 
Regions, FIR) om hun verantwoordelijkheid te kunnen uitoefenen met 
betrekking tot luchtverkeersdienstverlening in het betreffende gebied, 
overeenkomstig Bijlage 11 bij het Verdrag van Chicago. Op volle zee en 
in de Exclusieve Economische Zone (hierna: EEZ) van een Staat, kan deze 
Staat een gevarengebied aanwijzen om luchtvaartuigen te verwittigen van 
mogelijke veiligheidsrisico’s als gevolg van het gebruik van het op en boven 
de zee, maar is het een Staat niet toegestaan het gebruik van internationaal 
luchtruim door luchtvaartuigen te beperken of te verbieden door middel 
van het aanwijzen van een gevarengebied. Dit gebied moet zowel qua 
geografische grenzen als qua tijd zijn gedefinieerd..
Dit gezegd hebbende, deze studie ziet de mogelijke ontwikkeling van 
internationaal gewoonterecht op twee gebieden betreffende het concept van 
overvliegen, mochten verschuivingen zich verder uitkristalliseren.
Het eerste gebied betreft het recht van een kuststaat militaire activiteiten 
in zijn EEZ te reguleren, en het tweede onderwerp betreft het recht van een 
staat een ADIZ te vestigen.
Milieubeperkingen, die de oprichting van constructies op zee beperken 
of verbieden, kunnen bijdragen tot bescherming van het recht van over-
vliegen, doordat zij de reden voor verdere regeling van het overvliegen in 
internationaal luchtruim in relatie tot deze constructies, ondervangen. Dit 
is meer een overweging voor de toekomst, met name met het oog op de 
constructie van luchthavens in de EEZ van een kuststaat, waar, bijvoor-
beeld, de instelling van een gevarengebied als een van oudsher gebruikelijk 
luchtruimbeheersmechanisme om luchtruimveiligheid te helpen waar-
borgen in het geval van een verhoogd risico, niet voldoende zou zijn ter 
bescherming van die veiligheid.
Kuststaatjurisdictie is niet alleen een juridische kwestie, maar ook een 
politieke. Nationale veiligheid en het nastreven van macht op zee zijn 
hierbij drijfveren voor zowel kuststaten als voor Staten wier vliegtuigen in 
het internationale luchtruim opereren. De vaak voorkomende betrokken-
heid van staatsluchtvaartuigen bij deze vraagstukken impliceert dat deze 
grotendeels buiten de regelgevende bevoegdheden van de International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) vallen, omdat het mandaat van ICAO beperkt 
is tot de regulering van civiele luchtvaartuigen.
Wanneer juridische vragen rijzen over onder meer de rechtsmacht van 
kuststaten de interpretatie van het VN-zeerechtverdrag uit 1981, hierna: 
UNCLOS (1981), kunnen partijen die vragen, indien hun geen andere 
middelen ter beschikking staan, aan het International Tribunal on the Law of 
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the Sea (ITLOS) voorleggen. Deze optie is beperkt, omdat de belangrijkste 
maritieme Staten geen partij zijn bij UNCLOS.
Behalve de bovenstaande meer algemene conclusies en observaties heb 
ik specifiekere conclusies getrokken met betrekking tot de rechtsvragen die 
de centrale analyse vormen van het onderzoek in de hoofdstukken drie en 
vier.
Hoofdstuk drie stelt dat het recht om een  veiligheidszone in te stellen 
rond een maritieme constructie op grond van artikel 60 van UNCLOS 
beperkt is tot de zee zelf, zodat de kuststaat niet het recht heeft om 
rechtsmacht uit te oefenen in het luchtruim boven zo’n constructie. Deze 
conclusie is gebaseerd op een letterlijke interpretatie van artikel 60, in het 
bijzonder artikel 60 (4) (5) en (6), en wordt ondersteund door de latere prak-
tijk van Staten, alsmede en de redactiegeschiedenis van dit artikel. Artikel 
60 (1) en (2) van UNCLOS maakt duidelijk dat een Staat jurisdictie heeft 
over de maritieme operaties zelf die worden uitgevoerd naar en van zijn 
maritieme constructies. Indien een kuststaat een luchthaven zou bouwen 
in zijn EEZ of op zijn continentaal plat dan zou het derhalve rechtsmacht 
mogen uitoefenen over die luchthaven. Op basis van veiligheidszones die 
zich niet uitstrekken tot het luchtruim boven een maritieme constructie, zou 
de Staat als gevolg van de aanleg van de luchthaven echter geen jurisdictie 
hebben over het luchtruim boven zo’n luchthaven.
Hoofdstuk vier toont ten eerste aan dat de verlening van de operationele 
diensten met betrekking tot Air Traffic Services (ATS) in het internationale 
luchtruim niet impliciet onderworpen is aan het non-discriminatiebeginsel. 
De verantwoordelijkheid van de Staat voor de begeleiding van het lucht-
verkeer in de aangrenzende Flight Information Region (FIR) moet zo nauw 
omschreven zijn dat iedere vorm van discriminatie gerechtvaardigd moet 
zijn op grond van veiligheids- en doelmatigheidsoverwegingen. Ten tweede 
concludeer ik in dit hoofdstuk ten aanzien van de rechtsgeldigheid van de 
vestiging van een ADIZ, dat zelfs wanneer een Staat het recht heeft om 
een  ADIZ in te stellen (prescriptieve jurisdictie), zij niet het recht heeft om 
op te treden (handhavingsjurisdictie) in het internationale luchtruim van 
die ADIZ wanneer de exploitant van een vliegtuig niet voldoet aan haar 
voorschriften die in die ADIZ van toepassing zijn.
Deze conclusie tast uiteraard niet de rechten aan die die exploitant heeft 
onder het internationale recht bij afwezigheid van de ADIZ. Om te bepalen 
of een kuststaat het recht heeft om een  ADIZ in te stellen, gaat de studie na 
of er een regel is onder het internationale recht dat de vestiging van ADIZs 
toestaat. Bij afwezigheid van zo’n regel van internationaal recht is volgens 
mij de vestiging van een dergelijke zone verboden onder dat internationale 
recht. Ik kom derhalve tot de slotsom dat het bestaan van ADIZs inbreuk 
maakt op de vrijheid van overvliegen.
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What exactly does freedom of overflight entail and how is it evolving? What 
is the interaction between the law of the sea and international civil aviation 
law in international airspace? What do these things mean for the operation of 
a State’s aircraft in international airspace adjacent to another State?
This research addresses these, and related, legal questions, through the lens 
of contemporary challenges in the maritime arena. From jurisdiction in air-
space over maritime constructions, to air defence identification zones, and 
the provision of air traffic services in international airspace, it examines 
assertions of coastal State jurisdiction beyond that which is explicitly gran-
ted under international law. ‘Creeping jurisdiction’ as such assertions are 
known, is not a new phenomenon and much has been written on it over the 
years. This research aims to contribute to this body of work by approaching 
the matter exclusively from the perspective of freedom of overflight. What 
is the frontier of freedom of overflight and coastal State jurisdiction in inter-
national airspace?
This is a volume in the series of the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate 
School of the Leiden Law School of Leiden University. This study is part of the 
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